Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 211800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 211500Z NOV 25 – 211800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The synchronization of RF tactical pressure (Pokrovsk GLOC) and strategic Information Warfare (IO) regarding 'peace plans' and internal corruption remains the primary threat axis. Key technical data now confirms the high-value kinetic strike method (Kh-101) used in Ternopil.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis: No confirmed kinetic interdiction on the Kostiantynivka GLOC in this reporting period. The situation remains in the high-readiness posture defined by Operation VIPER HUNT.
• Deep Rear Area: The confirmed use of Kh-101 cruise missiles against high-rise residential buildings in Ternopil reaffirms the RF's intent to sustain the deep strike campaign targeting civilian morale and straining rear-area medical and rescue logistics. This strike diverts UAF assets from the front. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
• Logistics Corridors (RF-Controlled): Severe urban flooding in Luhansk (Kambród area) reported by RF sources (Mash na Donbasse) suggests localized weather and drainage issues that could temporarily impede Russian logistics movement within the occupied territory. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Localized flooding in occupied Luhansk may cause internal RF logistics bottlenecks, potentially delaying short-haul resupply but unlikely to affect the main Donbas axis operations. (LOW CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Posture: RF channels (Басурин) display evidence of localized volunteer/civilian-led manufacturing of 'Duga' (Дуга) hybrid VTOL UAVs, capable of 50km range and 1.5kg payload. This indicates continued distributed innovation to supplement state-level reconnaissance and strike capabilities, especially for low-altitude, confined-space deployment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
• UAF Force Posture: UAF DSHV units (46th Brigade) are reinforcing professional messaging and commemorating unit anniversaries (9th Army Corps), likely aimed at maintaining institutional morale and operational continuity amidst political turbulence. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Precision Deep Strike: Confirmed capability to strike civilian targets deep within Ukraine using high-value assets (Kh-101 cruise missiles) to maximize terror and media impact.
2. Agile UAS Innovation: RF non-state actors continue to rapidly develop and deploy specialized UAS/VTOL platforms ('Duga') to enhance tactical reconnaissance and strike capabilities, often bypassing the traditional state procurement timeline.

Intentions:

1. Operational Paralysis: Primary intent is to force UAF withdrawal from the Pokrovsk sector by synchronizing logistics interdiction (Kostiantynivka GLOC) with cognitive disruption (peace plan rumors/corruption narratives).
2. Information Control: Continue to push the narrative of Western fatigue and Ukrainian political corruption/instability (Tymoshenko's speech amplified by Colonelcassad) to prepare the ground for future strategic operations or peace demands.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Increased Use of Civilian-Manufactured UAS: The deployment of hybrid VTOL systems like 'Duga' suggests an RF adaptation to the necessity of rapid deployment and operation from non-traditional launch sites, enhancing the survivability of forward reconnaissance elements. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)
• Targeting Confirmation: The official identification of Kh-101 missile debris in Ternopil confirms the high-explosive, long-range nature of the recent deep strike campaign, validating the assessment of continued strategic kinetic pressure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Sustainment: The domestic fundraising efforts for tactical gear (from previous reports) coupled with localized civilian production of specialized drones ('Duga') indicates a resilient, if fragmented, tactical sustainment ecosystem.
• RF Economic Resilience: Moscow's agreement to sell its share in a Serbian oil company (ASTRA report) signals attempts to mitigate the impact of US sanctions on the financial sphere, possibly to free up capital for war financing, though the immediate tactical impact is LOW.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2: Synchronization remains highly effective, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Zakharova) immediately engaging in counter-IO to manage the narrative surrounding alleged US-led peace deals (TASS/Операция Z reports).
• UAF C2: The amplification of internal political disputes (Tymoshenko's corruption speech) by RF channels demonstrates the continued success of the enemy's IO campaign in creating strategic friction at the highest political levels.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Technological Advancement: Confirmed fielding and demonstration of specialized Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) by units like the 93rd Mechanized Brigade (DeepState report, 'ALTER EGO' platforms). This demonstrates continued proactive investment in battlefield automation for logistics and hazardous tasks, addressing long-term force protection requirements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
• Counter-Strike Capability: UAF sources (РБК-Україна) are actively refuting RF claims of striking ATACMS positions that allegedly targeted Voronezh, signaling an active denial/deception posture regarding high-value strike assets.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Tactical Success (Air Defense): Continued successful interceptions of Shahed UAVs (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС report), maintaining essential AD performance, particularly in high-threat sectors.
• Strategic Setback (Deep Strike Vulnerability): The Ternopil Kh-101 strike confirms UAF’s continued vulnerability to strategic missile attacks on rear infrastructure, generating casualties and psychological pressure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Air Defense (AD) Priority: Continued CRITICAL need for AD systems and munitions capable of defeating high-altitude cruise missiles (like Kh-101) and complex UAV swarms simultaneously.
• Technological Integration: The deployment of advanced UGVs creates an immediate requirement for trained operators, maintenance personnel, and secure communications protocols (UGV C2).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Peace Talk Manipulation (PRIMARY RF IO): RF MFA (Zakharova/TASS) aggressively denied receiving information on US-proposed peace agreements, attempting to: 1) Control the international narrative, and 2) Undercut the perceived validity of any potential US diplomatic initiative by framing it as media speculation or a Western internal dispute. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - JUDGMENT)
• Internal Corruption/Division Amplification: RF channels amplified Yulia Tymoshenko’s speech criticizing government corruption and misuse of military funds. This directly feeds the overarching IO goal of delegating Ukraine’s setbacks to internal political failings rather than RF military success. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - FACT)
• US Sanctions Minimization: TASS reported on Putin's attendance at an AI conference, projecting an image of stability and focus on long-term technological development, directly countering the impact of new US sanctions against Russian IT companies (РБК-Україна report).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Sentiment is characterized by simultaneous grief (Ternopil casualties) and political distrust (Rada corruption focus). The successful rescue of a man from the rubble (ЦАПЛІЄНКО) offers a minor, temporary morale uplift.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• EU Mobility (RF Counter-IO): While the EU plan for a "Military Schengen" is a positive development (reported in previous SITREP), RF sources (Поддубный) immediately framed the plan to highlight the long timeline (2027), attempting to minimize its immediate deterrent effect.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The predictive timeline remains focused on the Pokrovsk GLOC, but the MDCOA is heavily influenced by the persistent IO pressure targeting C2 and logistical decision-making.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4 Hours (211800Z NOV 25 - 212200Z NOV 25)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - GLOC Interdiction Attempt)

