Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: RF KINETIC INTENSIFICATION AND GLIDE BOMB DEPLOYMENT

DTG: 020600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. RF forces are executing a rapid and synchronized kinetic response, validating the previous MLCOA. The critical development is the confirmed immediate employment of aviation-delivered guided bombs (KAB) across multiple critical axes, signaling a high-priority effort to inflict maximum damage and rapidly consume UAF AD reserves.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry is defined by the immediate expansion of the aviation threat to include high-payload guided munitions across both the Northern (Sumy) and Eastern (Donetsk) operational zones.

• Tuapse (RF Rear): RF domestic sources (Operatsia Z, ASTRA) confirm the success of the UAF deep strike, reporting damage to a tanker and the oil loading terminal at the port (00:37Z, 00:45Z). This confirms significant kinetic damage to RF strategic oil infrastructure.
• Sumy Axis (CRITICAL NEW FOCUS): The Air Force confirmed launches of Aviation Guided Bombs (KAB) targeting Sumy Oblast (00:38Z). This is a definitive confirmation of the MDCOA defined in the previous report and indicates an immediate, high-lethality threat to logistics and troop concentration areas in the North.
• Donetsk Axis (KAB Threat): The Air Force confirmed separate launches of KABs targeting Donetsk Oblast (00:38Z). This confirms RF is leveraging the increased air threat to directly support frontline ground operations, likely targeting UAF command posts, fortified positions, or critical rear logistics in the Pokrovsk sector depth.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis: RF attacks continue, resulting in confirmed damage to the residential sector in Zaporizhzhia city (00:53Z, 00:54Z). The rapid issuance of an all-clear alert (00:56Z) suggests the strike involved a limited number of high-speed targets.
• RF Domestic Disruption: The implementation of "Plan Carpet" (План "Ковер") at Orenburg Airport (00:42Z) indicates a domestic security response to an unspecified threat, possibly related to UAV activity, drawing RF internal security assets away from the conflict zone.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night operations enable RF fixed-wing aircraft launching KABs to operate with reduced risk of detection and engagement, especially when exploiting ground clutter and terrain masking.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Strike Assets: RF is currently deploying high-speed air assets (likely Su-34/Su-35) to launch KABs outside UAF conventional AD range, simultaneously targeting the Northern, Eastern, and Southern operational depth.
• UAF AD: UAF AD is heavily tasked across four geographically distinct axes (Sumy, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv—as per previous report). The immediate priority has shifted to tracking and potentially intercepting the heavy KAB threat.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Immediate KAB Deployment (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates the capability to rapidly task and deploy fixed-wing assets for guided bomb strikes (KAB/UMPK) across geographically separated axes (Sumy, Donetsk) almost immediately following the UAF deep strike on Tuapse.
• Sophisticated IO (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF state media (TASS) is launching a sophisticated, multi-layered information operation attempting to link Ukrainian operations to international organized crime (narcotics cartels training FPV pilots) and is publicizing severe domestic legal action against supposed traitors/RDK affiliates (00:49Z, 01:02Z).

Intentions:

1. Kinetic Maximum Retaliation: Inflict maximum operational and strategic damage using high-payload KABs against UAF logistics and CNI in Sumy and military targets in Donetsk.
2. Psychological Coercion: Exploit the immediate threat of heavy ordnance (KABs) to degrade morale and force UAF command to prioritize the defense of non-frontline areas.
3. Undermine International Legitimacy: Continue the IO effort to delegitimize Ukrainian forces by linking them to criminality and showcasing severe RF domestic security response.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Confirmed KAB Synchronization: The coordinated use of KAB strikes in both Sumy and Donetsk within minutes of each other is a tactical escalation from previous single-axis saturation strikes, forcing an immediate, split-response decision by UAF Air Command.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed damage to the Tuapse oil terminal and tanker is a direct, measurable impact on RF seaborne oil export capacity, translating to a long-term strain on RF war financing (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating high effectiveness and responsiveness, coordinating a multi-platform kinetic retaliation (missiles/UAVs/KABs) while simultaneously managing complex strategic IO and domestic security responses (Orenburg "Plan Carpet").

