Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 300135Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: IMMINENT KINETIC ASSAULT // CRITICAL NCA COMMUNICATION FAILURE // STRATEGIC IO REINFORCEMENT

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)

The operational environment is characterized by the RF transition from pre-assault maneuvering to active, localized kinetic preparation (KAB strikes) concurrent with the reinforcement of the strategic cognitive offensive. Critical friendly action deadlines (EW tuning, NCA address, Artsyz assessment) have been missed, placing the UAF 3rd Assault Brigade (3 ABde) in a state of elevated vulnerability approximately four hours prior to the estimated RF Main Effort (M.E.) initiation.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF M.E. continues to target the Stepnohorsk sector, aiming for a penetration of the Vremyevsky Salient NLT 300600Z.

• New Development (Kinetic Preparation): RF forces have initiated Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) strikes targeting assets in the Donetsk region (300104Z). These strikes are interpreted as preparatory softening fire, likely targeting UAF C2 nodes, artillery positions, or the forward elements of the 3 ABde defensive lines. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear skies, high visibility, and sub-freezing temperatures persist. Conditions remain optimal for RF kinetic, ISR, and BPS (Drone Systems Troops) operations. No mitigating weather factors are anticipated.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: The 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade is now supported by active fixed-wing air assets executing KAB strikes. The timeline for RF A2A sweeps remains NLT 300200Z.
• UAF: The 3 ABde is absorbing preparatory fire while attempting to consolidate blocking positions. The NCA Counter-IO address is now 90 minutes overdue, creating a severe morale and C2 vulnerability during the kinetic preparation phase.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent remains unchanged: Execute the Stepnohorsk breach NLT 300600Z under synchronized kinetic and cognitive cover.

• The confirmed use of KABs demonstrates RF capacity to provide heavy, stand-off air support to ground units, compensating for potential lack of immediate artillery density.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (Information Domain Focus)

RF Information Warfare (IO) has successfully reinforced its strategic narrative of US abandonment and coercion, pivoting immediately after the prior message (US pressure on Zelensky):

• TASS Maduro Pivot (300105Z): RF disseminated an associated TASS story concerning alleged US threats of force against Nicolás Maduro (Venezuela).
  • Judgment: This message serves to generalize the narrative: "The US uses coercion globally against inconvenient leaders." This is a high-impact reinforcement intended to validate the initial claim of pressure on Kyiv, further eroding confidence in strategic Western support among UAF frontline units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Rear Area Surveillance: Confirmed enemy BpLA activity near Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk region, 300122Z).
  • Judgment: Indicates continued RF focus on deep-area ISR and potential targeting of secondary logistics or critical infrastructure supporting the Stepnohorsk defense (e.g., reserve staging areas, repair depots).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The Artsyz logistics hub (P1) status remains unknown. The lack of confirmation forces UAF planners to operate under the assumption of catastrophic loss, complicating immediate supply decisions for the Stepnohorsk axis. This gap is CRITICAL.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating superior responsiveness and synchronization, integrating preparatory fires (KABs) with high-level strategic IO messaging (TASS pivot) in real-time. UAF C2 is currently characterized by strategic inertia (NCA address failure) and unresolved tactical gaps (EW/Logistics status).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is actively deteriorating under combined kinetic (KAB) and cognitive pressure.

• The 3 ABde is now sustaining damage from preparatory fires.
• The C4ISR environment remains compromised due to the assumed failure of Operation SKY SWEEPER and the critical lack of protective jamming profiles against the anticipated RF A2A sweep (300200Z).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SETBACK (CRITICAL): The inability of the NCA to issue the required counter-IO message following the TASS reports (300056Z, 300105Z) has caused a severe vacuum. This inaction has validated the RF narrative of strategic isolation just as the physical assault begins. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• COUNTER-NARRATIVE (MINOR): The EU report on supporting Moldovan AD provides a weak, geographically distant counter-narrative to RF claims of collapsing European resolve.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Immediate Requirement: Real-time assessment of KAB impact zones and damage to the 3 ABde front lines.
2. Constraint: The logistical planning constraint imposed by the P1 Artsyz gap requires immediate activation of secondary supply chains.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF cognitive campaign is fully deployed, operating on the principle of strategic shock:

