Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 290830Z NOV 2025 SUBJECT: Systemic Infrastructure Attrition // Hybrid Warfare Synchronization // Critical Energy Degradation

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

The Russian Federation (RF) has executed a massive, synchronized deep strike operation targeting Ukraine's critical energy infrastructure across multiple oblasts, confirming the shift in operational priority from frontline maneuver warfare (Huliaipole) to systemic rear-area attrition. This kinetic action is immediately and aggressively coupled with a high-stakes Information Operation (IO) campaign designed to provide international justification and destabilize Kyiv leadership.

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Deep Rear (CRITICAL): Confirmed widespread missile and drone attacks targeted energy infrastructure across Kyiv, Kyiv Oblast, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Poltava Oblasts (Fact, HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Energy Minister reports over 500,000 subscribers are without power in Kyiv alone.
  • The previous strike on the Vyshneve logistics hub is confirmed to be part of this wider strategic degradation effort.
• Frontline (Zaporizhzhia Axis): Status Quo (Tactical Containment). RF channels claim high operational tempo and successful counter-drone activity by the Vostok Group (127th Division, 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment near Pankovka). This is assessed as narrative maintenance while operational resources are focused on the deep strike (Judgment: MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
• Reciprocal Deep Strike: UAF forces successfully conducted a reciprocal strike on the Afipsky Oil Refinery (Kuban, RF rear), demonstrating continued deep strike capability (Fact).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

• No significant constraints. Clear skies favor continued RF reconnaissance flights and KAB operations in the North.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Dispositions confirm intent to use air superiority and long-range precision strikes to force logistical and political collapse before committing decisive ground maneuver at Huliaipole.
• UAF Control Measures: Air Defense (AD) successfully engaged targets but failed to prevent widespread infrastructure damage. Emergency services (DSNS) are overwhelmed. Immediate resource prioritization must be shifted to stabilize the power grid and civilian casualties (now 29+ wounded).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

RF is maximizing the effects of the coordinated multi-domain attack. The primary threat vector is now the compounded impact of logistical starvation and C4ISR degradation due to energy loss.

2.1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

• Capability: RF maintains high capacity for synchronized massed missile and drone strikes against fixed, strategic infrastructure targets (Judgment: HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Intentions (Kinetic): To systematically degrade Ukraine’s national power grid (energy attrition strategy) and force UAF resources (personnel, material, AD assets) to be diverted away from frontline sustainment to rear-area repair and civilian stabilization.
• Intentions (Hybrid): RF is leveraging the kinetic strikes to justify the attack via the "FSB Gas Pipeline Terror Plot" narrative (Serpukhov, Moscow region), explicitly blaming "Kyiv special services." This is intended to internationally normalize aggression and pre-emptively delegitimize any future UAF strikes on Russian energy infrastructure.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Shift to Systemic Targeting: The shift from localized logistics hubs (Vyshneve) to widespread regional power networks (six oblasts) demonstrates an escalation in kinetic targeting prioritization aimed at maximizing civilian inconvenience and forcing national resource dispersion.
• Amplified Internal IO: RF media is immediately circulating high-volume, contradictory disinformation regarding the political status of Andriy Yermak. This is a deliberate attempt to generate internal political friction and distract from the kinetic losses.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF (CRITICAL): The energy outages directly impede transport networks, communication relay stations, and logistical throughput capacity (e.g., fuel pumping, automated loading). This critical pressure point compounds the existing threat from Kurier UGV interdiction on the Konstiantynivka GLOC.
• RF: Sustainment of deep strike munitions remains robust.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF synchronization across kinetic, IO, and internal propaganda domains remains highly effective and rapid (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Energy Sector Readiness: CRITICALLY LOW. The scale of the damage across six oblasts indicates vulnerability to massed strikes. Power grid resilience requires immediate reinforcement/redundancy implementation.
• Frontline Readiness: The 33 OShP at Huliaipole remains tactically contained, but their logistical stability is now threatened by the systemic power failures impacting the entire supply chain.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (CRITICAL): Systemic failure of the energy grid across multiple oblasts, resulting in widespread blackouts and rising civilian casualties (29+ injured).
• Success: Successful deep strike on the Afipsky Refinery (Kuban) demonstrates reciprocal pressure capacity.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT: Mobilization of emergency energy resources (generators, fuel stocks, repair components) and engineering teams to stabilize power transmission hubs in Kyiv and Kharkiv regions.
• CONSTRAINT: The rising civilian casualty count and infrastructure damage require the diversion of military engineering and medical assets from frontline support.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Primary Narrative: The FSB Serpukhov Gas Pipeline Plot is now the central justification for the energy strikes. This narrative must be immediately and robustly countered to prevent NATO/EU partners from viewing the energy attacks as 'justified retaliation.'
• RF Internal Narrative (Destabilization): Widespread rumors regarding Yermak's resignation and subsequent move to the front aim to sow political confusion and undermine public confidence in the administration's ability to manage the crisis.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• The large-scale blackouts and rising casualties will severely impact urban morale, particularly in Kyiv. Swift, transparent communication regarding repair efforts and clear refutation of RF propaganda (both the terror plot and the internal political rumors) are essential.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The convergence of the Polish railway sabotage claim, the Starlink denial threat, and now the FSB terror plot is creating a complex, multi-layered "Ukrainian security liability" narrative for Western governments. This jeopardizes the continuity of critical military aid flows.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

