Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IPB ANALYSIS

DTG: 182100Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 182000Z NOV 25 – 182100Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. The critical threat remains the synchronized RF effort on the Kostiantynivka–Pokrovsk axis. The MDCOA risk related to strategic air assets is validated by collection activity.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk Axis (FEBA): UAF 79th Air Assault Brigade (AAB) continues to hold defensive lines near Myrnohrad, confirming engagement continuity. Ukrainian units (e.g., СКЕЛЯ 425) report ongoing direct action and clearance operations in the Pokrovsk sector, confirming high-intensity, close-quarters combat against RF assault units (40th/155th OMBR).
• Logistics Interdiction (Kostiantynivka Corridor): The immediate threat remains the sole GLOC. Ukrainian drone footage (Ivan Franko Group) continues to demonstrate highly effective deep FPV strike capability (60+ km depth) against RF logistics, indicating the importance of UAV-based interdiction as both an offensive and necessary counter-measure.
• Zaporizhzhia Direction (RF Activity): Russian MoD reports clearing operations by Novorossiysk paratroopers on the Orikhiv direction, suggesting RF is consolidating control or pushing minor counter-attacks to fix UAF units further south. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Low visibility conditions (haze/fog) observed in an RF drone/aerial video (Pravda za nami) over a river system, potentially hindering UAF ISR operations but also concealing SpN movement.
• Night conditions remain favorable for the anticipated RF SpN kinetic action (MLCOA).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces (Ground): Confirmed presence of 40th and 155th OMBR on the Pokrovsk axis (previous report). New RF propaganda video features troops from the 34th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade operating in the Kherson region, confirming continued RF presence and resource requirements on secondary axes.
• UAF Forces (FEBA): Units like the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, 79th AAB, and NG units (e.g., 1st Corps 'Azov' brigades) remain actively engaged in high-attrition combat, with high operational tempo confirmed by frequent combat releases.
• Recruitment/Manning: Both sides display active, public recruitment efforts (UAF: Lobby X ARMY, Azov Corps; RF: Heroes Z testimonials), indicating sustained manpower needs across the front.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Drones and Counter-Drone Warfare: RF continues to utilize large-scale drone operations for reconnaissance (e.g., 'Provodnik' - railway worker turned UAV operator) and strike missions. RF Air Defense (ZU-23-2 crews) are actively adapting techniques to counter UAF FPV/strike drones.
2. Hybrid Warfare (Internal Instability): RF actors successfully amplified the arrest of former Ukrainian official Chernyshov (VESTI, Zerkalo), demonstrating robust capability to exploit internal Ukrainian political vulnerabilities for Information Warfare leverage.
3. Forward Logistics/Sustainment: RF propaganda highlights logistics support (Ural truck transfer, SpN 'Kashtan' support video), focusing on improving morale and recruitment related to support services, suggesting a focus on improving material support for deployed units.

Intentions:

1. Exploit the Logistics Choke Point: Execute the synchronized attack (SpN interdiction + conventional assault) on the Pokrovsk axis to force a local operational collapse.
2. Reinforce Narrative of Internal Decay: Use IO against Ukrainian political instability and judicial actions (Chernyshov arrest) to undermine UAF leadership confidence.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF Internal Security Threat: (NEW, NON-COMBAT RELATED) Reports of mobilized security guards from the SVO attempting to stage a security incident (planting TNT charge in Skolkovo for a bonus) indicate potential systemic psychological breakdown and unpredictable behavior among returning or rear-area RF personnel. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• RF Drone Defense: Increasing focus in RF propaganda on specialized Air Defense roles (ZU-23-2 crews dedicated to drone interception) suggests UAF drone saturation is having a significant operational effect, forcing RF to commit scarce ADA assets to localized point defense.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics: RF continues decentralized military support efforts (e.g., Ural delivery to SpN units) and humanitarian/civil-military projects in occupied territories (DNR social support, Harstsyzsk water delivery). This demonstrates an enduring, albeit fragmented, sustainment network.
• UAF Logistics: CRITICAL/UNCHANGED. Complete dependence on the Kostiantynivka road corridor for the main Donbas defense effort.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective in coordinating multi-domain pressure. The synchronized IO (Chernyshov arrest) and ground deployment (40th OMBR) point to centralized strategic direction.
• UAF C2 requires immediate tactical re-prioritization to address the imminent SpN threat (MLCOA).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF units are currently maintaining a resilient, active defense, engaging RF forces aggressively (СКЕЛЯ 425 operations). Deep strike capabilities (IFG/SBU) remain highly disruptive to RF rear-area security and logistics.
• Readiness: High combat readiness is evident, but the logistics pipeline is strained to the breaking point.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Demonstrated deep-strike range and effectiveness (IFG FPV strikes at 60+ km, Donbas logistics targeting). Continued high morale display across operational and informational domains (NGU, 10th Corps, 79th AAB videos celebrating sergeants/leadership).
• Setbacks: RF successfully introduced a second major unit (40th OMBR) onto the main axis, increasing immediate kinetic pressure precisely as the logistics crisis peaks.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL Requirement: Dedicated air transport or heavy-lift drone capability must be activated immediately to test contingency resupply procedures for the Pokrovsk axis, circumventing the expected road closure.
• Constraint: Internal security and counter-sabotage efforts (SBU/NGU) remain necessary in rear areas (Cherkasy, SBU rail sabotage arrests, previous report), diverting resources from the critical Kostiantynivka road security mission.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Internal Instability): RF media is fully exploiting the arrest of former Deputy Minister Chernyshov, portraying it as proof of Ukrainian governmental corruption and failure. This narrative is highly effective in discouraging Western support and damaging Ukrainian domestic trust. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF IO (Internal Unity/Nationalism): Messaging focuses heavily on Russian nationalism, historical revisionism (Archbishop Savva), and anti-immigrant/anti-Western themes ('MIGRATION — THIS IS OCCUPATION'), aiming to solidify internal cohesion and rationalize the conflict as existential.
• RF IO (Atrocities/War Crimes): Highly inflammatory, unsubstantiated claims by RF figures (Anastasia Kashevarova) regarding the torture and organ harvesting of Russian POWs. This is a classic atrocity propaganda technique intended to dehumanize UAF forces and justify RF brutality.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF combat morale remains robust, driven by local successes (drone strikes, frontline resistance).
• Vulnerability: Domestic political scandal and pervasive corruption narratives (Chernyshov, NABU tapes) risk eroding domestic support and creating division between the military and civilian leadership.

3. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

• RF Diplomacy: Lavrov's meeting with Pakistan underscores RF efforts to solidify non-Western partnerships (SCO focus), bypassing Western isolation.
• International Alignment: RF channels continue to push narratives of Ukrainian anti-religious persecution (SBU targeting UOC priests) to damage Kyiv’s image among conservative global actors.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The predictive timeline remains focused on the logistics bottleneck.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 8 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Confirmation Window 2100Z NOV 25 - 0500Z NOV 26)

1. Immediate SpN Interdiction: RF SpN will initiate kinetic operations along the Kostiantynivka road (GLOC). Actions will likely prioritize choke points using IED/EFP/direct fire against high-value convoys (fuel/ammo).
2. Feint Attacks: RF units will launch fixing and shaping attacks using infantry/armor against UAF positions on secondary axes (e.g., Orikhiv/Zaporizhzhia Direction) to pin down reserves, preventing their relocation to the Donbas axis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Operational Break and Strategic Strike Synchronization: Successful, sustained GLOC closure (>12 hours) creates critical shortages. RF launches a simultaneous, concentrated strategic long-range strike (potentially using the assets identified at Monchegorsk/Pskov or OTRK) targeting the secondary military-industrial base and long-range reserve staging areas (e.g., Dnipro, Kramatorsk), achieving strategic decoupling and enabling the 40th/155th OMBR to achieve a decisive breakthrough on the Pokrovsk axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Maneuver) / SOF Command: Execute Operation VIPER HUNT Phase II (Saturation Security).

   • Action: In addition to Hunter-Killer patrols, institute dynamic checkpoint security along the Kostiantynivka road (every 5-7 km) with rotating, heavily armed rapid response teams (RRTs). Task the 79th AAB and other relevant FEBA reserve units to designate 24-hour quick reaction forces (QRF) to immediately assist rear-area security in case of a confirmed interdiction.
   • Rationale: Maximize kinetic friction in the SpN infiltration zone and minimize time to clear any ambush, keeping the GLOC open.

2. J4 (Logistics): Execute Rotor Wing Contingency Drill (Proof of Concept).

   • Action: Immediately task the limited available heavy-lift helicopter assets (Mi-8 or similar) to conduct a time-sensitive, unannounced contingency drill to move a minimum of 5 tons of ammunition and fuel to a pre-selected FARP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point) or designated landing zone near Pokrovsk.
   • Rationale: Validate the critical contingency logistics plan before the MLCOA hits, determining real-world airlift capacity and constraints under operational pressure.

3. STRATCOM / J2: Proactively Counter Hybrid Threats.

   • Action: Launch a coordinated public information campaign immediately addressing the internal political/corruption scandals (Chernyshov arrest), positioning the actions as evidence of UAF institutions actively fighting internal corruption, rather than a sign of instability. Simultaneously, prepare materials to debunk the RF POW organ harvesting claims preemptively.
   • Rationale: Control the narrative during the critical kinetic phase. Prevent RF IO from dissolving public and international trust when the ground assault begins.

//END SITREP//