Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 011333Z NOV 25

DTG: 011333Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (Confidence remains high regarding kinetic and IO synchronization. Confidence is medium on the immediate tactical situation on the Pokrovsk axis due to conflicting information from RF and UAF sources.) PRIORITY FOCUS: Immediate assessment of RF's aggressive information-kinetic synchronization on the Pokrovsk axis and the confirmed deep-strike trajectory expansion toward Poltava Oblast.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is defined by continued high-intensity combat on the Pokrovsk Axis and the expansion of the RF deep strike range.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): The area remains the primary kinetic focus. RF sources (TASS, Colonelcassad) are claiming encirclement and surrender in Krasnoarmiysk (likely Pokrovsk) and showing combat footage inside heavily damaged buildings, attempting to project control. Conversely, UAF sources (Operatyvnyi ZSU, Sternenko) assert UAF counter-action, including a GUR-led "clearance operation" in Pokrovsk and successful FPV interdiction of RF logistics along the axis.
  • Judgment: Conflict over Pokrovsk is escalating rapidly, likely centered on urban clearance operations by both sides following intense RF kinetic pressure.
• Deep Strike Zone Expansion: Confirmed intelligence (TSAPLIENKO) indicates an RF UMPK-guided glide bomb (KAB) fell near Berestyn, just 6km from Poltava Oblast. This projectile covered over 100km, confirming RF capability to target strategic depth across nearly the entire Kharkiv Oblast and threaten Poltava's CNI and reserve/logistics hubs.
• Weather/Environmental: Fog advisory issued for Ukraine (РБК-Україна), which will limit RF ISR/air-ground cooperation and favor UAF maneuverability and ground reconnaissance operations for the next 12-24 hours.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Fog: Reduces visibility, potentially complicating deep strike precision targeting (KAB/UAV), but also limiting UAF visual-spectrum AD/SHORAD detection range. Favors low-level air infiltration or ground maneuver elements.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Focus appears highly synchronized: utilizing advanced FPV systems (Arkhangel Spetsnaza, Sever Group) for tactical destruction of UAF light armor and personnel, while simultaneously employing strategic information operations (IO) to claim massive victories (Pokrovsk surrender).
• UAF: Active counter-IO and kinetic response. UAF Air Force reports high October attrition (11,269 targets destroyed), aimed at countering the RF saturation narrative. GUR reports its engagement in clearance operations in Pokrovsk, indicating the highest levels of UAF tactical engagement in the area. UAF forces are reporting successful local counter-attacks (Deepstate map shows advance near Novo Shakhove).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(RF CAPABILITIES):

• Long-Range Glide Bomb Capability: (NEW CONFIRMATION) The KAB flight near Poltava confirms an operational range exceeding 100km, placing major logistics and CNI assets in Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts at risk from frontline fixed-wing assets (Su-34/Su-35).
• Advanced FPV/Drone Warfare: RF units continue to demonstrate highly effective tactical drone integration, using FPVs to strike lightly armored vehicles (HMMWV-variant strike shown by ARKANGEL SPETNAZ) and personnel (Colonelcassad).
• High-Impact IO: RF is effectively utilizing claims of strategic breakthroughs (Pokrovsk collapse, NATO trophy exhibits) to shape both domestic and international narratives.

(RF INTENTIONS):

1. Kinetic Domination on Pokrovsk Axis: Achieve a decisive tactical advantage in the Pokrovsk area through a combination of heavy kinetic pressure and deep IO projection (claims of mass surrender) to demoralize defending UAF forces and seize key terrain.
2. Strategic AD Overextension: Continue to stretch UAF AD by expanding the deep strike geography (threat to Poltava) and maintaining UAV pressure (UAV detected near Pavlohrad/Dnipropetrovsk).
3. Undermine International Support: Amplify narratives targeting foreign fighters (Colombian mercenary claim) and Western political vulnerability (Lukoil sanctions/Bulgarian government instability).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Glide Bomb Range Expansion: The extended range of the KAB strike is a critical tactical adaptation, requiring UAF to extend AD coverage eastward or target RF launch platforms further behind the FLOT.
• Enhanced Near-FLOT Recon: RF reconnaissance battalions (e.g., 68 ORB 20 MSD) are prioritizing UAV-assisted targeting of UAF transport and logistics in operational depth (Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhia) to complement Pokrovsk interdiction efforts.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF sustainment of FPV/UAV units appears HIGH, supporting the high tempo of tactical drone strikes.
• RF fixed-wing aviation is adequately supplied to conduct long-range KAB strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrates high effectiveness in tactical-level drone/precision fire synchronization (e.g., FPV strikes) and strategic IO synchronization (Pokrovsk claims, NATO exhibit).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive, with localized, aggressive counter-action.

