Situation Report

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - HYBRID SHOCK ASSESSMENT (H-HOUR MINUS)

TIME: 290600Z NOV 25 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY: Immediate confirmation of RF Vostok Group ground movement initiation on Huliaipole axis (CR-2217) concurrent with ongoing damage control and critical utility stabilization in the National Command Authority (NCA) region.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

FACT (NCA STRIKE): The multi-domain shock attack on Kyiv continues with follow-on BPLA activity (Borodyanka, Vasylkiv, Boryspil). Targeting now confirmed to have affected the Water Infrastructure (reduced water pressure confirmed on Kyiv Right Bank) in addition to widespread energy grid disruption. This confirms RF intent to maximize civilian discomfort and paralyze essential services. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). FACT (SOUTHERN FRONT): Fire saturation continues on the Huliaipole axis. RF Vostok Group (35th Army) combat footage confirms drone activity targeting UAF personnel and firing positions on the southeastern border of Huliaipole, maintaining continuous pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). FACT (GLOC INTERDICTION): RF claims success in intercepting UAF Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) near the Konstiantynivka area, indicating active counter-interdiction operations against UAF efforts to destabilize the RF supply chain. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH on RF claim; MEDIUM on actual damage assessment).

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Non-factor. Clear conditions continue to support RF BPLA/CR operations and IMINT collection.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Air Defense (AD) remains committed to intercepting the secondary BPLA wave targeting Kyiv Oblast. UAF Ground Forces (33 OShP) remain in containment posture on the Huliaipole sector, subjected to continuous drone-based fires. NCA crisis management is focused on restoring power and mitigating the new water supply degradation.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (MAXIMIZED PARALYSIS): RF strategic intent has shifted from pure military C2 decapitation to systemic paralysis by simultaneously degrading power and water supply (life support systems). The objective is to force immediate reallocation of UAF operational resources to the rear, enabling the Huliaipole breakthrough. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). CAPABILITY (C4ISR Targeting): RF MoD claims the destruction of four UAF communication antennas in the Southern grouping area. This confirms that even during the strategic strike, RF kinetic focus maintains a high priority on disrupting UAF C4ISR connectivity, particularly along the contested Southern Axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary tactical adaptation is the confirmation of RF counter-UAV/UAS capabilities targeting UAF ground assets ("Hunter-Killer" teams). If the RF claim of intercepting UAF UGVs near Konstiantynivka is true, it indicates rapid RF adaptation to UAF deep logistical interdiction efforts outlined in the 28 NOV Daily Summary. This directly challenges the UAF strategy of logistical strangulation.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics supporting Vostok Group remain robust enough to sustain high-volume preparatory fires (KAB, artillery). The UAF counter-logistics operation (UGVs on Konstiantynivka GLOC) is now contested. Deep strikes on Lipetsk and Yasny impose long-term friction but are not impacting the immediate Huliaipole window.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains assessed as HIGH, demonstrated by the ability to launch synchronized multi-utility infrastructure strikes and simultaneously monitor/counter UAF tactical responses on the ground (Konstiantynivka).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Emergency Resiliency (NCA); Defend-in-Place (Huliaipole). READINESS: Operational readiness is strained by the confirmed loss of essential services and rising casualties (2 KIA, 13 WIA in Kyiv). Forces in the Zaporizhzhia sector must maintain maximum readiness against the imminent ground assault, despite the critical logistical vulnerability posed by the Konstiantynivka GLOC.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Infrastructure/Casualties): Confirmed kinetic degradation of both energy and water supply systems in Kyiv. Confirmed civilian fatalities and injuries.
• Setback (Logistics): RF claims of success against UAF UGVs near Konstiantynivka, if verified, represent a failure of the initial UAF counter-interdiction force to achieve surprise and persistence on the critical GLOC.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate mobilization of specialized infrastructure recovery teams capable of repairing integrated power/water systems simultaneously. High-priority resupply of ammunition to the 33 OShP via secondary routes, assuming the Konstiantynivka GLOC is now highly contested. CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The ongoing air threat (BPLA waves) constrains the ability of critical infrastructure repair teams to safely operate in the Kyiv Oblast.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

FACT (IO Exploitation): RF military bloggers and state media are actively leveraging the infrastructure damage and civilian crisis for psychological operations (e.g., mocking the water/power outages). This targets UAF morale and seeks to amplify internal dissent regarding the NCA's ability to protect the capital. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). JUDGMENT (Psychological Impact): The extension of kinetic strikes to water systems (a basic life necessity) will significantly increase population stress and the cognitive burden on UAF command staffs tasked with non-military emergency response. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The strategic feint is transitioning to strategic pressure. The operational window for the RF ground assault is rapidly closing.

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(Confidence: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will exploit the confirmed utility degradation and UAF distraction in the NCA. The synchronized ground assault on the Huliaipole axis will commence NLT 290900Z NOV. The main effort will be supported by continued fire saturation, emphasizing TOS-2 thermobaric systems or high-volume KAB strikes enabled by favorable air defense disposition (per 28 NOV SAR indicators).

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(Confidence: MEDIUM) RF executes a simultaneous, devastating secondary strike on the main Water Treatment/Pumping facilities supplying Kyiv and Lviv (Western logistics hub) before launching the Huliaipole assault. This would trigger a humanitarian crisis, forcing NATO diplomatic/logistical support structures to shift focus from military aid to civil relief, achieving maximal logistical strangulation without relying on the contested Polish border situation.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J2/J6 COMMAND (C2 & INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - C2/UTILITY RESTORATION): Prioritize power restoration for WATER PUMPING STATIONS and key military C2 facilities (Kyiv/Fastiv). Deploy specialized J6 teams to ensure communications redundancy for water utility management. (CR-2225 related).
• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - TECHINT/BDA): IMMEDIATELY VERIFY RF CLAIM OF UGV INTERCEPTION. Initiate ELINT/IMINT collection (CR-2226) focused on the Konstiantynivka GLOC to assess the viability of the UAF Hunter-Killer UGV teams. Failure to verify requires immediate modification of logistical security protocols. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
• ACTION (PRIORITY 3 - AD REALLOCATION): Prepare regional AD assets (Vinnytsia/Zhytomyr) to immediately prioritize protection of identified water treatment facilities, anticipating the MDCOA of a secondary strike targeting the water grid.

2. J3/GROUND FORCES COMMAND (KINETIC DEFENSE & LOGISTICS)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - HULIAIPOLE COUNTER-FIRE): EXECUTE MAXIMUM COUNTER-FIRE NOW. Do not await CR-2217 BDA beyond 290730Z NOV. Authorize pre-emptive artillery and MLRS fires against known RF Vostok Group staging areas to disrupt the planned H-Hour synchronization.
• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - GLOC SECURITY SHIFT): Pending CR-2226 verification, assume the Konstiantynivka UGV operation is compromised. IMMEDIATELY TRANSITION to ARMORED CONVOY ESCORT PROTOCOLS utilizing integrated EW and drone surveillance, replacing stealth UGV reliance for short-term logistical security.

3. NCA/DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT (STRATEGIC COUNTER-IO)

• ACTION (PRIORITY 1 - PUBLIC HEALTH STATEMENT): NCA must release a unified statement acknowledging the coordinated attack on utilities (power and water), emphasizing civil resilience, and detailing planned emergency water distribution points. This counters RF IO by demonstrating organized response.
• ACTION (PRIORITY 2 - DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE): Use the confirmed targeting of civilian water systems as urgent justification to international partners for the immediate delivery of advanced AD systems capable of handling low-altitude BPLA and cruise missile saturation attacks, specifically to protect essential life-support infrastructure.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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