OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OP-INT-SITREP) - URGENT ACTION WINDOW
TIME: 270235Z NOV 25
SUBJECT: Confirmation of Sustained Kinetic Shaping and Activation of Reserve Commitment Protocol Window
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-TEMP)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The operational phase remains Pre-Assault Exploitation Shaping on the Zaporizhzhia Axis. RF main effort (MEV) targeting Huliaipole/Zatishye is confirmed to initiate ground maneuver NLT 270400Z.
- Zaporizhzhia Axis (Priority): Intense pre-assault kinetic shaping continues. UAF must consolidate forward defensive lines within the next 85 minutes.
- Northern Fixation/MDCOA Vector: Confirmed UAF Air Force reports indicate groups of RF Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have crossed from Sumy Oblast (Ulyanivka, Nedryhailiv) and are tracking toward Poltava Oblast (270216Z). This validates the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) targeting rear area logistics or C2.
- Deep Rear (RF): Operational friction persists within the Russian Federation. New alerts have been declared in Bryansk Oblast (270214Z) and a reinforced "Red Level" UAV threat alert is active across multiple districts in Lipetsk Oblast (270225Z). This confirms sustained UAF interdiction success.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Clear, cold conditions persist. Favorable for RF tactical aviation strikes, UAV operations, and continued ground maneuver preparation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
UAF forward units on the Zaporizhzhia Axis are holding under sustained air bombardment. The critical operational task is the immediate and secure deployment of tactical reserves. The window for issuing the J3 Reserve Commitment Order (NLT 270245Z) is active now.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
RF intent to launch a decisive ground assault on the Zaporizhzhia Axis remains fixed for 270400Z.
- Kinetic Synchronization: The simultaneous deep strike threat (Bryansk/Lipetsk), the AD fixation effort (Sumy/Poltava), and the Huliaipole shaping fires demonstrate effective, synchronized kinetic operations ahead of the ground assault. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Adaptation (Counter-Deep Strike): RF C2 is demonstrably committed to managing the internal security threat, as evidenced by the renewed, dispersed "Red Level" alerts in Lipetsk. This suggests UAF deep operations are succeeding in diverting local RF forces (Air Defense, EW, and Security units) away from front-line deployment. This is an immediate resource friction point for RF. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status
Despite logistical pressure from UAF deep strikes, RF is sustaining high kinetic output across multiple axes. The necessity for local RF authorities to manage UAV threats (Lipetsk/Bryansk alerts) likely complicates the secure movement of RF high-value assets (e.g., electronic warfare systems, strategic reserves) through RF territory toward the front line.
2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains robust for executing the operational plan (0400Z assault). However, the necessity to manage internal security crises and divert resources suggests a decentralized, reactive C2 response in the strategic rear area, which should be exploited. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF readiness is maximal. The immediate operational priority remains the secure execution of the reserve maneuver. The failure to confirm the status of Zatishye (Gap 1) by the critical 0230Z timeline introduces a critical uncertainty in tactical reserve positioning.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Success (Deep Operations): Confirmed continued operational disruption within the RF strategic depth (Lipetsk, Bryansk). This is forcing RF C2 to dissipate force protection resources. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Setback/Vulnerability: The lack of immediate confirmation regarding the operational status of the Zatishye settlement risks RF achieving operational surprise on the secondary axis of advance.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Time is exhausted for ISR confirmation. The J3 must now commit the reserves (NLT 270245Z) based on the high confidence of the Huliaipole MEV, accepting the risk posed by the Zatishye information gap.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF Information Operations (IO) have pivoted sharply toward exploiting Western domestic political friction and externalizing blame for the conflict.
- Sowing Division/Blame: TASS amplification of a British journalist blaming the UK/EU for "prolonging the conflict" (270219Z) is a direct StratCom effort to lower allied unity and justify RF maximalist demands.
- Exploitation of US Domestic Crisis: TASS immediately capitalized on the Washington shooting (targeting National Guard) and linked it to US internal security issues and the policies of the current administration (270231Z). This utilizes US political figures (Trump) to inject instability and divert global attention from the front line. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Hybrid Warfare Tactic).
- Minimizing Costs: TASS confirmation of a South Korean mercenary death (270210Z) seeks to normalize casualties of foreign fighters while downplaying domestic RF losses.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Ukrainian morale is likely sustained by confirmed deep operational successes. International focus remains high, but RF is actively attempting to erode confidence through synchronized diplomatic/IO efforts.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
Focused Breach at Huliaipole: RF will launch the primary combined arms assault on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole) at 270400Z. If the Zatishye gap remains unaddressed, RF will use a smaller, highly mobile strike force to push through the unverified settlement simultaneously, threatening a double envelopment or pinning movement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
Counter-Reserve Mission Kill: RF strategic forces (using confirmed UAV groups moving toward Poltava, supported by possible precision strikes) target the UAF reserve movement corridor or marshalling areas NLT 270300Z. Successful interdiction of the reserves prevents the stabilization of the Zaporizhzhia line and risks a breakthrough NLT 270600Z. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated Timeline (NLT) | Confidence | Status/Action Required |
|---|
| Verification of Zatishye Status (IMINT/ISR) | 270230Z | GAP FAILED | CRITICAL DECISION POINT: Requires immediate J3 judgment based on available data. |
| J3 UAF Reserve Commitment Order | 270245Z | HIGH | MANDATORY: Order must be issued NLT this time. Delay risks tactical defeat. |
| RF MDCOA Window (Counter-Reserve Strike) | 270300Z | HIGH | Maximum AD/EW required on reserve GLOCs (especially in Poltava direction). |
| RF Zaporizhzhia Ground Offensive Start | 270400Z | HIGH | Full tactical alert across the Zaporizhzhia line. |
6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
R-1: FORCE MANAGEMENT AND RISK MITIGATION (J3 / AD COMMAND)
- Reserve Activation (IMMEDIATE): The J3 must issue the CONPLAN DELTA replacement force commitment order NLT 270245Z. Deployment must proceed immediately toward the Huliaipole sector. The operational risk of waiting for Zatishye verification is now greater than the risk of deploying reserves slightly off-target.
- AD/EW Deployment (CRITICAL): Immediately assign all available mobile VSHORAD/EW units to the confirmed UAV flight path identified by Air Force Command (Sumy-Poltava vector). Establish overlapping AD bubbles over critical reserve transit chokepoints and marshalling areas NLT 270300Z to mitigate the MDCOA.
- Forward Fire Plan Adjustments: UAF artillery units near the Zatishye sector must be prepared to execute pre-planned target sets on potential RF assembly areas (if IMINT arrives late) or execute fragmentation fire on suspected maneuver routes, using the highest confidence Huliaipole axis as the primary guide.
R-2: INFORMATION WARFARE COUNTER-MEASURES (STRATCOM)
- Counter-Hybrid Narrative: StratCom must immediately issue a denouncement of the TASS report utilizing US domestic political figures (Trump/Washington shooting), framing it as blatant RF psychological operations designed to distract from confirmed strategic failures in Lipetsk and Bryansk Oblasts.
- Reinforce Alliance Unity: Highlight coordinated statements with Western partners (e.g., Canadian FM) that reiterate full sovereignty support, directly countering the TASS narrative that EU/UK are prolonging the conflict.
R-3: INTELLIGENCE REFINEMENT (J2 / ISR)
- ISR Priority Adjustment: While the reserve commitment proceeds, maintain CRITICAL priority on Gap 1 (Zatishye status). Redirect high-altitude IMINT/SAR assets immediately to achieve post-hoc verification to inform subsequent tactical fire missions.
7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap/Requirement | Confidence | Tasking Rationale |
|---|
| 1 (CRITICAL) | Status of Zatishye settlement control and RF troop density verification. | HIGH | Essential for refinement of tactical fire planning; required to determine if reserves need re-orienting. |
| 2 (HIGH) | UAV Target Confirmation: Specific objectives within Poltava Oblast for the incoming UAV wave (C2 vs. logistics hubs). | HIGH | Required for precise, non-redundant AD asset allocation before the 0300Z MDCOA window. |
| 3 (MEDIUM) | BDA/IMINT: Verification of which specific RF internal AD/EW units have been pulled from front-line deployment to counter the confirmed UAV alerts in Lipetsk and Bryansk. | MEDIUM | Required to assess the operational impact of UAF deep strikes on the RF C2/EW capabilities in the immediate front area. |