DTG: 201700Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 201600Z NOV 25 – 201700Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. Kinetic operations remain concentrated on the Pokrovsk axis. The Information Environment (IE) is currently experiencing severe pressure from coordinated RF psychological operations (PSYOPs).
Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): The immediate area surrounding Mirnohrad remains the kinetic focal point following the FAB-3000 strike. RF forces are judged to be consolidating the breach attempt, but no reports confirm the success of the 40th/155th OMBR mechanized thrust within the last hour.
Kryvyi Rih Sector: Local defense chief (Vilkula) is conducting public briefings, indicating maintained readiness and C2 integrity despite ongoing strategic strikes in rear areas.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No significant change. Ground conditions remain conducive to mechanized maneuver. The onset of colder weather (suggested by the 'Тепла зима' initiative) will necessitate forward logistics focus on non-kinetic consumables (fuel, heat, medical supplies).
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Posture: Highly aggressive kinetic posture supported by an aggressive disinformation campaign aimed at immediate psychological demoralization. RF forces are attempting to maintain high synchronization between tactical fighting (Colonelcassad video of close combat) and information warfare (fake Zelensky video, Trump peace plan).
UAF Posture: UAF maintains strategic communications focused on national resilience, historical context (Holodomor/Maidan), and public support ('Тепла зима' program). UAF C2 is actively focusing on technological adaptation, particularly in the EW/Counter-UAS domain (Orion radio plant equipment).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Sustained Combat Capacity: RF forces retain the capability for small-unit offensive action even when wounded ('Хруст' video), indicating high morale or strong command pressure among front-line fighters. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Sophisticated Deep Fake/IO: RF utilizes highly realistic fabricated content (fake Zelensky video) to directly target UAF political will and public confidence. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Mobilization Rate: RF continues to generate combat replacements via the 'volunteer' framework, though the send-off ceremony video indicates low expectations for return ('not to buy a train ticket'). (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Tactical Breach: Maximize the exploitation of the Mirnohrad breach point, aiming to compel UAF tactical reserve commitment.
Political Paralysis: Leverage the amplified 'Trump peace plan' (ASTRA report) and the fake surrender video to undermine UAF leadership's legitimacy and force internal debate on unfavorable negotiated terms.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Shift in IO Focus: The immediate shift from domestic social concerns (Sevastopol corruption, scammers) to maximal political disinformation (fake Zelensky surrender) indicates RF IO believes the kinetic effort (Mirnohrad breach) requires immediate political support to maximize demoralization.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Personnel Logistics: The video of the 'volunteer' send-off suggests RF relies heavily on volunteer/contract forces to sustain troop numbers, consistent with the low morale/high casualty rates suggested by the lack of guaranteed return ('pobyvka' in six months).
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is demonstrating highly coordinated, multi-domain control, ensuring that tactical battlefield activities (assaults) are immediately reinforced by strategic psychological operations (deep fakes, peace plan rumors). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Technological Adaptation: The demonstrated capability of the Orion radio plant to develop and showcase advanced Counter-Drone SENSE-3 EW systems highlights UAF readiness to implement localized, technological solutions against the primary aerial threats. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Strategic Resilience: UAF General Staff and government programs are focused on maintaining deep national resilience, linking current resistance to historical existential threats (Holodomor).
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes: New support secured via the Chile-Germany Marder 1A3 ring exchange, potentially providing 30 IFVs to European partners, indirectly freeing up equivalent or similar equipment for UAF.
Setbacks: The continued intensity of RF kinetic and PSYOP efforts places severe stress on UAF C2 and morale.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
IFV Capacity: The acquisition of Marder 1A3 IFVs through the ring exchange mechanism, if confirmed to yield direct transfer of equivalent capabilities, is a critical resource requirement for the coming mechanized defense of Pokrovsk.
EW/Counter-UAS: Continued demand for advanced counter-drone systems like the "Contra Drone SENSE - 3" is paramount for survival in the current theater.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
Political Targeting (CRITICAL): The official notification of a Trump peace plan project (ASTRA) and the simultaneous spread of a highly realistic fake video of President Zelenskyy agreeing to surrender Donbas and Crimea (Операция Z) are synchronized to create a cognitive shockwave designed to achieve battlefield effects (demoralization, unit surrender) without kinetic action. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Internal RF Messaging: RF channels promote content reinforcing battlefield masculinity and tactical success ('Хруст' video) while using low-tech sources (psychic readings for missing soldiers) to manage the massive domestic strain caused by unaccounted-for personnel.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
The psychological strain on RF families is evident in the consumption of 'psychic' videos regarding Missing in Action (MIA) status, suggesting a profound lack of trust in official RF reporting.
UAF morale is under direct assault from political disinformation. Immediate, high-profile counter-narratives are required to prevent confusion and insubordination in forward units.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The Chile-Germany Marder ring exchange is a positive development, indicating continued, creative methods of sustaining military aid despite political friction points.
