Archived operational intelligence briefing
OPERATIONAL FOCUS: The Russian Federation (RF) is sustaining the combined strategy of attrition on the Eastern FLOT (Siversk/Pokrovsk) and deep logistical paralysis against Critical Infrastructure (CI) recovery efforts. New, confirmed PPO activity over Odesa indicates the RF is immediately following up on the previous deep strike wave with continued pressure on vital Black Sea logistical hubs, confirming the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) is currently in execution.
The critical axis remains the multi-domain deep strike effort aimed at collapsing UAF and civilian sustainment before winter. The engagement geometry has expanded to include active air defense engagements over Odesa, placing the critical Black Sea port infrastructure under direct, immediate threat.
No change to the acute requirement for decentralized winterization support in Lviv. The successful targeting of repair crews in Chernihiv directly exacerbates the military-civilian crisis ahead of winter by slowing all recovery operations.
(INTENTION - Naval/Economic Paralysis): RF intends to paralyze Ukraine's Black Sea export capabilities by achieving successful strikes on key port infrastructure, likely using UAVs to saturate PPO prior to or during a potential follow-up missile strike.
(CAPABILITIES):
Immediate Re-engagement of Odesa: The rapid re-engagement of Odesa following the "Wave 3" attacks suggests a prioritization of the Southern axis. This confirms the RF operational assessment that the Odesa port infrastructure remains a critical vulnerable point despite previous PPO efforts.
RF sustainment remains robust enough to support massed deep strikes and high-intensity ground operations simultaneously. UAF sustainment is severely pressured by the targeting of CI recovery crews and the high PPO asset requirement.
RF C2 remains effective in coordinating multi-axis, multi-domain (kinetic and IO) attacks in rapid succession.
UAF PPO forces in Odesa are actively engaged in defending the port and city. This commitment diverts mobile assets necessary for protecting ground forces or CI recovery efforts in other threatened areas. Readiness is high in the PPO domain but under strain from the operational tempo.
Success (PPO Active): The confirmation of active PPO over Odesa is a minor tactical success, indicating the defense structure is operational and reacting effectively to the incoming threat wave.
CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: PPO Ammunition/Intercept Allocation: Sustained, multi-wave UAV attacks across multiple axes (Odesa, Chernihiv) will rapidly deplete PPO interceptor stockpiles. The constraint is the immediate need to prioritize ammunition allocation between deep strike defense and the immediate ground threat environment.
The confirmed power loss/explosion in Odesa (as claimed by RF sources and supported by PPO activity confirmation) will increase anxiety in the Southern region, especially concerning the security of the port and supply lines.
The RF focus on promoting external political instability (Trump tariffs, Latvia actions) suggests a continued effort to erode the perceived solidarity of the Western coalition and deter long-term military support commitments.
The RF will continue to synchronize logistical paralysis via deep strikes with localized ground pressure. The immediate priority is the saturation of PPO in Odesa.
MLCOA 1 (Odesa Saturation and Exploitation): RF will sustain the UAV strike campaign over Odesa for the next 6-12 hours, using the confirmed air defense engagement to fix and attrit UAF PPO assets. This UAV wave will likely serve as a shaping operation for a subsequent, more damaging cruise or ballistic missile strike (Kh-59 or Iskander) aimed at key port infrastructure or logistics hubs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Justification: Current MDCOA is in execution; the multi-wave approach maximizes PPO stress.
MLCOA 2 (Siversk Hold and Attrition): RF VDV forces will maintain high, attritional combat intensity around the Siversk salient, preventing UAF from safely repositioning any reserves or PPO assets to defend the critical deep strike axes (Odesa/Chernihiv). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Justification: RF objective is to fix UAF forces while deep strikes take effect.
MDCOA 1 (Strategic Infrastructure Collapse): RF achieves a simultaneous, unrecoverable blow against CI: Successful destruction of primary power generation/distribution nodes in the Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia region and successful crippling of cargo handling capacity at Odesa port and successful interdiction of multiple CI repair convoys in the North/West. This combined effect collapses logistical throughput and forces UAF to divert operational forces to full-scale humanitarian relief, creating conditions for an RF operational breakthrough at Siversk.
| Event | Estimated Timeline | Decision Point (DP) |
|---|---|---|
| Odesa Strike BDA | T+4 hours (Until 0300Z 11 OCT) | DP 350 Revised (Odesa Port Asset Relocation): Based on confirmed targets (e.g., grain terminal vs. energy node), immediately relocate vulnerable critical assets (e.g., mobile generators, PPO/EW systems) within the port area. |
| Missile Follow-up Strike (MLCOA 1) | T+6 to T+12 hours (Until 1100Z 11 OCT) | DP 351 (PPO Reinforcement Surge): If the UAV wave successfully suppresses PPO, surge mobile SHORAD assets (if available) to Odesa from rear-area reserves to counter the anticipated missile follow-up. |
| Siversk Line Stability Check | T+10 hours (Until 0900Z 11 OCT) | DP 349 (Siversk Reinforcement/Contraction): Re-validate the stability of the 110th BDE sector against continued VDV pressure. |
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Affected Area | Confidence Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - ODESA) | Independent Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of the current Odesa strike wave, specifically targeting which critical infrastructure nodes (Port vs. Energy Distribution) were successfully engaged. | TASK: IMINT/UAF PPO Reports from Odesa; HUMINT from port security and energy authorities. | MLCOA 1, DP 350 Revised | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 2 (HIGH - PPO AMMUNITION STATUS) | Assessment of PPO ammunition expenditure rate (especially against UAVs) across the Southern and Northern axes over the last 48 hours. | TASK: LOGINT/C2 Reports from PPO Commands. | MDCOA 1, DP 351 | MEDIUM |
| PRIORITY 3 (MEDIUM - SIVERSK) | Confirmation of the operational status and required logistical support for UAF units maintaining defense in the Siversk salient after high-intensity contact. | TASK: HUMINT/LOGINT from 110th BDE and supporting units. | MLCOA 2, DP 349 | HIGH |
Execute Immediate PPO Surge and Concealment in Odesa (CRITICAL PRIORITY - DP 351):
Activate "CI Repair Force Protection" Protocol (CRITICAL PRIORITY - DP 348):
Cross-Sector PPO Ammunition Assessment (OPERATIONAL PRIORITY):
//END REPORT//
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