Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 011800Z NOV 25

DTG: 011800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (Confidence remains high in the assessment of RF deep strike synchronization and Information Warfare (IO) intent. The kinetic situation in Mykolaiv and the new strikes in Sumy/Kharkiv confirm the predicted multi-axis pressure.) PRIORITY FOCUS: Immediate assessment of sustained RF deep strike effectiveness against CNI (Mykolaiv, Sumy, Kharkiv) and RF Information Warfare adaptation regarding the Pokrovsk axis.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Deep Strike Zone (Multi-Axis Confirmation): The multi-axis saturation campaign, predicted in the previous reports, is confirmed and escalating.
  • Mykolaiv: Ballistic missile strike confirmation (14:35Z) increases casualty count to 19, demonstrating RF continued targeting of urban civilian infrastructure outside the main FLOT with high-velocity munitions.
  • Sumy: New explosion reported (14:56Z), correlating with the predicted multi-axis effort to stretch UAF Air Defense (AD).
  • Kharkiv: RF drone attack confirmed on Zolochiv community (14:43Z), sustaining kinetic pressure on critical northern supply lines and near-border civilian targets.
• Pokrovsk-Krasnoarmiisk Axis: RF propaganda explicitly targets the logistics corridor supporting the Pokrovsk grouping, citing the work of their UAV unit "Irishmen" in destroying logistics around Krasnoarmiisk (15:03Z). This reinforces the operational objective of isolating the Pokrovsk defenders, as noted in previous reports.
• Kupiansk Axis: RF sources (Arkhangel Spetsnaza, 15:01Z) claim "battles in the center" of Kupiansk, a clear attempt to generate a narrative of decisive penetration, likely leveraging the general IO campaign against Pokrovsk.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Adverse weather (heavy precipitation/snow/sleet) confirmed by RF sources (Fighterbomber, 14:47Z) in some operational areas.
• Judgment: This weather favors close-range engagement and dismounted infiltration where RF relies on thermal imagery (as seen in UAF counter-UAS operations, 14:35Z). It hinders large-scale coordinated ground maneuver and traditional close air support, but does not deter RF guided missile/KAB strikes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are synchronized in their deep strike and Information Warfare (IO) efforts. Ground units in the East continue probing attacks (Kupiansk claim) and localized logistics interdiction (Krasnoarmiisk). RF internal security (TASS, 14:58Z) continues high-visibility arrests, signaling a focus on internal political control, potentially reflecting domestic instability (ASTRA report of former contractor violence, 14:39Z).
• UAF: UAF forces are actively engaging in counter-UAS operations (1129th ZRP success, 14:35Z; 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade drone strikes in Belgorod, 14:58Z). This confirms an aggressive and proactive asymmetric posture. UAF high command (President Zelenskyy meetings, 14:37Z) continues to signal centralized political and social stability despite kinetic pressure.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(RF CAPABILITIES):

• Sustained Ballistic Threat: Confirmed capability to launch high-velocity ballistic missiles (likely Iskander-M or SS-21 derivative) against non-FLOT urban centers, resulting in high civilian casualties (Mykolaiv, 19 wounded).
• Localized Logistics Interdiction: RF UAV/FPV units ("Irishmen") demonstrate proficiency in targeting UAF logistics nodes and supply trucks in the immediate rear areas of the operational front (Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk).
• Adaptable IO: RF is leveraging both high-level psychological warfare (Załuzhnyy critique meme, 14:36Z) and tactical IO (surrender leaflets in Kupiansk, 14:47Z) to target UAF morale across multiple axes.

(RF INTENTIONS):

