Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 052000Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051900Z NOV 25 – 052000Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (The synchronization of RF deep kinetic strikes, SpN activity in the operational rear, and information warfare pressure confirms the immediate threat picture.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk Axis (CRITICAL FOCUS): FACT: Heavy explosions and fires are reported in Russian-occupied Donetsk (1921Z, 1927Z, 1932Z NOV 25), with claims of a successful strike on an RF ammunition depot (BK). JUDGMENT: If confirmed, this UAF deep strike maintains pressure on RF logistics nodes, mitigating the effect of the Kramatorsk rail closure by forcing RF to relocate or disperse forward depots.
• Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia Axes (IMMINENT THREAT): FACT: UAF Air Force reports multiple UAV/Shahed groups active. One group is reported in Eastern Dnipropetrovsk moving toward Chaplyne (1908Z NOV 25), and another group from the south is moving toward Zaporizhzhia (1910Z NOV 25). FACT: The Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration issued an air raid alert (1909Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms the initiation of the MLCOA—the predicted, large-scale Shahed attack, targeting key CNI and logistics centers in the UAF operational rear.
• Odesa/Kyiv Rear Area: FACT: Public release of power outage schedules for Odesa Oblast (1904Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This indicates UAF is proactively managing power grid stability in anticipation of the ongoing/imminent RF strike wave, demonstrating high operational preparedness against CNI threats.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• The current nighttime conditions with associated low cloud cover (implied by the difficulty of identifying light sources in Donetsk strike footage) continue to favor RF drone infiltration and SpN operations (Kostiantynivka), while degrading UAF visual AD/ISR capabilities.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF AD is actively tracking multiple Shahed vectors. UAF deep strike capability remains effective (Donetsk strike). UAF CNI security is in high alert status (Odesa power management). FACT: UAF reportedly used a "Zenith Drone" to shoot down a Russian Shahed (1924Z NOV 25), indicating tactical innovation in low-altitude AD.
• RF Posture: RF is executing the synchronized attack (Shaheds + SpN in Kostiantynivka, per previous report). RF forces are showcasing counter-FPV adaptations, including a heavily modified logistics truck with improvised anti-drone defenses (1922Z NOV 25), suggesting continued evolution in tactical counter-drone warfare.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Mass UAV Attack (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF has launched a large-scale Shahed strike, demonstrating the capacity for coordinated, multi-axis drone attacks to saturate UAF AD.
2. Improvised Counter-UAS Protection (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The deployment of "cope cages" on logistics vehicles shows RF adaptation to UAF FPV dominance on forward GLOCs.

Intentions:

1. Operational Paralysis: The immediate RF intention is to leverage the ongoing Shahed strike, coupled with confirmed SpN activity in Kostiantynivka, to achieve temporary C2 paralysis and significant logistical disruption in the Donbas rear, forcing UAF units in Pokrovsk to commit to consumption of limited reserves.
2. Information Exploitation: RF IO is attempting to exploit public attention on minor issues (Angelina Jolie’s driver mobilization, 1908Z NOV 25) to distract from UAF tactical successes (Donetsk strike).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF Tactical Defense: The "cope cage" fitted to a logistics vehicle (ASTRA, 1922Z NOV 25) is a direct tactical adaptation to mitigate UAF FPV interdiction of vulnerable logistics assets.
• UAF AD Innovation: The reported use of a dedicated "Zenith Drone" to intercept a Shahed (1924Z NOV 25) is a significant UAF tactical countermeasure, indicating continuous evolution in the AD/UAS domain.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Constraint: The reported successful UAF strike on a possible RF ammunition depot in Donetsk (1932Z NOV 25) is a critical constraint. If confirmed as a major facility, it will necessitate increased transport effort from the deep rear to maintain current artillery usage rates in the Pokrovsk sector.
• UAF Constraint: The core constraint remains the protection and throughput of the secondary road GLOCs (Barvinkove-Husarivka) against SpN and FPV interdiction while managing the severe AD demands of the current Shahed wave.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• UAF C2 systems are currently under severe stress due to the multi-domain synchronized attack (Shaheds in the rear, SpN infiltration in Kostiantynivka, and ongoing frontal pressure). The CNI management demonstrated by the Odesa power schedule release suggests high CNI C2 resilience, but the tactical AD response remains the immediate test.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Readiness: UAF is in a high-readiness state, specifically on the AD axis. The deployment of UAV-based AD shows high tactical initiative in the face of resource constraints.
• Force Protection: UAF commanders must assume that all high-value nodes (C2, ASPs, and power substations) are currently under surveillance by RF ISR (UAVs) and SpN assets (Kostiantynivka).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Deep Strike on RF Depot: Confirmed explosions in Donetsk with high probability of hitting an RF ammunition depot (1932Z NOV 25).
2. Drone-on-Drone Kill: Reported successful interception of a Shahed by a UAF "Zenith Drone" (1924Z NOV 25).

