Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 030600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment is characterized by simultaneous RF deep strikes against strategic depth and sustained Information Warfare targeting US political alignment. The primary kinetic threat is the use of high-speed/ballistic missiles targeting critical logistics and population centers in the Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia region.

• Deep Strike Axes (Kinetic): Confirmed multiple launches of ballistic missiles from the Southern Axis (Crimea/Black Sea region) targeting Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia (0156Z - 0201Z). This aligns with the previous MDCOA of a multi-axis deep strike campaign.
• Air Domain (Kinetic): Multiple instances of Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) usage reported over Kharkiv/Poltava and Donetsk Oblasts, confirming continued RF tactical air superiority in contested airspace and sustained pressure on frontline and rear area logistics.
• Asymmetric Warfare (Kinetic): A Group of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) detected in Chernihiv Oblast (Korukivskyi Raion), following a confirmed Shahed strike resulting in a fire in Mykolaiv. This indicates a sustained, multi-vector nightly strike campaign utilizing Shaheds and potential loitering munitions to deplete UAF AD inventories.
• Strategic Domain (Information): RF state media (TASS) immediately amplified statements by former US President Trump, labeling Putin and Xi Jinping as "very strong and smart leaders," maintaining the strategic narrative designed to influence Western resolve.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No specific weather constraints reported that would significantly impede RF deep strike or nocturnal UAV operations. Clear skies likely favor continued KAB usage by RF tactical aviation.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Posture: Confirmed launch platforms (likely Iskander-type or KN-23 variants, given the ballistic threat from the South) are active. Tactical aviation is operational in the Kharkiv/Donetsk sectors for KAB strikes. UAV launch teams are active in the Northern/Southern operational zones (Chernihiv/Mykolaiv).
• UAF Posture: UAF AD forces are engaged in tracking and engaging multiple threats (ballistics, UAVs). Ground units are currently reacting to the deep strike threats. Strategic Communications (J7) is responding to continued RF Information Operations (IO) targeting US-Ukraine relations.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Synchronized Deep Strike Capability: RF demonstrates the ability to execute simultaneous strikes using ballistic missiles, KABs, and Shahed UAVs across multiple axes (South, East, North). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Exploitation of US Political Cycle: RF C2 remains highly adaptive and capable of instantaneously integrating US political rhetoric into its strategic IO narrative. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Sustained KAB Attrition: RF tactical aviation maintains the ability to launch precision-guided KABs against both frontline and near-rear objectives in high-intensity sectors (Donetsk, Poltava). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Intentions:

1. Strategic Disruption (Deep Strike): RF intends to disrupt UAF logistics and C2 in the critical Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia hub using ballistic strikes, forcing UAF to divert AD assets from the frontline.
2. Narrative Erosion (IO): RF seeks to legitimize its leadership and the Sino-Russian axis by leveraging US political endorsements, thereby eroding the Western narrative of unified opposition to RF aggression.
3. AD Saturation: RF intends to saturate UAF AD using multi-vector UAV and missile strikes (Mykolaiv, Chernihiv) to identify gaps for future, high-value kinetic strikes.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate shift from the previous day's focus on the Danylivka ground fight to a coordinated, high-intensity deep strike campaign targeting Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia indicates RF C2 possesses the flexibility to quickly pivot kinetic focus based on operational priorities or intelligence gathering.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The use of multiple ballistic missiles (minimum two launches confirmed) suggests RF maintains adequate inventories of high-value precision munitions, or that KN-23 stockpiles are being utilized aggressively.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in synchronizing kinetic strikes (multiple domains and geographic areas) with real-time strategic IO dissemination (TASS/Trump messaging).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF AD readiness remains critical due to the persistent multi-domain threat. Ground forces, particularly those securing critical infrastructure in the Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia region, are on high alert following the ballistic missile launches.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

TACTICAL SETBACK: The confirmed strikes on Mykolaiv (Shaheds) and the severe threat to Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia (Ballistics) demonstrate the continued effectiveness of the RF deep strike campaign, placing UAF infrastructure and civilian populations at high risk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Ballistic Missile Interception: Urgent requirement for enhanced terminal phase interception capabilities (e.g., PATRIOT, SAMP/T) to protect the Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia logistical hubs from sustained ballistic threats.
2. Counter-KAB Defenses: Requirement for better active and passive defenses against KABs in the East (Donetsk, Poltava) to protect forces and rear-area supply lines.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Legitimization of RF/PRC Leadership: TASS amplifies Trump's statements to strategically validate the strength and competence of Putin and Xi, undermining Western efforts to isolate these leaders.
• Distraction/Global Crisis Framing: The re-emergence of the "Washington attacks Venezuela" narrative (НгП раZVедка) serves as a classic RF distraction tactic, attempting to fragment Western attention and resources away from Ukraine.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The high-intensity deep strike targeting major cities (Mykolaiv, Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia) generates widespread civilian fear and stress. However, the immediate and accurate warning dissemination by the UAF Air Force channels (e.g., "Dnipro - to shelter!") is crucial for maintaining public trust and procedural discipline during attacks.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The continued RF IO exploitation of US domestic politics poses an unceasing challenge to maintaining political consensus and long-term aid commitments from the US.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to exploit the psychological and physical damage of the deep strikes:

1. Sustained Deep Strike Momentum: RF will follow the ballistic strikes with sustained Shahed/Cruise Missile attacks on the Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia region over the next 6-12 hours, aiming to overwhelm damage control efforts and secondary targets.
2. KAB Focus Shift: RF tactical aviation will increase KAB usage on high-value logistical nodes (e.g., rail yards, command posts) in the Poltava/Kharkiv operational area, leveraging the focus on the South for AD diversion.
3. Maximum IO Amplification: RF and proxy channels will saturate the information space with the Trump/TASS narrative for the next 24 hours, focusing on Western audiences.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF executes a decisive strike leveraging AD saturation:

1. Dual-Axis Breakthrough Attempt: RF utilizes the AD diversion caused by the deep strikes (Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia) to launch a coordinated, high-volume ground assault in a critical sector (e.g., Ivanopillya or Danylivka), potentially utilizing the previously identified DPRK elements as part of the initial wave, hoping to achieve an uncontested local penetration.
2. Targeted Infrastructure Kill Chain: RF executes a follow-on ballistic strike targeting a confirmed UAF AD battery position (e.g., PATRIOT site) that was forced to expose itself or relocate due to the high operational tempo required to defend Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia, aiming to achieve a critical AD kill.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/AD/G3 (Ballistic Defense): REINFORCE DNIPRO/ZAPORIZHZHIA TERMINAL DEFENSE. Immediately shift available highly mobile terminal defense assets (e.g., Gepard, Avenger systems) to protect critical infrastructure around Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, prioritizing energy infrastructure and main rail lines, anticipating follow-on strikes. (URGENT)
2. J7/Strategic Communications (Counter-IO): PRE-EMPT VENEZUELA DISTRACTION. J7 must prepare immediate statements and background briefings for Western media linking the RF's deployment of distraction narratives (Venezuela, US politics) directly to their sustained military failures on the ground and their need to draw international attention away from the conflict.
3. J2/GUR (DPRK/Ground Focus Reminder): MAINTAIN GROUND INTEL FOCUS. Despite the deep strike focus, J2/GUR must maintain priority on exploiting the DPRK POWs and acquiring intelligence on RF OOB in the Danylivka/Ivanopillya sectors, as the MDCOA suggests a ground assault may follow the AD distraction.

//END SITREP//