1. Maximize Psychological Attrition: The immediate intent is to compound the physical threat (ballistic strikes on civilians) with psychological pressure (IO about Pokrovsk failure, surrender leaflets) to force operational pauses and degrade UAF domestic support.
2. Isolate Pokrovsk: RF seeks to fully strangle the Pokrovsk grouping by systematically targeting logistics in the Krasnoarmiisk area using UAV teams, forcing UAF to divert resources to counter the low-cost drone threat.
3. Deter UAF Deep Operations: RF is attempting to deter UAF deep strikes by emphasizing strategic readiness (Burevestnik nuclear test commentary, 15:01Z), although this is likely posturing.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF IO Focus Shift: RF IO has rapidly pivoted to exploit perceived disagreements between UAF leadership (meme critiquing Załuzhnyy regarding Pokrovsk). This is a direct attempt to undermine command cohesion following Syrskyi's personal intervention in the Pokrovsk narrative.
• Dedicated Logistics Interdiction: The explicit naming of the "Irishmen" UAV unit targeting logistics (15:03Z) suggests RF is dedicating specialized, persistent ISR/Strike assets specifically to the UAF rear area supporting the Donbas front.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF maintains sufficient munitions for sustained multi-axis ballistic and UAV strikes, indicating robust deep strike logistics.
• RF appears to be sustaining small, highly mobile UAV/FPV logistics teams on the front, capable of rapid deployment for logistics interdiction missions.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing lethal strikes (ballistics on Mykolaiv, drones on Sumy/Kharkiv) with specific IO campaigns tailored to each operational axis (Pokrovsk psychological, Kupiansk tactical surrender).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• UAS Offensive Posture: UAF forces (specifically the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade) are maintaining an aggressive, offensive UAS posture targeting RF territory (Belgorod, 14:58Z). This generates strategic depth to UAF defense and forces RF to expend AD resources on their own rear.
• Counter-UAS Success: The 1129th ZRP's confirmed downing of 6 RF UAVs (Zala, Italmas, Lancet, Molniia) indicates strong, adaptive counter-UAS readiness.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Demonstrated tactical success in downing a variety of RF UAV types, including high-priority targets like Lancet, confirming effective use of AD and organic counter-UAS assets. Successful deep strike operations into Belgorod confirmed (14:58Z).
• Setbacks: The high casualty count (19 wounded) from the Mykolaiv ballistic strike confirms an ongoing operational vulnerability to RF high-velocity, high-impact CNI targeting outside the main AD concentration zones.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Targeted counter-logistics training and equipment for supply convoys operating on the Krasnoarmiisk-Pokrovsk road network to counter dedicated RF drone teams.
• CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The necessity to disperse AD assets to cover the new multi-axis threat (Sumy, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv) leaves UAF vulnerable to a massed strike on a single HVT (MDCOA).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Cohesion Attack): Primary focus is the erosion of UAF command cohesion via the promotion of internal criticism (Załuzhnyy critique on Pokrovsk, 14:36Z), leveraging the known friction points within UAF political and military leadership.
• RF IO (Surrender): Tactical leaflets promoting surrender in the Kupiansk area (14:47Z) are synchronized with the RF claim of "battles in the center" to create the perception of a collapsing front line and motivate troops to abandon their positions.
• UAF IO (Retaliation/Intimidation): Commander "Madyar" is leveraging the successful deep strike narrative to threaten new blackouts in Russia (14:48Z), serving both as a morale boost and a form of strategic intimidation/deterrence.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• The increased civilian casualty rate from ballistic strikes (Mykolaiv) will generate localized fear and pressure on government authorities to provide better AD coverage for urban centers.
• UAF successful counter-UAS and deep strike operations (Belgorod) provide a strong counter-narrative, boosting military morale by demonstrating proactive retaliation.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Belarusian President Lukashenko's absurd claim regarding "bullets over Lithuania" (14:33Z) is a transparent attempt to maintain regional tension and justify continued Russian military presence/influence in Belarus, increasing the perceived threat to NATO's eastern flank.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1 (Pokrovsk Logistics Attrition): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to prioritize the use of dedicated, localized UAV units (e.g., "Irishmen") to systematically target all identified logistics and supply movement between Krasnoarmiisk and Pokrovsk over the next 48 hours, maximizing the siege effect on the defending UAF grouping.

MLCOA 2 (Further CNI Targeting): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Following the strikes on Mykolaiv and Sumy, RF will prioritize ballistic/KAB strikes against identified critical energy infrastructure or logistics hubs in the Kharkiv Oblast to maximize the effect of the multi-axis saturation campaign.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1 (Massed Glide Bomb Attack on Krasnoarmiisk HVT): (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) RF will capitalize on the logistics interdiction efforts (MLCOA 1) to identify a high-value fixed target (e.g., a field HQ, major repair facility, or large ammunition depot) in the Krasnoarmiisk area and execute a massed strike using 6-10 UMPK-guided glide bombs to achieve a catastrophic localized defeat.

• Trigger Condition: Confirmed visual or SIGINT reporting of significant RF ISR platform loitering time over the Krasnoarmiisk area in the next 12 hours.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• T+12H (Counter-UAS Deployment): UAF must deploy layered counter-UAS assets (EW, mobile ZRP, FPV hunter-killer teams) along the Krasnoarmiisk-Pokrovsk axis to directly counter the dedicated RF logistics interdiction units (MLCOA 1).
• T+24H (Logistics Redundancy Activation): J4 must activate secondary/tertiary logistics routes and deploy enhanced decoy and camouflage measures for forward resupply points near Pokrovsk to mitigate the effects of MDCOA 1.

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Establish Counter-UAS Corridor on Krasnoarmiisk Axis (J3/GUR - CRITICAL ACTION):

   • Recommendation: Dedicate and task GUR and SUS FPV hunter-killer teams with localized AD support (SHORAD) to patrol and dominate the airspace over known logistics routes into Pokrovsk. The explicit mention of the RF "Irishmen" unit provides a specific target for attrition.
   • Action (GUR/SUS): Institute continuous 24/7 patrol/hunter rotations on the primary supply route and immediately engage any detected RF ISR/FPV platforms operating at low altitude near UAF rear areas.

2. Reinforce AD in Kharkiv/Sumy Logistics Hubs (Air Force Command - URGENT ACTION):

   • Recommendation: Given the confirmed strikes in Mykolaiv and Sumy, immediately reinforce mobile AD assets (specifically those capable of intercepting glide bombs/ballistics) near critical logistics hubs and rail yards in Kharkiv Oblast to mitigate MLCOA 2.
   • Action (Air Force): Prioritize mobility over static hardening. Use AD systems in "shoot-and-scoot" fashion to avoid becoming a target of the predicted follow-up massed strike (MDCOA 1).

3. Counter RF IO on Command Cohesion (J7/GUR - HIGH PRIORITY):

   • Recommendation: Immediately preempt and counter the RF narrative attempting to exploit perceived UAF leadership disagreements (Załuzhnyy/Syrskyi).
   • Action (J7): Release high-visibility joint statements or imagery featuring both senior military and political leadership figures visiting troops on the Pokrovsk axis or jointly reviewing the defense of critical infrastructure to project unwavering unity and stability.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CRITICAL FOCUS)

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