1. Immediate SpN/DRG Probe: RF SpN/DRG, likely employing hybrid UAS (e.g., 'Duga' for high-fidelity surveillance) or specialized FPV assets, will execute a reconnaissance-in-force against the fortified Kostiantynivka GLOC to identify weaknesses in Hunter-Killer patrols and EW coverage.
2. Psychological Shock Follow-up: RF state media will initiate a coordinated psychological operation leveraging the confirmed Kh-101 strike, suggesting that assets used for deep strike are inexhaustible and further rear-area attacks are imminent, forcing UAF to divert more AD assets away from the front.
3. 40th/155th OMBR Preparations: Intensive indirect fire (artillery/MLRS) preparation will be observed along the Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector, preparing for a mechanized push timed to coincide with a predicted GLOC closure attempt.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Operational Breakout)

RF SpN/DRG achieves a successful permanent interdiction (closure >18 hours) of the Kostiantynivka GLOC. The sustained logistics crisis leads to ammunition rationing at the front. The 40th and 155th OMBR launches a synchronized, three-pronged mechanized assault using main battle tanks (MBT) and heavy infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). The lack of counter-battery fire capability allows RF forces to achieve localized fire superiority, penetrating the UAF line by >7 km and threatening the town of Kostiantynivka, forcing a major operational withdrawal from the Pokrovsk defensive line.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CINC/STRATCOM: Public Rebuttal of IO (CRITICAL).

   • Action: Immediately address the RF IO campaigns regarding both the 'US Peace Plan' and internal corruption (Tymoshenko's statements). The President or Commander-in-Chief must deliver a public, televised address: "There are no peace talks. There is only an attempt by the enemy to divide our leadership while they attempt to starve our soldiers at the front. Our focus is defense, not political infighting."
   • Rationale: Neutralize the corrosive effect of the synchronized hybrid threat on C2 and public trust, which is the primary enabler for the MDCOA.

2. J3 (Operations) / SOF Command: Defensive Hardening and Active Interdiction (IMMEDIATE).

   • Action: Task UAF SOF and engineering assets to begin rapidly constructing secondary, hardened alternate supply tracks (e.g., agricultural roads, low-signature bypasses) adjacent to the Kostiantynivka GLOC. Simultaneously, elevate Operation VIPER HUNT to include limited, preemptive artillery strikes on confirmed high-probability SpN/DRG forward positions before they initiate kinetic action.
   • Rationale: Reduce reliance on the single vulnerable road and transition from reactive counter-ambush to preemptive suppression of the interdiction force.

3. J2 (Intelligence) / J6 (Cyber): EW Counter-UAS Priority (URGENT).

   • Action: Re-task existing tactical EW assets with specific frequency sets known to be used by new Russian VTOL/FPV systems like 'Duga.' Prioritize the saturation jamming of low-altitude airspace within 5km of all key GLOC chokepoints.
   • Rationale: Counter the confirmed RF adaptation of specialized, agile UAS platforms designed for tactical reconnaissance and strike targeting of logistics.

//END SITREP//