TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS
DTG: 200600Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 192300Z NOV 25 – 200600Z NOV 25 (Night Cycle)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The operational picture confirms the convergence of predicted MLCOA vectors: ground push in Donbas and logistics interdiction, offset by UAF's successful strategic deep strikes.
Pokrovsk Axis / Kostiantynivka Corridor (GLOC): Remains the operational center of gravity. No confirmed SpN interdiction action has been reported on the GLOC during the critical 191900Z–200300Z NOV 25 window, suggesting UAF counter-measures (Operation VIPER HUNT / Hunter-Killer patrols) have been effective, or RF execution was delayed/aborted. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - LACK of Negative Reporting)
Novo-Pavlivka Direction (Tactical Focus): Confirmed UAF counter-attrition operations by the 42nd Separate Mechanized Brigade (OMBr) 'Perun' FPV operators, clearing/stopping RF remnants following a November 14 assault (Message: 181927Z). This indicates sustained, localized RF pressure and UAF success in maintaining tactical lines in the Donbas.
Strategic Rear Area (Occupied Donetsk): Widespread power outage across occupied Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), affecting approximately 500,000 persons (Message: 181931Z). This is a direct, measurable impact of the UAF deep strikes against the Zuyivska and Starobeshevska TPPs (Previous SITREP), confirming major RF infrastructure damage and civilian disruption.
Zaporizhzhia Axis: Air raid warning issued by Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration (Message: 181931Z), indicating continued RF UAV/loitering munition threat across the Southern and Eastern sectors, maintaining pressure on UAF ADS.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
The overnight period (192300Z–200600Z NOV 25) saw low visibility, which favored RF SpN operations (MLCOA #1). The failure to interdict the GLOC during this window is a temporary blue-force advantage.
The TPP strikes will amplify cold-weather logistics difficulty for RF forces and civil administration in occupied territories.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Forces (Ground): The 40th and 155th OMBR remain the primary breakthrough force on the Pokrovsk axis. RF forces utilize FPV systems for localized tactical attrition (Novo-Pavlivka).
UAF Forces: Active defensive operations (42nd OMBr) and persistent air defense activity (Zaporizhzhia). UAF deep strike capability confirmed successful in operational effect.
Control Measures: Focus remains on deep defense of the Kostiantynivka GLOC and attrition against RF ground assaults.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Propaganda and Civilian Mobilization (Logistics Support): RF continues to leverage state-aligned civilian organizations (e.g., Narodny Front, Zdorovoe Otechestvo) for massive military support campaigns (camouflage netting, ATVs, 'plywood artillery'). This indicates a robust, institutionalized hybrid capability to absorb logistical friction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Multiple Messages: 181430Z, 171343Z, 131259Z, 130659Z)
Adaptive C-UAS/K9: RF is utilizing specialized assets (K9 units, Mrak the service dog) capable of detecting UAVs at range (200-300m) (Message: 131259Z), suggesting an adaptation to UAF’s FPV dominance by integrating non-electronic countermeasures. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Maintain Pokrovsk Breakthrough Pressure: The core RF objective is a coordinated breakthrough using the 40th/155th OMBR, necessitating repeated attempts at GLOC interdiction and high-intensity localized assaults (Novo-Pavlivka).
Operational Security (OPSEC) Hardening: RF is actively instructing its volunteer/logistics network on OPSEC protocols (Message: 171343Z), signifying an operational priority on minimizing UAF counter-intelligence access to rear-area activity.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF: Increased emphasis on K9 units for C-UAS reconnaissance and defense. Stronger institutional focus on OPSEC within the critical logistical volunteer supply chain, suggesting UAF ISR has been effective in the RF rear.
UAF: Successful kinetic operational-level strikes (TPP) that impose strategic costs, forcing RF into crisis management regarding power generation and civilian morale in occupied territories.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Logistics (Mixed Status):SUCCESSFUL UAF INTERDICTION (Strategic): 500k without power in DPR is a major disruption affecting infrastructure reliability and local civilian support. SUCCESSFUL RF MOBILIZATION (Hybrid): Continuous flow of civilian-sourced equipment (ATVs, camouflage) buffers conventional logistical shortfalls.
UAF Logistics (CRITICAL): Still entirely road-dependent. The immediate threat (SpN GLOC closure) remains imminent, even if the primary overnight window passed without confirmed incident.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is demonstrating effective integration of conventional ground forces (40th/155th OMBR) with hybrid logistical sustainment (Narodny Front, Zdorovoe Otechestvo), indicating a high degree of centralized control over the war economy/support structure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Posture: Active defense/attrition along the LBS (42nd OMBr) combined with successful operational-level deep strikes.
Readiness: High, but critical logistical dependency creates a persistent vulnerability. ADS assets remain under pressure (Zaporizhzhia alert).
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes (TACTICAL & OPERATIONAL):
Confirmed FPV attrition success against RF remnants (42nd OMBr at Novo-Pavlivka).
Confirmed strategic effect of TPP strikes (500k power outage in DPR).
Probable success of Hunter-Killer patrols in deterring/neutralizing SpN interdiction of the Kostiantynivka GLOC during the critical night window (19/20 NOV). (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT)
Setbacks: Persistent, significant intelligence gap regarding the status of the Kamyan’ske rail hub. This prevents effective contingency planning against the MDCOA.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Maintenance of security on the Kostiantynivka GLOC throughout the day, as RF SpN may shift timing due to the failure of the initial night window.
Logistics Requirement: Urgent resolution of the Kamyan’ske rail BDA/ETR to enable long-term logistical diversification.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF IO (Internal Unity/Normalization): Heavy investment in internal propaganda promoting "National Unity Day" and civic engagement through sports movements ('Zdorovoe Otechestvo') in occupied territories (Mariupol) and throughout Russia (Messages: 041259Z, 291339Z, 261004Z, etc.). This serves to normalize occupation and project an image of stability and patriotic youth mobilization. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
RF IO (Logistical Support/Moral Superiority): The 'Narodny Front' campaign (e.g., 'Everything for Victory!') is a critical IO vector, using highly emotional narratives (visually impaired volunteers, military K9 handlers) to drive domestic funding and maintain morale. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
RF Sentiment: Morale appears sustained by organized civic support, continuous political alignment (Putin birthday greetings), and consistent propaganda emphasizing heroism and national duty.
UAF/Occupied Civilian Sentiment: The DPR power outage (500k affected) will immediately increase stress and potentially decrease local RF support, but the long-term morale impact depends on RF's ability to restore services quickly.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
No new international diplomatic messages. The persistent RF IO campaign alleging UAF sabotage in Poland (Previous SITREP) requires continued monitoring and diplomatic counter-action to prevent supply chain friction.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The failure of the SpN MLCOA during the peak darkness window (19/20 NOV) creates an immediate inflection point. RF is likely to re-plan the timing of the interdiction.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12 Hours (200600Z NOV 25 - 201800Z NOV 25)
(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE - Shift in Timing)
Delayed GLOC Interdiction: RF SpN, having failed to execute during optimal cover, will shift the interdiction attempt to the next low-visibility period (201800Z NOV 25 onwards) or execute a high-risk daytime ambush relying on speed and superior cover/concealment against reduced UAF air ISR. The objective remains GLOC closure to facilitate the Pokrovsk assault.