The 'Trump Peace Plan' narrative presents a high-level diplomatic threat, regardless of its authenticity, as it frames the conflict as politically unstable in the US and pressures Ukraine toward concessions.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Sustained Psychological and Kinetic Pressure)
Intensified IO/PSYOP: RF will flood all media channels with the 'peace plan' and 'surrender' narratives to force UAF High Command to dedicate resources to political stabilization rather than combat control.
Mirnohrad Exploitation: Following the initial FAB-3000 shock, mechanized assaults (40th/155th OMBR) will attempt to probe and penetrate the ruins, aiming to find weak points in the UAF secondary defense lines west of the initial impact zone.
Reconnaissance in Force (RiF) near Gulyaypole: RF Group Vostok will conduct RiFs supported by Loitering Munitions to test the UAF cage armor/EW adaptations and confirm the tactical status of Veseloe (CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE GAP).
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Strategic Decapitation or AD Collapse)
Strategic Missile Strike: The observed surge at the GRAU Missile Arsenal culminates in a massed ballistic/cruise missile strike aimed at UAF C2 centers (Kyiv, Dnipro) and key air defense nodes, immediately preceding a large-scale mechanized thrust.
Psychological Breakage: Successful RF disinformation campaign leads to localized confusion, reluctance to fight, or temporary communications breakdown, allowing a swift, localized RF operational envelopment in the Pokrovsk sector.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-2 Hours (TACTICAL)
Confirmed Penetration of Mirnohrad Ruins: RF mechanized elements are confirmed operating past the first line of defense within the FAB-3000 impact area.
UAV/Ground Observer BDA confirming RF APCs/IFVs traversing the blast zone and engaging defensive remnants. (DECISION POINT: J3 must authorize pre-planned short-range indirect fire to suppress the breakthrough elements and cover immediate tactical withdrawals to the secondary line.)
2-6 Hours (STRATCOM)
Failure to Counter Fake Surrender Narrative: UAF government/High Command does not issue a visible, unified, and high-level rejection of the fake Zelensky video and peace plan rumors.
SIGINT/HUMINT reports of diminished combat morale or increased friction in forward unit communications. (DECISION POINT: High Command must issue a video address from a confirmed secure location refuting the content and reinforcing national resolve.)
12-24 Hours (LOGISTICS)
Marder IFV Confirmation: Confirmation of the specific IFV model (likely BDA confirmed Marder 1A3 equivalent) that will be transferred to UAF via the ring exchange.
Official diplomatic or logistical channel confirmation of delivery schedule/transfer point. (DECISION POINT: J4 must finalize transport and integration plans for the new IFV battalion.)
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - TACTICAL EXPLOITATION
RF Penetration Status: Confirm the depth and composition of RF forces attempting to exploit the Mirnohrad breach.
Deep Fake Origin/Distribution: Determine the initial source and method of deep fake distribution (Telegram, Dark Web) to optimize takedown/counter-dissemination efforts.
OSINT/CYBERCOM: Task analysts to trace the initial upload and propagation vector of the fake Zelensky video. (UNSATISFIED - PRIORITY 1)
LOW
HIGH - FOREIGN AID FLOW
Marder IFV Status: Confirm the specific delivery timeline and type of Marder or equivalent IFVs to be transferred to UAF.
HUMINT/DIPLOCOM: Task liaison officers (LiOs) to confirm the full details of the Chile-Germany-UAF ring exchange.
Action: Immediately disseminate a unified, high-level statement (preferably a video address from President/Chief of Staff) explicitly condemning the fake surrender video and the 'peace plan' rumors as an act of calculated RF hybrid warfare. This must be pushed to all frontline C2 networks.
Rationale: The IE is experiencing a CRITICAL threat event. Immediate, unambiguous political C2 is required to prevent demoralization or localized fracturing in the face of the kinetic offensive.
J3/OC East: Commit Tactical Reserves to GLOC Security (IMMEDIATE).
Action: Re-task the tactical reserve (identified in previous reports) with a dual mission: securing the Kostiantynivka GLOC and preparing to engage breakthrough elements 3-5km west of Mirnohrad. Do not wait for kinetic confirmation of GLOC closure.
Rationale: Synchronization of the Pokrovsk breach with GLOC interdiction remains the MLCOA for achieving operational collapse. Preemptive action is required to prevent isolation.
Action: Immediately initiate mass production and wide-scale deployment of validated domestic EW/Counter-Drone systems (e.g., Orion's Contra Drone SENSE-3) to front-line infantry and logistical convoys.
Rationale: The persistent drone threat (Loitering Munitions, Shaheds) demands decentralized, point-of-use defense to sustain combat effectiveness and logistics integrity.
