Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 042030Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 042000Z NOV 25 – 042030Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Imminent RF strategic strike preparations continue. RF ground focus remains on Pokrovsk GLOC interdiction, despite UAF resilience.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): The situation remains critical but stabilized by the confirmed UAF reinforcement corridor (previous report). RF fire pressure is maintained, confirmed by new KAB launches targeting the wider Donetsk region (CR: 20:22:56). RF Military Bloggers (e.g., Rybar, CR: 20:12:39) continue to publish maps detailing the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad direction, attempting to portray a high level of operational success and focus on the UAF’s defensive strongpoints and logistics lines (Colonelcassad, CR: 20:21:28 mentions Teruvatoye, Pokrovskoe, Novonikolaevka, supporting the narrative of operational movement west of Pokrovsk).
• Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Odesa): Confirmed KAB launches target Eastern Kharkiv Oblast (CR: 20:04:37), sustaining the attrition campaign. High-speed projectile (likely missile) threat confirmed targeting Odesa (CR: 20:12:54).
• Deep Strike/UAV Activity (Multi-Domain): Sustained RF reconnaissance and strike preparation observed:
  • UAV detected targeting Dnipro from the northeast (CR: 20:21:32).
  • UAV detected targeting Zaporizhzhia from the south (CR: 20:22:26).
  • These multi-vector UAV approaches confirm RF intent to disperse UAF Air Defense efforts across multiple oblasts in preparation for the predicted saturation strike.
• Black Sea/Naval Domain: Confirmed video footage of a successful UAF maritime drone attack on the Tuapse port (CR: 20:05:15), indicating sustained UAF deep strike capability against RF naval logistics and export infrastructure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night conditions continue to provide optimal cover for both RF fixed-wing KAB operations (where visual navigation is not required) and UAV/missile strike missions across the deep rear. Current conditions favor RF deep reconnaissance and strike preparation.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: President Zelenskyy's visit to the 414th Separate Brigade of Unmanned Aerial Systems ("Madjar's Birds") (CR: 20:25:36) emphasizes the high strategic priority placed on UAS capabilities and underscores the defensive necessity of this force in the current operational environment.
• RF: Dispositions are fixed on attrition in the East and simultaneous preparation of the deep strike complex. Confirmed deployment of the 338th Guards Rocket Artillery Brigade near Ternovatoe (CR: 20:24:27) indicates the continued use of high-precision heavy artillery fire to target UAF positions and logistics far into the rear areas of the Zaporizhzhia axis.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Precision Artillery Interdiction: Confirmed use of 338th Guards Artillery near Ternovatoe (CR: 20:24:27) demonstrates RF capability to execute high-impact strikes against UAF assets deep into the tactical rear, likely targeting logistics or command nodes near key settlements (Pokrovske, Novonikolaevka). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Sustained KAB Attrition: RF air assets maintain a high sortie rate, targeting key logistics and defensive infrastructure in Donetsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Strategic Missile/UAV Strike: The confirmed multi-vector UAV launches targeting Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia (CR: 20:21:32, 20:22:26) are final preparatory steps for the imminent strategic saturation strike, intended to maximize AD coverage disruption. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Intentions (Operational - 12-48 hours):

1. Execute Strategic Disruption: RF intent remains to execute the saturation strike within the immediate 12-36 hour window to achieve systemic energy and C2 failure, coinciding with high ground pressure on Pokrovsk.
2. Target UAF Rear Area Resilience: RF military bloggers are actively mapping UAF defensive engineering construction (trenches, strongpoints) in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (CR: 20:21:28), indicating an intent to use long-range artillery and deep strikes to pre-emptively degrade UAF defensive depth before any large-scale RF offensive move.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has confirmed a high-precision, deep-fire mission capability with the 338th Artillery Brigade (CR: 20:24:27) targeting Ternovatoe. This is not simple area suppression but likely aimed at high-value tactical targets or interdiction points, suggesting a more sophisticated targeting cycle is in effect.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are stressed but successfully supporting high-volume KAB and deep-fire MLRS operations. The celebration of designers of strategic systems (Burevestnik, Poseidon) by the MoD (CR: 20:13:02) serves as an internal propaganda piece aimed at reinforcing domestic confidence in RF long-term military technological superiority, despite immediate battlefield logistics concerns.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

UAF C2 demonstrates political and military cohesion, exemplified by the high-profile visit to the UAS brigade (CR: 20:25:36) and the rapid confirmation of ongoing threats (Air Force alerts). RF C2 is synchronized, coordinating IO (Rybar/Colonelcassad), tactical ground fires, and strategic strike preparations.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high, with a demonstrated focus on modernizing and utilizing asymmetric warfare capabilities (UAS, maritime drones - CR: 20:25:36, 20:05:15). The preemptive release of planned power outage schedules in Kyiv (CR: 20:12:59) is an explicit recognition of the imminent RF deep strike threat, enabling civilian and military entities to implement contingency plans.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed successful maritime drone strike on Tuapse port (CR: 20:05:15), inflicting damage on RF strategic port infrastructure.
• Continued official recognition and reinforcement of the critical role of UAS forces (414th Brigade visit), boosting morale and operational capability in the crucial drone domain.

Setbacks:

• Confirmed RF high-precision artillery strike capability utilized near Ternovatoe (CR: 20:24:27), posing a direct threat to UAF operational depth and rear-area strongpoints/logistics that are now being mapped by RF IO channels (CR: 20:21:28).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement remains AD saturation countermeasures. The multi-vector UAV approaches to Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia require AD assets to be positioned to protect critical infrastructure in those regions, potentially pulling resources away from the Pokrovsk corridor or Kyiv.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Narrative (Internal Focus): RF media focuses on glorifying high-tech strategic weapons (Burevestnik, Poseidon) and operational victories (Rybar maps), aiming to maintain domestic support by emphasizing long-term strategic power and near-term tactical success (CR: 20:13:02, 20:12:39).
• RF Narrative (Psychological Warfare): RF state-affiliated media (ASTRA, CR: 20:03:48) promotes disturbing, graphic content (both real and simulated—e.g., civilian violence, trauma first aid using hyper-realistic bloodied mannequins at public events in Novorossiysk, CR: 20:03:46). This type of IO is designed to normalize extreme violence, desensitize the Russian population, and project an image of unyielding brutality to the Ukrainian population. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - PSYOP ASSESSMENT)
• UAF Counter-Narrative: UAF maintains a narrative of resilience, modernization (UAS), and high political-military leadership support for frontline units.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment in Ukraine is being managed through proactive transparency (Kyiv power outage schedules, CR: 20:12:59), preparing the civilian population for the anticipated RF energy strike. Military morale is bolstered by Presidential recognition of key units (CR: 20:25:36).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF diplomatic focus is highlighted by the confirmed delegation change for the G20 summit (CR: 20:27:40), which IO channels interpret as avoidance of international legal risk (ICC warrant). This has a LOW immediate tactical impact but signals continued RF sensitivity to international pressure and isolation. TASS reports on reduced proceeds from the Chelsea FC sale (CR: 20:18:14) are used by RF media to subtly erode confidence in long-term Western financial support for Ukraine.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-36 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The strategic saturation strike is launched, and RF forces attempt to exploit the systemic confusion.

1. Massed Strike Launch: RF executes the predicted large-scale Shahed/missile strike, utilizing the multi-vector approaches confirmed (Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Chernihiv vectors) to maximize AD engagement complexity. Primary targets will be CNI, logistics hubs, and military C2 nodes in Central/Eastern Ukraine.
2. Pokrovsk Exploitation: Under the cover of the national AD effort, RF kinetic fire (KAB/Artillery) on the Pokrovsk GLOC is maximized. Просачивание infiltration groups will attempt high-risk missions to sever the reinforcement corridor.
3. Deep Fire Missions: The 338th Guards Artillery Brigade and similar deep-fire assets will be tasked to strike UAF rear-area engineering and logistics nodes identified via RF OSINT/ISR (e.g., Ternovatoe, Pokrovskoe - CR: 20:21:28).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves localized Air Superiority and operational paralysis in the Pokrovsk rear.

• RF deep strike successfully neutralizes or heavily degrades a major UAF AD command node, achieving temporary localized air superiority over the Donetsk or Zaporizhzhia axis. This allows a significant increase in KAB sorties, suppressing UAF tactical reserves and eliminating key fortified positions (trenches/strongpoints identified by RF IO, CR: 20:21:28). This suppression allows an RF mechanized unit or concentrated infiltration force to successfully establish sustained control over a primary GLOC west of Pokrovsk, effectively isolating the reinforced city garrison.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Air) / J2 (Intelligence): MAXIMIZE AD DISPERSION AND ALERT. Immediately raise AD readiness status to maximum for all critical infrastructure targets in Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Odesa, in addition to Northern sectors. Implement strict EMCON (Emission Control) procedures for fixed AD sites. Use mobile systems and decoy targets to dilute the effect of the multi-vector saturation strike. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - AD MANAGEMENT).
2. J3 (Fires) / J2 (Intelligence): SUPPRESS DEEP FIRE ASSETS. Immediately task available long-range precision fires (e.g., HIMARS, Storm Shadow) to prosecute the confirmed location of the 338th Guards Rocket Artillery Brigade (Ternovatoe area) and any associated forward logistics. Neutralizing this deep fire capability will protect UAF defensive engineering and rear logistics. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - COUNTER-FIRE INTERDICTION).
3. J7 (Engineering) / J3 (Operations): HARDEN CRITICAL LOGISTICS NODES. Given the RF IO focus on UAF defensive engineering (CR: 20:21:28), reinforce all key operational strongpoints and logistics hubs in the Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk rear with additional cover and concealment. Implement counter-drone patrols (EW/UAS) around these fixed sites to defeat RF ISR targeting prior to artillery engagement. (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION/RESILIENCE).

//END SITREP//