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF Air Force is tracking KAB launches in near real-time, indicating effective air surveillance (HIGH CONFIDENCE). However, the resource allocation decision (which KAB launch to prioritize for interception, given finite long-range interceptors) is a critical current challenge.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Strategic): Confirmed high-value BDA at Tuapse (tanker and terminal damage) achieving strategic goals against RF war economy.
• Setback (Tactical): Confirmed KAB launches over Sumy and Donetsk represent a successful penetration of the operational air domain by high-lethality RF assets, placing critical UAF assets at extreme risk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement for long-range interceptors to counter the KAB threat has dramatically increased, particularly in the Sumy sector where fixed defenses are less dense than in the East.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative (Global Security): TASS is launching a highly inflammatory narrative suggesting international narcoterrorist cartels are involved in training Ukrainian FPV drone pilots (00:49Z). This aims to reduce international political tolerance for military support to Kyiv.
• RF Narrative (Domestic Security): RF state media is heavily publicizing severe legal actions (10 years for treason/RDK affiliation, 01:02Z), projecting an image of internal strength and zero tolerance for dissent or cooperation with Ukrainian forces.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed damage to residential areas in Zaporizhzhia (00:54Z) and the confirmed KAB threat in Sumy will elevate civilian anxiety and place immediate pressure on political and military leadership for enhanced defense of urban centers and rear areas.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Monitoring of international media (RBC-Ukraine reporting on Belgian base surveillance, 01:00Z) suggests heightened global security concerns, potentially increasing the scrutiny and urgency for delivering advanced AD assets to Ukraine.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will sustain and potentially increase the synchronized KAB strikes against identified fixed HVT (High-Value Targets) in the Sumy and Donetsk operational depths. The goal is rapid, large-scale destruction before UAF can reposition adequate AD. Concurrently, RF will intensify the IO campaign linking Ukraine to global criminality to maximize the political impact of the kinetic retaliation.

• Indicators: Repeat confirmations of KAB launches (e.g., against rail lines or large industrial complexes); RF media promoting "evidence" of cartel/UAF links.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF conducts a massed, coordinated missile/UAV/KAB strike against a single, high-value AD battery or command post (CP) protecting a critical axis (e.g., the KAB launch points in Sumy or Donetsk). The KABs will be used for direct kinetic effect, while the UAV/missiles act as AD decoys/saturation elements. Loss of a critical AD asset would immediately open the door for sustained, high-damage air strikes.

• Indicators: Precursor EW activity near known AD positions; simultaneous launch of 10+ targets (mix of types) directed at a small geographic area.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Air Force (Prioritized Air Interdiction - KAB Threat): IMMEDIATE ACTION. Based on confirmed KAB launches in Sumy and Donetsk, task fighter elements or the most capable long-range AD systems (Patriot/SAMs) to establish patrols/alert readiness to intercept or suppress the RF fixed-wing launch platforms before they reach KAB release points, particularly focusing on the Sumy axis.
2. J4 (Logistics Security - Sumy/Donetsk): IMMEDIATE ACTION. Direct all major logistics convoys and fixed materiel storage sites within a 50km radius of the confirmed KAB impact zones (Sumy and Donetsk) to implement Level 1 Dispersion and Camouflage. Reposition mission-critical supply caches to hardened or subterranean sites immediately.
3. J7/GUR (Information Operations - Countering Criminality Narrative): ACTION. Immediately task J7 to preemptively brief key Western media and diplomatic liaisons, providing verifiable evidence (e.g., formal statements, captured RF documentation) that refutes the RF "narcoterrorist FPV training" claim (00:49Z), stressing the professional nature of UAF training and denying the narrative any traction.

//END SITREP//