• GUR/SOF Deployment: The reported direct involvement of GUR units in the Pokrovsk clearance operation (Operatyvnyi ZSU) signals the critical importance of holding this axis and demonstrates high readiness and prioritization of specialized units.
• AD Effectiveness: UAF Air Force statistics for October (11,269 targets destroyed) show high overall effectiveness, but the current multi-axis, long-range KAB/UAV pressure (new threat to Poltava, existing threat to Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia) poses an increasing strain.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed local advance near Novo Shakhove (Deepstate). Successful FPV interdiction of RF logistics on the Pokrovsk axis (Sternenko). High reported AD kill rates.
• Setbacks: RF continues to push aggressive, if localized, ground pressure on the Pokrovsk axis, requiring commitment of high-value UAF units (GUR). The expansion of the KAB threat range is a major strategic setback.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: AD resources, particularly medium- and long-range interceptors, must be reallocated and prioritized to address the new KAB threat to the Poltava-Kharkiv line while maintaining defense of the capital and Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia.
• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid reinforcement of tactical ISR/Counter-ISR capabilities in the Pokrovsk sector to combat aggressive RF FPV targeting.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Core Narrative - Tactical Victory/Encirclement: TASS and Colonelcassad are aggressively pushing the narrative of UAF collapse and mass surrender in "Krasnoarmiysk," attempting to capitalize on the Pokrovsk operational situation.
• RF Core Narrative - NATO Failure: Continued effort to undermine Western aid (trophy exhibit narrative, and peripheral IO suggesting Western sanctions cause instability in partner nations like Bulgaria).
• UAF Counter-Narrative: UAF IO focuses on high metrics (October AD success) and executive stability (President Zelenskyy announcements on winter aid/energy security). The GUR clearance operation announcement is intended to directly refute the RF collapse narrative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Public morale is supported by transparency from the Air Force and President's focus on winter readiness.
• The aggressive RF IO regarding Pokrovsk and the potential expansion of deep strikes toward Poltava risk increasing public anxiety regarding safety in central Ukraine.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The announcement regarding potential US sanctions on Lukoil and the resulting threat to the Bulgarian government highlights RF attempts to exploit European political instability linked to energy dependence. This must be monitored closely as a hybrid warfare tactic designed to disrupt EU unity.
• Reports of Revolut blocking Russian accounts under new EU sanctions confirm continued economic pressure on Russia, despite IO efforts.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1 (Pokrovsk Escalation & IO Amplification): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will mass fire and tactical drone assets to support ground advances aimed at capturing key administrative centers in Pokrovsk. Simultaneously, RF IO will aggressively amplify footage from inside the town (like the FPV footage) and formal MOD statements to declare a full operational victory in the sector within 48 hours, regardless of true FLOT status.

MLCOA 2 (Test Poltava AD Threshold): (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) RF will launch a limited, high-speed deep strike package (e.g., 1-2 KABs and associated UAVs) targeting CNI (e.g., power substations or rail hubs) in western Kharkiv Oblast or eastern Poltava Oblast over the next 24-72 hours to assess UAF AD response time and coverage depth in the newly threatened area.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1 (Massed KAB Strike on Critical Logistics Hub): (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) Following successful identification of a soft spot in the expanded AD coverage (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk), RF will commit a massed strike package (10+ KABs launched by multiple aircraft) against a critical, high-value logistics node (rail marshalling yard or major fuel depot) previously deemed out of range. This could severely disrupt UAF operational depth.

• Trigger Condition: Evidence of reduced UAF AD activity (ELINT silence or repositioning) along the western Kharkiv/Poltava border.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• T+12H (Weather Impact): Fog is likely to peak overnight, reducing RF ISR/KAB guidance effectiveness. This window should be exploited for UAF engineer/logistics movement.
• T+24H (Pokrovsk C2): UAF high command will need to publicly validate or refute the scale of RF tactical claims in Pokrovsk to manage the IO narrative and maintain unit morale.
• T+72H (AD Reallocation): UAF must finalize and execute the strategic reallocation of long-range AD to defend the new KAB threat envelope (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk).

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Strategic Air Defense Reallocation (Air Force Command - CRITICAL ACTION):

   • Recommendation: Prioritize the defense of the Poltava rail hub and critical logistics centers over forward CNI in the threatened western Kharkiv Oblast. Re-task one mobile long-range AD system (if available) to the Poltava/Kremenchuk area to directly counter the new 100km+ KAB threat (MLCOA 2 / MDCOA 1).
   • Action (Air Force): Increase fighter patrols/CAP missions near RF launch zones if range permits, or deploy dedicated EW assets to disrupt KAB guidance systems operating over the expanded threat zone.

2. Pokrovsk IO/C2 Synchronization (J7/GUR/J3 - URGENT ACTION):

   • Recommendation: Utilize GUR’s active presence in Pokrovsk to generate immediate, high-quality counter-footage (FPV, combat cameras) to refute RF claims of collapse and surrender.
   • Action (GUR/J3): Establish a dedicated secure communications relay to extract real-time combat footage and BDA from GUR units to rapidly counter the aggressive TASS/Colonelcassad narrative.

3. Exploit Fog for Tactical Maneuver (J3/Ground Forces - URGENT ACTION):

   • Recommendation: Exploit reduced visibility caused by fog to accelerate engineer operations on the Vovcha River crossing and execute localized counter-attacks or deep strikes against identified RF FPV launch/C2 positions on the Pokrovsk axis.
   • Action (Ground Forces): Issue EMCON (Emission Control) protocols for ground units to minimize RF detection via ELINT/SIGINT during maneuver under cover of fog.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CRITICAL FOCUS)

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