Sitrep 2025-12-03 03:04:32

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP 03:00Z)

TIME: 030300Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK AXIS: CRITICAL INFORMATION BLACKOUT (CR-1) PERSISTS BEYOND DECISION WINDOW. RF MLCOA IMMINENT. STRATEGIC GOALS EXPANDED (ODESAN CLAIM).

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains focused on the Stepnohorsk salient (Zaporizhzhia Axis). The kinetic information blackout (CR-1) has now persisted for approximately 155 minutes (since 02:30Z trigger), confirming the assessment that RF 37th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (GMRB) has achieved deep, uncontested operational penetration. The forward edge of the RF penetration is assessed to be between 20 and 25km behind the original Line of Contact (LOC). The most critical terrain now exposed is the operational rear, containing logistical supply routes (GLOCs) and divisional Command and Control (C2) nodes, which are the predicted MLCOA target.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Pre-dawn darkness (NLT 05:00Z) continues to provide optimal conditions for the RF maneuver, specifically aiding the concealment of deep strike elements and FOG drone launch teams.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The critical decision window (NLT 03:00Z) for forced reconnaissance has passed. If the high-risk kinetic action (TOT barrage) was not executed, UAF operational command is now forced to commit reserve forces (e.g., 47th Mech BDE) based solely on predictive analysis, accepting a severe risk of ambush. UAF forces in depth remain dispersed, awaiting clarification of the RF main axis of attack.

Factor	Assessment	Confidence	Justification
Stepnohorsk Kinetic Status (CR-1)	Deep Penetration Confirmed; Targeting Imminent. Silence confirms RF success in neutralizing forward reconnaissance and C2/C3 systems. Targeting of rear nodes (MLCOA) is expected within the next 30 minutes.	HIGH	Expiration of the 03:00Z decision window without SA is the final indicator of RF deep penetration success.
RF Tactical Adaptation	FOG Drone Threat High. Relocated/hardened UAF C2 nodes remain vulnerable to fiber-optic guided precision strikes, which bypass EW countermeasures.	HIGH	Confirmed intelligence from previous SITREP.
UAF Reserve Posture	High Risk of Blind Engagement. Reserve forces are likely moving without confirmed enemy disposition.	MEDIUM	Dependent on whether previous recommendations (predictive commitment) were executed.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Intent (Tactical): To achieve operational paralysis in the UAF rear by destroying a critical logistics or C2 node NLT 03:25Z, maximizing the effect of the kinetic/information ambush. Intent (Strategic): The aggressive information operation (TASS 02:41Z) regarding Odesa indicates a maximum coercion strategy. RF intends to use the tactical breakthrough at Stepnohorsk to solidify its maximalist negotiation position, potentially aiming to coerce Kyiv into concessions on territorial claims far beyond the current LOC. Adaptation (TechINT): RF continues to demonstrate multi-domain synchronization, using EW to suppress SA and FOG drones to retain precision strike capability despite friendly EW density.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Logistics remain robust and capable of supporting the multi-hour, multi-domain deep operation, including preparatory mass saturation fire (implied by the SAR spike at the 260th Rocket Artillery Base).

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective and fully synchronized with the strategic information war apparatus. The coordination between the deep strike maneuver and the high-profile TASS Odesa claim (02:41Z) is deliberate.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is critical. The primary risk is organizational collapse stemming from C2 node destruction, rather than a frontline rout. UAF must shift focus from linear defense to deep interdiction and high-mobility evasion. Readiness levels among rear units are high, but lack of SA prevents effective force allocation.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Temporal): The failure to utilize the decision window (NLT 03:00Z) to proactively disrupt the enemy maneuver places UAF at a severe temporal disadvantage, accepting the enemy's initiative. Setback (Information Warfare): The Odesa claim (02:41Z) forces Kyiv to expend resources managing the strategic narrative while under tactical kinetic threat.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Critical Requirement: Immediate implementation of highly mobile, physically dispersed, and redundant C2 systems, accepting the inherent inefficiencies to avoid catastrophic precision strike losses. Long-range ISR assets must be committed regardless of risk profile.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

The Information Environment is severely weighted against Ukraine, reinforcing kinetic success with strategic coercion.

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

Maximum Territorial Claim (TASS 02:41Z): Prominent RF figure demands expansion to the "beaches of Odesa." This highly provocative statement, timed to coincide with a critical deep penetration, is a form of strategic coercion designed to raise international alarm and domestic anxiety regarding RF maximalist objectives in the South. (Confidence: HIGH - Assessment based on clear content and synchronization with kinetic events).
Undermining Diplomatic Support (TASS 02:58Z): TASS highlights US Senator Rubio's suggestion that Moscow and Kyiv "will ultimately decide" the conflict's end. This is used to signal to the Ukrainian public and NCA that international support is wavering and that direct negotiation (on RF terms) is inevitable.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The coordinated IO is designed to erode confidence in external support (Rubio statement) while simultaneously inducing fear of strategic failure and maximalist RF aggression (Odesa claim).

