Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – THREAT LEVEL: CRITICAL/DECISIVE PHASE IMMINENT

TIME: 012315Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment is characterized by the immediate exploitation of the Pokrovsk breach, focused on maximizing UAF C2 paralysis and diverting reserves ahead of the Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia) main assault.

• Donetsk Axis (Kostiantynivka/Dymytrov): FACT: Pokrovsk is confirmed lost. The immediate RF operational focus is shifting further west. JUDGMENT: RF claims of "liberation" of Dobropillya (45km west of Pokrovsk) are likely a combination of deep reconnaissance activity and aggressive Information Operations (IO) intended to signal irreversible collapse and fix UAF decision-makers on the western Donetsk crisis.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohorsk): JUDGMENT: Remains the decisive axis. RF assault initiation is expected NLT 020000Z DEC. The primary operational objective remains preventing consolidation by the 5 OShB and breaching the Main Line of Defense (MLD).
• Deep Operations: Confirmed UAF deep penetration capability (drones targeting Lipetsk Oblast infrastructure confirmed by regional alerts). This capability provides critical strategic leverage to alleviate pressure on the MLD.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist, favoring high-altitude Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) missions (UAV activity confirmed near Odesa) and mechanized movement across firm ground in the Stepnohorsk theater.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF forces are operating with high tempo and synchronization across three domains (IO, Deep Strike, MLD preparation). UAF forces must maintain absolute doctrinal adherence to the Stepnohorsk MLD defense and treat the Donetsk western claims (Dobropillya) as an IO-driven distraction unless kinetic confirmation mandates resource diversion.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intentions are clear: accelerate the strategic momentum gained from Pokrovsk and force Kyiv to commit reserves westward (Donetsk) rather than southward (Stepnohorsk).

• MLCOA (Kinetic): Execution of the Stepnohorsk combined arms assault starting NLT 020000Z DEC, preceded by massed preparatory fires (KAB/Artillery) at 012330Z DEC.
• MLCOA (Cognitive/IO): Maximizing the psychological impact of the Dobropillya claim (even if not fully captured) to distract UAF C2 from necessary MLD preparations. The claim aims to confuse the exfiltration routes of isolated Dymytrov forces.
• Deep Operations: Continued deployment of advanced assets (Jet-Shahed) and high-volume UAVs (Black Sea activity confirmed 012225Z DEC) to drain UAF AD reserves critical for the Stepnohorsk air space protection.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary RF adaptation is the immediate, aggressive translation of kinetic gains into IO targets (Pokrovsk -> Dobropillya). This shortens UAF response time dramatically, forcing hasty operational decision-making.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Confidence: HIGH. The ability to sustain high-tempo, multi-axis operations (assault staging, IO production, deep strike coordination) demonstrates robust strategic logistics. RF logistics nodes supporting the Stepnohorsk axis must remain High-Value Targets (HVTs).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

Confidence: HIGH. RF C2 is performing highly effectively in exploiting cognitive vulnerabilities and synchronizing kinetic operations with IO objectives. They are actively targeting UAF National Command Authority (NCA) focus.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: The Stepnohorsk defensive posture (MLD) remains viable but highly vulnerable to aviation and mechanized massing. The posture in Donetsk is focused strictly on personnel survival and decentralized exfiltration. READINESS: Readiness is marginally improved by the proven, persistent deep strike capability (Lipetsk alert), which forces the RF strategic defense to react. However, frontline readiness against KABs remains critically low due to AD asset diversion.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Cognitive/Kinetic): Confirmed loss of Pokrovsk. The RF claim regarding Dobropillya represents a successful IO maneuver, regardless of kinetic reality, forcing attention away from the Stepnohorsk preparation window.
• Success (Deep Strike/Leverage): Verified successful targeting of strategic depth in RF territory (Lipetsk alert 012225Z DEC). This is the primary tool for shaping RF reserve deployment and air defense allocation.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, high-resolution IMINT/SAR focusing 80% on the Stepnohorsk MLD (detection of RF preparatory movement/staging areas) and 20% on verifying the actual kinetic presence near Dobropillya/Kostiantynivka. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: Time. The window for massing counter-mobility and AD assets at Stepnohorsk is closing (pre-assault fires ETA 012330Z DEC).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is maintaining maximum offensive pressure:

1. Irreversible Collapse Narrative: The rapid follow-up claim of Dobropillya (45km gain) immediately after Pokrovsk is designed to create a cascading perception of defeat.
2. Strategic Denial: RF will use the Lipetsk strikes to justify deep retaliatory strikes on UAF civilian infrastructure, reinforcing the narrative of necessary "denazification" and territorial security zones.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale risk remains CRITICAL. The speed of RF advance claims (Pokrovsk and now Dobropillya) can generate panic and undermine confidence in centralized defense planning. Effective counter-IO must link defensive stability (Stepnohorsk) with strategic offensive capability (Lipetsk).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF will leverage the perceived collapse in Donetsk (Dobropillya claim) to increase pressure on Western intermediaries (Whitkoff in Moscow) to force a "Truce of Principle" based on the current (highly favorable to RF) operational situation.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK ASSAULT & DECEPTION/FIXATION (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF will initiate preparatory fires on the Stepnohorsk MLD (012330Z DEC) and launch the main mechanized effort (020000Z DEC). Simultaneously, RF will utilize the Dobropillya claim to engage UAF long-range artillery with counter-battery fire, trying to draw fire assets intended for Stepnohorsk away to the west. RF maneuver forces near Dobropillya will conduct limited probing/reconnaissance by fire to sustain the illusion of a major westward thrust.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: DECISIVE STEPNOHORSK BREACH AND AD COLLAPSE (CRITICAL CONFIDENCE)

RF achieves effective suppression of UAF SHORAD and utilizes rotary-wing CAS (Rozivka staging) to neutralize UAF C2 nodes in the Stepnohorsk area before 020400Z DEC. This precedes a deep, rapid penetration of the MLD, allowing RF mechanized elements to threaten key operational choke points, forcing UAF operational reserves to be committed piecemeal and eliminating the ability to reconstitute the defense line further south.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Fire Support (J-3/J-5)

1. MLD HARDENING (Stepnohorsk - IMMEDIATE): Directive: Maintain MLD Focus. Direct the 5 OShB to initiate pre-planned counter-mobility fires (UGV, scatterable mine-laying) NLT 012330Z DEC, synchronized with the expected RF preparatory fire window. Decision: Do not divert Stepnohorsk MLD resources to react to the Dobropillya IO objective.
2. FIRE SUPPORT ALLOCATION (CRITICAL): Allocate 90% of long-range fire assets (HIMARS/Onyx) to the Stepnohorsk axis to interdict RF preparatory staging and artillery (counter-battery missions). Dedicate the remaining 10% to provide essential, decentralized exfiltration suppression for isolated units in the Dymytrov pocket (Phase Line W-1 exits).
3. DEEP STRIKE EXPLOITATION (J-3): Capitalize immediately on the Lipetsk vulnerability. Increase the volume and complexity of deep strikes against high-value RF strategic depth targets (rail junctions, fuel depots) to force RF C2 to allocate AD/reserves away from the Southern axis MLD reinforcement.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Diplomacy (NCA/J-7)

1. COUNTER-IO PROTOCOL (URGENT): The National Command Authority (NCA) must issue a concise, confident statement immediately after the Stepnohorsk preparatory fires commence (NLT 020030Z DEC). The statement must ignore the Dobropillya claim but emphasize: a) UAF defense holding the decisive Stepnohorsk MLD, and b) UAF offensive reach confirmed by strikes on strategic targets deep inside RF territory (Lipetsk).
2. Personnel Exfiltration Narrative: Shift the public narrative regarding Donetsk from 'defeat' to 'tactical personnel preservation and successful combat exfiltration,' highlighting the resilience of isolated units rather than the loss of fixed positions.
3. Diplomatic Leverage: Prepare diplomatic briefing packages emphasizing that RF’s aggressive IO (Pokrovsk/Dobropillya claims) synchronized with the Stepnohorsk assault demonstrates RF bad faith in any negotiations, requiring sustained Western kinetic aid (Netherlands pledge) to deter MDCOA.

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