Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 192330Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 192300Z NOV 25 – 192330Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The kinetic focus on logistics nodes and the IO effort to generate strategic friction are highly synchronized and confirm the immediate precursor phase to the Pokrovsk mechanized assault.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Kharkiv Oblast (Eastern Sector): A new group of RF UAVs has been detected moving from eastern Kharkiv Oblast with a confirmed southwest trajectory (192304Z NOV 25).
• Target Vector Confirmation: This southwest trajectory places the UAV group on a likely path toward the Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad logistics corridor, reinforcing the MLCOA identified in the previous report (192300Z NOV 25).
• Lviv Oblast (Information Domain): RF IO is focusing on claimed 'blackout and transport collapse' in Lviv (192306Z NOV 25). While video evidence is non-military, the focus on a deep Western hub suggests continued effort to terrorize the strategic rear and demonstrate kinetic reach (even if only via propaganda).
• Zaporizhzhia Front (Primorske): Vague RF social media reporting of night activity in Primorske sector (192304Z NOV 25), possibly indicating ISR or localized probing actions ahead of the anticipated Pokrovsk thrust.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Nighttime conditions continue to facilitate RF deep-strike UAV operations and provide cover for ground maneuver elements (40th/155th OMBR) pre-positioning near Mirnohrad.
• The claimed transport collapse in Lviv (192306Z NOV 25) highlights the reliance of rear-area C2 and logistics on sustained power and communication stability, which RF deep strikes seek to erode.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Posture: RF is demonstrating rapid tactical innovation through the display of the NRTK 'Kur'yer' mini-TOS UGV (192303Z NOV 25), indicating increased investment in autonomous systems for close-range saturation fire or high-risk scouting.
• UAF Posture: UAF AD is tracking the new UAV wave from Kharkiv and is likely engaged in re-tasking AD assets toward the high-risk vector (Dnipropetrovsk). UAF State Emergency Services (DSNS) are actively maintaining 'Points of Invincibility' (192315Z NOV 25), indicating active civil defense measures against power/infrastructure failure.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (New/Confirmed):

1. Autonomous Ground Systems: RF C2 is integrating small, unmanned MLRS platforms (NRTK 'Kur'yer') into the battlespace, potentially for use in dense urban fighting or clearing limited trenches. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
2. Sustained, Staggered Deep Strike: RF continues to launch successive UAV waves (Kharkiv ➡️ SW) with minimal breaks, sustaining kinetic pressure on UAF strategic logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Intentions (Reinforced):

1. Preparation for Pokrovsk Breakthrough: The combined pressure (FAB-3000, sustained UAV interdiction) is unequivocally designed to soften the sector and disrupt the flow of UAF reserves before the 40th/155th OMBR assault (MLCOA).
2. Information Correction/Noise Generation: RF state media (TASS) is injecting noise regarding the 'US peace proposal' (192308Z NOV 25 - denial of European knowledge), aiming to make the original, more damaging narrative less clearly defined, while maintaining the overall psychological effect of strategic uncertainty.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Integration of Mini-UGV/TOS: The demonstration of the 'Kur'yer' UGV suggests RF is prioritizing miniaturization and autonomy for systems that can provide organic fire support to small infantry assault groups or Special Forces units, mitigating risk to personnel.
• Immediate IO Adjustments: TASS reporting on the US proposal (192308Z NOV 25) shows RF willingness to immediately pivot or refine their disinformation efforts in response to Western/Ukrainian denials, maintaining control over the narrative flow.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF is able to sustain near-continuous UAV launches, suggesting robust, decentralized forward UAV staging areas.
• RF C2 is managing a complex logistics/IO sequence while simultaneously dealing with internal friction from the UAF deep-strike campaign (Perm, Lipetsk).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains highly adaptive, coordinating technological demonstrations (UGV), kinetic deep strikes (UAVs), and rapid IO management (TASS reports) in a synchronized manner intended to support the frontline decision to assault Pokrovsk.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• AD Readiness: UAF AD must maintain high alert and resource readiness (munitions, radar assets) to meet the new UAV wave tracking SW from Kharkiv, which threatens Dnipropetrovsk logistics.
• Civil Defense: DSNS maintaining 'Points of Invincibility' demonstrates organizational resilience in maintaining public support and basic services despite sustained infrastructure targeting.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: Effective tracking and early warning of the new UAV threat by UAF Air Force (192304Z NOV 25). Maintenance of civil services resilience in the rear.
• Setback: Renewed, sustained threat against critical logistical nodes in the Dnipropetrovsk corridor. Continued exposure to RF IO that requires constant effort to mitigate.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• AD Munitions: Continued high rate of consumption of interceptor missiles to defend high-value assets. J4 must expedite resupply.
• UGV Countermeasures: UAF units must rapidly develop and implement counter-UGV doctrine, utilizing light anti-tank weapons, FPV drones, or close-quarters C-UAS systems to neutralize platforms like the NRTK 'Kur'yer' if encountered on the battlefield.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Lviv Blackout Narrative (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF milbloggers (Operation Z) are amplifying claims of a 'blackout and transport collapse' in Lviv (192306Z NOV 25).
  • Intent: To maximize psychological effect of previous strikes, suggest national paralysis, and distract from UAF deep-strike successes (Perm).
• Peace Plan Refinement (HIGH CONFIDENCE): TASS report claiming the US did not inform Europe about the alleged peace proposal (192308Z NOV 25) serves as a tactical retreat/refinement of the initial, more inflammatory narrative. It seeks to inject ambiguity and sustain doubt among key allies.
• Diversionary Tactics: The insertion of non-military, soft-focus content (Peskov discussing music, 192258Z NOV 25) is a classic RF IO technique to fill low-information periods and subtly normalize the leadership amidst kinetic/IO escalation.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• The continuous cycle of air alerts and IO narratives (capitulation/chaos) is designed to wear down civilian resolve. The visibility of DSNS services (Points of Invincibility) is critical to maintaining domestic morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The conflicting reporting on US peace proposals (TASS vs. previous AFP/TASS report) creates an environment of distrust and forces Western diplomats to spend time clarifying internal alignments rather than focusing on support delivery. The absence of European knowledge (192308Z NOV 25) attempts to drive a wedge between the US and European NATO members.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (192330Z NOV 25 - 200330Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Kinetic Precursor Completion)

