Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 010933Z NOV 25

DTG: 010933Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (High confidence in tactical RF claims but medium confidence in UAF recovery speed on Pokrovsk Axis.) PRIORITY FOCUS: Damage assessment and counter-C2/IO efforts following RF claims of success against UAF Special Operations Forces (SOF) near Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiisk, and sustaining logistics bypass operations.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis remains the main effort. RF sources are heavily promoting kinetic strikes in this area:

• RF Claimed Strike (GUR/SSO): RF channels (Старше Эдды, Басурин) are circulating drone footage claiming successful strikes against UAF GUR/SSO forces near Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiisk (09:02:35, 09:16:32). This directly supports the RF narrative of isolating the UAF front line and eliminating high-value assets.
• RF Claimed Strike (UAF Logistical Hub): RF sources claim a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike on a Forward Observation Post (FOP) of the 38th Separate Motorized Brigade (38th OMBR) in the vicinity of Myrnohrad (09:10:07). Myrnohrad is immediately west of the critical logistics bottleneck created by the Vovcha River bridge destruction.
• RF Confirmed Action (Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk): RF MoD claims ongoing destruction of UAF formations near the railway station in Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk) (09:33:32). This indicates continued RF commitment to seizing the Pokrovsk logistical hub.

Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipro):

• UAF Strike Confirmation: UAF sources confirm a successful FPV drone strike by the 46th Separate Airmobile Brigade (46th OAMBr) against an RF remote weapon station (RWS) with an Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGS) near the Dnipropetrovsk border (09:07:01), indicating local UAF tactical success in counter-UAS/UAV operations.
• Air Activity: UAF Air Force reports launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast (09:05:11), and persistent Iranian-design UAV activity targeting Sumy/Chernihiv Oblasts (09:06:20, 09:17:17).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Persistent mud complicates ground maneuver and engineer efforts near the Vovcha River but favors fixed defense positions.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Posture: Highly aggressive kinetic and information campaigns focused entirely on exploiting the logistical paralysis near Pokrovsk. RF is using massive ordnance (FAB-3000 claims) to pressure rear area C2/logistics nodes like Myrnohrad.
• UAF Posture: UAF is maintaining forward defense while urgently attempting to restore supply on the Pokrovsk Axis. UAF C2 is actively countering RF influence operations by promoting local tactical successes (46th OAMBr strike) and prioritizing morale-boosting news (GS Staff messaging, veteran support).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(RF CAPABILITIES):

• FAB-3000 Deployment: The credible claim of a FAB-3000 strike near Myrnohrad (09:10:07) suggests RF is employing its largest conventional ordnance to destroy hardened or large area-targets supporting the Pokrovsk axis. This capability forces UAF to disperse assets further and increases the operational cost of logistics consolidation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Effective Counter-SOF Targeting: RF claims of eliminating UAF GUR/SSO elements near Pokrovsk (09:02:35, 09:16:32) suggest highly effective ISR-to-strike targeting, potentially utilizing FSTH-LD or other advanced reconnaissance capabilities outlined in the previous report. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Integrated Mobilization/Occupation Strategy: RF sources confirm efforts to legally formalize the mobilization of Ukrainian citizens in occupied territories, specifically Melitopol (09:13:50). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) This provides a future source of forced manpower for RF forces and fuels hybrid warfare.

(RF INTENTIONS):

1. Exploit Logistics Bottleneck (Immediate): Maintain maximum kinetic pressure (precision strikes, KABs, FABs) on the Pokrovsk Axis, specifically targeting any UAF attempt to reorganize or resupply forces west of the Vovcha River (i.e., Myrnohrad).
2. Discredit UAF Elite Forces: Use IO campaigns focused on alleged GUR/SSO losses to undermine UAF special operations capacity and deter further deep operations.
3. Sustain Manpower Pool: Continue efforts to integrate occupied populations into the RF military structure (Melitopol mobilization).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift to using FAB-3000 on a relatively forward logistical target (Myrnohrad) is a significant adaptation, demonstrating RF willingness to expend high-value ordnance to achieve local strategic paralysis. It suggests RF views the destruction of UAF C2/logistics west of the Vovcha River as critical to enabling the MDCOA breakthrough.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF Frontline Logistics: Critical constraints remain due to the Vovcha River bridge loss. The concentration of strikes around Myrnohrad confirms RF understands this is a crucial choke point for UAF logistics moving toward the Pokrovsk front.
• RF Supply Chain: Evidence of continued sanctions evasion via US-made components (Swiwin engines in Shahed drones) and the MoD appointment of Osmakov (DIB integration) points to robust long-term RF sustainment capability.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating highly coordinated fire support (FAB-3000 integration) and IO/PsyOp application (immediate dissemination of GUR/SSO claims). UAF C2 remains focused on immediate crisis management and essential morale maintenance.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF units on the Pokrovsk Axis are under extreme duress due to logistical starvation and concentrated heavy fire (FAB-3000). The 38th OMBR, if confirmed struck at Myrnohrad, will face immediate readiness degradation. UAF Air Defense is managing ongoing KAB and UAV threats on the Southern/Northern axes.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Pokrovsk Axis): High probability of significant casualties or disruption of GUR/SSO elements near Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiisk, compounded by the FAB-3000 threat to logistics hubs.
• Success (Tactical Counter-UAS): Successful FPV strike by the 46th OAMBr against an RF AGS-equipped RWS (09:07:01) demonstrates persistent UAF lethality at the tactical edge despite strategic difficulties.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical requirement remains expedient logistics resupply and the deployment of hardened C2 nodes further east of the immediate combat zone, away from known FAB-3000 range/target areas.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative Focus:
  1. Targeted Assassination/Elimination: Claims regarding successful strikes against elite UAF forces (GUR/SSO) to sow mistrust and fear.
  2. Strategic Momentum: Constant reports of UAF destruction near Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk railway station to suggest RF is on the verge of operational victory.
  3. Internal Weakness: RF state media (TASS) attempting to introduce narratives of UAF soldiers executing wounded comrades (09:14:01) to delegitimize UAF combat ethics.
• UAF Counter-Narrative: Focus on resilience, tactical victories (46th OAMBr), and positive internal news (veteran support, GS staff messaging) to stabilize morale against the high volume of negative RF claims.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

