Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 031405Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: Escalation on Zaporizhzhia Axis and Synchronized RF Coercion Strategy

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Main Effort remains the Zaporizhzhia Operational Axis, specifically the immediate defense of Stepnohorsk. The RF Vostok Group (37th Guards MRB) is postured for a decisive assault.

• Zelyony Gai (Confirmed RF Control): RF units maintain a staging area 15km east of Stepnohorsk, providing an optimal base-of-fire location for the Mechanized Land Drive (MLD). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Huliaipole Salient: RF Information Operations (IO) channels are dedicating significant traffic to operations around Huliaipole, potentially indicating a secondary fixing attack designed to draw UAF reserves away from the Stepnohorsk main effort. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Operational Depth: Drone activity reported over Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk (Pavlohrad) confirms continued RF deep strike attempts aimed at fixing UAF reserves and degrading logistics nodes supporting the main defensive line. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

B. Weather and Environmental Factors

The Russian Academy of Sciences (TASS source) forecasts an anticipated geomagnetic storm (magnetic wave) commencing 03 DEC 25.

• Impact Assessment: This event poses a significant risk to unhardened C2, radio relay, and precision-guided munitions reliant on Satellite Navigation (SATNAV/GPS). This applies equally to both sides but could disrupt the "Gerbera" munition's online control link (PRIORITY 1 INTEL GAP).
• Actionable Impact: UAF must enforce stricter Emission Control (EMCON) protocols, utilize hardened terrestrial communications, and prepare Electronic Warfare (EW) assets to exploit potential interference windows.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF has implemented defensive hardening (Protocol "HARP-1" recommended previously). The air threat remains high, evidenced by the lifting of the air raid alert in Zaporizhzhia only minutes before this report (13:38Z), indicating preceding aerial softening. The UAF 5th Assault Brigade faces the immediate threat.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT-ASSESS)

A. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

RF Intent is to achieve a decisive operational breakthrough at Stepnohorsk, forcing a catastrophic collapse of the Zaporizhzhia front line. This kinetic action is explicitly synchronized with strategic coercion efforts aimed at fracturing Western support.

• Kinetic Synchronization: RF Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov explicitly linked "successes of the Russian soldier on the battlefield" to a "positive change in the character of negotiations." (HIGH CONFIDENCE). This confirms the Stepnohorsk push is a lever for immediate diplomatic advantage (ultimatum timing predicted 031200Z DEC 25, previously).
• Technological Threat (MOG Suppression): The validated deployment of the "Gerbera" anti-MOG munition remains the most critical tactical threat, effectively stripping forward AD cover from defending units.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No large-scale mechanized assault has been confirmed since the previous report's projected NLT time (021700Z DEC 25).

• Observed Adaptation: RF channels (Kotsnews) showcase the use of dedicated snipers and specialized teams to engage low-flying UAVs (likely UAF MOG/ISR). This indicates RF recognition of UAF’s remaining tactical air superiority via reconnaissance and targeting drones, and their proactive effort to counter it, independent of their "Gerbera" system.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The critical ammunition throughput observed at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (SAR Score 29.50) confirms the logistical staging is complete. Sustained drone strikes on Pavlohrad suggest RF is attempting to preemptively disrupt the movement of UAF reinforcements and ammunition from the central logistics hub. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 is highly effective in linking military operations (Zaporizhzhia) directly to high-level diplomatic messaging (Moscow/Ushakov).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE-FORCE)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF has publicly committed to a long war effort, symbolized by the approval of the 2026 State Budget prioritizing 2.8 Trillion UAH for defense. Basic combat readiness is maintained (180th Training Battalion updates).

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The primary setback remains the MOG vulnerability and the loss of operational depth in Donetsk (Pokrovsk).

• Constraint Confirmation: A specific fundraising appeal from the 43rd Separate Motorized Brigade (43 ОМБр) highlights the persistent operational challenge of providing basic, ruggedized transport and equipment at the tactical edge, despite massive high-level defense budget commitments. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The UAF Ministry of Finance publicly stated a need for over $45 Billion USD in external support for 2026, confirming that the approved domestic defense budget requires massive international financing to execute.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (INFO-ENV)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO focus is twofold:

1. Coercion: Emphasizing battlefield success to weaken the UAF diplomatic position ahead of key meetings. (Ushakov statements).
2. Diversion: Highlighting action around Huliaipole to distract operational focus from Stepnohorsk.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

President Zelenskyy’s rapid messaging post-budget approval ("no internal instability") directly targets RF IO narratives aiming to exploit alleged US aid suspensions. Ongoing police evacuation efforts in Zaporizhzhia confirm severe civilian impact in the primary operational area, requiring dedicated force protection assets.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The strategic environment is volatile. The previous report noted unverified but critical rumors of a US aid suspension. The current RF IO strategy (Ushakov) is designed to maximize the political impact of this uncertainty. The newly approved 2026 budget is intended as a signal of internal resolve to partners, mitigating the optics of dependence.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (PRED-INT)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Phased Mechanized Assault Synchronized with Diplomatic Pressure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Delay and Final Prep: RF Vostok Group (37th Guards MRB) has delayed the main mechanized thrust on Stepnohorsk, potentially due to interdiction efforts or C2 refinement, but the intent remains.
2. MLD Initiation: RF will launch the full MLD on Stepnohorsk utilizing "Kuryer" UGVs to breach minefields, under cover of KAB/Artillery saturation, timed to coincide with the high-level Dec 3rd US/UAF proxy meeting in Europe.
3. Huliaipole Fix: RF increases IO and preparatory fires around Huliaipole to prevent the redeployment of UAF reserves.
4. EW Exploitation: RF attempts to leverage the predicted geomagnetic storm to maximize disruption of UAF C2 while minimizing risk to their own hardened/redundant systems.

• TIMELINE: MLD initiation NLT 031800Z DEC 25. (Refined from previous prediction, adjusting for diplomatic event timing).

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: MOG Vacuum Exploitation and Operational Deep Strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF exploits the critical MOG suppression success (Gerbera) to achieve temporary local air superiority, allowing uncontested KAB use or high-speed missile strikes (e.g., Iskander/Kinzhal) against key 5th Assault Brigade C2 nodes near Stepnohorsk. Simultaneously, a false, highly convincing confirmation of full US aid suspension is leaked, causing C2 paralysis and operational collapse, enabling a rapid RF operational advance toward the Dnipro River line.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS (ACTION-INTEL)

1. C2 Hardening & EMCON (IMMEDIATE - J6/J3): Due to the predicted geomagnetic storm, immediately implement maximum EMCON for all forward units. Prioritize the use of fiber optic and hardened radio systems over SATNAV-reliant C2/targeting in the Stepnohorsk AO. Task EW assets to actively scan and attempt to disrupt known MOG-targeting frequency bands (P2 CR) during the storm window.
2. Multi-Axis Defense Preparation (IMMEDIATE - J3): Assume the Huliaipole hype is a fixing operation. DO NOT REDEPLOY 5th Assault Brigade reserves to Huliaipole. Maintain aggressive counter-mobility efforts (minefields, demolition) on both axes but concentrate available fire support (MLRS/HIMARS) on verified massing in Zelyony Gai (P1 CR).
3. Counter-UGV Protocol (IMMEDIATE - J3/J7): Given the confirmed deployment of "Kuryer" UGVs, rapidly disseminate specialized counter-UGV Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to all frontline squads (e.g., use of explosive charges, heavy machine guns, or dedicated rifle anti-drone systems at close range).
4. Strategic Communication (IMMEDIATE - NCA): Prior to the conclusion of the Dec 3rd partner meeting, issue a consolidated statement referencing the overwhelming support for the 2026 defense budget and explicitly refute RF claims that battlefield successes are determining the outcome of diplomatic relations. Emphasize UAF’s long-term stability and internal commitment.