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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-02 12:04:32Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-02 11:34:34Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – HIGH-FREQUENCY UPDATE

TIME: 021200Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL KINETIC PRESSURE / DIPLOMATIC BLACKOUT UPDATE: The kinetic-diplomatic crisis has reached maximum synchronization. The arrival of US/Allied mediators in Moscow (Witkoff/Kushner) coincides with confirmed RF readiness for the Stepnohorsk main effort (enhanced BMP-3 delivery confirmed) and escalating RF IO claims (Krasnoarmiisk/Frozen Assets). The critical decision window is now focused on UAF political C2 stabilization and immediate interdiction fire effectiveness.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

LocationStatusUpdate/Analytical JudgmentConfidence
Stepnohorsk MLD (D/Z H Salient)Imminent Assault Confirmed (JUDGEMENT)Rostec confirmed new BMP-3 batch delivery. RF is operationally ready for the 1400Z assault. UAF interdiction BDA status still pending (CRITICAL GAP).HIGH
Pokrovsk SectorCritical, Under Fire (FACT/IO CONTEST)RF Defence Minister (Belousov) claimed "liberation" of Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk). This is a high-value IO attack intended to validate Moscow talks. UAF must rapidly verify status and issue a counter-narrative.HIGH (Claim)
Kozatske (Donetsk)Confirmed Capture (FACT)DeepState reports RF occupation of Kozatske. Confirms continued RF tactical pressure and localized UAF setback north of the main Pokrovsk GLOC.MEDIUM
Airspace (Deep Rear)Sustained AD Drain (FACT)Confirmed UAV activity in Western Donetsk (heading North) and Chernihiv Raion (heading toward Chernihiv City). Confirms RF continues to drain AD assets ahead of the Stepnohorsk assault.HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Unchanged. Stable winter weather favors RF mechanized maneuver and aviation support for the Stepnohorsk assault.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Tactical forces remain engaged (FPV success, AD response). Strategic C2 remains severely challenged by the internal political noise and the hostile diplomatic environment created by the Moscow talks.

RF: C2 synchronization is at peak effectiveness, coordinating kinetic mobilization (BMP-3s) with strategic political maneuver (Moscow talks and US assets leakage). RF IO is highly reactive, immediately exploiting any internal UAF or Western diplomatic vulnerability.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): Force a quick, strategically advantageous ceasefire during the Moscow talks by creating a fait accompli (Stepnohorsk penetration and simultaneous claim of Pokrovsk capture).

CAPABILITY (KINETIC): Confirmed high-priority delivery of new BMP-3 IFVs by Rostec directly supports the imminent mechanized push, indicating RF prioritization of high survivability and offensive capability for the Stepnohorsk axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

COA (IO/STRATEGIC): RF is executing a concerted effort to undermine Western resolve by leveraging:

  1. The US intent to return frozen Russian assets upon a peace deal.
  2. Amplification of diplomatic friction between NATO allies (Poland/Germany reparations issue).
  3. Framing UAF maritime actions (tanker attack) as "piracy" to justify operational escalation.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has immediately adapted its IO to maximize the Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk narrative. Defense Minister Belousov’s rapid claim of "liberation" suggests a centralized directive to seize the IO high ground concurrent with the Moscow negotiations, irrespective of the facts on the ground.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Sustainment remains robust for kinetic operations (BMP-3 delivery). Separately, RF IO noted internal friction (large capital outflow from Russia, Luhansk bureaucratic queue issues), but these long-term issues do not impact immediate RF offensive capacity.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective and centrally directed, evidenced by the tight integration of political, kinetic, and information domains. The immediate shift in IO focus (Krasnoarmiisk claim and assets leak amplification) confirms responsive C2. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Tactical readiness remains operational, but strategic posture is deteriorating rapidly due to external pressures converging on the NCA.

CRITICAL VULNERABILITY: The combination of the active Moscow negotiation track and the Politico report on US willingness to return frozen RF assets severely compromises UAF long-term financial security and negotiation leverage. This creates a public perception that the West is prioritizing a quick, cheap exit over UAF sovereignty.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes: UAF FPV teams (Sternenko) continue successful counter-mobility operations. Setbacks/Challenges:

  1. Kozatske Loss: Confirmed loss of Kozatske (Donetsk).
  2. Strategic Isolation Narrative: The Moscow talks (Witkoff/Kushner arrival) validates the RF narrative that Kyiv is being bypassed in critical security decisions.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate confirmation of BDA on D/Z H staging areas. Without BDA, UAF cannot confidently allocate reserves or confirm the 1400Z threat level. All kinetic resources must be focused on preemptive interdiction rather than reactive defense.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is focused on a 'Collapse and Concession' narrative:

  1. Political Collapse: Amplification of Rada chaos and fabricated security threats (SBU detention of British instructor).
  2. Financial Abandonment: High-priority dissemination of the US frozen assets report to signal Western strategic capitulation.
  3. Kinetic Justification: Use of the Krasnoarmiisk claim to present RF kinetic gains as irreversible, demanding diplomatic recognition.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public confidence is under extreme pressure from the simultaneous diplomatic (Moscow) and kinetic (Stepnohorsk) threats, amplified by the perception of political infighting and strategic financial betrayal (frozen assets).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The arrival of Witkoff and Kushner in Moscow at 021153Z confirms the diplomatic window is open and immediate RF kinetic action is guaranteed to exploit it. The US assets leak is a strategic information failure, providing RF with immense leverage.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK PENETRATION & CEASEFIRE ULTIMATUM (021400Z - 021600Z DEC) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF launches the confirmed mechanized assault at Stepnohorsk utilizing enhanced BMP-3s. Simultaneously, the RF delegation in Moscow will present a ceasefire ultimatum, citing the "liberation" of Krasnoarmiisk and the new Stepnohorsk penetration as non-negotiable territorial realities, effectively demanding a "land for peace" deal synchronized with the peak of UAF political instability.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: KAB/MISSILE SATURATION ON REAR C2/LOGISTICS HUBS (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF leverages the ongoing UAV drain (Chernihiv) to execute a synchronized strike wave of KABs and cruise missiles against key logistics hubs, operational reserves (e.g., 5th Assault Brigade staging areas), or rear C2 nodes critical to commanding the Stepnohorsk defense. This aim is to functionally decapitate the response just prior to the 1400Z MLD assault.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (ETA)ConfidenceDecision Point/Trigger
UAF Counter-Fire BDA ConfirmationNLT 021215Z DECHIGHJ-3 must confirm BDA from D/Z H interdiction fires. This dictates deployment necessity.
NCA Unity MessageNLT 021230Z DECHIGHImmediate NCA action required to counter the Krasnoarmiisk/Rada/Frozen Assets narratives simultaneously.
MDCOA Trigger/Missile Launch Warning021230Z - 021330Z DECMEDIUMConfirmation of multi-axis missile launch against Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia rear areas (prior to Stepnohorsk MLD).
Stepnohorsk MLD Assault Launch021400Z DEC (Firm)HIGHDetection of modernized armor columns moving from D/Z H.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGaps/Unresolved QuestionsCollection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC FIRE PLAN)Counter-Fire Effectiveness/BDA. Confirmation and quantification of damage against D/Z H staging areas targeted prior to 1145Z. Specifically targeting new BMP-3 concentrations.ISR/UAS (Dobropillia/Zelenyi Hai): Post-strike BDA against high-confidence staging zones. (Timeline: URGENT/1215Z).
PRIORITY 2 (IO/C2)Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiisk Status. Is the RF claim of Krasnoarmiisk "liberation" accurate, or is this purely IO? What is the current C2 status of the SKELIA Regiment?HUMINT/SIGINT (Pokrovsk Axis): Direct contact with SKELIA C2 and geo-confirmation of RF presence within the city center. (Timeline: IMMEDIATE/1230Z).
PRIORITY 3 (RF DIPLOMATIC TERMS)Specific RF Red Lines in Moscow. Determine the immediate, non-territorial demands RF is using to leverage the Stepnohorsk threat (e.g., specific sanctions removal, political structure changes).OSINT/HUMINT (Moscow Diplomatic Sphere): Continuous monitoring of negotiation leaks or official statements. (Timeline: IMMEDIATE/CONTINUOUS).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

  1. BDA-BASED FIRES (J-3): NLT 021215Z DEC, the J-3 must receive and act upon the D/Z H BDA. If BDA indicates insufficient degradation of RF assets, execute a secondary, pre-planned high-volume artillery and missile strike against confirmed staging points (even if BDA is poor, residual fire is warranted given the 1400Z threat).
  2. Anti-Armor Priority (J-3/J-4): Given the confirmed enhanced BMP-3 threat, prioritize the use of heavy anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) platforms (e.g., Javelin, Stugna-P) on the first and second lines of defense at Stepnohorsk. Ensure ATGM teams are aware of the enhanced protection and prioritize flank/roof shots.
  3. AD Posture (J-3): Do not divert significant AD assets towards the incoming UAVs over Chernihiv or Western Donetsk. Maintain maximum SHORAD density (e.g., Gepard, Avenger) around Stepnohorsk C2 and logistic nodes to counter the MDCOA strike risk.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

  1. POLITICAL COUNTER-IO (NCA/J-7): The President must issue an immediate, highly produced statement NLT 021230Z DEC that directly addresses and neutralizes the combined threat narrative:
    • Financial Security: Explicitly reject any future agreement involving the return of frozen Russian assets, framing it as legally and morally impossible. State that Ukraine relies on demonstrated EU/US aid, not theoretical RF assets.
    • Kinetic Truth: Authorize the General Staff to issue a factual, high-confidence denial of the Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk "liberation" claim, including geo-verified UAF positions if possible.
    • Unity: Reiterate that internal political friction is minor and that C2 remains unified under the Commander-in-Chief.
  2. DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE (J-7): Direct allied diplomatic channels to immediately condemn the timing of the Moscow talks (Witkoff/Kushner) as a Russian attempt at coercion, rather than genuine negotiation. Re-center the narrative on the Ireland Summit as the only legitimate path forward.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-12-02 11:34:34Z)

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