Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 050900Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 050830Z NOV 25 – 050900Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Confirmation of SSO deep strikes and persistent kinetic pressure on Pokrovsk are the dominant factors. Intelligence confirms continued RF reliance on KABs on the Zaporizhzhia axis and the continued use of IW/PSYOP to mask operational setbacks.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk): Confirmed ongoing, intense urban combat operations (0848Z video evidence). UAF Special Operations Forces (SSO) are actively engaged in close-quarters battle, reinforcing the previous assessment that the UAF corridor is holding, but under severe pressure from RF infiltration groups (просачивание).
• Zaporizhzhia Axis: UAF Air Force reports launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) by hostile tactical aviation over Zaporizhzhia (0846Z). JUDGEMENT: This indicates RF is utilizing KABs not only on the main Pokrovsk axis but also for suppressing UAF positions and attempting to interdict movement on the secondary southern front. This suggests a systemic, front-wide reliance on KABs.
• Deep Rear (Kursk Oblast, RF Territory): Confirmed high-value deep strike by UAF SSO on an Iskander OTRK and a Harmon (Гармонь) Radar Station (0834Z). FACT: The Harmon radar is a critical component of RF Air Defense (AD) C2, specifically for counter-UAS and low-altitude detection. IMPLICATION: The synchronized destruction of the OTRK and its AD/ISR support significantly degrades RF long-range strike capability and local air defense coverage in the Kursk region.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new significant weather data affecting the current reporting period.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF SSO: Demonstrated capacity for high-risk, high-reward deep precision strikes (Iskander/Harmon) and continued effective engagement in urban combat (Pokrovsk video confirmation, 0848Z). This suggests high morale and effective C2 integration.
• RF Logistics/Support: Confirmed ongoing civilian logistical support from deep RF territory (Chelyabinsk, VSKR, 0832Z) indicates the RF military supply chain remains reliant on mobilized civilian resources for non-lethal, essential items (e.g., camouflage netting, hygiene).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Massed KAB Employment: RF maintains the capability to employ KABs in saturation across multiple operational axes (Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia), posing a persistent, high-damage threat to fixed UAF positions and logistics nodes.
2. Information Manipulation: RF IW machinery continues to operate effectively, quickly generating propaganda related to Ukrainian mobilization efforts (0843Z) and using hyper-nationalist framing (0837Z) to justify the conflict and distract from operational losses.

Intentions (Operational - Next 12 hours):

1. Sustain Pokrovsk Pressure: RF will continue to use infiltration tactics (просачивание) and high-volume indirect fire (KAB/artillery, as seen in 0847Z strike video) to attempt to isolate and crush the UAF pocket in Pokrovsk.
2. Escalate Deep Strike Retaliation: The confirmed SSO strike on the Iskander/Harmon complex (0834Z) increases the certainty of an immediate, high-volume RF retaliatory strike against Ukrainian strategic CNI (see Predictive Analysis).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF Fire Coordination: Video evidence of the 338th Guards Rocket Artillery Brigade targeting Ternovate (0847Z) confirms effective, high-precision employment of MLRS/artillery on the Group Vostok sector, suggesting good fire C2 integration in localized sectors.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Deep Strike Vulnerability: The loss of the Iskander OTRK and its associated AD/ISR system (Harmon Radar) confirms the persistent vulnerability of high-value RF systems deep within their territory to UAF deep strike. This directly impacts RF ability to sustain precision strike operations.
• RF Domestic Burden: Continued civilian mobilization of resources (VSKR, Chelyabinsk) for basic front-line supplies (0832Z) indicates that the standard RF military logistics chain is either insufficient or unwilling to bear the full burden of non-lethal supplies for forward units.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• UAF C2: UAF demonstrates strategic and tactical C2 synchronization, linking SSO deep strike capabilities to operational objectives (degrading RF long-range fires and AD) while simultaneously sustaining urban maneuver and defense (Pokrovsk).
• RF C2: RF C2 appears effective at the political/symbolic level (Kremlin awards, 0835Z) and capable of localized fire missions (338th Brigade, 0847Z), but systemic issues persist, as evidenced by reliance on civilian logistics support.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• SSO Readiness: SSO units are highly effective and are operating at risk inside contested zones (Pokrovsk) and deep inside enemy territory (Kursk).
• Domestic Support: The successful fundraising effort (8.2 Million UAH, 0849Z) confirms continued high domestic support for the front line, providing a moral and financial buffer against RF kinetic and IW pressure.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. SSO Deep Strike (CRITICAL): Destruction of Iskander OTRK launcher and Harmon AD Radar (0834Z). Confidence: HIGH.
2. Pokrovsk Corridor Sustained: SSO and ground forces confirm active engagement in street fighting in Pokrovsk (0848Z), confirming the reinforcement corridor remains viable.

