Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: DEEP STRIKE AND LOGISTICS ATTRITION

DTG: 020730Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. RF continues a high-tempo, multi-domain campaign focused on saturating UAF Air Defense (AD) with UAVs and kinetic strikes on critical logistics and energy infrastructure (CNI), while ground forces maintain heavy attrition on the Pokrovsk axis. The UAF response involves successful counter-CNI operations in occupied territory and high AD effectiveness.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment is defined by kinetic attrition across the Eastern FLOT and reciprocal deep strikes on CNI.

• UAF Deep Strike Success (CRITICAL): UAF Special Combat Service (SBS, Sily Boyovogo Spetsnaz - implied) confirms striking five (5) Russian substations with a total capacity of 5066 MVA overnight. RF-affiliated sources (LNR head) confirm that four of these were located in occupied Luhansk Oblast (TOT). This represents a successful retaliatory strike on RF-controlled CNI, likely aimed at disrupting logistics and military C2 power grids. (Source: SBS/Operatyvny ZSU/ASTRA - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Air Defense (AD) Success (CRITICAL BDA): Confirmed destruction/suppression of 67 enemy UAVs by UAF Air Defense Forces overnight. This reinforces the assessment of high UAF AD readiness against mass saturation attacks. (Source: UAF Air Force/ASTRA - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• FLOT - Pokrovsk Axis: ISW analysis confirms UAF Airborne Assault (DShV) forces successfully disrupted recent RF assault plans near Pokrovsk. This indicates robust UAF defensive integrity despite continuous RF pressure and logistics interdiction attempts. (Source: RBK-Ukraine/ISW - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• FLOT - Orekhov Direction: RF MoD claims successful neutralization of UAF temporary deployment areas using Krasnopol high-precision munitions, indicating continued high-precision targeting capability and active engagement in the Zaporizhzhia sector. (Source: MoD Russia - HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• FLOT - Dvorichna Direction: RF sources claim the liberation of Fyholivka (Figolevka). This, if confirmed, indicates marginal RF advance in the northern Kharkiv/Kupyansk sector, requiring immediate BDA. (Source: Operatsiya Z - MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Southern FLOT: RF forces conducted over 480 shelling incidents using nearly 1780 munitions against UAF positions and adjacent settlements over the past day, highlighting sustained high-volume indirect fire pressure. (Source: Southern Defense Forces - HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

UAV footage from the Dvorichna direction noted adverse weather (haze/low visibility and strong winds), suggesting environmental factors continue to impede precise ISR and tactical UAV operations, particularly for small-scale reconnaissance.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF AD assets are demonstrating high operational tempo, successfully managing saturation attacks. Ground forces in the critical Pokrovsk sector are maintaining a successful active defense, supported by DShV units. UAF deep strike units (SBS) are demonstrating strategic reach and effective targeting against high-value RF CNI in occupied territory.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Precision Artillery (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrated effective use of precision-guided munitions (Krasnopol) to neutralize UAF tactical positions (e.g., Orekhov direction).
• Sustained Artillery Volume (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains the capacity for extremely high-volume conventional shelling (480+ incidents, 1780+ munitions in the Southern sector alone).
• Multi-Domain IO: RF continues to generate domestic propaganda (TASS: new methanol regulations, social benefits) while military blogs conduct grassroots fundraising (Arkhangel Spetsnaz), illustrating a fragmented, yet persistent, sustainment model reliant on both state and non-state support.

Intentions:

