Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 050630Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 050600Z NOV 25 – 050630Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus remains on confirmed strategic strike initiation and critical tactical pressure points.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Deep Rear Area (RF Territory): No new confirmed kinetic strikes within this immediate reporting window. The strategic effect of the Vladimir strike (confirmed in the previous report) is ongoing.
• Dnipro Axis (CRITICAL): UAF Air Force confirms the presence of an inbound Shahed-type UAV tracking toward Dnipro from the East (БпЛА на Дніпро зі сходу). This confirms the sustained nature of the strategic strike wave, validating the MLCOA/MDCOA overlap predicted in the previous report. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Kupyansk-Oskil Axis: RF sources (Rybar) indicate significant UAF pressure and localized advances around Kupyansk (Yuvileiny/Zapadne) in the October 17 - November 3 timeframe, forcing RF counterattacks to stabilize lines near Dvorichna/Novomlynsk. Current tactical lines hold RF on the eastern bank of the Oskil, but UAF maintains initiative. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Based on RF chronology)
• Novopavlivka Direction (South Donetsk): RF map analysis confirms active fighting in this sector as of 05 NOV 25, suggesting persistent localized ground assaults, though no major breakthroughs are indicated in the immediate reporting window.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Nighttime/Low-Visibility Conditions: RF-released thermal footage of a UAF armored column near Kupyansk confirms RF forces are utilizing low-visibility conditions (night/fog) to conduct ISR and engagement operations. This reinforces the need for UAF forces to maintain strong night-fighting discipline and passive defense.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Air Defense: UAF Air Force is actively tracking threats and issuing public warnings for the inbound strike wave, confirming high readiness levels.
• RF Ground Forces (Kupyansk): RF propaganda claims the 68th Division is actively engaged in defense near Kupyansk against UAF armored attempts to break through. This provides a unit identification (OOB data) for a key defensive force. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - OOB provided by RF source)
• RF Ground Forces (Donetsk): The 110th Brigade (DPR militia/RF element) is confirmed by Colonelcassad to be operational and engaged in combat, likely near the Avdiivka/Donetsk sector, based on historical deployment and fundraising efforts. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - OOB provided by RF source)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Strategic Strike: RF possesses the ability to launch sequential waves of Shahed UAVs to sustain systemic pressure on the energy grid (confirmed by Dnipro ingress).
2. Combined Arms Defense/Counterattack (Kupyansk): RF is capable of mounting coordinated fire missions (68th Division) against UAF armor attempts, indicating persistent defensive depth on the Kupyansk axis.

Intentions (Operational - Next 6 hours):

1. Target Dnipro CNI: RF intent is to hit a critical node in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to maximize power disruption, given the region's importance as a logistics and command hub for the Eastern Front.
2. Information Warfare Exploitation: RF will continue to use high-value propaganda (e.g., captured/defected UAF personnel, massive loss claims) to undermine UAF morale and recruitment efforts.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Propaganda as Tactical Intel: RF sources (RVvoenkor, Colonelcassad) are consistently disclosing deployed unit identities (68th Division, 110th Brigade) and operational focus areas (Kupyansk, Donetsk). This allows for rapid refinement of UAF target packages.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment of frontline units (68th Division) appears sufficient to counter UAF armored assaults. The focus on showcasing the 110th Brigade's equipment needs (fundraising) suggests some logistical gaps persist for older/DPR-affiliated units.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating synchronization between strategic deep-strike planning (UAV launch) and immediate tactical response (Kupyansk defense/propaganda release).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Offensive Pressure (Kupyansk): UAF maintains operational initiative and the capability to conduct mechanized assaults/advances on the Kupyansk axis, as confirmed by RF counter-claims.
• Air Defense Readiness: UAF AD is in a high state of alert and actively disseminating threat warnings.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Success: UAF maintains operational pressure on the Kupyansk axis, forcing RF to commit named formations (68th Division) to localized defensive engagements. Setback: The confirmation of the strategic UAV strike targeting Dnipro constitutes a renewed threat to CNI and systemic resilience.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement is for Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) ammunition to effectively engage the inbound Shahed wave, ensuring adequate coverage for vulnerable logistics and CNI in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• UAF Morale Attack (HIGH CONFIDENCE): TASS is utilizing a captured/defected UAF soldier from Kharkiv Oblast to promote the narrative that UAF mobilization is coercive and that Ukrainian soldiers are willingly defecting to join RF volunteer units ("Martyn Pushkar detachment"). This aims to discourage UAF mobilization efforts.
• RF Loss Denial: RF military bloggers are simultaneously downplaying RF losses while showcasing fierce defensive fighting (Kupyansk), counteracting the UAF General Staff’s reported losses of 900 personnel, 3 tanks, and 2 AD systems in the last 24 hours.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF General Staff's prompt release of high RF casualty figures (900 personnel) is essential for maintaining domestic morale, while the confirmed air threat over Dnipro will raise regional anxiety levels.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No new diplomatic developments. The primary IW threat remains the RF narrative targeting UAF mobilization and Western instability (per previous report).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6-12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The synchronization of fire and maneuver will continue.

1. Immediate CNI Strike: The inbound Shahed (Dnipro) will likely be followed by additional waves, confirming the large-scale saturation strike predicted previously, targeting high-value infrastructure in Central/Eastern Ukraine.
2. Sustained Pressure (Pokrovsk): RF forces, leveraging KAB strikes and infiltration teams, will maintain maximum pressure on the Pokrovsk GLOC, aiming to distract UAF C2 from the strategic AD effort.
3. Local Counterattacks (Kupyansk): The RF 68th Division will conduct localized, focused counterattacks to eliminate UAF breakthroughs and stabilize the eastern bank of the Oskil River.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(CRITICAL CONFIDENCE - UNCHANGED)

• Synchronized MDCOA Execution (Strategic Paralysis): RF synchronizes the deep-strike campaign (Shahed + missiles) targeting AD and logistics C2 nodes with a maximum-effort ground push by infiltration/KAB forces to sever all major GLOCs west of Pokrovsk, aiming for a catastrophic operational failure on the Donetsk axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Air): IMMEDIATE SHORAD TASKING. Immediately allocate all available mobile SHORAD and air defense cannon systems to defend critical energy infrastructure and logistics nodes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Ensure high-readiness status for follow-on waves. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - AD PROTECTION)
2. J3 (Ground) / J3 (Fires): EXPLOIT OOB INTEL. Utilize the confirmed identity of the RF 68th Division (Kupyansk) and 110th Brigade (Donetsk) to cross-reference with existing target packages. Prioritize TST against their known C2 and logistics hubs to degrade their immediate combat effectiveness. (HIGH PRIORITY - TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT)
3. J3 (Info Ops) / J2 (Counter-Intelligence): NEUTRALIZE DEFECTION NARRATIVE. Rapidly develop a proactive media response to the TASS defector story, emphasizing RF propaganda tactics, coercive conditions, and highlighting UAF soldier resilience and commitment to national defense. (HIGH PRIORITY - COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

//END SITREP//