CONFIRMED RF ADVANCE: New RF milblogger footage (Shef Hayabusa) showing a correspondent reporting from the severely damaged town of Selidovo (approx. 35km SW of Pokrovsk). This confirms a significant Russian tactical gain and geographic shift, indicating RF forces have established control or are operating in Selidovo. This puts pressure on the UAF logistics hub of Myrnohrad and exposes the southwestern flank of the main Pokrovsk defense. (FACT / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Pokrovsk: Urban fighting continues, with the focus now on preventing the RF forces that penetrated Selidovo from leveraging that position to pressure the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad road network.
Deep Strike Operations (RF Rear):
Volgograd Oblast Targeted: UAF deep strikes (likely UAVs) confirmed targeting the 500 kV substation in Frolovo, Volgograd Oblast. Local reporting indicates communication problems, suggesting successful kinetic effect on supporting infrastructure. (FACT - UAF/OSINT Confirmation / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Lipetsk Oblast Alert: Red alert ("Threat of UAV Attack") declared for Yelets, Yeletsky MR, Dolgorukovsky MR, Stanovlyansky MO, and Izmalkovsky MO (Lipetsk Oblast). This confirms UAF long-range strike capabilities are active and targeting industrial or military infrastructure deep inside Russia. (FACT - RF Official Declaration / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Nighttime operations continue to favor both UAF deep strike penetration (Volgograd, Lipetsk) and RF ground maneuvers/reconnaissance (Black Sea UAV).
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
RF Deep AD: RF milblogger Colonelcassad posted footage claiming successful Night Air Defense (AD) work against "Patriots" (likely a reference to UAF drones/long-range targets, not Patriot missiles). The footage shows successful engagements against multiple small targets, indicating RF forces are adapting to counter-UAV measures in the rear. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT / MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
UAF Air Defense: UAF AF reports new UAV groups:
One likely reconnaissance UAV detected over the Black Sea, heading toward Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Raion (Odesa Oblast). (FACT / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
UAV/Shahed activity observed in Sumy Oblast (near Ulyanivka) and Kharkiv Oblast (near Zlatopil). This confirms a continuation of the multi-axis UAV strike pattern targeting Central and Northeastern Ukraine. (FACT / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
Enhanced Ground Penetration: RF forces have demonstrated the capability to seize and hold contested urban areas (Selidovo), allowing them to project power deeper into the Donetsk Oblast rear.
Logistics Resilience: Despite UAF strikes on Kursk and Luhansk, RF forces maintain sufficient logistics flow to support the major offensive in Donetsk and sustained deep strikes across multiple Russian oblasts.
Propaganda Amplification: RF IO organs (TASS, milbloggers) are rapidly generating and disseminating professional-quality propaganda narratives, particularly on the sensitive religious front and through exaggerated claims of UAF atrocities.
Intentions:
Isolate Pokrovsk: Utilize the confirmed Selidovo position to conduct further offensive operations toward Myrnohrad, thereby threatening to isolate Pokrovsk from its main southern supply routes and reserve staging areas.
Disrupt Central Ukrainian CI: Continue high-tempo deep strikes (Volgograd, Lipetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy) to degrade UAF electrical and communications networks, complicating C2 and civilian resilience ahead of winter.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF Media Exploitation of Selidovo: RF media is immediately deploying correspondents to newly captured or contested areas (Selidovo), indicating a deliberate strategy to quickly convert tactical gains into strategic Information Operations (IO) victories.
Targeting Deep CI: The attack on the 500 kV substation in Frolovo (Volgograd Oblast) signifies UAF's willingness to target high-voltage infrastructure deep within Russia, increasing the pressure on RF domestic energy distribution that supports military rail transport and industrial output.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
The UAF deep strikes targeting electrical infrastructure in Volgograd and Lipetsk (alert) are aimed at disrupting the RF rail network and associated supply chain, which are critical for sustaining the high-consumption offensive in Donetsk.
Impact: Damage to the Frolovo substation may temporarily affect the rail lines running south toward Rostov-on-Don and subsequently toward the Donbas Axis.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains robust, successfully coordinating offensive ground operations (Selidovo/Pokrovsk) with synchronized, multi-domain IO narratives (religious persecution, mobilization claims) and defensive AD operations in the RF deep rear.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
Engineering Focus: UAF is maintaining a focus on combat engineering support, demonstrated by the public ceremony honoring Engineer Troops (Kyiv). This highlights the recognition of the critical role of obstacle breaching, mine clearance, and mobility in the current operational environment.
Personnel Sustainability: RF claims of forced mobilization in the Kharkiv metro (Colonelcassad) are a clear IO effort to undermine UAF personnel generation efforts and domestic morale. While aggressive recruitment practices may exist, the footage serves a distinct propaganda function.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Success: Confirmed successful deep kinetic strike on the Frolovo 500 kV substation (Volgograd).
Setback: Confirmed RF occupation/operation within Selidovo, representing a significant loss of rear security and an increased threat to Myrnohrad.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
Urgent Requirement: Reinforcement and immediate stabilization of the defensive line between Selidovo and Myrnohrad is critical. Reserves must be rapidly tasked to prevent the RF from consolidating their flanking position.
Winter Energy Security: President Zelensky's statement noting a requirement for an additional $750M for winter gas purchases underscores the significant financial constraint and the persistent vulnerability of the energy sector to RF strikes.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
RF Core Narrative 1 (Religious Persecution/Hybrid Warfare): RF media is fully exploiting the detention of Metropolitan Arseniy, framing the UAF/SBU action as state-sponsored religious persecution intended to "destroy Orthodoxy in Ukraine." This narrative is highly effective in polarizing audiences.
RF Core Narrative 2 (Atrocity Claims): TASS is disseminating video footage with the caption that UAF drone operators "killed civilians near Kupyansk trying to exit to the RF." This is a classic atrocity claim intended to delegitimize UAF precision strikes and FPV use.
UAF Counter-IO: Polish General Staff warning of RF IPSO is a positive step, confirming international awareness of the hybrid threat. UAF messaging focuses on resilience (Engineer Troops ceremony) and international support (gas funding appeal).
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
The combination of confirmed RF advances into Selidovo and continued air raid alerts (Kharkiv, Sumy) likely places significant pressure on civilian morale in Eastern and Central Ukraine.
The high-profile RF IO campaign concerning forced mobilization (Kharkiv metro) is designed to generate fear and distrust in the UAF government's personnel policies.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will prioritize the exploitation of the Selidovo penetration to increase the operational tempo against UAF flanks.
Myrnohrad Push: RF forces will consolidate positions in Selidovo and attempt probing attacks northward and westward toward Myrnohrad to disrupt UAF C2 and supply lines linking Pokrovsk to the rear.
Maximum AD Exhaustion: RF will launch a final wave of synchronized UAV attacks (Kharkiv/Sumy) alongside continued high-volume KAB strikes (Zaporizhzhia) to force UAF AD to expend stocks and divert attention from the Donetsk ground threat.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours
(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
Double Envelopment of Pokrovsk: RF commits substantial armored reserves from both the north (current Pokrovsk penetration) and the south (Selidovo axis) in a simultaneous assault aimed at fully encircling or isolating key UAF units within Pokrovsk, leading to a critical decision point for UAF High Command regarding retreat or counter-attack.
Strategic Communications Decapitation: RF executes a highly effective, coordinated strike using precision munitions (Iskander/KN-23) targeting a combination of UAF National C2 nodes and major communication centers (fiber optic hubs, broadcast towers) to achieve temporary national C2 disruption concurrent with the Donetsk offensive.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
Timeframe
Event/Decision Point
Triggering Indicator
0-12H
Southern Flank Re-Stabilization: UAF must commit at least Brigade-level reserves to establish blocking positions to the North and West of Selidovo to protect Myrnohrad.
Confirmed RF movement beyond Selidovo toward Myrnohrad.
12-36H
Deep Strike Retaliation Assessment: UAF must assess the functional damage to the Frolovo substation and subsequent RF logistics delays.
SIGINT/HUMINT confirmation of reduced rail traffic capacity on the southern RF axes.
48H
Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad Resource Allocation: UAF High Command must decide on the long-term resource commitment (AD, reserves, fires) to hold Pokrovsk versus establishing a new, robust line further west.
Sustained RF pressure on both northern and southern Pokrovsk flanks.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Priority
Gap Description
Collection Requirement (CR)
CRITICAL
RF Forces in Selidovo (OOB & Intent): Identify the specific RF units (Division/Brigade), combat strength, and immediate offensive vector from Selidovo (e.g., direct north to Pokrovsk rear or west to Myrnohrad).
ISR (UAV/SAR): Continuous, high-resolution surveillance of Selidovo and the M04/H32 road network. HUMINT: Urgent focus on local sources in Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk rear areas.
HIGH
Effectiveness of Deep Strikes: Detailed damage assessment of the Frolovo 500 kV substation (Volgograd) and the operational impact of the Lipetsk AD alert.
OSINT/GEOINT: Imagery analysis of target sites; monitoring of RF regional infrastructure reports.
MEDIUM
Targeting Data for Storm Shadow: Identification and prioritization of high-value, fixed RF military targets (major logistics hubs, permanent C2 facilities) within range of the newly delivered Storm Shadow missiles.
J2/Targeting Cell: Integration of HUMINT/SIGINT data with GEOINT to generate Tier 1/Tier 2 target lists.
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
J3/Ground Forces (Selidovo-Myrnohrad):IMMEDIATE COUNTER-FLANK ACTION. Reposition two combat-effective maneuver battalions (from a less active sector, e.g., Zaporizhzhia or Kupyansk holding) to reinforce the Myrnohrad defensive sector within the next 12 hours. The goal is to establish a hard counter-flank to prevent RF from exploiting the Selidovo penetration to reach Myrnohrad. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
G7 (Information Warfare/PSYOPS):PROACTIVE COUNTER-DISINFORMATION. Develop and immediately disseminate a coherent, multi-platform narrative (domestic and international) that counters the RF religious persecution claims and the new TASS atrocity narrative. Provide factual evidence regarding the detention and highlight the RF's own history of striking religious sites. (HIGH PRIORITY)
J3/AD Command (Black Sea Axis):MARITIME RECON INTERDICTION. Given the confirmed reconnaissance UAV movement over the Black Sea, task available AD/EW assets in Odesa Oblast (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Raion) to specifically target and neutralize any maritime or coastal reconnaissance platforms to deny RF targeting data for future missile/UAV strikes on Odesa infrastructure. (HIGH PRIORITY)
