Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) – HIGH VALUE TARGETING & OPERATIONAL CRISIS

TIME: 280130Z NOV 25

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The operational center of gravity remains fixed on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole) where RF forces are postured for an imminent mechanized assault, threatening a critical operational breakthrough. The Pokrovsk Axis is confirmed as an operational loss (Presumed Total Encirclement - P1 GAP). UAF defensive posture is focused on preventing penetration past the current forward line of troops (FLOT) in the South and managing the extraction/breakout of forces in the East.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Current conditions (late night/early morning) favor small unit infiltration and persistent UAV operations by RF forces (Confirmed UAV movement in Kherson). RF utilizes this limited visibility for final reconnaissance targeting, particularly for high-value thermobaric assets (TOS-2).

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

1. Huliaipole: UAF assets are engaged in Pre-Emptive Counter-Preparation (PCP) fires based on previous intelligence, targeting suspected RF concentration areas. RF 35th Army (Vostok Group) is the primary kinetic threat element.
2. Pokrovsk: Fragmented Defense Protocols (FDP) are being executed, shifting control from large-scale maneuver to decentralized breakout operations toward Myrnograd.
3. Rear Area Security: RF Spetsnaz teams continue to fix UAF operational reserves by interdicting the Konstiantynivka GLOC.

D. Recent Tactical Events (272200Z - 280130Z)

• Air Defense: Clearance of air alerts (Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, 00:41Z - 00:47Z) indicates no successful RF long-range strike execution during the immediate pre-assault window, likely due to successful UAF AD or temporary RF asset withdrawal. (FACT)
• Southern ISR: Confirmed RF UAV ingress course toward Kherson from the northeast (00:40Z), indicating continued ISR pressure on the Dnipro River line defenses. (FACT)

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

A. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions RF intentions are unchanged: achieve a decisive tactical breakthrough in the South (Huliaipole) to exploit the collapse of the Eastern front (Pokrovsk).

• Capabilities: RF maintains high kinetic capability, demonstrated by confirmed KAB saturation and the integration of Thermobaric systems (TOS-2) for defensive breach. The confirmed SAR spike in RF AD units (1488th Regiment) suggests an operational decision to aggressively shield high-value assets (C2/Logistics) or preparation for increased air cover for the Huliaipole assault. (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Immediate Threat Vector: The primary threat remains the Huliaipole ground assault, followed by persistent RF Spetsnaz interdiction on UAF main supply routes (MSRs) (Konstiantynivka).

B. Recent Tactical Changes/Adaptations RF has successfully adapted its strike tempo, prioritizing tactical interdiction (UAVs on Sloviansk/Kherson, Spetsnaz on GLOCs) over deep ballistic strikes in the immediate timeframe. This maximizes the isolation of the Southern defense group prior to the main thrust.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status RF sustains the ability to deliver heavy munitions (KAB) and specialized assets (TOS-2) to the contact line. RF deep logistics vulnerability remains high following UAF strikes (Grozny), forcing costly AD repositioning.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness RF C2 is highly effective in the Information Environment (IE), utilizing explicit presidential claims of victory (Pokrovsk) to amplify demoralization potential among UAF forces and fracture Western political will.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Readiness: High alert status in the Zaporizhzhia axis. Units are currently focused on executing the Counter-Preparation fires recommended in the 27 NOV report, crucial for disrupting the RF assault time-table.
• Resource Strain: The need to deploy QRFs to clear the Konstiantynivka GLOC represents a critical diversion of limited reserve capacity away from the Huliaipole defense.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback: Pokrovsk Operational Loss. This necessitates a strategic redeployment and creates a gap in the Southern Donbas defense line that RF will aggressively attempt to exploit.
• Success: UAF execution of deep strikes (Grozny) demonstrates successful asymmetric escalation, confirmed by RF counter-reactions (1488th SAR spike). Successful defense against recent kinetic threats targeting capital/major logistics hubs (Kyiv/Zaporizhzhia clearance).