Concentrated Ground Assault: The 40th/155th OMBR initiates high-intensity probing attacks or a full-scale assault on the Pokrovsk axis, using preparatory artillery fire (BM-27 Uragan) and attempting to draw UAF reserves away from rear security.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours
(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE - Unchanged, but greater urgency due to logistics buffer depletion)
Strategic Air/Ground Synchronization: A successful, protracted SpN closure of the GLOC (lasting $>12$ hours) coincides with the high-intensity ground assault by the 40th/155th OMBR on the Pokrovsk axis. Simultaneously, the rising SAR activity at AB Monchegorsk/Pskov culminates in a targeted air campaign using ASMs against secondary UAF logistical hubs and high-value ADS nodes protecting the rear. This synergy aims to collapse the UAF defense-in-depth by eliminating both tactical resupply and strategic reserve capacity while RF gains a significant territorial breach.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-12 Hours
Re-Assessment of GLOC Threat: UAF must confirm if the SpN threat has withdrawn, remains in place, or has shifted tactics/timing.
Absence of confirmed SpN activity AND high-confidence ISR sweep of the corridor.
12-24 Hours
Pokrovsk Maneuver Decision: If the GLOC holds, UAF must decide whether to commit reserves or maintain current attrition operations.
Confirmed scale of the 40th/155th OMBR offensive and measured success/failure of initial assault waves.
48 Hours
Infrastructure Restoration RF Decision: RF C2 must demonstrate ability to repair TPP power grid.
Confirmed restoration of power supply to DPR civilian centers. Failure indicates prolonged RF logistical friction.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE
SpN Interdiction Force Status: Confirmation of the disposition of the previously tracked SpN elements in the Kostiantynivka corridor after the critical night window passed without incident.
SOF/ISR: Increase Hunter-Killer density on the GLOC during daylight hours. Task high-resolution drone sweeps of known choke points and suspected hide sites.
LOW
CRITICAL - LOGISTICS (PERSISTENT)
Kamyan’ske Rail BDA/ETR: Definitive engineering assessment (ETR) of the rail infrastructure damage and time-to-repair.
Engineering Tasking (J4/J7): Renew Red-Line request for structural integrity and time-to-repair report, emphasizing the urgency due to the ground situation. (GAP IS NEGATIVE LOGISTICS INDICATOR)
MEDIUM
HIGH - STRATEGIC
Northern Air Base Activity Characterization: Determine the specific nature of the rising SAR scores at Monchegorsk/Pskov (strike package vs. cargo/training).
SIGINT/ELINT: Collect on heavy aviation C2 networks and prioritize SAR imagery capable of distinguishing ordnance staging.
LOW
MEDIUM - ENEMY ADAPTATION
RF C-UAS K9 Effectiveness: Validate the claimed 200-300m drone detection capability of specialized K9 units.
ISR Tasking (FPV/Recon): Initiate controlled tactical engagements against suspected K9-supported RF positions to test effectiveness and inform FPV doctrine adjustments.
LOW
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
J3 (Maneuver) / SOF Command: Sustain GLOC Hunter-Killer Posture (URGENT).
Action: Do not decrease security force density on the Kostiantynivka GLOC based on the passing of the initial threat window. Maintain Operation VIPER HUNT, shifting to high-speed vehicle patrols supported by continuous ISR during daylight hours. Prepare contingency forces for rapid deployment to the corridor between 201600Z NOV 25 and 200000Z NOV 25, anticipating the next low-visibility attempt.
Rationale: The RF MLCOA is likely only delayed, not canceled. Sustained pressure prevents RF SpN from re-establishing optimal ambush sites.
J4 (Logistics) / J7 (Engineering): Force Rail BDA Resolution (CRITICAL).
Action: Mobilize redundant engineering teams or third-party contractors immediately to the Kamyan’ske rail hub to finalize the BDA and establish an Estimated Time to Repair (ETR). This cannot remain an intelligence gap.
Rationale: The current logistics plan is blind to the long-term rail restoration capability, which is essential to mitigating the risk of the Pokrovsk MDCOA.
Action: Task UAF ISR/FPV assets to prioritize tracking and targeting of RF logistics efforts related to the repair of the Zuyivska and Starobeshevska TPPs.
Rationale: Capitalize on the operational success by preventing rapid restoration, further complicating RF rear-area sustainment and drawing RF resources away from front-line combat.
