Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - URGENT OPERATIONAL UPDATE: AD STRESS AND GLIDE BOMB THREAT

DTG: 012100Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. Confirmed continued RF deep strike activity, primarily utilizing glide bombs (KAB) and UAVs, with a focus now shifting south of the Pokrovsk axis toward Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk. The kinetic pressure continues to stress UAF Air Defense (AD) assets.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment remains focused on the Pokrovsk Axis ground defense and the deep strike campaign in the operational depth. The focus of the air campaign is now confirmed to be actively engaging the Southern/Central logistics corridor.

• Air Defense Saturation (Southern/Central Axis): Air Force of Ukraine (UAF AF) confirms launches of Unattended Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) toward Pavlohrad and Kharkiv from the north (20:35Z). Additionally, UAF AF confirms KAB (Glide Bomb) launches aimed at Zaporizhzhia Oblast (20:46Z) and the southern part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (20:59Z). This confirms the MLCOA from the previous report regarding sustained dispersed strikes designed to fix AD assets.
• Zaporizhzhia Oblast: The Oblast Military Administration issued multiple high-priority air alerts (20:45Z, 20:49Z), indicating the immediate threat environment for CNI and civilian population centers in the region is elevated.
• Logistics Interdiction: The confirmed use of KABs (glide bombs) targeting Zaporizhzhia and Southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast strongly suggests RF is targeting high-value fixed logistics nodes (rail yards, depots, industrial facilities) that support the Southern/Donetsk fronts.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• The start of November sees continued high-intensity air activity, indicating clear weather windows or RF capability to operate in adverse conditions using guided munitions (KABs). The approaching winter highlights the criticality of maintaining power and heating infrastructure targeted by these strikes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF AD Posture: UAF AD remains reactive, issuing timely alerts based on detection of incoming UAVs and KAB launches. The spread of targets (Kharkiv, Pavlohrad, Zaporizhzhia, Southern Dnipropetrovsk) confirms the AD assets are severely dispersed.
• UAF Ground Forces (IO/Morale): UAF-aligned channels (e.g., Шеф Hayabusa) are showcasing kinetic success against RF personnel/positions (20:40Z), attempting to maintain tactical morale despite the broader operational pressure.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Glide Bomb Delivery (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains a significant capability for massed use of UMPK-guided KABs against fixed targets in the operational depth, enabled by air superiority or proximity of launch platforms (e.g., Su-34/35) to the FLOT.
• Synchronized Multi-Platform Strikes (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Demonstrated ability to coordinate simultaneous UAV and KAB strikes across multiple regions to maximize AD workload (Pavlohrad/Kharkiv UAVs synchronized with Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk KABs).

Intentions:

1. Exploit AD Saturation: Utilize UAVs to fix or distract AD assets in the northern sectors (Kharkiv, Pavlohrad) while delivering high-damage KAB strikes against critical logistics/CNI targets in the south (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk).
2. Strategic Isolation: Degrading CNI in the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia corridor aims to functionally isolate the Donetsk operational area from the strategic rear, hindering UAF reserve movement and sustainment.
3. IO Diversion (Medium Confidence): RF-aligned sources are actively promoting irrelevant international news (US politics, Chinese army updates, Belgian nuclear base drones) to clutter the information space and dilute attention from domestic failures or ongoing kinetic operations (20:47Z, 20:59Z).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• KAB Reliance: The increased and confirmed use of KABs in this reporting period, especially against the Southern corridor, suggests a higher priority on destroying fixed infrastructure rapidly, validating the MDCOA from the previous daily report.
• Morale Targeting: RF IO is actively disseminating content showcasing poor UAF morale (veteran expressing fear/attrition, 20:49Z), indicating a continued focused psychological warfare effort to break the will of frontline units and the home front.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF is dedicating significant high-value munitions (KABs) to targeting UAF logistics, indicating the successful interdiction of the Pokrovsk/Konstiantynivka corridor remains a central operational objective.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective in coordinating complex, multi-axis air operations and rapidly disseminating strategic IO (e.g., the narrative surrounding the Belgian drone incident, 20:35Z, 20:41Z) to global and domestic audiences.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• High Alert Status: UAF AF and regional military administrations are maintaining high alert status, providing real-time warnings to civilian populations, demonstrating effective sensor fusion and warning systems.
• Personnel Attrition/Morale Risk: The RF propaganda targeting UAF veterans expressing high combat stress and attrition rates (20:49Z) highlights a critical vulnerability in personnel sustainability and home front morale.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (OPERATIONAL): Confirmed KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast increase the operational risk to key logistical hubs and CNI.
• Success (TACTICAL): UAF channels successfully display footage of RF casualties (20:40Z), maintaining the narrative of tactical success in local engagements.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• GLIDE BOMB COUNTERMEASURES: Immediate requirement for improved or dedicated systems/doctrine to counter UMPK-guided KABs, which are currently placing critical logistics infrastructure at high risk.
• Counter-IO on Morale: Requirement for internal messaging to address and mitigate the psychological effects of RF propaganda targeting veteran and frontline morale.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Strategic Distraction (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF channels are employing a broad distraction strategy, flooding OSINT space with geopolitical news (Trump/Nigeria, China military) and unrelated security incidents (Belgian drone incident) to divert analytical and public attention away from the critical situation on the Pokrovsk axis and the ongoing deep strikes (20:47Z, 20:59Z, 21:01Z).
• Morale Degradation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The dissemination of distress narratives from UAF veterans (20:49Z) is a targeted IO effort to convince both the domestic and international audience of UAF's impending collapse due to high attrition.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Air raid alerts and confirmed KAB strikes in major population centers (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk) will place immediate stress on public confidence and daily life, despite signs of normalcy in rear areas (Odesa nightclub, 20:55Z).
• Lukashenka's aggressive rhetoric (20:52Z) is intended to raise anxiety regarding potential escalation on the northern border, though this appears to be political posturing rather than immediate military intent.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• RF continues to exploit US political developments (Trump comments) to frame the conflict within the context of unreliable or unpredictable Western alliances.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will sustain the KAB/UAV strike rhythm against the Southern/Central logistics corridor (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk) to maximize the attrition of high-value CNI. Ground forces on the Pokrovsk axis will continue local consolidation of any gains near the depot area, limiting movement and exploiting the AD gap created by the deep strike campaign.

• Indicators: Further confirmed KAB launches on industrial or transport infrastructure in the targeted oblasts; decreased UAF AD reaction time/effectiveness against subsequent strike waves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a critical saturation strike on a single, vital fixed target (e.g., a major transformer station or bulk fuel depot) in Dnipropetrovsk or Zaporizhzhia using massed KABs, resulting in a regional energy or logistics network failure that severely impacts UAF capacity to sustain the Donetsk front.

• Indicators: IMINT/BDA confirming the synchronized impact of multiple KABs on a single CNI location; immediate, widespread power or communication outages across multiple large cities in the targeted oblasts.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Air Force (AD Command): IMMEDIATE ACTION. Prioritize the defense of railway junctions and major power substations in the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia corridor against KAB strikes. Assets must be deployed with a counter-KAB doctrine, focusing on the launch envelope and terminal phase engagement. Mobile AD (SHORAD) should be rotated constantly to prevent RF targeting of the defensive systems themselves.
2. G2/GUR (Collection Management): CRITICAL ACTION. Shift dedicated ELINT and long-range ISR assets to track RF fixed-wing strike platforms responsible for KAB delivery. Develop high-confidence target sets for these platforms for time-sensitive targeting (TST) opportunities.
3. J7 (Strategic Communications/IO): URGENT ACTION. Launch a specific, targeted information campaign aimed at military veterans and recently demobilized personnel, emphasizing support services, successful tactical engagements, and national solidarity. Directly address the RF IO content (20:49Z) without amplifying the negative narrative.

//END SITREP//