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Critical Requirement: Timely delivery of fire support (MSRL/Artillery) and dedicated ISR platforms (UAVs) to confirm/strike TOS-2 positions before they can commit to the assault.
• Constraint: Limited high-quality operational reserves are fixed by RF Spetsnaz action along critical MSRs.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO is actively conducting two simultaneous campaigns:

1. Diplomatic Wedge: Aggressive exploitation of the leaked US peace proposal to isolate Kyiv from key European partners (Germany/France). This narrative frames Kyiv as an obstacle to peace supported by an unstable Western coalition. (JUDGMENT - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Internal Dissolution: Attempted amplification of UAF internal corruption investigations ("Mindichgate") to undermine trust in state institutions.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors UAF morale is stressed by the confirmed operational loss at Pokrovsk. The subsequent RF visual evidence (expected NLT 280600Z) will test unit cohesion. The FDP authorization is a necessary measure to preserve combat effectiveness by granting independence, mitigating the psychological impact of encirclement.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Critical Fissure: The alliance rift over the US peace plan is the highest strategic vulnerability. The high Dempster-Shafer belief mass (0.4288) dedicated to "Peacekeeping Deployment" suggests that external actors perceive the situation as unstable enough to warrant intervention planning, potentially outside the expressed desires of Kyiv. (JUDGMENT - MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) MLCOA: Kinetic Breakthrough & Information Campaign (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Assault Execution: RF initiates the Huliaipole mechanized assault (utilizing TOS-2 and KAB saturation) within the next 04-08 hours (NLT 280600Z).
2. Tactical Objective: RF achieves a penetration depth of 5-10 km, sufficient to require UAF commitment of local reserves and threaten the next layer of defense.
3. Information Objective: RF releases incontrovertible evidence (visual confirmation/POWs) from the Pokrovsk pocket within the next 12 hours (NLT 281400Z) to maximize diplomatic pressure during the ongoing NATO/EU deliberations regarding aid.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) MDCOA: Southern Collapse and Strategic Isolation (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a rapid, deep breakthrough at Huliaipole (15+ km penetration) due to successful saturation of UAF defenses and the effective fixing of UAF reserves by Spetsnaz on the Konstiantynivka GLOC. This deep penetration forces a generalized operational withdrawal across the entire Southern Donbas line. Simultaneously, the diplomatic fissure leads to a temporary logistical freeze (e.g., fuel or high-caliber ammunition shipments) NLT 281800Z, crippling UAF ability to stabilize the new defensive line.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. FIRE SUPPORT & TARGETING (J3/Fire Command)

• ACTION: Priority 1 Intelligence Gap remains the location of TOS-2 systems west of Huliaipole. All ISR assets (UAV, IMINT) must be re-tasked immediately to the grid sectors identified as potential pre-assault staging areas.
• IMPACT: Confirmation allows for the destruction of the key RF breakthrough capability, significantly reducing the MLCOA penetration depth.

2. FORCE PROTECTION & LOGISTICS SECURITY (J3/J4)

• ACTION: Immediately deploy Counter-Sniper/Anti-Infiltration teams (equipped with advanced thermal sights and communications intercept capabilities) to actively sweep the Konstiantynivka GLOC. The objective is to neutralize RF Spetsnaz interdiction teams NLT 280800Z to free up fixed UAF operational reserves.
• ACTION: Issue an emergency tactical alert to UAF units operating near the Kherson axis regarding the detected northbound RF UAV ISR vector (00:40Z). Enhance local AD readiness for low-altitude threats.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION & DIPLOMACY (NCA/MFA)

• ACTION: Immediately implement the recommended diplomatic action: The NCA must issue a joint statement with key European partners (prioritizing Germany/France) leveraging PM Shmyhal’s NATO visit. The statement must explicitly reject "unilateral" or "uncoordinated" peace proposals and affirm unconditional long-term support for Kyiv's operational objectives.
• IMPACT: Neutralizes RF IO exploitation of the US-EU rift and stabilizes the flow of critical military aid.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS