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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-11-25 19:13:53Z
3 months ago
Previous (2025-11-25 18:43:53Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) TIME: 251930Z NOV 2025

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains dominated by the immediate threat of a major ground offensive on the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast). RF forces are exploiting the kinetic shaping operations executed over the last 24 hours. The key terrain remains the T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), essential for reinforcement of forward defensive lines around Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka. RF fixation operations continue in the North (Kharkiv) and are potentially initiating in the South (new UAS track toward Mykolaiv).

  • Focus Area 1 (Critical): Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka corridor. High probability of mechanized assault initiation NLT 260000Z.
  • Focus Area 2 (Logistics Interdiction): Northern Chernihiv and Southern Kherson/Mykolaiv. RF attempts to disrupt logistics and divert UAF reserves/AD assets.
  • Confirmed BDA: Geran-2 strike confirmed on the Kyiv TV tower, validating RF intent to degrade communications and media access across the theater (251845Z).

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant adverse weather reported impacting ground maneuverability or close air support (CAS) capability. Clear visibility is expected through the assault window (NLT 260000Z), favoring RF drone and precision targeting capabilities.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are currently in a crisis posture due to the failure of Plan 7-B MOD (confirmed non-viable). AD assets remain dispersed following the massed strike. Control measures are strained by the continued RF Information Operation (IO) impacting National Command Authority (NCA) decision cycle regarding reserve commitment. The defense remains critically thin along the Pokrovsk salient.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is clear: conduct a decisive, localized breakthrough near Pokrovsk leveraging the recent systemic (energy/C2) degradation and the current paralysis of UAF strategic reserves.

CapabilityAssessmentConfidence
Ground Assault (Pokrovsk)RF 40th/155th OMBR positioned for mechanized assault NLT 260000Z, aiming to seize T-05-15 GLOC.HIGH
Kinetic ShapingContinued use of UAS (Geran-2, Lancet) confirmed (Kyiv BDA, MoD videos). New UAS group targeting Kherson/Mykolaiv confirms diversification of fixation strikes.MEDIUM
ISR & C3RF forces show effective coordination between deep strikes and pre-positioning. RF is monitoring UAF activities (e.g., UAV footage over Pokrovsk suggests reciprocal ISR).MEDIUM
LogisticsAssessment of GRAU depletion remains tentative (low SAR score), but high expenditure suggests forward positioning of high-value munitions for the ground assault.MEDIUM

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

  • Diversionary Focus: The UAS activity tracking from Kherson toward Mykolaiv (251905Z) indicates a low-cost, high-impact attempt to draw AD assets away from the critical eastern front or protect the vulnerable southern flank, should the Otradnoye claim be verified.
  • IO Synchronization: RF IO efforts (disinformation regarding peace terms and troop limits) are perfectly synchronized to peak immediately before the ground assault to sow maximum confusion and delay UAF reserve deployment.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status (Enemy)

RF is sustaining high-tempo kinetic operations (drone swarms and KABs). Evidence suggests that the expenditure of high-value missiles has been compensated by a surge in forward deployment, indicating high readiness for the imminent assault.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness (Enemy)

RF C2 appears highly effective, having successfully coordinated the massed strike, followed by the specific IO campaign, and the pre-positioning of ground forces on the Pokrovsk axis.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Current UAF posture is defensive and critically constrained by the compromised reserve force (Plan 7-B MOD) and internal logistical failures.

  • Readiness Assessment (Pokrovsk Sector): Low, unless immediate, decisive reserve action is taken (Recommendation 2 from previous report: Deploy Reserve Bravo).
  • Air Defense Success: Confirmed interception of 8 RF UAVs over Dnipropetrovsk (251843Z) demonstrates localized AD effectiveness, but sustained operational capability is threatened by magazine depletion.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Setback (Logistics): CRITICAL LOGISTICAL FAILURE. 5,000 units of body armor are reportedly delayed/stuck at a supplier (Milicon UA). This directly impacts frontline unit survivability, morale, and immediate combat readiness. (DS Belief: 0.059 - Logistical Shift: Disruption in Protective Gear supply).
  • Success (Deep Strike): UAF units reportedly engaged and destroyed an RF BM-21 Grad MLRS system, confirming ongoing offensive capabilities in the Siversky direction (251904Z).

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

  • Immediate Need: Deployment of an operational reserve to the T-05-15 GLOC.
  • Critical Constraint: AD assets remain scarce; allocation requires prioritization between C2 nodes (MDCOA) and ground defense coverage (MLCOA).
  • Logistical Priority: Immediate resolution and acquisition of the delayed body armor and related protective gear.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign claiming a fictional "800,000 troop limit" agreement remains the primary psychological warfare effort, designed specifically to cause cognitive dissonance within the NCA and undermine mobilization efforts.

  • RF Amplification: Channels are actively weaponizing diplomatic discussions (Trump/Zelenskyy meeting, "28-point plan") to imply Kyiv is being forced into unacceptable peace terms, feeding the surrender narrative.
  • UAF Response (Pending): NCA counter-IO (Recommendation 1 from previous report) has not been confirmed executed. The delay is compounding the cognitive paralysis.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is volatile. Diplomatic activity (Macron, Freeland/Canada) offers strategic reassurance, but critical operational reporting (body armor failure, potential Pokrovsk collapse) threatens to depress frontline morale and public support for continued resistance.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

  • Positive Developments: Macron proposed moving forward on frozen Russian assets and security guarantees. Zelenskyy proposed involving European partners in the Trump meeting, a strategic move to maintain European cohesion and dilute RF attempts to isolate Ukraine diplomatically.
  • Assessment: International support remains strong but RF is effectively weaponizing the perception of diplomatic friction to achieve tactical goals.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces initiate the mechanized assault along the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis NLT 260000Z. This assault will be preceded by heavy KAB and UAS strikes to suppress remaining UAF AD and C2 nodes in the immediate operational area. RF will leverage the IO-induced paralysis to ensure the penetration force meets minimal resistance from UAF reserves.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) In parallel with the Pokrovsk ground assault, RF launches a concentrated precision strike (Iskander/KN-23) on the backup C2 and logistics nodes in the Poltava/Vinnytsia area (as previously assessed NLT 251600Z, but now likely shifted to NLT 252200Z to align with the ground assault climax). This strike aims for full operational decapitation during the critical defense window.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Time (Z)Decision Point
Commit Reserve BravoNLT 252000ZImmediate NCA authorization required to meet deployment window.
Otradnoye VerificationNLT 252100ZRequired to confirm/deny southern flanking maneuver threat.
RF Pokrovsk AssaultNLT 260000ZMain combat initiation. Reserve force must be in position.
Execute Counter-IONLT 252000ZRequired to mitigate IO effects on frontline morale and mobilization.

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

PRIORITY 1: POKROVSK DEFENSE & RESERVE COMMITMENT

ACTION: Immediate declaration of Plan 7-B MOD as non-viable, followed by the expedited deployment of Reserve Force Bravo (or highest-readiness equivalent) to reinforce the T-05-15 GLOC corridor. RATIONALE: The window for pre-positioning is closing rapidly. Failure to commit reserves NLT 252000Z guarantees the RF breakthrough NLT 260000Z.

PRIORITY 2: COGNITIVE DOMAIN RESPONSE (Counter-IO)

ACTION: NCA must issue a joint, high-profile statement NLT 252000Z explicitly debunking the "800,000 troop limit" and "surrender terms" as RF psychological warfare directly preceding the anticipated Pokrovsk assault. RATIONALE: Address the source of NCA paralysis and mitigate mass-messaging that degrades troop and mobilization morale.

PRIORITY 3: LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL PROTECTION

ACTION: Joint Staff (J4) must immediately intervene regarding the Milicon UA body armor supply failure. Initiate emergency procurement or redistribution from less active sectors to cover the 5,000 unit deficit and maintain frontline survivability. RATIONALE: The confirmed logistical failure is a critical vulnerability that will undermine confidence in leadership and affect combat effectiveness in the coming assault.

PRIORITY 4: AIR DEFENSE ALLOCATION

ACTION: Shift mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard/NASAMS) currently defending non-essential infrastructure toward the backup C2 nodes in Poltava/Vinnytsia by 252100Z to mitigate the MDCOA precision strike threat. RATIONALE: Protection of C2 superiority during the ground assault is paramount.


INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

PriorityGap DescriptionRequired Action (Tasking)
CRITICALVerification of Otradnoye Capture. Confirm/deny RF presence in Dnipropetrovsk region.Task ISR/SIGINT/HUMINT to Otradnoye sector NLT 252100Z.
HIGHChernihiv/Mykolaiv UAS Intent. Determine if the new UAS groups are targeting AD batteries, logistics hubs, or C2 relays.Task COMINT/ELINT assets to track flight patterns and transmission profiles NLT 252000Z.
MEDIUMPlan 7-B MOD BDA. Confirmation of destruction/compromise to officially close the file and reallocate attached support assets.Task GEOINT/SAR to last known grid NLT 260600Z.
Previous (2025-11-25 18:43:53Z)

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