Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP)

TIME: 270634Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL DEEP STRIKE TARGET PIVOT TO KHMELNYTSKYI. ZAPORIZHZHIA GROUND THREAT REMAINS HIGH. IMMEDIATE FORCE REDIRECTION REQUIRED.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is dominated by the confirmed geographical pivot of the RF deep strike vector and persistent, synchronized pressure on the Southern Front.

• Deep Strike Axis (CRITICAL PIVOT): The hostile UAV track previously targeting the Vinnytsia C2 complex has successfully penetrated that zone and is now confirmed moving toward Khmelnytskyi Oblast (270605Z). This pivot shifts the primary immediate kinetic threat further west, likely targeting strategic high-value assets (HVA) such as C2 nodes, air bases (e.g., Starokostiantyniv), or major logistics hubs within the Khmelnytskyi sector. Fact: UAV track confirmed entering Khmelnytskyi Oblast.
• Southern Front (INTENSE): The threat on the Zaporizhzhia Axis remains high, evidenced by the immediate alert issued by the Zaporizhzhia OVA (270633Z). RF ground pressure around Huliaipole is assessed to be maintained to fix UAF reserves.
• Widespread AD Saturation: UAF Air Force reports neutralizing/suppressing 92 enemy UAVs during the recent attack wave (270632Z). This confirms that RF kinetic saturation continues to strain AD resources across the rear depth.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist. Optimal conditions for RF deep strike (high-precision) and continued ISR operations. No significant weather impact is anticipated in the immediate 24-hour window. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The critical decision point for CONPLAN DELTA viability (270600Z) has elapsed without confirmation of deployment. UAF must now treat these forces as defensive reserves for the Southern Axis. AD assets must immediately re-task priority coverage from the Vinnytsia region to the Khmelnytskyi high-value target areas.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to achieve maximum operational disruption in the strategic rear to prevent organized reinforcement or withdrawal on the Southern Front.

• Deep Strike Intent: The pivot to Khmelnytskyi confirms the RF's ability to maintain real-time C2 over deep strike assets and adjust targeting dynamically. The ultimate intention is the kinetic degradation of a strategic HVA, likely to disrupt operational depth capabilities (C2, logistics, or air power projection). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• C-UAS Adaptation: The public promotion of the new PT-02 "Ptitselov" counter-UAS device (270601Z) signals RF awareness of UAF drone superiority and an active effort to deploy and utilize new electronic warfare and physical counter-UAS systems to neutralize UAF tactical ISR and strike drones. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Coordinated Pressure: RF continues to synchronize the deep strike vector (Khmelnytskyi) with concentrated ground pressure (Zaporizhzhia) to maximize UAF resource partitioning.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed trajectory shift of the deep strike UAV from Vinnytsia to Khmelnytskyi is a significant tactical adaptation. This suggests either: a) The primary target was always Khmelnytskyi, and the Vinnytsia trajectory was a pre-planned deception to draw down local AD resources, or b) RF ISR observed high AD readiness in Vinnytsia and executed a rapid target change via C2 uplink. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains capable of maintaining both high kinetic saturation rates (implied by the 92 neutralizations) and focused ground operations (Zaporizhzhia). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrates high effectiveness, evidenced by successful dynamic retargeting of the deep strike asset (Vinnytsia $\rightarrow$ Khmelnytskyi) and effective IO synchronization (claiming 118 UAF UAVs downed over RF territory, 270603Z). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF Air Defense performed effectively against the saturation attack, neutralizing 92 UAVs. However, the confirmed penetration of the deep strike asset into Khmelnytskyi Oblast reveals persistent vulnerabilities in layered AD coverage across the operational depth. Forces on the Zaporizhzhia Axis are maintaining alert status against intense enemy pressure (270633Z).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: UAF AD achieved a high neutralization rate (92 UAVs) against the massed attack, preventing widespread kinetic impacts.
• Setback (CRITICAL RISK): Failure to intercept the deep-flying UAV before it entered the Khmelnytskyi sector, placing a strategic HVA under imminent threat.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Constraint: Lack of dedicated AD resources (medium- and long-range) to adequately cover the entire strategic depth, forcing constant prioritization between C2 centers (Vinnytsia), logistics hubs, and military installations (Khmelnytskyi airbases). The critical constraint remains the unconfirmed status of the CONPLAN DELTA forces, vital for defensive operations in the South.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is focused on:

1. Overwhelming Success Narrative: Claiming a massive UAF UAV failure (118 downed drones) to offset the reality of UAF AD success (92 downed RF drones).
2. Internal Patriotism: Celebrating Marine Day and promoting "Code of the Patriot" videos (270615Z, 270630Z) to boost domestic military morale and recruitment.
3. Western Distraction: Fabricating or amplifying geopolitical crises (e.g., linking the Louvre heist to Moscow, 270611Z) to distract Western public attention from the conflict and delegitimize Western support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale in threatened regions (Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhzhia) will face immediate strain due to the active deep strike and ground alerts. Internal UAF commentary (STERNENKO, 270622Z) reflects public frustration over the inability to achieve 100% interception rates ("sranі shahady").

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The CSTO summit remains a key RF diplomatic signaling event. Conversely, international partners (Rutte, 270623Z) are proactively countering RF geopolitical maneuvering by confirming that Russia holds no veto over Ukraine's NATO membership path. Warnings regarding the use of frozen RF assets (Euroclear, 270612Z) indicate slow progress and potential future legal obstacles in securing funding mechanisms.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

The RF deep strike asset will attempt to deliver ordnance to a strategic military/logistics target within Khmelnytskyi Oblast NLT 270730Z. Simultaneously, RF ground forces will sustain high-intensity contact and probing attacks on the Huliaipole sector (Zaporizhzhia Axis) for the next 6-12 hours, forcing UAF J3 to commit the redirected CONPLAN DELTA reserves prematurely or piecemeal. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Successful RF kinetic strike against a high-value C2/logistics node or strategic airbase (e.g., Starokostiantyniv) in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, combined with an operational breakthrough on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (e.g., decisive capture of Huliaipole/Zatishye). The loss of a strategic rear hub while suffering a ground collapse would severely complicate immediate large-scale logistical and troop movements, critically inhibiting the defense of the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: IMMEDIATE AD AND EW RE-TASKING (J3 / AD COMMAND)

The operational threat has shifted to Khmelnytskyi Oblast.

1. Prioritization Shift: Immediately re-task all mobile and medium-range Air Defense assets from the Vinnytsia operational area to provide maximum coverage over critical military infrastructure and C2 nodes within Khmelnytskyi Oblast.
2. Enhanced C2/Logistics Hardening: Activate full physical security and maximum Electronic Warfare (EW) jamming/spoofing around the Starokostiantyniv Airbase sector and regional C2 sites immediately, focusing on mitigating terminal guidance systems (e.g., GNSS jamming).
3. C-UAS Countermeasure Review: Analyze the advertised capabilities of the new RF PT-02 "Ptitselov" C-UAS system (270601Z). UAF tactical units must adjust drone flight patterns and operational protocols to mitigate this emerging threat insertion.

R-2: CRITICAL FORCE REDIRECTION EXECUTION (J3)

1. Force Accountability and Deployment: Immediately confirm the physical status and location of the previously failed CONPLAN DELTA reserve force (GAP 1). Upon confirmation, expedite deployment orders to assigned defensive sectors on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (e.g., reinforcing the line west of Huliaipole/Zatishye).
2. Southern Flank Integrity: Prioritize rapid reinforcement of major road junctions and GLOCs leading from the current contact line toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border to deny RF operational exploitation in the event of a Huliaipole fracture.

R-3: ISR RE-TASKING (J2)

1. Khmelnytskyi Terminal Target ID: Divert high-fidelity SIGINT/IMINT assets to the Khmelnytskyi target area to confirm the specific HVA targeted by the deep strike UAV, allowing for precision AD engagement or C2 mitigation. (Priority 2 CRITICAL requirement from previous report remains vital.)
2. Zaporizhzhia Ground Truth: Maintain high-priority tactical ISR coverage (IMINT/HUMINT) focused on verifying RF ground disposition and potential penetration points near Huliaipole and Zatishye to guide the deployment of the redirected reserve force (R-2.1).

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS