Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 050600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 050600Z NOV 25 – 050700Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Continued confirmation of RF deep strike campaign and UAF strategic interdiction.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Deep Rear Area (RF Territory): CONFIRMED ESCALATION. UAF deep strike assets (likely UAVs) successfully struck the Orël Thermal Power Plant (TEC) and secured a repeat strike on the Vladimirskaya substation (Vladimir Oblast). This confirms UAF intent to maximize kinetic pressure on RF energy generation and transmission infrastructure deep within the strategic rear. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Dnipro/Kryvyi Rih Axis: UAF Air Force reports continued inbound Shahed activity tracking toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from Southern Kharkiv region. Local authorities (Kryvyi Rih - Vilkul) report the situation is currently controlled, indicating successful initial AD response or ongoing tracking. The sustained threat confirms this axis as a high-priority RF target. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Donbas (Pokrovsk GLOC): RF forces continue high-intensity suppressive fire, specifically utilizing FPV drones and artillery against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast settlements (RBC-Ukraine/OVA reporting), directly supporting the effort to destabilize the Pokrovsk approach and interdict rear logistics nodes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Resting/Holding Areas (RF): RF MILBLOGGER channels (Воин DV) publish successful FPV/UAV strikes on UAF vehicle and possibly drone operator positions, indicating RF is actively employing counter-UAS (C-UAS) hunter-killer teams, corroborating the previous daily report's threat assessment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• RF Deep Rear (Moscow/Vladimir): Heavy fog reported in the Moscow region, forecasted to persist until 10:00–11:00 LMT. IMPACT ASSESSMENT: Fog conditions can be exploited by UAF long-range UAV assets for ingress/egress by severely degrading RF visual and electro-optical (EO/IR) air defense systems, potentially explaining the success of the overnight strikes. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Operational Area (Ukraine): No significant weather changes reported affecting frontline operations. Low visibility favored for drone operations continues.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF AD: UAF AD units are actively tracking new inbound UAVs across the Dnipropetrovsk axis.
• UAF Deep Strike Assets: Demonstrated high operational tempo, successfully striking multiple strategic CNI targets in the RF rear.
• RF C-UAS Teams: Confirmed active, seeking to neutralize UAF UAV operators and logistics vehicles.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Deep Strike: RF retains the capability for multi-vector saturation strikes (Shahed/Artillery) against UAF logistics and CNI (Dnipro, Kirovohrad).
2. Adaptive C-UAS: RF has successfully integrated C-UAS hunter-killer teams into forward area operations to degrade UAF FPV/ISR advantage.
3. Advanced Hybrid Warfare: RF maintains high capacity to deploy sophisticated AI-enhanced disinformation and multi-layered PsyOps, specifically targeting UAF morale and international support.

Intentions (Operational - Next 6-12 hours):

1. Logistics Denial (Donbas): RF will intensify FPV and artillery strikes on settlements west of the Kakhovka line and along the Pokrovsk approach to suppress UAF supply lines.
2. Homeland Security Amplification: RF state media (TASS, Rybar) will heavily promote narratives of UAF personnel liquidation (TASS claim of UAF UAV operator killed in Kharkiv) and massive Western destabilization efforts (Rybar) to justify the war and distract from UAF strikes on RF territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Kinetic Strike Diversification: UAF has expanded its strategic strike targets beyond substations (Vladimirskaya) to include power generation facilities (Orël TEC), indicating a systematic effort to target both transmission and generation components of the RF energy grid. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Targeting of UAF Operators: The TASS claim of liquidating a UAF UAV operator, while unverified, aligns with the confirmed RF deployment of hunter-killer teams and signals RF intent to publicize these counter-UAS successes to deter UAF drone usage. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF continues to sustain high-volume FPV drone and artillery use in the Dnipropetrovsk sector, confirming high logistics readiness for localized fire missions.
• RF CNI resilience is being tested by UAF strikes (Vladimir, Orël), potentially forcing resource diversion to repair/defense.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains synchronized, effectively coupling high-tempo kinetic operations in Ukraine with an aggressive information campaign in the RF rear.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Deep Strike Posture: UAF Deep Strike forces demonstrate high readiness and mission success against high-value strategic targets in RF territory.
• Air Defense: UAF AD units are responding proactively to the confirmed inbound UAV threat on the Dnipropetrovsk/Kryvyi Rih axis, maintaining operational control in the immediate operational area.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Strategic Interdiction: Confirmed successful strikes on Orël TEC and Vladimirskaya substation, degrading RF energy supply and forcing political and military reaction within Russia.
2. C2 Maintenance: Kryvyi Rih authorities confirm the situation is "controlled," suggesting successful local force readiness despite the saturation strike threat.