1. CNI Degradation: RF continues to target civilian infrastructure (Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa attacks resulting in high civilian casualties) to degrade morale and strain emergency response resources.
2. FLOT Attrition: RF intent remains fixed on breaching the Pokrovsk defensive line and achieving localized gains (Fyholivka claim), primarily through massed indirect fire and small, continuous probing assaults.
3. Counter-IO: RF is attempting to deflect attention from its own logistical weaknesses by promoting local fundraising efforts as patriotic duty.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Glide Bomb Targeting Shift: UAF Air Force warnings of new КАБ (KAB/UMPK glide bomb) launches toward both Donetsk (FLOT proximity) and Sumy (deep rear) indicate that RF tactical aviation is simultaneously supporting frontline operations and continuing deep strikes on the northern sector, stretching UAF interceptor coverage.
• Precision Fire Deployment: The confirmed use of Krasnopol in the Orekhov direction (MoD Russia) confirms the deployment of high-value, laser-guided munitions for tactical engagements against confirmed UAF positions, reflecting a shift from massed dumb munitions to surgical strikes where targets are positively identified by ISR.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The active appeal for general donations ("День Сотки" - Day of the Hundreds) by a major RF military blog (Arkhangel Spetsnaz) reinforces the MEDIUM-HIGH confidence assessment of persistent, grassroots logistical deficits for frontline RF units, despite robust state support for strategic assets (UAVs, missiles).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is effectively synchronizing the complex, multi-axis deep strike campaign (UAVs on Odesa/Dnipropetrovsk, UMPK on Sumy/Donetsk), even while ground operations show localized failures (Pokrovsk assault disruption by UAF DShV).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF AD readiness remains demonstrably HIGH (67 UAV kills). UAF ground force posture in the critical Pokrovsk axis is RESILIENT, with DShV forces capable of disrupting RF assault plans. UAF SBS units are conducting highly effective, strategic counter-CNI operations in occupied territory.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Deep Counter-CNI): The confirmed successful strike on five RF-controlled substations is a major operational success, directly challenging RF military power projection capability in occupied regions.
• Success (Defensive): UAF DShV successfully disrupting RF assaults near Pokrovsk validates the current defensive force allocation and training.
• Setback (Force Protection): The confirmed increase in civilian casualties (fatalities now six, including two children) in Dnipropetrovsk/Odesa underscores the inability to provide 100% AD coverage for non-military civilian population centers.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement is for increased ISR/EW assets in the Dvorichna/Fyholivka sector to confirm or deny RF advance claims, and additional mobile AD systems to counter the expanded UMPK glide bomb threat against the Sumy/Northern logistics rear.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Internal IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF state media (TASS) maintains a focus on domestic administrative updates (methanol, maternity capital), insulating the domestic audience from direct combat realities.
• RF Logistical IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The fundraising appeal ("Day of the Hundreds") demonstrates RF bloggers' consistent reliance on public donations, which, while providing some materiel, serves an IO purpose of portraying unit needs as a noble cause.
• RF External IO (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF military blogs (Operatsiya Z, Rybar) are rapidly claiming minor territorial gains (Fyholivka) and promoting precision strike videos (Krasnopol) to sustain a narrative of continuous, successful offensive operations.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The high civilian casualty count (six fatalities in two oblasts) is a major blow to public morale, despite the strong UAF AD success (67 kills). UAF public information channels (DShV, Southern Command) are effectively counteracting this by emphasizing successful training and operational performance.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

UAF strategic counter-CNI strikes in TOT Luhansk provide a powerful demonstration of independent operational reach, which should be leveraged to secure further long-range strike capabilities from international partners.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to replicate the deep strike saturation model but will likely focus the high-value assets (Iskander, UMPK) on potential CNI or logistics nodes linked to the power disruption caused by the UAF SBS strikes. Ground forces will intensify artillery fire in the Pokrovsk and Southern sectors, aiming to exploit any perceived UAF AD resource depletion. RF will likely launch a focused ISR effort over the Fyholivka/Dvorichna area to confirm the claimed local advance and prepare follow-on ground operations in that sector.

• Indicators: Repeat mass UAV/UMPK launches directed at Poltava/Sumy; sustained, heavy indirect fire volume in the Southern FLOT (e.g., 500+ daily incidents).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF executes a Coordinated Rail/Energy Interdiction Strike. Leveraging intelligence from the previous saturation attack and the UAF counter-CNI strikes, RF launches a simultaneous, multi-platform attack (Iskander/Kh-series missiles + UMPK) targeting a major, high-volume rail bottleneck (e.g., a critical yard near Dnipropetrovsk or a key bridge) AND a critical repair depot or power distribution center, aiming to paralyze UAF response and logistics resupply to the Eastern FLOT for a minimum of 72 hours.

• Indicators: Massed tactical aviation sorties (Su-34/35) confirmed operating near FLOT/deep rear; SIGINT spike related to long-range missile targeting data.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J4 (Logistics Protection): FORTIFY CRITICAL RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE. Given the high success of UAF counter-CNI strikes and the increased UMPK threat, immediately prioritize hardening and active AD/EW protection for major railway junctions and bridges feeding the Pokrovsk axis, as these are the most likely high-value targets for RF kinetic retaliation (MDCOA).
2. J7/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IO): LEVERAGE COUNTER-CNI STRIKE. Publicly, but strategically, highlight the successful UAF SBS operation against RF-controlled CNI in TOT Luhansk. Use this success to demonstrate UAF's necessary retaliatory capacity and argue for increased provision of long-range precision strike systems (e.g., ATACMS/Storm Shadow variants) from Western partners.
3. J2/Northern Command (Tactical Response): DEPLOY RECON TO DVORICHNA. Immediately dispatch ground and aerial reconnaissance assets to the Fyholivka area to gain positive control confirmation. If the RF claim is confirmed, prepare reserve forces for immediate counter-attack or consolidation of defensive positions in adjacent areas.

//END SITREP//