1. Dnipropetrovsk Strike Consolidation: The UAV group tracking SW from Kharkiv will strike key logistical nodes (rail lines, transfer points) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
2. Synchronized Ground Assault Preparation: RF ground forces (40th/155th OMBR) will complete final mechanized assault formation positioning near Mirnohrad, maximizing readiness for a decisive push at first light (approx. 200330Z - 200500Z NOV 25).
3. SpN GLOC Interdiction: RF Spetsnaz teams will initiate kinetic action on the Kostiantynivka GLOC to close the road coincident with the launch of the mechanized assault, maximizing tactical friction.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Exploitation of the Breach)

1. Deep Tactical Encirclement: RF mechanized forces (40th/155th OMBR), exploiting the FAB-3000 strike and successful GLOC closure, bypass major urban centers at Pokrovsk and drive toward the operational rear, aiming to sever the primary north-south communication axis and force a large-scale, costly UAF disengagement.
2. GRAU Missile Strike Wave: The extreme activity spike observed at the GRAU Missile Arsenal results in the launch of a high-density, multi-type missile strike (Iskander, Kh-101) against regional C2 centers, airfields, and power infrastructure, achieving a short-term operational paralysis across OC East.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/OC East: Immediate Deployment of Counter-SpN Teams (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Do not wait for kinetic confirmation. Deploy specialized counter-reconnaissance and counter-IED teams (including light armored protection) to patrol and secure the high-risk sections of the Kostiantynivka GLOC.
   • Rationale: The closure of the GLOC is the critical non-kinetic operational effort for RF. Preemptive counter-SpN action can delay or disrupt this effort, ensuring crucial supplies reach Pokrovsk before the main assault (MLCOA).

2. STRATCOM/MoD: Focus on Strategic Resilience (URGENT).

   • Action: Use the DSNS 'Points of Invincibility' coverage (192315Z NOV 25) and the Perm railway sabotage (Previous Daily Report) to frame a narrative of "Ukrainian resilience and successful strategic interdiction" to neutralize the psychological effect of the Mirnohrad FAB-3000 strike and the Lviv blackout propaganda.
   • Rationale: Morale remains the most vulnerable center of gravity. UAF must demonstrate both offensive capability in the rear and defensive stability in the civil domain.

3. J4/Logistics Command: Decentralize Reserves (URGENT).

   • Action: Immediately initiate the "SPOKE" distribution model for critical ammunition (especially anti-tank missiles) within the Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad region. Do not allow large volumes to consolidate in single depots that are HVTs for the incoming UAV wave.
   • Rationale: Mitigate the impact of the anticipated UAV strikes (MLCOA) by ensuring that the loss of one depot does not sever the supply route for OC East defense forces.

//END SITREP//