RF attempts to show Budanov far from the front (Pavlohrad claim, 09:19:01) combined with claims of elite force destruction are direct attacks on UAF military confidence. The confirmed successful UAF FPV strike (09:07:01) provides a localized counter-point that must be leveraged for morale purposes.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Negotiations between Lithuania and Russia regarding the Kaliningrad gas transit agreement (09:26:41) highlight Russia's continuing leverage in the energy domain, even amidst the conflict. The TASS focus on a refinery explosion in New Mexico (09:26:01) is likely designed to draw attention away from UAF deep strikes on RF oil infrastructure and portray US vulnerabilities.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1 (Logistics Strangulation and KAB Saturation): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will escalate the use of KAB (FAB-1500/3000) strikes against UAF C2, assembly areas, and logistics nodes up to 15-20km west of the Pokrovsk frontline (e.g., Myrnohrad, Kurakhove area). The aim is to make any forward logistics staging impossible. This will be the immediate precursor to the MDCOA.

MLCOA 2 (Drone/UAV Deep Penetration): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will continue to use Shahed/UAVs targeting Sumy/Chernihiv Oblasts (09:06:20), forcing UAF Air Defense resources to the North/Northeast, further reducing AD coverage over the critical Southern/Pokrovsk Axes.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1 (Exploitative Mechanized Breakthrough): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will launch a concentrated, large-scale mechanized assault (BTG+) targeting a weakened UAF sector on the Pokrovsk Axis. This assault will be preceded by intense artillery and FAB/KAB preparation fires, exploiting the confirmed UAF logistics failure at the Vovcha River and the alleged destruction of UAF SOF elements. The primary objective is to breach the frontline, bypass critical strong points, and force a substantial UAF tactical withdrawal.

• Trigger Condition: Successful interdiction of UAF engineer/resupply efforts for T+72H.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

• T+0 to T+48H (FAB Saturation): Expect concentrated KAB/FAB strikes on Myrnohrad and adjacent towns, targeting railheads, depots, and known UAF C2 locations.
• T+48H (Defensive C2 Reorganization): (DECISION POINT: J3/J6 - All Battalion-level and higher C2 nodes within 15km of the established frontline must implement pre-planned, dispersed alternate C2 locations immediately, given the confirmed FAB-3000 threat.)
• T+96H (Logistics Threshold): If UAF fails to establish reliable logistics flow across the Vovcha River area within 96 hours of the bridge destruction, J3 must execute the planned phased tactical withdrawal to secondary defensive lines to preserve combat power.

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Vovcha River Area Denial (J3/J4 - CRITICAL ACTION):

   • Recommendation: Prioritize immediate establishment of redundant, low-signature logistics bypasses (ferry/small pontoon) away from RF ISR observation points (IMINT CRITICAL 2). All UAF engineer movement near the river must be supported by persistent counter-battery fire focusing on known or suspected RF fire control observation posts.
   • Action (J3): Allocate loitering munitions and FPV drone reserves specifically for anti-ISR/anti-counter-battery fire missions in the Vovcha River valley to blind RF precision targeting systems.

2. Mitigate FAB-3000 Threat (J2/J3 - URGENT ACTION):

   • Recommendation: J2 must integrate intelligence from the Myrnohrad strike claim (09:10:07) into the High-Value Target list.
   • Action (J3): Immediately order all UAF units within 30km of the Pokrovsk frontline to move HQs and logistics stacks into highly dispersed, deeply buried, or urban-protected positions, recognizing that typical field fortifications are vulnerable to the FAB-3000.

3. Counter RF IO (J7/GUR - IO ACTION):

   • Recommendation: Rapidly debunk the RF claims of eliminated GUR/SSO forces (09:02:35, 09:16:32) by releasing pre-staged, dated media of high-profile SSO/GUR commanders in action or conducting routine duties, without compromising location security.
   • Action (J7): Amplify the successful 46th OAMBr drone strike (09:07:01) to demonstrate UAF capacity for sophisticated, localized counter-offensives and lethality.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CRITICAL FOCUS)

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