TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)
DTG: 060600Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 060500Z NOV 25 – 060600Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (The synchronization between kinetic action and immediate IO claims indicates high RF C2 effectiveness.)
Focus Area 1 (Operational Depth - Kostiantynivka): Confirmed continued RF infiltration operation inside Kostiantynivka, directly threatening the operational rear of the Pokrovsk salient. This remains the critical threat to UAF stability.
Focus Area 2 (Frontal Pressure – Pokrovsk): RF forces (specifically the СОМАЛИ motorized rifle brigade) are actively engaged in drone warfare (UAV strikes) against UAF personnel near Pokrovsk. This confirms continued high-intensity attrition warfare synchronized with deep disruption.
Focus Area 3 (IO Target - Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk): RF Ministry of Defence (MOD) has immediately deployed claims of UAF forces surrendering in Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) due to being "abandoned by command." This suggests a strong RF intent to amplify psychological pressure directly following the confirmed SpN activity in the area.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Deteriorating weather (as reported in previous assessment) continues to favor RF operations by degrading UAF AD sensor performance and providing concealment for RF infiltration groups.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
UAF Counter-Infiltration: UAF forces are engaged in securing key nodes within Kostiantynivka against the confirmed RF SpN groups. The immediate threat to C2 must be mitigated rapidly.
RF Frontal: RF elements, including specialized brigades (СОМАЛИ), are maintaining high-tempo UAV/artillery pressure on the Pokrovsk salient, utilizing precision strikes against personnel.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Precision Attrition: Demonstrated capability by RF specialized units (СОМАЛИ) to execute targeted UAV strikes against UAF combatants, maintaining high attrition rates while simultaneously fixing UAF attention on the front line.
Information Warfare (IW) Synchronization: RF C2 is executing near-immediate information operations following kinetic or near-kinetic events. The claim of surrendering UAF troops in Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) is designed to maximize panic and degrade UAF cohesion precisely when SpN is active in the rear. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Strategic Signaling: RF Defense Minister’s proposal to prepare for nuclear tests is a strategic signaling move aimed at international audiences, designed to increase diplomatic pressure on NATO allies and potentially distract from tactical failures or set a backdrop of severe escalation. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
Exploit Rear Chaos: RF intends to leverage the confirmed SpN presence and the impending Shahed strike (MLCOA from previous reports) to force UAF tactical reserves into costly counter-infiltration and rear-security operations, drawing them away from the main Pokrovsk line of contact.
Degrade UAF Moral and C2: The claims of mass surrender in Pokrovsk aim to sow internal distrust and confusion among UAF units fighting on the salient.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
Adaptation: The immediate, location-specific RF MOD claim of surrender in Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk suggests RF intelligence is receiving timely feedback from forward elements or SpN groups and immediately weaponizing that information. This indicates high C2 integration between operational maneuver and IO.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF Vulnerability: Unchanged. UAF successful deep strikes on fuel nodes (Simferopol) and ports (Tuapse) maintain pressure on RF strategic sustainment.
RF Focus: RF logistics remain focused on sustaining the Pokrovsk offensive, making the Kostiantynivka area a critical choke point for both sides.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains effective, demonstrating tight synchronization between tactical military operations (UAV strikes, SpN infiltration) and immediate strategic IW messaging.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Readiness: UAF is on high alert for the predicted Shahed saturation strike and simultaneous SpN kinetic activity. The force posture must be reactive and robust in both the deep rear (Kostiantynivka) and on the line of contact (Pokrovsk).
Legal/Diplomatic Posture: UAF continues to engage in high-level diplomatic efforts, emphasizing accountability for the crime of aggression (Kravchenko reports). This is important for maintaining long-term international support.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes: Continued successful UAF deep strike campaign against strategic RF targets (Tuapse, Simferopol).
Setbacks: The operational environment remains highly contested. The presence of confirmed SpN inside Kostiantynivka is a significant operational setback requiring immediate, resource-intensive response.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Critical Requirement: Immediate need for increased thermal and night-vision capable Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) to effectively sweep the urban environment of Kostiantynivka against the confirmed RF infiltration groups.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
Primary Narrative (RF): Rapid collapse of UAF defenses in the Pokrovsk sector, exemplified by the RF MOD claim of mass surrender in Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk. This is classic demoralization PSYOP. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Secondary Narrative (RF): Glorification of RF specialized units (44 АК, СОМАЛИ) and the effectiveness of precision drone strikes against UAF personnel to promote superiority.
RF Domestic Focus: Continuous effort to manage domestic perception via "canned" appearances of leadership (Putin reports) and minimizing negative news (e.g., censoring books on the war), suggesting internal stability concerns.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF morale is stable but highly vulnerable to the kinetic-IO synchronization. Successful RF SpN attacks in Kostiantynivka, combined with claims of surrender, could rapidly degrade local troop and civilian morale.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
International support remains focused on accountability, with UAF officials actively engaging partners (EU delegation, Lithuania) to maintain pressure and secure legal support against Russian aggression.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
The intelligence confirms that the multi-domain pressure campaign—SpN in the rear, high-tempo attrition on the front, and IO amplification—is reaching its operational peak.
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-8 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Refinement of Previous MLCOA)
SpN Kinetic Initiation: RF infiltration groups in Kostiantynivka will initiate coordinated kinetic actions (IEDs, targeted ambushes, assassination attempts) against UAF C2/Comms nodes or high-value logistical convoys between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk. This will be timed to coincide with darkness/adverse weather.
Shahed Saturation Strike: RF will launch the anticipated large-scale Shahed UAV strike (est. 50-80+ platforms) against CNI and logistics hubs in Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava Oblasts to fully paralyze UAF operational maneuver capabilities in the sector.
Frontal Exploitation: Utilizing the chaos created by rear strikes, RF ground forces will launch local probing attacks on the Pokrovsk salient to test UAF tactical reserve response times and identify weak points for future exploitation.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Unchanged)
Systemic Rear Disruption and Frontal Exploitation: Successful RF SpN operations sever the main logistics artery near Kostiantynivka. Concurrently, the Shahed strike causes catastrophic power/C2 failure across the Dnipro rail corridor. This paralyzes UAF reinforcement, enabling a decisive RF mechanized breakthrough on the Pokrovsk salient and forcing a costly, disorganized withdrawal.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-2 Hours
SpN Action Confirmation: Decision point for UAF to deploy heavy counter-infiltration forces (SSO/SOF) and establish hardened inner perimeter security around C2/Logistics nodes in Kostiantynivka.
Confirmed detonation of an IED, successful ambush, or direct engagement of RF SpN elements.
2-6 Hours
Shahed Strike Initiation: Decision point for UAF AD to commit strategic reserves to the defense of Dnipro/Poltava logistics hubs.
Confirmed mass launch detection (50+ platforms) detected by SIGINT/Overhead ISR systems moving toward the operational rear.
6-12 Hours
Pokrovsk Breach Mitigation: Decision point for J3 to commit operational reserves to repel a major frontal assault on the Pokrovsk salient.
Confirmed RF mechanized force penetration deeper than 2km along the main Pokrovsk axis.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
Confidence (Pre-Analysis)
CRITICAL - UNCHANGED
Kostiantynivka SpN OOB/Mission: Specific force size, C2 structure, armament, and confirmed mission sets of RF infiltration groups inside Kostiantynivka.
HUMINT/SIGINT/C-UAS: Maximize collection priority on RF tactical communications and employ low-flying UAS with thermal sensors over Kostiantynivka HVTs.
LOW
CRITICAL - UNCHANGED
Shahed Target Set: Identification of specific primary targets (substations, rail yards) for the imminent large-scale RF Shahed attack.
IMINT/ELINT: High-tempo monitoring of RF staging areas for drone launch activity and analysis of recent RF electronic attack patterns near CNI targets.
MEDIUM
HIGH - NEW
Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk IO Validation: Independent validation of RF MOD claims regarding UAF surrender in the Pokrovsk salient to prevent internal demoralization.
HUMINT/SIGINT: Local contact validation and monitoring of UAF tactical net traffic in the alleged surrender area.
Action: Execute a phased, sector-by-sector clearance operation in Kostiantynivka utilizing dedicated SOF/GUR teams supported by thermal ISR. Establish hardened perimeters around the Brigade HQ and main GLOC ASPs. Deny RF SpN the ability to achieve any confirmed kinetic success.
Rationale: The SpN presence is the immediate kinetic threat designed to enable the larger operational collapse. Neutralizing this threat prevents the MDCOA.
J4/J6 (Logistics/Comms): Implement Decoy and Hardening Plan.
Action: Immediately implement pre-planned passive defense measures (decoy assets, hardened fuel/ammo storage, redundant communications links) at all CNI and logistics nodes in the Dnipro/Poltava/Kharkiv operational area in anticipation of the imminent Shahed strike.
Rationale: Reducing the success rate of the Shahed attack mitigates the impact of C2/power loss, preventing operational paralysis.
Action: J7 (Command) must issue a clear, brief, and immediate internal FLASH message to all units on the Pokrovsk salient, denying the RF MOD surrender claim in Krasnoarmeysk. Accompany this with high-confidence tactical messaging (video/imagery) from defending UAF units to maintain morale and cohesion.
Rationale: The immediate IO attack demands an immediate counter-narrative to prevent self-fulfilling prophecy and panic among frontline troops.
