Archived operational intelligence briefing
RF forces are successfully synchronizing deep kinetic strikes against Critical Infrastructure (CI) with persistent, multi-domain attrition against UAF logistics and frontline C2. The critical operational area remains the Central/Southern Logistical Axis and the Eastern Attrition Axis (Pokrovsk/Druzhkivka).
No significant change. The strategic effects of the RF deep strike campaign now supersede immediate weather concerns, as the focus shifts to CI survivability and winterization (Lviv confirmed heating failure).
(INTENTION - Coerce and Collapse): RF intentions are rapidly shifting towards a strategy of Coercion through Infrastructure Collapse, aiming to force UAF resource diversion and diplomatic concessions before the next US political cycle. The military effort (Siversk, Pokrovsk) is designed to maximize attrition and fix UAF reserves, while the deep strikes create strategic societal instability.
(CAPABILITIES):
The confirmation of impacts at the Kremenchuk HPP reinforces the RF shift from generalized interdiction to the systematic destruction of key energy generation and industrial hubs within the central operational theater. This move directly targets UAF industrial mobilization capacity.
RF logistics remain capable of sustaining both high-intensity ground assaults (Siversk) and a massed missile/UAV campaign. The focus on destroying UAF CI (energy/rail) suggests RF is attempting to inflict a systemic logistics failure on Ukraine rather than relying solely on frontline interdiction.
RF C2 is demonstrating high effectiveness in multi-domain synchronization (kinetic strikes, IO, ground ops). The ability to integrate tactical (drone BDA, artillery) and strategic (CI strikes) operations suggests a well-functioning theater command structure.
UAF forces are facing a dual challenge: defending the FLOT against kinetic attrition while simultaneously supporting the population and infrastructure repair in the deep rear. Readiness levels are strained by the need for resource management and crisis response (Zaporizhzhia casualty response).
Setbacks:
Successes:
Beyond the critical need for EW systems (per previous report), there is an immediate requirement for CI Repair Capacity and Dedicated PPO for repair teams. The targeting of Kremenchuk HPP indicates the need for specialized electrical/hydro repair equipment and personnel, who are now highly vulnerable to follow-on RF strikes.
Public morale is under severe test. The confirmed heating crisis (Lviv), the public acknowledgment of the need for survival preparations (Kyiv Mayor Klitschko, Lviv Mayor Sadovyy), and visible civilian casualties (Zaporizhzhia) create a high risk of localized panic and political pressure on UAF leadership to address the CI crisis.
The RF strategy is maximizing the shock effect of Wave 3 strikes. The next phase will focus on preventing recovery and exploiting the resulting logistical friction.
MLCOA 1 (Deep Strike Follow-on Targeting): RF will sustain the deep strike campaign (UAVs/Missiles), shifting targeting from primary CI nodes (HPPs, major substations) to secondary distribution infrastructure, military logistics nodes, and civilian repair crews/locations. RF will exploit the need for emergency repair teams to concentrate, making them vulnerable targets (similar to the PVD strike near Berestok). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Justification: Observed RF shift in targeting strategy from previous reports; logical progression to prevent CI recovery.
MLCOA 2 (Eastern Axis Attrition and Fixation): RF ground forces will maintain extreme pressure at Siversk and along the Pokrovsk-Druzhkivka axis, aiming to fix UAF forces and reserves, preventing their transfer to stabilize the disrupted Central/Southern logistical sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Justification: Confirmed ongoing VDV assault (Siversk) and localized advances (Dorozhne/Volodymyrivka claims).
MDCOA 1 (Logistical Choke and Operational Breach): RF executes a massed, synchronized FPV/artillery saturation strike against the most critical secondary UAF MSRs identified through recent BDA in the Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia area, achieving a temporary total logistical choke. This is immediately followed by a rapid, concentrated RF ground push (e.g., using fresh reserves or VDV elements) along the Siversk salient or the Pokrovsk axis, capitalizing on the temporary inability of UAF forces to receive timely reinforcement, resupply, or rotation.
| Event | Estimated Timeline | Decision Point (DP) |
|---|---|---|
| RF Secondary CI/Repair Targeting | T+0 to T+72 hours (Until 1300Z 13 OCT) | DP 314 (PPO for Repair Assets): UAF PPO Command must designate mobile PPO assets (e.g., Gepard, Avenger, Skyranger 35 upon delivery) for the dedicated protection of high-priority CI repair locations and major temporary power/logistical hubs in the Central Axis (Kremenchuk/Zaporizhzhia). |
| Logistical Rerouting and Stabilization | T+24 hours (Until 1600Z 11 OCT) | DP 315 (Logistical Reconfiguration): UAF Logistics Command must execute a full re-assessment of MSR vulnerability following Wave 3 BDA and activate secondary/tertiary rail and road lines for Eastern Front supply, assuming primary routes are significantly degraded. |
| RF IO Campaign Peak | T+0 to T+1 week (Leading up to diplomatic/political deadlines) | DP 316 (Counter-IO Mobilization): UAF Strategic Communications must launch a coordinated, high-visibility counter-narrative focusing on sustained Western military/industrial support (e.g., drone MOU, Skyranger 35) to mitigate the strategic uncertainty caused by RF political signaling (Trump exchanges). |
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Affected Area | Confidence Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - CI Integrity) | Detailed Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of the Kremenchuk HPP and associated distribution network. Determine the long-term impact on power generation and river crossing capacity. | TASK: IMINT/SIGINT monitoring of power grid status and local civilian/official reports (Kremenchuk/Svetlovodsk). | MLCOA 1, UAF Sustainment | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 2 (HIGH - UAV Threat) | Confirm the specific guidance system and operational range of UAVs being directed toward Brovari and Zaporizhzhia (e.g., Shahed-136, Geran-2). | TASK: ELINT/TECHINT analysis of intercepted drone fragments and associated guidance signals. | MLCOA 1, UAF PPO | MEDIUM |
| PRIORITY 3 (MEDIUM - Ground Attrition) | Corroborate RF claims of movement near Dobropillya-Volodymyrivka (Eastern Axis). Identify the specific RF units responsible for the push. | TASK: IMINT/UAV Reconnaissance over the specific Dobropillya-Volodymyrivka sector. | MDCOA 1, RF Intentions | MEDIUM |
Dedicated PPO for CI Repair (OPERATIONAL URGENCY - DP 314):
Accelerate Indigenous Drone Program (STRATEGIC URGENCY - DP 316):
Harden Critical Rear-Area C2/HQs (FORCE PROTECTION URGENCY):
//END REPORT//
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