Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 281304Z NOV 25 ANALYST JUDGMENT: The successful containment of the RF tactical penetration in the Huliaipole sector by UAF forces (33 OShP) temporarily stabilizes the Zaporizhzhia axis. However, RF adaptation in GLOC interdiction (UGVs) combined with continuous, high-casualty pressure on Pokrovsk means the operational threat remains CRITICAL.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole): UAF operational reporting indicates that elements of the 33rd Separate Assault Regiment (33 ОШП) and supporting mechanized units have successfully contained the breach and "returned control over the situation" following the kinetic RF penetration. This stabilizes the forward line, transitioning the objective from an immediate counter-penetration to a localized counter-attack aimed at full line restoration. RF forces (Vostok Group sub-elements) are confirmed utilizing drone swarms against UAF transport in the immediate vicinity, suggesting an inability to maintain armored maneuver momentum.
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): Status remains Severe Engagement/Presumed Encirclement (P1 GAP). UAF reports confirm RF forces are "storming Pokrovsk around the clock," sustaining heavy losses but maintaining continuous kinetic pressure. This suggests UAF forces, while isolated, are still combat effective and executing robust resistance.
• Konstiantynivka GLOC: RF forces are confirmed employing Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and FPV drones, specifically mentioning the NTK Kurier, to strike UAF positions and interdict the primary supply route. This represents a confirmed, technologically adapted threat to UAF operational reserves.
• Stepnohirsk Sector: RF sources report targeting UAF resupply operations in heavy fog, highlighting the environmental advantage RF is currently exploiting for close-range FPV attrition strikes.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors

• Confirmed localized weather factors (fog) are reducing ground and aerial visibility in sectors like Stepnohirsk, favoring short-range FPV drone use and complicating UAF visual reconnaissance and resupply efforts.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF (Red): Vostok Group elements are fixed in the immediate Huliaipole area, focusing on attrition via drone strikes and sustaining pressure on Pokrovsk. Deployment of the 1488th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment suggests an continued defensive posture covering rear assets, likely in anticipation of further UAF deep strikes.
• UAF (Blue): The 33 OShP is confirmed as the immediate tactical reserve/counter-attack force in Huliaipole. UAF forces in Pokrovsk are engaged in high-intensity, close-quarters defense. Efforts are underway to maintain administrative efficiency (Rezerv+ update) despite combat stress.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities: RF continues to demonstrate multi-domain attrition capability: (1) Rapid kinetic assault (Huliaipole), (2) Persistent siege tactics (Pokrovsk), and (3) Technological adaptation for GLOC interdiction (UGVs/FPV swarms).
• Intentions:
  • Operational: Sustain combat intensity on both Huliaipole and Pokrovsk simultaneously to force UAF operational exhaustion and prevent the successful execution of the Huliaipole counter-attack.
  • Tactical Adaptation: Maintain deep pressure on UAF GLOCs, utilizing UGVs (Kurier) to reduce risk to RF personnel while maximizing disruption.
  • Strategic (IO): Exploit global diplomatic vulnerabilities and internal Ukrainian challenges (corruption) to undermine Western support continuity.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Technological Interdiction: Confirmed fielding and active use of the NTK Kurier UGV on the Konstiantynivka axis. This UGV, potentially equipped with an NSVT heavy machine gun, provides a low-cost, high-leverage tool for fixing UAF forces and targeting rear echelon transport and dismounted infantry, significantly elevating the threat level to the GLOC. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF immediate logistics are assessed as sufficient to maintain the current tempo of attrition warfare (drone and artillery consumption).
• Non-Kinetic Setback: The reported industrial accident at the Baikonur Cosmodrome following the Soyuz MS-28 launch represents a potential mid-to-long term constraint on RF strategic programs (e.g., satellite launch capacity, strategic morale) but is unlikely to impact current ground operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective at coordinating multi-axis pressure and integrating new technologies (UGVs) into the operational plan, specifically targeting UAF logistical weak points. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Huliaipole Sector: CRITICAL/STABILIZED. The successful containment by 33 OShP demonstrates high tactical proficiency and resolve, but the units are likely depleted and require immediate reinforcement to transition from containment to counter-attack.
• Pokrovsk Sector: EXTREME STRESS/RESILIENT. UAF units are executing defense protocols effectively under intense, continuous assault. Their continued combat effectiveness buys critical time for action in the South.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed containment of the Huliaipole penetration. Successful high-profile prosecution of FSB agents/collaborators (treason case), bolstering internal security and rule-of-law credibility.
• Setbacks: Confirmed technological adaptation by RF (UGVs) targeting critical GLOCs, requiring immediate development of countermeasures. Continuous high attrition rates in Pokrovsk.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Urgent Requirement: Specialized counter-UAV and counter-UGV assets (e.g., electronic warfare, specialized anti-armor teams) must be deployed to the Konstiantynivka GLOC to neutralize the enhanced interdiction threat.
• Constraint: The successful containment in Huliaipole must not mask the reality that operational reserves are still tied up by the persistent interdiction threat.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Core Themes: (1) Weaponizing Western Conditional Aid: Amplifying statements by EU officials (e.g., Justice Commissioner McGrath) that accession support is conditional on corruption eradication, framing Kyiv as endemically corrupt and unreliable. (2) Historical Revisionism: Countering Western narratives of aggression (Medinsky vs. Kallas exchange). (3) Morale Boost: Highlighting RF tactical drone successes (Huliaipole/Kharkiv) and internal stability narratives.
• UAF Counter-Themes: Focus on internal resilience (Rezerv+ deferment system for families with disability, supporting morale and legality) and judicial success (treason prosecution), projecting state functionality.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Domestic UAF morale is sustained by visible tactical success (Huliaipole containment) and legal resilience. RF IO efforts to exploit the EU accession conditionality will target domestic trust in Kyiv's leadership, particularly following the previous US peace plan leak.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The conditional nature of future EU support, confirmed by official statements regarding corruption and rule of law, remains a critical vulnerability. This provides RF with leverage to slow down aid flow and complicate Kyiv's diplomatic objectives. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(Confidence: HIGH) RF forces will shift the Huliaipole effort from mechanized exploitation to sustained, high-volume attrition warfare, utilizing massed artillery and drone swarms (as confirmed by current activity) to paralyze the 33 OShP counter-attack force. Concurrently, the operational tempo against Pokrovsk will be maintained or increased, accepting massive casualties, with the aim of forcing a decisive result (collapse or surrender) NLT 290000Z NOV. The use of UGVs on the Konstiantynivka GLOC will intensify, aiming to prevent the committed UAF reserves from reaching the Huliaipole axis.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(Confidence: MEDIUM) RF achieves a secondary breach or bypass of the contained Huliaipole line and rapidly secures a major North-South GLOC connection, isolating Orikhiv. Simultaneously, the UGV deployment proves overwhelmingly effective, resulting in the failure of UAF attempts to reinforce the front. This combination forces UAF command to divert critical AD and electronic warfare assets from vital C2 nodes (e.g., Sloviansk) to counter the UGV threat, exposing strategic rear areas to renewed KAB/missile strikes.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary operational objective is to exploit the successful containment at Huliaipole by rapidly neutralizing the RF interdiction capability on the Konstiantynivka GLOC, thereby freeing reserve forces for the planned counter-attack.

1. J3/Force Protection (IMMEDIATE COUNTER-UGV/SPETSNAZ):

   • ACTION: Immediately deploy Electronic Warfare (EW) assets capable of directional jamming and rapid-response counter-drone/counter-UGV teams to the Konstiantynivka GLOC. Priority targets include identified UGV control stations and launch points, and confirmed NTK Kurier units.
   • RATIONALE: Neutralizing the UGV threat is paramount to releasing fixed reserves and restoring operational freedom of movement for the Huliaipole counter-attack.
   • CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

2. J3/J5 (HULIAIPOLE EXPLOITATION):

   • ACTION: Release pre-positioned operational reserves (once Konstiantynivka GLOC is stabilized) to support the 33 OShP in executing a coordinated Counter-Attack to Restore Line of Contact (CALOC). Utilize the window of reduced RF armored momentum (due to drone attrition focus).
   • RECOMMENDATION: The CALOC must be supported by heavy M777/Giatsint fires (as confirmed operationally ready) to suppress RF drone assembly areas and C2 supporting the Vostok Group.
   • CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

3. J2/SIGINT/IMINT (PRIORITY COLLECTION FOCUS):

   • ACTION: Focus SIGINT on detecting RF UGV command frequencies and IMINT/ISR assets on tracking UGV deployment patterns along the Konstiantynivka-Pokrovsk road network.
   • PRIORITY 1 GAP (UPDATED): UGV Command/Control signatures and operational range/effectiveness.
   • CONFIDENCE: HIGH.

4. MFA/NCA (STRATEGIC COUNTER-IO/DIPLOMACY):

   • ACTION: Proactively engage key EU member states and the European Commission to reaffirm commitment to anti-corruption reforms (citing the recent high-profile treason prosecution) to mitigate the diplomatic damage caused by conditional aid statements. Isolate the RF narrative of systemic Ukrainian failure.
   • RATIONALE: Failure to address conditional support risks logistical aid disruption.
   • CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

//END OF REPORT//