Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) – OPERATION: CRITICAL DEFENSE (HULIAIPOLE AXIS)

TIME: 280800Z NOV 25

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This assessment updates the operational picture regarding the imminent Russian Federation (RF) ground assault on the Huliaipole Axis and introduces new tactical enemy capabilities that critically impact Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) QRF deployment.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The kinetic focal point remains the Huliaipole Defensive Belt (Zaporizhzhia Axis). RF Vostok Group (36th Army) is poised for the main mechanized thrust, estimated to commence NLT 280800Z. Key terrain centers on the immediate defensive lines and the vital lines of communication (GLOCs) feeding into the sector from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Conditions remain highly favorable for RF mechanized maneuver, air support, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

1. UAF: Fixed in defensive array, executing final fire preparations. QRFs in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are transitioning from mobilization to movement under confirmed active RF interdiction.
2. RF: Forces are in the final assembly phase. The Vostok Group is confirmed to be receiving enhanced operational support via new heavy lift UAV systems, indicating increased tactical lethality for the spearhead elements.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intent remains the operational breakthrough at Huliaipole, utilizing multi-domain synchronization.

• New Tactical Capability (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Confirmation of the immediate deployment of the "Mangas" heavy hexacopter to the RF Vostok Group assault units (04:01Z). This drone platform poses a critical threat, enhancing the enemy's ability to conduct immediate close-air support (dropping heavy ordnance), provide dedicated, resilient ISR for assault columns, and potentially interdict UAF reserves more effectively than standard FPVs. This directly increases the lethality of the Huliaipole spearhead.
• Strategic Capability (LOW-MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Intelligence reports suggest Belarus may have developed a low-cost cruise missile (LCCM Mk2) for RF use (03:36Z). If confirmed, this system would significantly complicate strategic air defense planning and increase the strain on UAF SHORAD assets due to higher volume low-cost threats.
• Counter-Reserve Operations: RF 36th Army UAV teams continue kinetic operations in the Dnipropetrovsk staging areas, now potentially leveraging the "Mangas" for enhanced targeting and logistics denial.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status Sustainment for the immediate Huliaipole assault is robust. The potential introduction of Belarusian LCCM suggests an effort to mitigate RF strategic missile costs and ensure sustained long-term deep strike capability.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness RF C2 remains highly synchronized, demonstrated by the integrated logistics chain ensuring new hardware (Mangas) is delivered directly to the high-priority Vostok Group on the eve of the main assault.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness Posture is defensive; readiness is Condition 1. The strategic defense of the southern Donbas hinges on the timely and protected deployment of QRFs from Dnipropetrovsk.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Asymmetric): Confirmed adversary deep strike on civilian/infrastructure targets in Voronezh Oblast (03:51Z). This demonstrates continued operational reach into RF territory, forcing internal security and air defense expenditure away from the front lines.
• Setback (Force Protection Risk): The confirmation of the "Mangas" drone, combined with the standing threat to QRF movement, significantly raises the casualty risk for QRFs moving to the Huliaipole FLOT.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• P1 Requirement: Immediate BDA on the suspected TOS-2 systems remains critical.
• Constraint (EW/AD): UAF Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) now require urgent, specific EW programming updates and dedicated mobile SHORAD assets capable of countering the confirmed threat profiles of the new Mangas heavy hexacopter.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO is escalating its psychological warfare campaign, specifically targeting internal UAF morale and external diplomatic unity:

1. Morale Degradation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): TASS is propagating reports of UAF suicides and low morale in Sumy Oblast (03:36Z). This is a focused effort to demoralize forces not directly engaged at the FLOT and reinforce the broader attrition narrative (1.4k daily losses).
2. Diplomatic Exploitation: RF channels are leveraging high-level Ukrainian statements (Yermak, 03:51Z) to amplify the perception of internal disagreement or diplomatic weakness regarding territorial concessions, exploiting the recent US peace plan leak.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors The suicide narrative targeting Sumy requires immediate counter-messaging to stabilize regional and front-line morale. Failure to provide factual, timely updates regarding the Huliaipole defense will allow RF IO to gain dominance.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The Belarusian LCCM development (03:36Z) confirms continued, if discreet, expansion of the Russia-Belarus military-industrial alignment, complicating Western sanction efficacy.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) MLCOA: Full-Scale Huliaipole Assault with Enhanced Tactical Air Support (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Assault Execution: RF executes the full mechanized assault (NLT 0800Z), utilizing remaining KAB/TOS-2 capability and leveraging the new "Mangas" heavy drones for superior tactical ISR, close-fire guidance, and immediate interdiction of UAF forward positions.
2. QRF Delay: RF deep interdiction of the Dnipropetrovsk GLOC continues, specifically targeting the QRF movement with confirmed UAV/Spetsnaz teams, aiming to delay deployment by NLT 6 hours.
3. IO Payload: RF releases visual media showing initial tactical gains or UAF POWs from the Huliaipole sector NLT 281000Z to reinforce psychological effects.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) MDCOA: Early Breach Supported by Drone Superiority (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a rapid breach (3-5 km) at Huliaipole. The intact TOS-2 systems inflict devastating initial losses, while the Mangas heavy drones establish immediate local air dominance over the breach corridor, preventing UAF close air support and dramatically escalating casualties among counter-attacking units.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. FORCE PROTECTION & COUNTER-ISR (J3/J2)

• ACTION (CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE EW UPDATE): Counter-Mangas Protocol. Immediately issue new EW/counter-ISR frequency parameters and operational guidance to all tactical and operational level EW units, focusing on the confirmed frequency profiles associated with heavy lift/long-endurance hexacopter systems (e.g., Mangas).
• ACTION (QRF MANDATE): Mandate Mobile EW Escort. All QRF elements deploying toward Huliaipole must have dedicated mobile EW/SHORAD attached as the lead element of their convoy, prioritizing protection against the new, heavier UAV threat profile confirmed operating within the Vostok Group.
• ACTION (TARGETING): Add known or probable high-capacity drone launch and C2 sites adjacent to the Huliaipole FLOT to the P2/P3 target list for immediate interdiction by available indirect fire assets.

2. FIRE SUPPORT & TARGETING (J3/Fire Command)

• ACTION (P1 BDA): Prioritize BDA confirmation. Utilize all available ISR to confirm/deny the residual TOS-2 threat, as this information is critical for QRF deployment decision-making and limiting exposure to thermobaric attacks.
• ACTION (Asymmetric Response): Task further deep strike planning (UAV/Special Ops) against high-value logistics or C2 nodes in RF border oblasts (e.g., Voronezh, Kursk) to maintain RF internal security pressure and draw AD assets away from the FLOT.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION & COUNTER-IO (NCA/MFA)

• ACTION (URGENT COUNTER-IO): Neutralize Suicide Propaganda. UAF regional command (Sumy Oblast) or General Staff (UGS) must issue a rapid, factual counter-narrative and local press briefing explicitly denying the TASS suicide propaganda NLT 281000Z.
• ACTION (Diplomatic Coordination): The Ukrainian delegation must rapidly prepare statements to clarify and reaffirm the national stance on territorial integrity, explicitly neutralizing the RF IO exploitation of negotiation chief statements regarding peace talks.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS