INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: MARITIME LOGISTICS DENIAL & SOUTHERN AXIS CRITICALITY
DTG: 291200Z NOV 2025
SUBJECT: Escalation of Maritime Counter-Logistics // Konstiantynivka GLOC Status // Hybrid Diplomatic Counter-Offensive
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (CURRENT OPERATIONAL PICTURE)
The operational tempo is high, characterized by UAF leveraging strategic deep-strike superiority in the Black Sea and RF rear areas, while RF forces maintain critical, technically sophisticated pressure on the Southern Front Ground Line of Communication (GLOC). Logistical warfare remains the primary determinant of tactical success in the Zaporizhzhia sector.
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
- Strategic Rear (Maritime): The Black Sea is confirmed as a successful domain for UAF offensive operations. SBU naval drones successfully struck two RF shadow fleet oil tankers, KAIRO and VIRAT, near the Turkish coast, extending the operational reach of the maritime denial zone. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Zaporizhzhia Axis: Focus remains on the Konstiantynivka GLOC, which is critically interdicted by NTK Kurier UGVs. RF air activity is confirmed, with Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) launched against targets in the wider Zaporizhzhia region, intended to suppress UAF fire positions and fixed defenses.
- Kyiv Sector: Confirmed missile strike documentation (video evidence) shows impact near Vyshneve, Kyiv Oblast, reinforcing the previous report's assessment of persistent deep strike threat against critical C2/infrastructure targets.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors
No significant change. Sub-freezing temperatures and persistent mud limit major RF mechanized maneuver outside of established roads/hardened paths, favoring fixed position attacks (KABs) and persistent attrition (UGVs).
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- RF: RF forces are prioritizing logistical attrition and information operations (IO) over costly mechanized maneuver in the Huliaipole sector, likely pending a tactical decision point concerning the 33 OShP’s collapse. RF is actively suppressing reconnaissance (KABs, drone strikes near Novopavlivka). RF has also imposed strict internal security measures in Crimea (fines for publishing AD/military location data) indicating acute concern over deep-strike intelligence.
- UAF: UAF retains the strategic initiative via successful multi-domain logistical strikes (NPZs and Tankers). Tactical forces (e.g., 4414th Brigade FPV units) continue highly effective, localized attrition operations on the Southern and Donetsk axes. The defensive focus remains solely on clearing the Konstiantynivka GLOC to sustain the 33 OShP.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
- Capability (Deep Strike/AD Denial): RF retains robust long-range strike capabilities (missiles, KABs) but continues to display persistent vulnerabilities in deep strategic air/maritime defense (evidenced by the loss of two tankers and multiple NPZs).
- Intentions (Operational): RF intention is fixed: force the logistical collapse of the 33 OShP in the Huliaipole sector (NLT 300000Z) to create a breach point on the Southern Front. RF will continue high-rate KAB usage to suppress UAF counter-fire.
- Intentions (Strategic/IO): RF strategy is shifting to aggressively counter the Ukrainian diplomatic track. The primary IO vector is to delegitimize the Umerov delegation (claims of US citizenship, flexibility on Trump’s plan) and portray UAF negotiation efforts as weakness or external coercion.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
- Maritime AD/Security Failure: RF inability to protect oil tankers (even flagged under third parties and near neutral coasts) confirms a strategic failure in maritime security and intelligence-sharing. This requires immediate RF reallocation of resources to protect Black Sea commerce or shift energy transport entirely to land/rail.
- IO Shielding: The enactment of fines in Crimea shows that RF command is actively adapting counter-intelligence measures to prevent targeting of high-value assets (AD systems, POL depots) by UAF long-range ISR/strike assets.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (RF)
- CRITICAL DEGRADATION (POL/FISCAL): The confirmed successful strikes against three NPZs and two strategic oil tankers within 72 hours represent an unprecedented attack on RF operational sustainment. This is compounded by new intelligence confirming a 5 trillion ruble shortfall in RF budget tax collection for 2025, indicating escalating fiscal strain that will eventually impact procurement and replacement capacity. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- The POL supply to the Vostok Group is critically vulnerable. This may enforce a short, unscheduled operational pause in mechanized assault preparations.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF military C2 remains adequate for tactical coordination (e.g., KAB synchronization with UGV deployment). However, the public infighting observed in RF Telegram channels ("Два майора" exposing "pseudo-patriots") indicates significant fractionalization and poor IO discipline within the RF information sphere, suggesting potential C2 weakness in the cognitive domain. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
- Strategic Posture: HIGH. UAF deep strike synchronization (NPZ, maritime assets) is demonstrating strategic initiative and successful multi-domain attrition against RF logistics and fiscal capacity.
- Tactical Posture: CRITICAL. The 33 OShP is operating under extreme logistical constraints. While UAF FPV teams are achieving high attrition rates near Pokrovsk, the failure to clear the Konstiantynivka GLOC risks rapid tactical ammunition exhaustion.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- SUCCESSES: Confirmed SBU strikes on VIRAT and KAIRO tankers. Successful strategic-level IO synchronization regarding the Umerov delegation mandate.
- SETBACKS: The missile strike near Vyshneve (Kyiv suburbs) confirms the continued penetration capability of RF strategic missiles. The Konstiantynivka GLOC remains functionally closed.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
- PRIORITY REQUIREMENT: Timely, successful execution of the GLOC clearance operation (previously recommended as "Operation Supply Line Hammer").
