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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-27 03:34:25Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-27 03:04:27Z)

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP) - CRITICAL // EXECUTION PHASE

TIME: 270335Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: MDCOA Targeting Refined; Multi-Axis Deep Strike Underway (T-25 minutes to MEV H-Hour)


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment is characterized by the immediate execution of a synchronized, multi-domain RF offensive targeting C2, reserves, and the front line simultaneously.

  • Zaporizhzhia Axis (MEV): Kinetic shaping fires confirmed (AD activity 270321Z). RF forces are 25 minutes from the projected H-Hour (270400Z) ground assault initiation.
  • Poltava/Kharkiv MDCOA Vector: The previously tracked UAV wave through Poltava is now confirmed tracking toward Kharkiv Oblast (270332Z). This shifts the primary target from static Poltava C2 nodes to mobile reserves and/or key logistical/C2 hubs in the Kharkiv area, further complicating the defense of the southern front.
  • Diversionary/Deep Strike Vectors: Confirmed active air threats are now tracking toward Kyiv Oblast (via Boryspil) and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (via Donetsk axis). This represents four simultaneous, active air threats, placing extreme stress on UAF Air Defense (AD) assets.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions remain optimal for RF long-range precision strikes and tactical aviation. No environmental constraints are present for the 0400Z ground assault. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF AD assets are currently engaged or shifting to address the four active air corridors (Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava/Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia). The critical vulnerability remains the CONPLAN DELTA reserve force, whose status and proximity to the Poltava/Kharkiv UAV track are unknown.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is fixed on initiating the Zaporizhzhia breakthrough (MEV) while simultaneously executing the MDCOA to achieve operational paralysis in the UAF rear.

  • MDO Synchronization (FACT): RF C2 has successfully synchronized the ground offensive with coordinated deep strikes across multiple, widely dispersed axes (Kyiv, Poltava/Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia).
  • MDCOA Refinement (JUDGMENT): The confirmed trajectory shift of the Poltava UAV groups toward Kharkiv indicates RF is targeting either the northern reserves or critical logistics hubs that support the entire Eastern/Southern front. The likelihood of interdicting the moving CONPLAN DELTA reserve (if deployed) remains high as the UAVs pass through the Poltava corridor now. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The capacity to sustain four simultaneous deep strike vectors and maintain pre-assault fires in Zaporizhzhia indicates robust logistics capacity focused on maximizing kinetic effect prior to H-Hour.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective and resilient, successfully executing the planned operational synchronization despite internal friction (Lipetsk/Bryansk alerts from previous reports). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Units on the Zaporizhzhia line are at maximum readiness for the 0400Z assault. The critical weakness is the systemic overstretch of AD capability required to cover four active, high-priority threats concurrently.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Setback (Force Protection): The new air threats against Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk force a critical trade-off in AD allocation, potentially stripping protection from the most essential operational asset: the CONPLAN DELTA reserve force.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

AD ASSET ALLOCATION (CRITICAL CONSTRAINT): Resources must be immediately shifted from the symbolic threat (Kyiv) to the operational threats (Poltava/Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk) to preserve operational mobility and C2.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) remain at a pre-H-Hour peak, focusing on degrading UAF cohesion and diplomatic support.

  1. Command Disintegration: TASS report (270322Z) claiming UAF uses strikes in Kherson Oblast for internal business vendettas continues the theme of corruption and internal instability, designed to undermine loyalty immediately before the major assault. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  2. Diplomatic Erosion: The amplification of high-level diplomatic reports (270303Z) coinciding with military defeat aims to signal to the Ukrainian public and troops that international support is wavering.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is under intense psychological stress due to synchronized battlefield collapse narratives and IO efforts promoting internal distrust. Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) action is required immediately to counter these narratives and maintain cohesion during the anticipated high kinetic phase.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF initiates the combined arms assault on the Zaporizhzhia Axis at 270400Z. Simultaneously, the UAV strike packages will achieve kinetic effects on:

  1. Poltava/Kharkiv: Interdicting the CONPLAN DELTA reserve movement corridor, followed by strikes on Kharkiv logistics/C2.
  2. Dnipropetrovsk: Degrading rear area logistics supporting the Zaporizhzhia front. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The UAF Command authorizes AD assets to defend the symbolic target of Kyiv or high-value infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, failing to provide protection for the highly mobile CONPLAN DELTA force. RF UAVs successfully mission-kill the strategic reserve in the Poltava corridor NLT 270350Z. This ensures a successful RF operational penetration of the Zaporizhzhia front NLT 270600Z. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (NLT)ConfidenceStatus/Action Required
MDCOA Kinetic Effect Window (Poltava Corridor)270350ZHIGHCRITICAL: UAVs are currently transiting the critical zone. Final AD decision point.
RF Zaporizhzhia Ground Offensive Start (H-Hour)270400ZHIGHFull tactical alert; defensive fires initiated.
Kyiv / Dnipropetrovsk Kinetic Effect270415Z - 270430ZMEDIUMFollow-up AD decisions required post-H-Hour initiation.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

R-1: AIR DEFENSE AND FORCE PROTECTION (J3 / AD COMMAND)

  1. AD Prioritization Shift (IMMEDIATE): AD Command must execute an immediate WEAPONS TIGHT order on the Kyiv air threat. All available mobile AD/EW assets must be re-tasked immediately to the Poltava-Kharkiv corridor and the Dnipropetrovsk corridor. Operational integrity (reserves/logistics) supersedes symbolic defense (Kyiv).
  2. Reserve Protection (CRITICAL): J3 must confirm the current coordinates of CONPLAN DELTA (Gap 1). If confirmed moving, ensure they are dispersed and utilizing EW/VSHORAD protection along the Poltava GLOCs NLT 270345Z to evade the active strike wave.
  3. Zaporizhzhia Defensive Fires: All tactical commanders on the Zaporizhzhia line must be prepared to initiate pre-planned defensive fires at 270350Z, irrespective of final confirmation of H-Hour.

R-2: INTELLIGENCE REFINEMENT (J2 / ISR)

  1. Target Confirmation (Poltava/Kharkiv): Highest tactical ISR priority is to confirm the specific targets within Kharkiv Oblast (e.g., Odesa-Kharkiv railway nodes, strategic command bunkers) based on the refined UAV trajectory (270332Z).
  2. Dnipropetrovsk Threat Assessment: Immediate SIGINT/EW monitoring of the new Dnipropetrovsk UAV wave to determine the target type (C2, energy infrastructure, or movement corridors).

R-3: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM)

  1. Counter-Corruption Narrative (URGENT): STRATCOM must issue a forceful, unified rejection of all simultaneous RF narratives (Kharkiv sabotage, Kherson business strikes, Mindichgate). Frame the aggressive disinformation surge as proof of RF desperation to demoralize UAF troops ahead of the anticipated 0400Z failure.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap/RequirementConfidenceTasking Rationale
1 (CRITICAL)Status and current coordinates of CONPLAN DELTA reserve force relative to the Poltava UAV threat.HIGHEssential for force protection and tactical deployment.
2 (CRITICAL)Verification of specific RF ground attack vectors/unit density on the Zaporizhzhia Axis for immediate fire plan adjustment (post-0400Z).HIGHRequired for effective counter-battery and counter-attack planning.
3 (HIGH)Target Confirmation: Specific objectives within Kharkiv Oblast for the UAV wave tracking through Poltava.HIGHRequired for precise AD asset allocation and effective C2 protective measures in the new target area.
Previous (2025-11-27 03:04:27Z)

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