Setbacks:

1. Initiation of Mass Strike: The confirmed launch of multiple Shahed groups (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia axes) signifies the initiation of the most dangerous predicted enemy course of action.
2. Casualty Confirmation: UAF media confirmed previous strike casualties on a military target in Dnipropetrovsk on 01 November: 8 KIA, 40 WIA, 6 MIA (1913Z NOV 25). This confirms the lethality of RF deep precision strikes and the need for improved force dispersal.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT: AD/Counter-UAS: Requires immediate dynamic reallocation of mobile AD systems (SHORAD, Gepard, ManPADS teams) to protect known Shahed trajectories intersecting with critical nodes (rail junctions, substations, C2).
• SECURITY REQUIREMENT: Kostiantynivka SpN: Continued prioritization of QRF and thermal assets to neutralize the confirmed RF infiltration groups. Every hour these groups operate inside the rear area increases the risk of successful HVT targeting.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Tactical Disinformation: RF channels are propagating the IO theme that UAF forces are intentionally killing civilians attempting to flee UAF-held areas (Kupiansk area, 1909Z NOV 25), aiming to disrupt civilian loyalty and complicate UAF Rules of Engagement (ROE).
• RF Domestic Reinforcement: Russian channels are using the current operation to reinforce domestic narratives of Russian power and victory (Rybard, 1915Z NOV 25).
• UAF Counter-Propaganda: UAF channels are aggressively highlighting RF domestic weaknesses (drug use and mistreatment of soldiers, 1912Z NOV 25) and showcasing UAF tactical dominance (Zenith Drone intercept, 1924Z NOV 25).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public sentiment is focused on the immediate threat to CNI (power schedules, air raids). The confirmed casualties from the 01 NOV strike (1913Z NOV 25) will reinforce public demands for robust and preemptive AD coverage.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• US Political Distraction: Continued reporting on US domestic political drama (Trump's comments on New York election and US sovereignty, 1925Z, 1926Z NOV 25) may divert international focus away from the critical operational phase in Ukraine. UAF diplomacy must work to maintain visibility.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-8 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The synchronization attack will continue its kinetic phase:

1. Shahed Peak Activity (0-4H): The main Shahed wave will reach its target areas (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Poltava). RF will attempt to hit multiple grid substations simultaneously to maximize system shock, capitalizing on the deteriorating weather and AD saturation.
2. SpN Raid Execution (2-6H): The confirmed RF просачивание groups in Kostiantynivka will execute their primary mission (e.g., IED attack on a major road junction, or direct assault on an unsecured C2/ASP) coordinated with the peak of the Shahed strike to ensure maximum confusion.
3. Frontal Pressure Maintenance: RF forces will continue local tactical assaults near Pokrovsk to keep UAF forces committed to the line and prevent reinforcement of the rear area.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Logistical Severance: A combination of a successful SpN raid on a critical bridge/intersection along the Barvinkove-Husarivka axis, coupled with sustained power loss in the regional logistics hub (due to Shahed strikes), leads to a 24+ hour interruption of heavy supply delivery to the Pokrovsk salient. This creates an immediate need for emergency tactical withdrawal planning.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Air) / J6 (C2): Maximize AD Interdiction and System Resilience.

   • Action: Immediately deploy UAF "Zenith Drone" units or similar tactical C-UAS innovations to intercept incoming Shahed waves on the final approach path to critical infrastructure. Mandate the use of pre-approved backup power and communications procedures for all operational C2 nodes in Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia Oblasts.

2. J3 (Operations): Aggressive Counter-Infiltration Tasking.

   • Action: Commit maximum available combat power (SSO/GUR/QRF) to Kostiantynivka to neutralize the RF SpN threat within the next 4 hours. Failure to secure the operational rear will undermine the entire Pokrovsk defense.

3. J2 (Intelligence): Rapid BDA and Target Prioritization.

   • Action: Confirm the BDA on the reported Donetsk ammunition depot strike. If confirmed, issue an immediate intelligence assessment on the resulting RF artillery supply reduction and adjust RF ammunition consumption rate estimates for the Pokrovsk sector.

//END SITREP//