- CONSTRAINT: The constant threat of RF KAB and missile strikes necessitates continued high resource allocation (AD, damage control) to the rear, limiting the availability of high-value EW or SOF assets for the critical GLOC clearance.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO is actively targeting the Umerov delegation to frame the peace talks as a forced compromise on sovereignty, leveraging personal allegations (US passport claim) to erode trust. This is a critical point in the information war, designed to weaken the Ukrainian negotiating position prior to US engagement.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Military morale is boosted by the string of deep-strike successes (NPZ, Tankers). However, domestic sentiment is under duress due to persistent infrastructure strikes in the Kyiv region. UAF must rapidly translate strategic military successes into credible political/diplomatic strength to maintain civilian support.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The confirmed departure of the Umerov delegation is a high-risk, high-reward diplomatic maneuver. The successful deep strike operations provide significant kinetic leverage to support the diplomatic efforts by demonstrating UAF resilience and RF vulnerability. This leverage must be immediately integrated into the delegation's talking points.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
MLCOA: Logistical Fixation and Diplomatic Sabotage (NLT 72 hours) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF will utilize the temporary POL strain to reorganize forces while maintaining heavy fire saturation (KAB, artillery) on the Southern Front to fix UAF 33 OShP positions.
- GLOC Reinforcement: RF increases persistent saturation fire and expands the use of low-cost, expendable assets (UGVs, FPV ambushes) along the Konstiantynivka GLOC to negate UAF clearance attempts.
- IO Surge: A major coordinated IO campaign will be launched targeting the Umerov delegation, aiming to influence US public opinion and congressional support.
- Retaliatory Strikes: RF executes highly visible, massed missile/UAV strikes (possibly against civilian population centers or non-POL energy infrastructure) as a kinetic response to the maritime losses.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
MDCOA: C2 Denial and Breakthrough Exploitation (NLT 010000Z DEC) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF executes the long-threatened multi-domain shock operation, leveraging UAF logistical paralysis.
- GLOC Failure: If UAF fails to restore the Konstiantynivka GLOC by 301200Z, the 33 OShP begins critical ammunition rationing.
- C2 Denial/EW Surge: RF activates highly effective, regional EW measures (targeting Starlink/tactical radio nets) across the Zaporizhzhia axis.
- Mechanized Assault: Vostok Group, utilizing prioritized POL reserves, launches a massed mechanized assault on the weakened 33 OShP positions, achieving a rapid operational breach that UAF reserves cannot contain due to C2 disruption.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated DTG | Criticality | Decision Point |
|---|
| Konstiantynivka GLOC Status (Restored) | NLT 291800Z | CRITICAL | If GLOC is not cleared and resupply convoys commence movement, authorize the use of heavy armor/mine-clearing assets (accepting high loss risk) to escort the emergency convoy. Tactical failure at 33 OShP is imminent without supply. |
| RF Strategic Retaliation Strike | NLT 300600Z | HIGH | Maintain heightened AD readiness around secondary/tertiary energy infrastructure nodes (e.g., thermal power plants outside major cities). |
| Umerov Delegation Talking Points Integration | NLT 291500Z | HIGH | Release high-level statement confirming UAF commitment to sovereignty and directly refuting RF claims regarding Umerov's mandate or US citizenship. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap | Collection Requirement (CR) | Domain | Confidence Assessment |
|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (TECHINT/GLOC) | Kurier UGV Control Node Location & Power Source | Dedicated 24/7 EW sweeps (UAV/Ground) to specifically identify C2 signatures and determine if UGVs utilize line-of-sight communication or secure mesh networks. (Follow-up to previous CR). | SIGINT, EW | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 2 (IMINT/MARITIME) | Damage Assessment (KAIRO/VIRAT) | IMINT (SAR/Optical) targeting of the Turkish coast (area of attack) and nearby ports (e.g., Novorossiysk, Tuapse) to track movement and estimate time-off-service for the damaged tankers and associated shadow fleet activity. | IMINT, OSINT | MEDIUM |
| PRIORITY 3 (HUMINT/IO) | RF IO Coordination Center Identity | Active HUMINT/Cyber monitoring of Russian pro-war channels to determine the origin, funding, and command structure of the coordinated IO campaign against the Umerov delegation (e.g., investigating claims of US citizenship origin). | HUMINT, CYBERINT | MEDIUM |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
The combined pressure from deep strikes has created a momentary opportunity to restore tactical stability on the Southern Front and gain leverage in the diplomatic sphere.
-
JOINT GLOC CLEARANCE (J3/SOF):
- ACTION: Immediate execution of night operation (NLT 291500Z) to clear the Konstiantynivka GLOC. Utilize EW/jammer assets to suppress Kurier UGV control signals, followed by SOF/engineer teams with thermals for kinetic clearance. This mission must prioritize speed over asset preservation.
- RATIONALE: Logistical failure of the 33 OShP is the primary operational vulnerability. Failure to clear the GLOC renders all strategic deep strikes irrelevant to the immediate battlefield geometry.
-
STRATEGIC FINANCIAL AND MARITIME EXPLOITATION (NCA/MFA):
- ACTION: Immediately brief international partners (US Treasury, EU institutions) on the confirmed maritime strikes against the RF shadow fleet, providing BDA evidence. Demand heightened scrutiny, increased insurance costs, and targeted sanctions against shipping companies associated with KAIRO and VIRAT to permanently disrupt RF maritime energy transport.
- RATIONALE: Leverage kinetic success to inflict long-term fiscal pain, compounding the confirmed RF budget deficit and reducing the sustainability of the war effort.
-
DEFENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOL (J6):
- ACTION: In light of persistent Starlink threat (MDCOA) and confirmed RF C2 hardening (Crimea fines), order all units (Brigade level and below) on the Southern Axis to conduct 24-hour C2 drills using secondary, hardened encrypted VHF/UHF radio nets. All sensitive data communication (fire missions, troop locations) must transition to these redundant systems NLT 300000Z.
- RATIONALE: Preparation for MDCOA requires preemptive C2 hardening. Waiting for RF to execute the Starlink denial will result in operational paralysis.
//END OF REPORT//