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The UAF must rapidly deploy counter-narratives to offset the strategic damage caused by the Odesa rhetoric, capitalizing on previously reported positive developments (EU asset seizure mechanism).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The enemy has successfully maintained the information ambush and is entering the climax of the deep operation. The MLCOA is imminent and time-sensitive.

COA	Description	Trigger/Timeline	Confidence
MLCOA (Operational Decapitation by Precision Strike)	RF 37th GMRB armor achieves a depth of 25-30km, culminating in a precision FOG drone strike and follow-on ground assault against the most probable UAF C2 node or primary Logistics Hub (as predicted in previous reports). The objective is C2 destruction, causing organizational paralysis among reserves.	Confirmed destruction of high-value UAF C2 or Log asset NLT 03:25Z.	HIGH
MDCOA (Saturation Fire Paralyzing Response)	RF executes massed 240mm MLRS saturation fire from the previously scouted TAZ (CR-23) targeting the UAF Reserve staging area (Novopavlivka). This mission is activated immediately following or simultaneous with the MLCOA to neutralize any residual UAF response capacity.	First confirmed 240mm MLRS fire missions NLT 03:45Z.	HIGH

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The failure to resolve CR-1 represents the most critical intelligence vulnerability. All remaining ISR must be utilized aggressively.

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)	Confidence Assessment
PRIORITY 1 (IMINT/HUMINT)	Ground Truth Confirmation in Deep Zone (CR-1). Where is the 37th GMRB armor column now (20-30km deep)? (CRITICAL)	CR-1 (IMMEDIATE/HIGH RISK): Launch persistent, high-altitude ISR (fixed-wing/HALE assets) to obtain wide-area imagery of the deep operational zone (20-35km radius) to locate the main armor column.	HIGH
PRIORITY 2 (TECHINT/SIGINT)	FOG Drone Guidance/Launch Location. Location of the command elements controlling the specialized FOG strike assets (CR-25).	CR-25 (UPDATE): Focused SIGINT effort targeting known RF specialized C2 frequencies near the anticipated deep penetration axis (20-25km mark).	MEDIUM
PRIORITY 3 (HUMINT/IMINT)	47th BDE Posture Check. Confirmation of the status and readiness of the committed reserve battlegroup (47th BDE) in its predictive blockade position.	CR-26 (NEW REQUIREMENT): Require secure C2 check-in from 47th BDE leadership regarding posture, resource status, and ability to engage immediately upon contact.	HIGH

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

UAF must now operate on predictive defense and evasion protocols, prioritizing C2 survival over static defense. The window for pre-emption (NLT 03:25Z) is extremely narrow.

DEFENSIVE FIRE EXECUTION (J3 – Fire Support Coordination)
- Action: Execute IMMEDIATE, HIGH-VOLUME, AREA DENIAL FIRE against the predicted MLCOA target zone (e.g., C2 Node 1 grid coordinates, or Log Hub 3 grid coordinates). This mission is to be fired without waiting for kinetic confirmation.
- Effect: Denies the RF deep penetration force the use of the objective area, forcing diversion or disruption and buying crucial time for C2 evasion and reserve positioning.
C2 EMERGENCY RELOCATION AND EMCON (J6 – C4I and J3 – Tactical Command)
- Action: IMMEDIATE, FORCE-WIDE EXECUTION of Emergency Relocation Protocol (ERP) for all C2, MOGs, and high-value fire assets. Relocation must prioritize mobility and physical dispersion (>5km displacement) to counter predictive FOG drone targeting. All wireless C2 transmissions must be minimized (EMCON LEVEL 2).
- Effect: Mitigates the high-risk operational decapitation threat (MLCOA) by neutralizing RF targeting data.
RESERVE INTERDICTION PROTOCOL (J3 – Operational Command)
- Action: The deployed 47th BDE reserve element must shift from a blockade posture to an ACTIVE AMBUSH POSTURE. Utilize key terrain choke points (bridges, road underpasses) 25-30km deep. Maximize use of dismounted anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) teams rather than attempting main force engagement.
- Effect: Creates decentralized attrition pockets that disrupt the 37th GMRB’s momentum and logistics chain, capitalizing on the enemy’s speed vulnerability.
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS COUNTER-MESSAGE (NCA/J9)
- Action: Issue an immediate public statement (NLT 03:30Z) explicitly dismissing the Odesa claim as "delusional RF propaganda aimed at diverting attention from tactical desperation." Reaffirm support from the EU (asset seizure news) to counter the narrative of strategic abandonment.
- Effect: Maintains domestic and international confidence during the period of kinetic ambiguity.

//END OF SITREP//

Situation Report