The current operational tempo is designed to maximize shock and paralysis before an anticipated ground action.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Phased Infrastructure Destruction and Deep Attrition (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will maintain the tactical pause at Huliaipole until NLT 300000Z. RF focuses on:

1. Secondary Strikes: RF precision assets (UAVs/loitering munitions) will target UAF infrastructure repair teams and secondary power distribution nodes in the six affected oblasts throughout the next 24 hours.
2. Increased UGV Effectiveness: The widespread systemic failure will make logistical detection and interdiction by Kurier UGVs on the Konstiantynivka GLOC easier, accelerating the rate of supply starvation for the 33 OShP.
3. Political Coercion: RF will amplify the Yermak/internal instability rumors to prompt US political pressure on Kyiv leadership (NLT 291200Z).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Multi-Domain Shock and Breakthrough (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF executes a localized Starlink denial on the Southern Front, synchronized with a politically-driven temporary closure of a key Polish GLOC (citing the pipeline/rail sabotage pretext). Under this cover, Vostok Group launches a massed, high-intensity assault on the logistical-starved 33 OShP at Huliaipole, achieving a rapid operational breach.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate objective is to mitigate the effects of the multi-oblast energy strikes and prevent logistical collapse, while aggressively countering RF hybrid narratives.

1. CRISIS MANAGEMENT & INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (J4/J7):

   • ACTION: Immediately implement Operation COLD START—prioritize the allocation of mobile AD assets (e.g., Gepard, Avenger) to defend the primary energy repair sites (Ukrenergo/DTEK) identified in the damage assessment. Simultaneously, issue a call for international assistance for large-scale industrial power generators (1MW+).
   • RATIONALE: Repair crews will be secondary targets. Protecting repair operations is essential to restore C2 and logistical continuity before the Huliaipole assault begins.

2. COUNTER-HYBRID OPERATIONS (J2/MFA/IO):

   • ACTION: UAF Official Channels must publish a synchronized release NLT 291000Z: 1) Detailed BDA on the energy strikes (500k without power, 29+ casualties); 2) Confirmation of the Afipsky Refinery strike; and 3) A direct accusation linking the RF energy strikes to the manufactured FSB terror plot, labeling it a "pre-meditated act of war justification."
   • RATIONALE: Must internationally seize the narrative by linking RF kinetic action to demonstrable hybrid deception, discrediting the gas pipeline claim immediately.

3. LOGISTICAL PRIORITY (J3/SOF):

   • ACTION: Hunter-Killer Task Force (HKTF-K) must remain fully engaged on the Konstiantynivka GLOC. Given the systemic energy failure, the mission to destroy Kurier UGV control nodes is now the single highest kinetic priority for preserving the 33 OShP, which is entering a critical supply window.
   • RATIONALE: Clearing the main GLOC mitigates the compounded effects of rear-area energy damage.

4. C4ISR REDUNDANCY (J6):

   • ACTION: Implement the second phase of Operation GUARDIAN SHIELD. All frontline and immediate rear-area units (including logistics convoys) must shift C2 protocols to assume intermittent Starlink denial and operate using low-signature, redundant radio networks for all essential communications (fire control, resupply requests).
   • RATIONALE: Prepare for the MDCOA by mitigating the risk of C2 collapse during the Huliaipole ground assault.

//END OF REPORT//