Sitrep 2025-12-05 02:04:29

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/027

TIME: 050215Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: ESCALATION CONFIRMED: MLD ADVANCE AND SYNCHRONIZED C2 DEGRADATION ATTEMPT (DNIPRO). CRITICAL EW/AD DOCTRINE ADJUSTMENT REQUIRED. PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE AD INTERCEPT (DNIPRO). URGENT ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) FOCUS ON COTS UAV PROTOCOLS.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The operational environment is characterized by two simultaneous crises: the Stepnohorsk MLD Penetration and the immediate threat to the Dnipro C2/Logistics Node.

Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia): High-intensity kinetic contact persists along Phase Line BRAVO. New UAV ingress is confirmed in the region (01:37Z), supporting the MLD reconnaissance effort.
Dnipro (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): The UAV threat identified previously is now tracked further inland, near Krynychky and Bozhedarivka (01:43Z, 01:58Z). The C2 node is under direct and imminent threat of precision strike or focused ISR.
Widespread Fixation Fires: RF continues multi-domain KAB strikes across Sumy and Eastern Kharkiv (01:34Z), confirming the intention to fix UAF reserves outside the primary Stepnohorsk operational area.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Conditions remain optimal for UAV/drone operations and combined arms maneuver. No constraints reported.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

UAF forces are executing a bifurcated defense: Containment at Phase Line BRAVO (Stepnohorsk) and immediate, high-priority Air Defense (AD) operations focused on the Dnipro approach corridors. The decision to commit 50% of the BRAVO-BLOCK operational reserve remains pending, critically dependent on P1/P5 gap resolution.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

Intention: RF confirmed its intent to execute a synchronized operational effort (MLD distraction and C2 decapitation). The logistics constraint (Syzran/Temryuk strikes) means the MLD remains a high-risk, high-reward thrust designed to compel a premature UAF operational surrender before the RF kinetic culmination point is reached.

New Tactical/Technological Adaptation (FACT): RF-aligned forces are standardizing their FPV/ISR fleet. Intelligence confirms widespread use of the RadioMaster TX12 COTS controller to guide their "Ovod" (Ovod) drone systems, often supported by the SRC 7 Modular Repeater System.

Assessment: This capability indicates increased RF reliance on standardized, accessible, and potentially networked FPV systems, allowing for rapid deployment and highly effective low-level ISR/strike missions (relevant to the Dnipro threat). The identification of specific COTS hardware is a critical vulnerability for UAF EW exploitation.

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Logistics status remains catastrophic strategically. The MLD remains time-sensitive. The high volume of KAB usage confirms that RF is leveraging its available air munitions stocks to compensate for ground logistics deficiencies, aiming to achieve a breakthrough before fuel starvation occurs (estimated 050400Z - 051800Z).

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

The synchronized attack (Stepnohorsk MLD + Dnipro UAV) demonstrates effective cross-domain synchronization at the operational level. The utilization of standardized COTS hardware (TX12/Ovod) confirms distributed C2 resilience in the tactical drone domain.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Readiness remains high, but resources are severely stretched by the simultaneous operational requirements.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

IMMINENT SETBACK: The requirement to commit significant AD resources to secure the Dnipro C2 node has begun. This shift is exposing forward maneuver elements at Phase Line BRAVO to increased risk from KAB strikes, especially near concentration areas, until the Dnipro threat is neutralized.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CRITICAL EW CONSTRAINT: UAF EW/AD capacity must rapidly adapt to counter the documented COTS/FNV (Fixed-Wing/Next-Generation Vehicle) threat. Standard military jamming profiles may be ineffective against standardized commercial protocols (TX12). Specific frequency targeting is now required.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

Domain	Finding (FACT/Observation/Judgment)	Confidence	Impact on Operations
RF Tactical Morale/Technology IO	Pro-RF channels (e.g., "Birkin") disseminate instructional videos (RadioMaster TX12, SRC 7 Repeater) alongside celebratory Spetsnaz/drone posts.	HIGH (Fact/Judgment)	Confirms Technical Standardization. Provides actionable technical intelligence (TX12, Ovod) while boosting the morale and professionalism image of RF tactical units internally.
RF Strategic Messaging	Continuation of fabricated stories (e.g., Hermes Birkin bag) blended with personal celebration posts.	HIGH (Observation)	Normalizes Conflict/Projects Stability. Attempts to distract the RF domestic audience from combat losses and logistics failures by projecting cultural normalcy and military success.
UAF Counter-Messaging	Previously successful messaging regarding the Syzran strike and the Patriot package must be maintained to counter RF IO efforts to exploit political uncertainty (Trump, EU misalignment).	HIGH (Judgment)	Maintains strategic depth and international credibility against RF destabilization attempts.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

The RF MLD at Stepnohorsk will continue maximum kinetic pressure, heavily relying on the "Kuryer" UGV spearhead and continuous KAB coverage, aiming for a penetration depth of 1.5–2.0 km before the kinetic culmination. The Dnipro UAV mission will prioritize high-value ISR (if reconnaissance platform) or execute a time-sensitive strike (if OWA platform) within the next 30 minutes (NLT 050245Z).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

HEIGHTENED RISK. The Dnipro UAV threat achieves a disabling strike against a key UAF C2 element while the 38th GMRB resolves the P1 intelligence gap by aggressively maneuvering to flank Huliaipole/Varvarivka, coinciding with the 37th GMRB achieving a tactical breach at Stepnohorsk. Command paralysis allows RF to exploit the depth, forcing UAF to execute a costly counter-attack with fragmented reserves.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Event	Estimated Time Frame	Decision Point	Status Change
Dnipro UAV Intercept/Strike	NLT 050245Z	CRITICAL: AD command must neutralize the threat before it reaches C2 facilities.	IMMEDIATE
MLD Penetration Assessment (P5)	NLT 050230Z	J3 must receive depth assessment to justify the remaining 50% BRAVO-BLOCK hold/commit.	CRITICAL (NOW)
RF MLD Kinetic Culmination	050400Z - 051800Z	UAF must finalize counter-exploitation plans and asset allocation for subsequent counter-attack phase.	NARROWING WINDOW

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Required Action	Confidence Impact
P1 (CRITICAL - MANEUVER/FLANK)	Vector and immediate intention of the 38th GMRB. (Unchanged)	ISR Tasking (IMINT/HUMINT): Dedicated observation of 38th GMRB staging areas.	HIGH, dictates final commitment of operational reserves.
P6 (CRITICAL - EW/TECH)	Precise operating frequencies and command protocols (e.g., OpenTX/EdgeTX) associated with the RadioMaster TX12 COTS system used by "Ovod" drones.	IMMEDIATE ELINT/EW Tasking: Prioritize targeting known COTS frequency bands (e.g., 2.4 GHz) in the Dnipropetrovsk region to jam or spoof the incoming UAVs.	CRITICAL for mitigating the deep-strike threat.
P5 (CRITICAL - MLD STATUS)	Actual MLD Penetration Depth and Rate (Phase Line BRAVO).	IMMEDIATE COMMO/ISR: Focus all local ISR and ground unit reporting resources on confirming MLD status.	HIGH, informs immediate decision to commit reserves.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Electronic Warfare and Air Defense (J6 / AD Command)

ACTION: IMMEDIATE ADAPTATION TO COTS THREAT.

EW Protocol Adjustment (IMMEDIATE): All EW units operating in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts must immediately adjust priority jamming profiles to target common COTS radio frequencies, specifically those used by the RadioMaster TX12 controller (commonly 2.4 GHz). Target the C2 link of the incoming Dnipro UAV (P6).
Repeater Hunting: Dedicate ISR assets to locating and neutralizing SRC 7 Repeater systems (or similar modular relays). Destruction of the repeater will disrupt long-range COTS drone operations more effectively than attempts to jam individual platforms.
AD Prioritization: Maintain Level 1 Force Protection and divert all deployable SHORAD assets to critical C2 facilities in Dnipro.

7.2. Operational Maneuver and Force Protection (J3 / J7)

ACTION: COMMIT 50% RESERVE; HOLD THE LINE.

Reserve Commitment: The failure to resolve P1 and P5 necessitates risk mitigation. J3 must execute the commitment of 50% of the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve NOW to reinforce defenses at Phase Line BRAVO against the 37th GMRB penetration.
Contingency Planning: Initiate planning for the 50% held reserve (BRAVO-BLOCK REMAINDER) to vector rapidly toward either the Stepnohorsk breach (if P5 confirms deep penetration) or toward Huliaipole/Varvarivka (if P1 confirms the flanking maneuver). The decision point for the remainder must be NLT 050300Z.

7.3. Fires and Targeting (J2 / J3)

ACTION: INTERDICT FOLLOW-ON FORCES.

Fires Synchronization: Maintain maximum suppression fires against RF mechanized concentrations immediately behind the Stepnohorsk breach to prevent follow-on exploitation.
Deep Strike Targeting: Re-prioritize GUR/Long-Range fires on identified rail-tanker staging areas (P3 Gap) to maximize the impact of the Syzran/Temryuk strategic strikes and accelerate the RF MLD culmination.

Situation Report