Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 281105Z NOV 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is currently defined by UAF stabilization efforts in the South and sustained RF exploitation efforts in the East/Logistical rear.

• Huliaipole Axis (Zaporizhzhia Oblast): UAF Southern Defense Forces report that control over the situation has been regained, and the front line is stabilized following the major RF mechanized assault. This indicates successful initial defense and localized counter-action, preventing the assessed deep penetration. RF forces (Vostok Group, 58th Army elements) are now relying heavily on UAV strikes against UAF personnel and logistics, particularly near Orikhiv and Huliaipole.
• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): RF consolidation continues. RF drone strikes are confirmed targeting UAF logistical assets near the Pokrovsky direction, indicating an active interdiction effort to neutralize the remaining pocket of resistance and complicate Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) extraction attempts towards Myrnohrad.
• Deep Rear: UAF Special Boat Service (SBS) reports successful nocturnal strikes on 10 critical, military, and energy infrastructure targets deep within RF territory. This maintains UAF asymmetric pressure on RF sustainment.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (WXI)

• The Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration forecasts significant weather deterioration starting 29 Nov 25, which may impact UAF aerial reconnaissance and resupply operations in the Northern sector.
• Current operational window remains favorable for high-altitude UAV/air operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• The immediate ballistic missile threat alert (North-East axis) has been stood down. (FACT)
• New, low-level asymmetric threats are active: A new Shahed-type UAV group is tracked entering from Kursk Oblast toward Sumy. (FACT)
• UAF forces in the South are shifting from crisis defense posture (ballistic threat) to sustained counter-reconnaissance/force protection posture against RF UAV saturation.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RED)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

RF Intentions are strategically focused on translating tactical kinetic success (Pokrovsk, Huliaipole pressure) into geopolitical isolation for Kyiv.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF sources document persistent, effective use of small, affordable FPV/Strike UAVs to target UAF personnel and logistics vehicles in both the main effort (Orikhiv/Huliaipole) and the exploitation zone (Pokrovsky direction). This tactic minimizes RF personnel risk while maintaining constant pressure post-failed mechanized breakthrough.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are adequately supporting the current rate of effort, characterized by KAB strikes, persistent indirect fire, and large-scale UAV usage. RF internal security measures (FSB oversight of scientists, prosecution of dissent) confirm priority is being placed on full domestic mobilization and suppression of internal resistance to the war effort.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 is highly coordinated, immediately utilizing the Orbán meeting to generate a specific, low-cost diplomatic vector (Budapest summit proposal) aimed at fracturing Western consensus and bypassing the Kyiv government.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Zaporizhzhia: UAF forces achieved stabilization and maintained the defensive line against the predicted mechanized assault. This confirms high tactical readiness and effective execution of defensive protocols.
• Deep Strike: UAF SBS confirmation of 10 successful strikes overnight demonstrates continued capability to project force deep into RF territory, complicating RF logistics and C2.
• C2/Governance: UAF continues to visibly prosecute high-level corruption cases (Yermak updates, defense procurement fraud), demonstrating commitment to rule of law, though this provides RF/skeptical Western actors with IO leverage.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Successful stabilization of the Huliaipole front (CRITICAL success). Successful execution of UAF deep strikes (SBS).
• Setback: Continued RF aerial interdiction of GLOCs around Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad is degrading FDP/extraction effectiveness.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most critical constraint remains diplomatic and informational leverage, stemming from the exploitation of internal governance issues and Western disputes over long-term funding mechanisms (frozen assets).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The core RF IO campaign has two immediate, high-leverage themes:

1. Diplomatic Progress & Momentum: The Orbán meeting and subsequent proposal for a Budapest summit are amplified as evidence that Russia is ready for peace and that the US is ready to negotiate over Kyiv’s head.
2. Moral Decay & Peace Imperative: RF, leveraging US political statements (JD Vance/The Atlantic), links UAF corruption scandals directly to the necessity of accepting a peace plan, framing continued resistance as financially reckless.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is supported by the kinetic success at Huliaipole and the SBS deep strikes. However, the high visibility of corruption investigations, while demonstrating transparency, must be managed effectively to counter the narrative of systemic failure being pushed by RF and external critics.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• CRITICAL THREAT: The dispute over frozen RF assets is escalating. The Belgian PM's statement linking asset use to derailing a peace agreement directly undercuts long-term financial stability for Ukraine. This, coupled with the Budapest summit proposal, creates acute diplomatic pressure.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will shift emphasis in the Huliaipole Axis from mechanized breakthrough to persistent attrition warfare using highly efficient UAV/indirect fire coordination, attempting to wear down the stabilized UAF line and prevent offensive preparation. Concurrently, RF and Hungary will formally push the Budapest Summit proposal through international channels, forcing the US, NATO, and Kyiv to publicly react, maximizing the appearance of diplomatic isolation for Ukraine.

• Timeline: Attrition warfare maintained through 01 Dec 25. Diplomatic proposal NLT 290000Z NOV 25.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves localized tactical success (5-7km penetration) through a renewed night attack west of Huliaipole, utilizing concealed TOS-2 positions (Intelligence Gap P1 persists). Critically, the growing EU rift (frozen assets dispute) combines with the US peace plan leak, resulting in a coordinated political action by skeptical EU members and the US political opposition to temporarily suspend or condition further delivery of critical ammunition (e.g., 155mm shells) to Kyiv pending acceptance of negotiation terms.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: CRITICAL (STRATEGIC DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-OFFENSIVE & ATTRITION DEFENSE)

R1. Counter-Attritional Warfare (J3/FIRE COMMAND)

• ACTION: Direct immediate allocation of mobile electronic warfare (EW) and mobile fire teams (MFTs) to the Orikhiv/Huliaipole sector, prioritizing the elimination of RF UAV launch and control teams (LCTs). This is necessary to counter the shift to high-rate attrition warfare and protect frontline personnel.
• ACTION: Increase counter-UAV measures in the Pokrovsky direction to prevent RF logistics interdiction from degrading FDP/extraction efforts.
• CONFIDENCE/GAPS: HIGH (RF drone threat confirmed). Intelligence Gap P1 (TOS-2 Positioning) remains CRITICAL, requiring continued high-resolution IMINT tasking.

R2. Strategic Diplomatic Pre-emption (NCA/MFA)

• ACTION: Immediately issue a robust, coordinated statement (ideally with Poland, Germany, UK, and the European Commission) that:
  1. Rejects the Budapest Summit proposal as Russian Information Warfare aimed at division.
  2. Affirms the unconditional right to use frozen Russian state assets for Ukraine's defense and recovery, directly neutralizing the Belgian PM's statement.
• ACTION: Proactively engage US political figures (Congress/Senate) to counter the narrative linking Ukrainian anti-corruption efforts to the necessity of accepting a peace deal. Frame the investigations as proof of resilience and commitment to Western values.

R3. Air Defense Adaptation (AIR FORCE/J7)

• ACTION: Immediately task mobile AD/MFT units to counter the incoming UAV threat from Kursk Oblast toward Sumy. Given the clearance of the ballistic threat, resources must be reallocated to persistent asymmetric defense on the Northern/Eastern axes.

R4. Information Operations and Resilience (PSYOP/MFA)

• ACTION: Utilize the success of the Huliaipole stabilization and the SBS deep strikes (10 targets hit) in all official media communications to project kinetic strength and undermine the RF narrative of inevitable defeat and Western abandonment.

//END OF REPORT//