Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 301100Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK CRITICAL PHASE // UAF COUNTER-SHOCK INITIATED // REVISED RESERVE COMMITMENT WINDOW

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

The operational environment remains defined by the culmination of the RF Vostok Group's main effort (ME) at Stepnohorsk. However, UAF has successfully initiated decisive cognitive and technological countermeasures, challenging the core assumptions of the RF hybrid shock campaign. The commitment of UAF Strategic Reserves remains the singular decisive factor pending.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohorsk): UAF 3rd Assault Brigade continues to hold blocking positions, inflicting significant attrition (Confirmed RF losses of 350+ personnel, 2 tanks). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Axis (Hryshyne/Kostiantynivka): RF MoD claims of entry into Hryshyne and clearance of Rivne are validated by RF MIC reporting (1000Z). This confirms the RF fixation effort is deepening, aiming to solidify a threat to the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka GLOC and prevent lateral reserve deployment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Deep Rear: Confirmed successful UAF deep strike via UAS targeting the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Tatarstan, an HVA for RF drone production. This is an operational success against RF long-term sustainment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Airspace (Kyiv/Sumy): RF/Adversary UAS activity continues. A downed UAS with a warhead was confirmed in Kyiv Oblast (0953Z), confirming ongoing kinetic threat despite high UAF Air Defense (AD) efficacy. Ongoing low-level UAS tracks reported near Lebedyn, Sumy Oblast (0953Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Sub-freezing conditions persist. Power restoration efforts in Kyiv Oblast have restored power to 170,000 households (0941Z), mitigating the immediate effects of the RF "Thermal Denial" kinetic campaign.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: 3 ABde holding critical line at Stepnohorsk. Successful local counter-action by UAF Marine Infantry resulted in RF POW captures (37th Marine Brigade, Dnipropetrovsk/Donetsk border). Strategic reserves remain uncommitted.
• RF: Vostok Group maintains high tempo assault using reserves replenished via Kazakh transit. Confirmed integration of NTK "Kurier" UGVs for tactical logistics support on the Kostiantynivka axis, challenging UAF ground interdiction. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent remains centered on achieving an operational breakthrough at Stepnohorsk before 301400Z, believing the NCA remains paralyzed.

• RF Technological Adaptation: RF ground forces are demonstrating tactical logistical innovation using UGVs ("Kurier") to ensure forward momentum despite deep-strike pressure on GLOCs. This adaptation must be countered immediately.
• RF Information Warfare (IW) Synchronization: The enemy continues to execute the MDCOA precondition by using high-level political figures (US Congressman) amplified through state media to destabilize the NCA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the increased utilization of ground robotics (UGV logistics) on the Donetsk fixation axis (Kostiantynivka), suggesting RF is mitigating UAF counter-mobility/interdiction efforts to sustain assault units in built-up areas.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF immediate POL and heavy equipment sustainment via Kazakh transit remains robust. However, the UAF strike on the Alabuga drone production facility constitutes a significant future degradation of RF BPS (Drone Systems Troops) and long-range strike capability. This deep strike must be followed up with further HVA targeting. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 remains highly effective in synchronizing kinetic (Stepnohorsk, Hryshyne) and cognitive (NCA delegitimization) operations.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are demonstrating high tactical resilience and technological innovation:

• Technological Success: Confirmed first operational success of the UAF Sting interceptor drone system against Russian Shaheds (0958Z). This validates UAF counter-BPS capabilities and offers a potential localized solution to RF A2A UAV aerial reconnaissance denial. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Strategic Resolve: General Zaluzhnyi's public statement directly counters the RF "peace talks" narrative and signals military alignment against external pressure for capitulation (0950Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Successful deep strike on Alabuga SEZ. Sting interceptor success. High attrition inflicted by Southern Defense Forces. Successful POW capture operation in the secondary sector.
• Setbacks: RF confirmed advance into Hryshyne increases the risk of UAF reserves being fixed in Donetsk, reducing options for Stepnohorsk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains the NCA's commitment status regarding Strategic Reserve deployment. The time required for mobilization and deployment dictates that the reserve decision window is closing rapidly, especially given confirmed RF advances in Donetsk.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IW remains at peak effort, focused on institutional erosion:

• Amplification of Corruption/Paralysis: RF MICs immediately amplified US Congressional criticism targeting NCA integrity (0937Z), aiming to sustain the narrative of internal political collapse.
• Geopolitical Framing: TASS frames joint UK/Finland exercises as aggression ("Northern Axe 25") near the border, normalizing conflict escalation for domestic RF consumption (0941Z).