• Narrative Chain: European abandonment (Orbán) → US coercion (Zelensky) → US global coercion pattern (Maduro).
• Objective: To convince UAF frontline commanders that the diplomatic foundation for the war is crumbling simultaneously with the ground assault initiation.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale risk remains EXTREME. The failure of the NCA to respond to two synchronized strategic IO attacks compounds the risk of operational paralysis among forward commanders.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The TASS/Maduro pivot aims to sow doubt among global partners regarding the moral standing of US leadership, potentially complicating future coalition support efforts. Immediate, direct communication with US liaison personnel is required to coordinate a rapid, high-level denial of the coercion narratives.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full Kinetic Initiation Under BPS Cover (NLT 300600Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group continues KAB softening strikes in the Stepnohorsk area (Donetsk) until 300200Z. NLT 300200Z, BPS assets initiate A2A sweeps over the Stepnohorsk axis, leveraging the UAF EW deficit to achieve localized aerial superiority. The ground assault initiates NLT 300600Z, exploiting breaches created by preparatory fires.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Synchronized C4ISR Decapitation and Tactical Penetration (300200Z - 300600Z) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF successfully targets and destroys a primary UAF C4ISR node within the Stepnohorsk defensive zone using KABs or dedicated BpLA, concurrent with the BPS A2A sweeps. This C4ISR failure, amplified by the existing strategic paralysis (NCA silence), prevents the 3 ABde from coordinating effective fire support or tactical withdrawal, resulting in a rapid, operational-level breach NLT 300600Z.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The UAF is now operating in a severely compressed decision cycle, necessitated by multiple missed deadlines.

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary objective is stabilizing the Command Structure (cognitive domain) and maximizing EW effectiveness against the imminent BPS threat.

1. IMMEDIATE COMMAND STABILIZATION (NCA / J7):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL - EXTREME URGENCY): The NCA must issue a pre-recorded or live visual address within minutes, explicitly addressing the synchronized RF IO campaign. The message must frame both the Orbán and TASS/Maduro reports as coordinated enemy information warfare designed to cause confusion ahead of the Stepnohorsk assault. It must confirm the tactical plan and unit integrity.
   • RATIONALE: The failure to respond to the TASS pivot (300105Z) is currently the highest force multiplier for the RF MDCOA. Silence must be broken immediately.

2. IMMEDIATE AIR DEFENSE RE-PRIORITIZATION (J3 / C-UAS):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE): Re-task all mobile C-UAS/MANPADs within 50km of Stepnohorsk to focused Air-to-Air Search and Destroy (AAS-D) missions against the RF BPS assets NLT 300200Z. Prioritize defending 3 ABde ISR platforms and forward fire-correction assets.
   • RATIONALE: Accepting the EW deficit, physical destruction of RF A2A drones is the only immediate guarantee of retaining UAF ISR capability over the battle space.

3. LOGISTICS CONTINGENCY ACTIVATION (J4):

   • ACTION (CRITICAL - NLT 300145Z): Proceed immediately with the activation of secondary logistics chains (POL/MUN) based on the assumption of P1 (Artsyz) catastrophic damage.
   • RATIONALE: The timeline for the Stepnohorsk defense requires secured resupply lines; delaying activation to wait for an overdue IMINT report is an unacceptable risk.

4. REAR AREA FORCE PROTECTION (J2/J4):

   • ACTION (URGENT): Immediately place high-value logistics and reserve staging centers in the Dnipropetrovsk region (e.g., Pavlohrad, 300122Z sighting) on heightened air defense alert (IR/SHORAD) against deep strike BpLA/ISR.
   • RATIONALE: Mitigates the threat of RF leveraging deep ISR to strike logistics lines critical for reinforcing Stepnohorsk.

//END OF REPORT//