Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 060435Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 060405Z NOV 25 – 060435Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (The synchronized kinetic and information operations sequence is in full execution. RF kinetic strikes are confirmed in the deep rear.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Focus Area 1 (Critical – UAF Rear): The operational rear area of the Pokrovsk Salient (Kostiantynivka) remains under active Counter-Infiltration operations. This area is the decision point for rear security.
• Focus Area 2 (Kinetic – Deep Strike): Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Kam'yans'ke/Dniprodzerzhinsk). The predicted RF Shahed strike is confirmed active and has resulted in successful impacts on energy infrastructure (TTC/TEZ confirmed strike claims by RF sources).
• Focus Area 3 (Strategic Interdiction): Kostroma Oblast, RF (Volgorechensk/Kostroma GRES). UAF deep strike campaign continues, confirmed successful attack on a substation serving the Kostroma GRES.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• (No change in assessment.) Fog and low clouds continue to favor RF aerial infiltration and degrade UAF AD sensor performance, favoring the ongoing Shahed UAV strike in the central sectors.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF AD Posture: Engaged in maximum alert and active defense in the central (Poltava/Dnipro) sectors. The confirmed impacts in Kam'yans'ke indicate saturation tactics are achieving some success.
• UAF Deep Strike Posture: UAF maintains strategic initiative in deep strikes, evidenced by the successful attack in Volgorechensk (Kostroma Oblast, RF). This demonstrates UAF capacity to maintain pressure on RF critical infrastructure while under duress.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. High-Density Strike Execution: RF is demonstrating the capability to successfully penetrate UAF AD in the central sector with high-density Shahed waves, achieving confirmed strikes on critical energy infrastructure (Kam'yans'ke TPP).
2. Strategic Denial (IO/Disinformation): RF state media (TASS) is attempting to counter UAF deep strikes with immediate counter-narratives focused on domestic U.S. and irrelevant foreign accidents (Mississippi chemical spill, Khabarovsk rail accident). This is a clear attempt to dilute domestic and international focus on RF infrastructure vulnerability.

Intentions:

1. Degrade UAF Logistical Enablers: Primary intent remains the systemic degradation of power supply and logistics nodes (rail/marshalling yards) in the Dnipro/Poltava region to paralyze the flow of resources to the Pokrovsk salient. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Overwhelm/Fix UAF AD: By saturating the central AD sector (Kam'yans'ke), RF intends to create vulnerabilities elsewhere or prevent efficient resource shifting to the threatened operational depth (Kostiantynivka).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Targeted Strike Confirmation: RF channels (Two Majors) are immediately claiming highly successful strikes on specific infrastructure (e.g., "20 Geranium hits on TPP in Kam'yans'ke"). This rapid confirmation attempts to maximize the psychological impact and solidify the IO narrative of RF operational dominance.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Vulnerability: Confirmed UAF deep strikes on the Kostroma GRES substation (Volgorechensk) demonstrate continued successful UAF targeting of the Russian internal energy grid. While the impact on frontline RF sustainment is indirect, it constrains RF economic capacity and public confidence.
• Dempster-Shafer Assessment: The high belief mass in Logistical Shift: Infrastructure Damage (0.26) and Logistical Shift: Disruption of Supply (0.24) underscores the strategic effectiveness of UAF deep strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective in coordinating the multi-domain attack (deep strike, rear infiltration, IO) but is showing internal stress by rapidly engaging in denial/deflection IO following UAF deep strikes.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• AD Posture: UAF AD forces are heavily engaged. The successful impacts in Kam'yans'ke necessitate a rapid Post-Strike Assessment (PSA) of the operational readiness and remaining capacity of the targeted infrastructure.
• Ground Forces: UAF forces must maintain the defensive line in Pokrovsk while prioritizing the elimination of RF SpN in Kostiantynivka.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: UAF maintains initiative in the deep battlespace, successfully hitting a major RF power generation component (Kostroma GRES substation).
• Setback: Confirmed successful RF strikes on central energy infrastructure (Kam'yans'ke TPP) validate the MDCOA threat of deep operational disruption.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Urgent Requirement: Immediate damage assessment and resource allocation for emergency power provision in the Dnipro-Poltava logistics corridor following the confirmed TPP strike. This is critical to preventing cascading logistics failures.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Denial and Deflection (New/Escalated): TASS is employing a "Whataboutism" campaign, attempting to redirect global attention from successful UAF strikes (Volgorechensk) by reporting on unrelated accidents in the US (Mississippi chemical spill) and remote RF regions (Khabarovsk rail crash).
• Morale Boost/Exaggeration (RF): RF sources (Two Majors) are immediately claiming highly exaggerated success ("20 Geranium hits") on the Kam'yans'ke TPP, likely inflating the damage to demoralize the local populace and UAF rear echelon.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF morale is reinforced by UAF General Staff (Genshtab) reports of high daily RF losses (+1170 personnel). These figures serve to justify the continued high operational tempo despite kinetic setbacks.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The TASS focus on foreign incidents and remote domestic issues indicates a defensive posture regarding RF internal security and infrastructure vulnerability.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The initial phase of the MLCOA sequence is complete. The focus now shifts to the operational consequence of the deep strikes and the follow-on actions of the RF SpN groups.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 1-4 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - In Execution)

1. SpN Kinetic Activation: RF infiltration groups in Kostiantynivka will likely activate their kinetic sabotage missions concurrently with the peak power disruption caused by the Kam'yans'ke strike, leveraging the darkness and command confusion. Targets will focus on C2 nodes and choke points.
2. Secondary Strike Wave: A second, smaller RF strike wave (UAV or Missile) may target the power generation sector near Kyiv or Odesa to prevent rapid diversion of energy from those regions to the central logistics corridor.
3. Frontal Probing: RF conventional forces on the Pokrovsk salient will initiate increased frontal probing (artillery preparation and localized assaults) to identify weaknesses created by the rear-area disruption.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Unchanged)

• Systemic Rear Disruption and Frontal Exploitation: The Kam'yans'ke strike successfully causes extended power failure, paralyzing the Dnipro rail hub. RF SpN successfully severs the main logistics artery near Kostiantynivka and destroys a Brigade-level C2 node. This creates a critical operational vacuum, enabling a successful, exploitationary RF mechanized breakthrough on the Pokrovsk salient, forcing significant UAF loss of terrain.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J4 (Logistics/Engineers): Immediate Power Contingency (FLASH EXECUTION).

   • Action: Immediately activate pre-positioned high-capacity generators for all critical rail switching yards and communication nodes in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast sector. Prioritize maintenance of power flow to critical C2 nodes supporting the Pokrovsk salient.
   • Rationale: The confirmed strike on Kam'yans'ke TPP threatens systemic logistical failure. Rapid contingency activation mitigates the MDCOA threat of operational paralysis.

2. J3 (Ground/SOF): Kostiantynivka Total Security Sweep.

   • Action: Initiate a full-spectrum security sweep and lockdown of Kostiantynivka. Any detected RF SpN elements must be neutralized immediately, without waiting for kinetic activation, to eliminate the direct threat to the rear before power outages can be fully exploited. Deploy additional SOF elements with thermal imagery capability.

3. J7 (PSYOP/J2): Counter-Disinformation Surge.

   • Action: Release coordinated UAF reporting on the successful strike against the Kostroma GRES substation (Volgorechensk), using verified imagery. Concurrently, deny and dismiss the RF "20 Geranium hits" claim in Kam'yans'ke with verified, localized damage reports.
   • Rationale: Maintain the perception of UAF strategic reach and counter the RF narrative of deep strike dominance to stabilize domestic and frontline morale.

//END SITREP//