Setbacks:

1. Continued KAB Threat: RF continues KAB launches on the Zaporizhzhia axis (0846Z), indicating the challenge of suppressing RF tactical air power remains.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Core Narrative (Mobilization/Nazism): RF channels are pushing two main lines: 1) Fabrication/exaggeration of UAF forced mobilization (e.g., seizing a gym teacher, 0843Z) to damage UAF morale and internal cohesion. 2) Using highly inflammatory historical imagery (WWII SS posters, 0837Z) to reinforce the foundational claim of 'Nazism' and justify RF actions.
• RF Internal Consolidation: Putin's high-profile awarding of religious leaders (0835Z) and appointment of regional governors (0855Z) is an IW effort designed to project domestic political strength and unity amidst external pressures.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF domestic morale remains demonstrably high, indicated by the rapid, large-scale fundraising efforts for the front (8.2M UAH).
• RF domestic sentiment shows fragmentation, with MILBLOGGERS focusing on symbolic political issues (0835Z, 0855Z) rather than frontline successes, reflecting a need to shift focus away from tactical realities.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• US Diplomatic Focus: Reports regarding the US seeking to lift sanctions on the Syrian President (0840Z, 0842Z) suggest a potential shift in US diplomatic priorities that could affect the global coalition supporting Ukraine, though the direct impact is currently LOW.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will prioritize strategic retaliation following the successful SSO strikes in Kursk, coupled with maximum kinetic pressure on Pokrovsk.

1. Synchronized Retaliatory Strike (Strategic): RF will launch the anticipated large-scale saturation strike (UAVs and/or Missiles) within the next 12 hours. Targets will likely include a key military airfield or a major rail junction supporting the Donbas front (e.g., Dnipro/Kharkiv), synchronized with concentrated strikes against TPPs or 330 kV substations in Central/Eastern Ukraine.
2. Targeted Interdiction (Tactical): RF will intensify the use of KABs and infiltrate more просачивание groups (likely SpN or airborne elements) to ambush UAF supply convoys and fixed fire positions along the Pokrovsk corridor, aiming to exploit the tactical chaos caused by the strategic strike.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

• Escalated Border Kinetic Action: RF initiates calculated, high-precision rocket/artillery strikes (e.g., Tornado-S or high-calibre artillery) on identified UAF staging areas or logistics depots located within 10-15 km of the international border (Sumy/Chernihiv Oblasts), leveraging the threat of ground incursion to fix UAF reserves away from the Donbas and test UAF AD integrity in the north.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Air) / J3 (AD): IMPLEMENT IMMEDIATE RETALIATION DEFENSE PROTOCOL (CRITICAL PRIORITY). Disperse non-essential CNI personnel and equipment immediately. Prioritize mobile AD system (NASAMS, IRIS-T, Gepard) allocation to defend the highest-risk targets identified in the MLCOA (Rail hubs, high-voltage switchyards 330kV and above, and SSO support bases).
2. J3 (Fires) / J2 (Targeting): MAINTAIN DEEP STRIKE INITIATIVE (HIGH PRIORITY). Leverage the successful Iskander/Harmon strike to demonstrate continued dominance in the deep rear. Task follow-on precision strikes against known RF military installations in Kursk, Voronezh, or Belgorod Oblasts that support tactical operations on the Northern and Donbas axes, focusing on ammunition depots and additional AD/ISR assets.
3. J3 (Maneuver) / SSO Command: EXPLOIT URBAN GAINS (HIGH PRIORITY). Provide immediate, flexible artillery and close air support for SSO/GUR units engaged in close-quarters battle in Pokrovsk. Use TST procedures to rapidly eliminate identified RF infiltration groups to ensure the integrity of the reinforcement corridor is maintained and the localized RF assault is decisively defeated.

//END SITREP//