4.2. Blue Force Cognitive Counter-Action

UAF has delivered a powerful synchronized counter-blow in the information domain:

• Political Unity: President Zelensky confirmed synchronization of sanctions with the US against Lukoil and Rosneft (0946Z), signaling decisive action and continued US coordination, directly countering the "NCA collapse" narrative.
• Military Resolve: General Zaluzhnyi's public rejection of a "quick peace" as a defeat condition (0950Z) reinforces UAF strategic commitment and undermines RF attempts to leverage political fatigue.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Ukrainian sanction synchronization with the US against major RF energy entities (Rosneft/Lukoil) demonstrates continued high-level diplomatic support, countering RF narratives that Kyiv is being abandoned or pressured into unfavorable negotiation.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

UAF strategic communication success has slightly degraded the psychological precondition for the MDCOA. However, the kinetic situation at Stepnohorsk is now time-critical due to the confirmed RF advance in Donetsk.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Operational Breakthrough into UAF Rear Areas via Stepnohorsk (301200Z - 302000Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group detects continued absence of UAF strategic reserves. Utilizing the operational fixation provided by the Hryshyne advance, RF motorized rifle battalions initiate a full-scale exploitation assault against the depleted 3 ABde blocking positions, prioritizing securing operational depth toward the T0408 GLOC before UAF can react.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Strategic Operational Rout and Exploitation (301400Z - 302400Z) (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) Despite UAF counter-messaging, the political decision to commit reserves is delayed past the 301400Z deadline. RF achieves breakthrough at Stepnohorsk. Simultaneously, the RF fixation effort in Donetsk is successful, drawing UAF tactical reserves away from the ME. RF units achieve a rout condition, exploiting the exposed flank toward Zaporizhzhia, while RF IO broadcasts pre-prepared narratives of military defeat and political failure, leading to localized UAF command disintegration. Note: Confidence in MDCOA success is slightly reduced due to UAF NCA's strong counter-messaging.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations focus on capitalizing on recent cognitive successes while mitigating the immediate kinetic threat at Stepnohorsk.

1. OPERATIONAL DECISIVENESS (J3/C-in-C):

   • ACTION (CATASTROPHIC URGENCY): The NCA must CONFIRM and COMMENCE MOVEMENT of strategic reserves towards the Stepnohorsk axis NLT 301200Z.
   • RATIONALE: The confirmed enemy fixation effort in Donetsk combined with the time-critical nature of the Stepnohorsk defense means the decision window has functionally collapsed to prevent an MLCOA success.

2. TECHNOLOGICAL MITIGATION (J6/J3):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL): Rapidly deploy mobile EW assets with a mandate to target and disrupt UGV control frequencies on the Kostiantynivka GLOC (Donetsk) to counter RF tactical logistical adaptation.
   • RATIONALE: Disrupting UGV resupply will degrade RF assault force sustainment and reduce the effectiveness of the fixation effort. Simultaneously, integrate the newly successful "Sting" interceptor drones into the Stepnohorsk AO for C2/ISR protection.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAPITALIZATION (NCA/J7):

   • ACTION (URGENT): Leverage the synchronized NCA/Zaluzhnyi messaging (sanctions and rejection of quick peace) by immediately broadcasting news of the Strategic Reserve commitment (Action 1), explicitly framing it as a unified, decisive response to both foreign pressure and internal subversive narratives.
   • RATIONALE: Convert cognitive defense success into kinetic force multiplier effect and disrupt the MDCOA political precondition.

4. DEEP STRIKE CONTINUITY (J2/SOF):

   • ACTION (URGENT): Prioritize follow-on deep-strike analysis and targeting development for the confirmed alternative Kazakh-RF rail transshipment hubs (P2.0 CR).
   • RATIONALE: The operational success against Alabuga must be immediately followed by strikes against Vostok Group's immediate logistical sustainment to maximize pressure.

//END OF REPORT//