Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041000Z NOV 25 – 041300Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Confirmation of RF retaliatory strike campaign and UAF deep strike efficacy.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational axis remains divided between the high-intensity ground battle for Pokrovsk and the strategic deep strike/retaliation cycles targeting rear area logistics.

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): RF forces are confirmed to be operating inside the southern quarters of Pokrovsk. Ground action remains intense. Artillery activity is extremely high, indicated by the ZAP OBA report of 668 strikes on 14 settlements in the Zaporizhzhia region, reinforcing the high tempo of RF fire support across the southern front. (FACT - ZAP OBA, D-S Belief: Artillery Barrage)
• Deep Strike/Retaliation Axis (Central/RF Rear):
  • UAF Deep Strikes: Visual confirmation (Sternenko) of fires at the Kstovo refinery (Nizhny Novgorod Oblast) validates successful deep penetration and significant damage to RF strategic POL capacity. (FACT - STERNENKO)
  • RF Retaliation: RF launched an anticipated punitive strike campaign. Dnipropetrovsk OBA confirms enemy attack on Mykolaiv Hromada (Synelnykove Raion) involving both a missile and a UAV, confirming the multi-domain nature of the strike. (FACT - DNIPROPETROVSK OBA)
• Black Sea/Crimea: Reports indicate a fire on an RF Project 1124-M "Albatros-M" small anti-submarine ship in Sevastopol. If confirmed as a kinetic strike, this represents a significant UAF naval domain success, disrupting RF naval control in the Black Sea. (FACT - RBC-UA/Crimean Wind)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night/pre-dawn conditions facilitated both the UAF deep drone strikes (Kstovo) and the RF retaliatory UAV/missile launches (Synelnykove Raion). Weather is not reported as a constraint on multi-domain operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are simultaneously prosecuting the Pokrovsk ground offensive and executing a synchronized, retaliatory deep strike operation targeting Central/Eastern Ukraine. RF MOD claims the destruction of 85 UAVs overnight over Russian territory, likely an inflated figure intended for IO, but confirming the scale of the UAF deep strike effort. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT on Volume Claim)
• UAF: UAF forces are engaged in active defense in Pokrovsk and heightened Air Defense (AD) operations in Central and Eastern Oblasts. UAF forces are continuing offensive deep strike operations despite high threat levels.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Urban Assault and Fire Support: RF maintains the capability to sustain high-intensity ground operations in Pokrovsk, supported by massive, sustained artillery fire (668 strikes in ZAP Oblast).
2. Multi-Domain Retaliation: RF demonstrated the intent and capability to launch immediate, combined missile/UAV punitive strikes targeting critical logistics and C2 in Central Ukraine (Synelnykove incident).
3. Information Warfare: RF IO is highly synchronized, leveraging the "Day of National Unity" holiday to counter the negative impact of the Kstovo deep strike and framing UAF actions as "terrorist" (Starshie Eddy post linking UAF to "atrocities").

Intentions (Immediate - 0-12 hours):

1. Strike Exploitation: RF intent is to continue missile/UAV strikes throughout the night and day to disrupt UAF logistics and C2 supporting the Pokrovsk axis.
2. Stabilize Pokrovsk Penetration: RF priority remains the solidification of gains in southern Pokrovsk, likely utilizing localized EW/C-UAS protection for forward units (as previously reported).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Combined Strike Package: The RF strike on Mykolaiv Hromada utilized a combined missile and UAV package, indicating an adaptive strategy to saturate local UAF AD and EW defenses. This confirms the MDCOA threat predicted in the previous report.
• Increased Internal Security Risk: The reported murder allegation against an escaped RF serviceman in Belgorod Oblast highlights the continued erosion of RF force discipline and internal security, which may divert internal RF security assets from border defense.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

CRITICAL ASSESSMENT: UAF deep strikes against POL (Kstovo, Sterlitamak) and localized logistics nodes (Dovzhansk, Rozkishne) have severely constrained RF strategic and operational POL supply. The successful strike on the Project 1124-M vessel (if confirmed) further degrades RF logistical and patrol capabilities in the Black Sea. This continued kinetic pressure on logistics is the most significant operational constraint on the RF.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains responsive and focused, successfully executing the predicted retaliatory strikes despite suffering major strategic industrial losses. Synchronization between ground operations (Pokrovsk) and deep strikes remains effective.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive-offensive. High attrition rates inflicted on RF forces (840 personnel, confirming previous daily report numbers) are sustained, suggesting effective defensive action and counter-battery fire. However, the confirmed penetration in Pokrovsk and the active retaliatory strike campaign require maximum readiness across the AD, EW, and ground defense domains.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Strategic Damage: Visually confirmed destruction/damage at Kstovo refinery validates UAF deep strike effectiveness, imposing significant long-term strategic cost on RF.
2. Naval Interdiction: Reported damage to the Project 1124-M ship is a significant success in the Black Sea (pending confirmation of kinetic origin).

Setbacks:

1. Confirmed Penetration: RF forces are confirmed to be entrenching in Pokrovsk.
2. Confirmed Retaliatory Impact: The attack on Mykolaiv Hromada confirms the success of the predicted RF punitive strike, likely causing localized damage to UAF assets or critical infrastructure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement remains dedicated, mobile, high-value AD assets to protect priority targets against RF combined missile/UAV strikes, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava Oblasts. Sustained artillery resupply to the Pokrovsk axis is critical to maintaining the attrition rate (840 personnel losses).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus: RF channels (Dnevnik Desantnika, Rybar) are heavily featuring the "Day of National Unity" holiday to promote domestic cohesion and deflect attention from deep strike losses. They are simultaneously maximizing the claimed success of AD (85 UAVs shot down) to minimize the perceived impact of UAF deep strikes.
• UAF IO Focus: UAF channels are aggressively highlighting both the success of the deep strikes ("salutes" sent for the holiday) and the high RF attrition rates (840 "derussified" personnel), effectively linking kinetic success with information warfare.
• Sabotage/Internal Threat Narrative: RF IO (Starshie Eddy) is exploiting the previously reported UAF internal security breach (captured "Azov" infiltrator) to brand UAF forces as "atrocious creatures," preparing the public for potential escalation or justifying atrocities.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale remains high due to confirmed strategic strike success. RF domestic morale is being manipulated via the synchronized holiday and deflecting propaganda, attempting to mask strategic failures with tactical (Pokrovsk) and defensive (AD claims) successes.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt consolidation and continue the high-intensity air and ground campaign.

1. Pokrovsk Entrenchment: RF assault groups will prioritize constructing strongpoints and defensive positions within the captured southern sectors of Pokrovsk to withstand immediate UAF counter-attacks. Fire support (artillery, MLRS) against UAF concentration areas west of the city will increase.
2. Sustained Retaliatory Strikes: RF will execute follow-on UAV and missile strikes, likely targeting rail lines, power substations, and major road chokepoints in Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts to hinder reserve deployment to Pokrovsk.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves localized air superiority over Pokrovsk and commits new reserve formations.

• Massed Glide Bomb Attack: RF introduces a concentrated, short-duration tactical aviation wave utilizing FAB glide bombs against UAF reserve positions or fortified C2 nodes just outside Pokrovsk. If successful, this could create a localized, irreversible collapse of the forward defense lines, forcing a major operational withdrawal towards Myrnohrad.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Air Defense Command (Central Oblast): AD APTATION: COUNTER-COMBINED STRIKE. Immediately implement layered AD/EW protocols specifically designed to defeat combined missile/UAV packages, prioritizing electronic countermeasures against UAV swarm coordination and maintaining readiness for high-altitude missile threats. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - IMMEDIATE ACTION)
2. J3/Fires Command (Pokrovsk Axis): COUNTER-ENTRENCHMENT FIRE. Utilize long-range precision fires (HIMARS, artillery) to target and suppress confirmed RF C2 nodes and logistical supply routes (road/rail) feeding the southern penetration of Pokrovsk. Focus on denying RF the ability to bring up heavy engineering equipment for fortifications. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - KINETIC INTERDICTION)
3. J2/GUR/SBU (Counter-Intelligence): EXPLOIT SABOTEUR NETWORK. Leverage the captured "Azov" infiltrator for immediate, high-value intelligence on the network's C2 structure, operational cells, and potential targets. Use this intelligence to pre-emptively neutralize follow-on sabotage threats in critical rear areas (Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia). (HIGH PRIORITY - COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)

//END SITREP//