Sitrep 2025-12-01 12:34:30

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OPEINTREP)

DTG: 011235Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: Multi-Domain Crisis Update: Pokrovsk Terminal Phase and Strategic AD Drain PERIOD COVERED: 011200Z DEC 25 – 011235Z DEC 25 (Immediate tactical and strategic IO developments) ANALYST CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH (Unless otherwise specified)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The focus remains the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk), where UAF forces are engaged in critical CQC against the newly designated RF 55th Guards Marine Infantry Division elements. The threat of GLOC severance remains imminent (NLT 020000Z DEC 25).

Deep Strike Operations: Casualty reports from the Iskander strike on Dnipro confirm 40 injured, validating the high-impact kinetic threat to civilian and rear area infrastructure. This strike is highly synchronized with the ground offensive.

Northern Axes: RF reconnaissance and saturation attacks using UAVs (likely Shaheds) are confirmed in Chernihiv (Novhorod-Siverskyi, Koriukivskyi) and the Kyiv region (Borodianka direction). This effort is intended to drain UAF Air Defense (AD) assets away from the main operational effort.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors

No changes. Winter conditions support RF resilience messaging.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are successfully engaging RF long-range strike platforms (confirmed shoot-down of two jet-powered Shahed UAVs), demonstrating effective counter-UAS capabilities against upgraded threats. However, this success is balanced by confirmed Russian territorial gains: RF occupied 505 sq km in November, nearly double September's figures, confirming a strategic setback that is now being exploited at Pokrovsk.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Domain	Finding/Capability	Intentions	Confidence
Kinetic/Ground	Sustained push at Pokrovsk; localized assaults near Lyman (Stavki, Novoselivka claims denied by UAF 3rd Corps). Strategic momentum confirmed (505 sq km gained in Nov).	Fix UAF operational reserves in the North/East; secure Pokrovsk regardless of loss projections; maintain narrative of tactical superiority leading into negotiations.	HIGH
Kinetic/Air	Confirmed UAV saturation runs deep into Chernihiv and Kyiv regions; successful AD on jet-Shaheds confirmed. Dnipro casualty count (40) confirmed.	Drain critical AD interceptors and crew rest cycles from the Stepnohorsk/Southern AD gaps, setting conditions for the MDCOA tactical air surge.	HIGH
IO/Political Decapitation	Amplified, high-profile disinformation campaigns targeting UAF NCA leadership (Yermak/Zelensky alleged internal crisis).	Maximize internal friction and distrust during the Pokrovsk tactical crisis; paralyze UAF strategic decision-making regarding the commitment of the operational reserve.	HIGH
C2 Effectiveness	Strategic C2 synchronization (Dnipro strike + IO) is high. However, internal reporting friction observed (Rybar challenging MoD claims on Klinovoye capture), suggesting localized intelligence over-reporting to satisfy RF High Command demands for rapid success.	MEDIUM

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is employing upgraded jet-powered Shaheds for deep strikes, as confirmed by UAF AD engagement footage. This increases the speed, range, and difficulty of interception, forcing UAF to allocate more capable (and scarce) AD assets to defend deep rear areas, effectively increasing the AD drain.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

No change. RF sustainment is robust (Indian oil, Kazakhstan corridor). The destruction of the Sumy depot remains the single largest UAF logistical constraint for the next 48 hours.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is stressed by the immediate operational losses (Sumy, confirmed November territorial losses) and the humanitarian toll of the Dnipro strike. However, the operational success of intercepting jet-powered Shaheds demonstrates highly trained, resilient AD crews.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

SUCCESS: Successful kinetic interdiction of two jet-powered Shahed UAVs (UAF Air Force).
SUCCESS: UAF 3rd Corps denial of RF claims near Lyman (Stavki/Novoselivka), confirming defensive cohesion on secondary axes.
SETBACK: Confirmed loss of 505 sq km of territory in November (DeepState), providing RF with strategic momentum leverage.
SETBACK: The Dnipro strike resulting in 40 casualties validates the AD vulnerability identified in the previous report.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate need remains high-caliber ammunition resupply. The AD constraint is critical: the new UAV saturation runs in the North are taxing already strained AD capabilities needed to prevent the Southern Axis MDCOA breakthrough.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF efforts are now focused on internal political destabilization within Ukraine:

NCA Crisis: Widespread circulation of the Yermak resignation/conflict narrative via state and proxy media (TASS, Colonelcassad). Intent: Political Decapitation.
Military Validation: Promotion of perceived successes (Lancet strike footage, MoD MP activity near Bakhmut) alongside the factual territorial gains in November.
Diplomatic Leverage: RF MFA publicly frames NATO statements as deliberate attempts to sabotage peace talks, positioning RF as the victim and the reasonable actor.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is under intense pressure due to high casualties in Dnipro and the visible fighting at Pokrovsk. The NCA must immediately pivot the narrative to focus on resilience and successful counter-strikes (jet-Shahed kills, Moscow sabotage) to avoid the political paralysis RF IO is attempting to create.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF continues to show strong diplomatic resilience (KSA, India ties). The synchronization between RF diplomatic messaging and kinetic activity is driving the perception that tactical success equals diplomatic victory.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF MLCOA: Pokrovsk Seizure and IO Consolidation (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will continue the concentrated urban assault, utilizing air superiority support and sustained artillery fires (including TOS-1A if the collection requirement R-1 is not actioned) to force the UAF SKELIA Regiment to withdraw or be enveloped. The seizure will be followed by a strategic IO package (NLT 020600Z DEC 25) validating the "UAF collapse" narrative and maximizing pressure on the US/UAF diplomatic track.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF MDCOA: Stepnohorsk Breakthrough Synchronization and AD Exploitation (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF executes the mechanized ground assault in the Stepnohorsk sector (Southern Axis) synchronized with the final Pokrovsk push. The persistent UAV saturation in the North (Chernihiv/Kyiv) will have successfully diverted critical AD assets. The resulting AD gap over Stepnohorsk enables RF tactical aviation to suppress UAF defenses and exploit the ammunition constraint, threatening a strategic breach of the Southern GLOCs.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Event	Estimated DTG	Criticality	Decision Point
Pokrovsk Fall/GLOC Severance	NLT 020000Z DEC 25	CRITICAL	Immediate stabilization of the W of Pokrovsk defensive line; preparation for strategic counter-fire missions.
Stepnohorsk MDCOA Initiation	NLT 011800Z DEC 25	CRITICAL	Immediate redeployment of mobile AD/EW assets and UGV/SKELIA TTPs to Stepnohorsk corridor to mitigate the impending air threat surge.
NCA Strategic IO Response	NLT 011500Z DEC 25	CRITICAL	NCA must issue a pre-emptive, highly visual statement countering the "Yermak crisis" and "territorial collapse" narratives.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The critical gaps identified in the previous report remain UNMET, severely hindering the ability to preempt the MDCOA.

Priority	Gap/Requirement	Domain	Actionable Requirement (Target/Frequency)
PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL)	R-1 Fire Mission Confirmation Status & TOS-1A Deployment Tonnage	Kinetic/IMINT	URGENT CONFIRMATION from J3/Artillery Command. Target 55th Division and BARS-22 assembly areas for TOS-1A launchers. (IMMEDIATE)
PRIORITY 2 (CRITICAL)	Stepnohorsk RF Ground Reserve Status	IMINT/HUMINT	Locate and track high-readiness RF mechanized reserves in the Stepnohorsk sector to establish precise MDCOA breach location and timing. (IMMEDIATE)
PRIORITY 3	RF Deep Strike Intent - Next Target	SIGINT/ELINT	Analyze C2 synchronization between SRF and IO assets following Dnipro strike to anticipate next high-value strategic target. Current AD drain suggests a shift toward high-value AD nodes or C2 hubs in the South.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 OPERATIONAL COMMAND (J3)

CRITICAL MDCOA MITIGATION (STEPNOHORSK): Due to the confirmed UAV AD drain in the North, the window to prevent the Southern air surge is closing. Immediately execute the transfer of validated "Sting" interceptor teams and UGV-capable units (5 OShB TTPs) to the Stepnohorsk corridor. Execute NLT 011500Z DEC 25.
Fire Support Reorientation (POKROVSK): Assuming R-1 has failed or is delayed, prioritize all remaining artillery fire missions on RF C2 nodes, choke points, and concentrated personnel within the Pokrovsk breach, focusing on delaying the complete envelopment until strategic extraction or counter-attack preparation can be finalized.
Northern AD Re-prioritization: Utilize less resource-intensive AD solutions (e.g., mobile small arms units, directed energy) against the confirmed UAV saturation in Chernihiv/Kyiv to preserve high-end interceptors for the critical Southern/Eastern sectors.

7.2 LOGISTICS & SUSTAINMENT (J4)

Ammunition Re-Sourcing Velocity: Double the velocity of high-caliber ammunition transport via the Alternative Sourcing Plan. The Sumy loss combined with the approaching Pokrovsk collapse makes rapid resupply to the Stepnohorsk axis a matter of critical force preservation.

7.3 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS & NCA (J5/NCA)

IO Counter-Strike (Immediate): The NCA must issue a high-impact, visual, unified statement NLT 011500Z DEC 25 to counter the intensifying Yermak/corruption and territorial collapse narratives. Key messages must include:
- Fact: Acknowledge the severity of the Dnipro strike (40 casualties) but emphasize the criminality of urban targeting.
- Force Protection: Publicly confirm the successful shoot-down of advanced RF jet-Shaheds to demonstrate technological resilience.
- Unity: Explicitly reject all narratives of internal conflict or political paralysis, emphasizing the unity of the defense and the diplomatic track.

Situation Report