Setbacks:

1. Increased Exposure: UAF UAV operators face increased risk due to confirmed RF C-UAS hunter-killer team deployment and focused targeting efforts.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• ISR Support: Increased need for low-altitude ISR/Counter-battery assets to counter RF FPV/artillery teams targeting logistics in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
• Air Defense Interceptors: Continued critical need for AD interceptors to counter the predicted large-scale Shahed/missile strike, especially around logistics nodes supporting Pokrovsk.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• Anti-Western Narratives (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF MILBLOGGER Rybar is promoting a complex narrative accusing the US/UK of systemic, foreign-funded influence operations designed to destabilize post-Soviet states (Tajikistan cited as proxy), directly mirroring official Kremlin narratives to justify aggression against Ukraine.
• Exaggerated RF Success (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): TASS claims the liquidation of a UAF UAV operator in Kharkiv, intended to inflate RF counter-strike capability and demoralize UAF drone teams.
• DPRK Narrative Amplification (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF channels continue to amplify the narrative that DPRK soldiers are gaining "combat experience in a new war, a war using drones," used to normalize and justify the military alliance and personnel support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF Deep Strike Impact (RF Home Front): The successful UAF strikes on Orël and Vladimir will increase domestic pressure on the RF government to improve air defense and public security, potentially diverting military resources.
• UAF Home Front: The confirmed successful defense of Kryvyi Rih is a positive morale factor, but the continued high volume of fire on Dnipropetrovsk settlements sustains civilian anxiety.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• EU Accession: Discussion of an EU probationary period for new members (Ukraine) highlights continued Western political engagement but indicates a cautious approach to full integration, possibly affecting long-term resource commitments. (LOW MILITARY RELEVANCE)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6-12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The synchronization between kinetic deep strike and information operations will peak.

1. Max-Effort Shahed/Missile Strike: RF will execute the predicted large-scale saturation strike against CNI and logistics hubs in Central Ukraine (Dnipro/Kirovohrad), leveraging the ongoing UAV wave as an initial screen.
2. Targeted C-UAS Operations: RF will continue to focus hunter-killer teams on identifying and eliminating UAF UAV/FPV operators in frontline and near-rear areas (Kharkiv/Donetsk axes) to degrade UAF tactical fire support.
3. Information Spike: RF state media will flood the information space with claims of strategic victory, UAF operator liquidation, and Western/AI-driven deception narratives to mask the UAF strikes on Vladimir/Orël.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(CRITICAL CONFIDENCE)

• Coordinated Systemic Degradation: RF successfully synchronizes a large missile strike (e.g., Kalibr/Kh-101) with the UAV swarm, achieving critical damage to a primary UAF logistics depot in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (disrupting the Pokrovsk supply chain) while simultaneously exploiting degraded UAF C2 (due to a successful strike on a rear C2 node) to launch a massed infiltration/armor push against the vulnerable Pokrovsk GLOC.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Air) / J4 (Logistics): FORCE PROTECTION AGAINST C-UAS. Immediately disseminate FLASH warning to all forward UAV/FPV units regarding confirmed RF C-UAS team activity. Mandate change of routine (COR) for all launch/recovery sites and implement rotating, temporary forward operating bases to minimize RF targeting predictability. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION)
2. J3 (Fires) / J2 (Targeting): INTERDICT KAB ENABLERS. Prioritize the targeting of any identified RF C-UAS teams (if located via SIGINT/HUMINT) and execute the pre-emptive deep strike plan against the high-activity GRAU missile arsenal and confirmed KAB FAFPs to preempt the predicted saturation strike. (HIGH PRIORITY - OFFENSIVE INTERDICTION)
3. J3 (Info Ops): COUNTER-PROPAGANDA FUSION. Immediately publish verifiable evidence and public statements confirming UAF strikes on the Orël TEC and Vladimirskaya substation, leveraging this success to neutralize the RF internal narrative (TASS claims, Rybar Western destabilization narrative) and bolster domestic morale. (HIGH PRIORITY - COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

//END SITREP//