Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - RF ATTRITION CAMPAIGN INTENSIFICATION

TIME: 101230Z OCT 25

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF operations continue to be defined by simultaneous deep strikes on Critical Infrastructure (CI) and localized ground pressure, supported by continued logistical interdiction in the North.

• Deep Rear/CI (Kyiv, Lviv, Chernihiv): CRITICAL PRIORITY. The impact of the CI strikes is confirmed to be geographically widening. New reports confirm power outages and load shedding schedules in Lviv Oblast (Colonelcassad) and an increase in simultaneous disconnections to three queues in Chernihiv Oblast (RBC-Ukraine). This confirms that RF CI attrition is achieving operational effect by stressing the national grid and forcing resource diversion across multiple military districts. The reported placement of bio-toilets in the Cabinet of Ministers building in Kyiv (Alex Parker Returns) highlights the psychological and administrative disruption resulting from these strikes.
• Eastern Axis (Donetsk Oblast): HIGH PRIORITY. UAF Air Force reports renewed launch of KAB (Guided Aerial Bombs) by hostile tactical aviation toward Donetsk Oblast (Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine). This reinforces the analysis that RF is using heavy aerial bombardment to soften UAF defenses in the eastern sector, likely supporting the ongoing intensified ground assault at Siversk or preparing a new vector near Pokrovsk (as highlighted in DP 291).
• Kupyansk Direction: RF Ministry of Defence (MoD) claims successful Geran-2 UAV strikes against a Temporary Deployment Area (TDA) of the UAF 48th Artillery Brigade near Lozovoye. While propaganda, this validates the continued use of standoff precision strikes against UAF C2 and high-value artillery assets in the Northern Donbas/Kharkiv sector.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The environmental impact of the CI strikes is now the dominant factor, specifically the imposition of rolling blackouts across large parts of Ukraine, including logistics hubs (Lviv, Chernihiv). This complicates military logistics, C2 redundancy, and civilian support networks ahead of winter.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• Friendly Force Status (IADS): UAF Air Defense is confirmed active against both UAV (Northern axis, Kupyansk) and fixed-wing (KAB launches, Donetsk) threats. The geographic spread of power outages (Lviv to Chernihiv) confirms that existing IADS allocation is insufficient to protect the entire grid against deep strikes.
• RF Force Status (Deep Strike): RF MoD specifically advertises the use of Geran-2 UAVs against a UAF Artillery Brigade TDA, confirming the system remains a primary tactical and operational strike asset. This aligns with the previous report's concern regarding the adapted air-burst warhead capability.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(INTENTION - Strategic Paralysis): RF intentions are clear: accelerate strategic paralysis through kinetic strikes on CI while maintaining synchronized attrition along the front lines.

• The expansion of power outages to Lviv Oblast (Western Ukraine) demonstrates an increased operational reach and prioritization of high-value energy infrastructure, indicating RF is prioritizing systemic grid collapse over localized frontline support.
• The continued use of KABs in the East aims to maximize UAF casualties and attrit defensive structures, reducing the cost of follow-on ground assaults.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Propaganda Focus on Geran-2 Success: RF MoD explicitly advertises a successful Geran-2 strike against a UAF Artillery Brigade. This serves dual purposes: 1) internal validation of the strike campaign, and 2) psychological pressure on UAF artillery units, encouraging dispersal. This confirms the Geran-2 threat remains critical.
• RF Political Cohesion: Putin's continued diplomatic activity (CIS summit/Tajikistan focus) and statements on migrant compliance (TASS) aim to project control over domestic and near-abroad political dynamics, demonstrating C2 stability.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF continues robust civilian support for the military. The "KatyaValya Motorcade" (Colonelcassad) mobilizing numerous civilian vehicles (UAZ, Lada Niva) marked with patriotic slogans is a clear indication of a resilient, mobilized civilian-military supply chain for non-standard equipment and morale.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains synchronized between the military-kinetic domain (MoD strike reports, KAB launches) and the information domain (milblogger narratives, TASS diplomatic coverage). The narratives of the successful CI strikes are being used internally to justify military decisions (Alex Parker Returns criticizing Putin's initial "soft" approach).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking) (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are challenged by multi-domain threats:

• Logistical Stress: The increased power outages in Chernihiv and the introduction of schedules in Lviv directly stress logistical nodes and C2 redundancy systems.
• Internal Stability: New reports of corruption in the military sphere (bribery for disability classification in Bila Tserkva, Prosecutor General's Office investigating abuses in military units) indicate internal security challenges persist, which RF IO will attempt to exploit to undermine public trust.
• SSO Operations: The release of the film "Dentist" regarding Special Operations Forces (SSO) Resistance Movement confirms ongoing intelligence and sabotage operations in RF-occupied territories.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks:

• Confirmed extension of power outages/load shedding to Lviv and Chernihiv, stressing Western and Northern logistics/civilian centers.
• Confirmed KAB launches against Donetsk Oblast, suggesting RF continues to maintain air dominance for standoff strikes in the East.

Successes:

• Successful fundraising efforts (e.g., STERNENKO reporting 21 million out of 25 million UAH collected) confirm sustained civilian support and high morale for specific operational objectives.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most critical resource constraint is the defense of CI, as demonstrated by the widening geographic impact of power outages. UAF must rapidly deploy distributed power generation and redundancy measures to protect C2 and critical logistics nodes.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain) (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

RF IO is focused on exploiting the CI strikes and undermining UAF morale and legitimacy:

1. Exploiting CI Damage (Alex Parker Returns): RF milbloggers are using the image of bio-toilets in Kyiv's Cabinet of Ministers to mock the effectiveness of the CI strikes and pressure the RF high command for further escalation (implying the need for Tomahawk use).
2. Undermining Refugee Return: Propaganda reports (Russian Spring citing Finnish research) suggest most Ukrainian refugees in Finland do not plan to return, aiming to project a permanent population loss and irreversible decline in national capacity.
3. Weaponizing Corruption: Highlighting UAF corruption investigations (disability bribes, military unit abuses) to sow distrust between the military and the civilian population/government.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is stressed by the threat of CI failure and the physical presence of load shedding (Lviv, Chernihiv). RF morale is supported by organized civilian aid efforts (KatyaValya Motorcade) and positive testimonials regarding soldier performance supplements (Wagner Group video).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

President Zelensky's call for Europe to utilize frozen RF assets to counter the energy attacks (RBC-Ukraine) indicates a diplomatic push to finance CI recovery and increase the cost of RF aggression.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The RF campaign to achieve multi-domain attrition is accelerating. The most immediate threat is the exploitation of CI damage to enable a tactical breakthrough in the East.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1 (Deep Strike and Eastern Pressure Synchronization): RF will sustain the campaign of multi-sector CI strikes (next 24-48 hours) targeting primary generation and transmission nodes that feed the newly affected Western/Northern Oblasts (Lviv, Chernihiv). This tactical isolation will be immediately followed by intense KAB/artillery preparation and VDV/mechanized assaults along the Siversk-Donetsk axis, attempting to capitalize on C2 and logistical disruptions caused by blackouts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

MLCOA 2 (Targeted Artillery Attrition): Based on the RF MoD claim of striking the 48th Artillery Brigade TDA, RF will increase intelligence-driven targeting of UAF artillery assets and fire support C2 nodes, likely utilizing both Geran-2 and electronic warfare assets in the Kupyansk and Siversk directions to suppress UAF counter-battery fire. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM-HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1 (Operational Collapse via CI Failure): RF launches a massive, coordinated strike (cruise missile, ballistic missile, UAV) that successfully compromises multiple key energy substations and generation facilities simultaneously (e.g., DniproHES and Kyiv TЭЦ repair sites), resulting in a cascading national grid failure. This operational chaos provides the window for a rapid, deep penetration by RF VDV elements in the Eastern sector, leading to the encirclement or forced withdrawal of UAF formations from key defensive strongpoints.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Implement Priority CI Defense Overlay (OPERATIONAL URGENCY):

   • Recommendation: Immediately execute DP 290. Establish a layered IADS defense, prioritizing the protection of newly exposed CI assets in the West (Lviv) and North (Chernihiv) critical to military logistics. Assume RF will strike repair crews and secondary infrastructure in these areas within 48 hours.
   • Action: Task National Guard/Territorial Defense units to establish security perimeters around critical power substations in Lviv and Chernihiv Oblasts to prevent sabotage or follow-on ground attacks by SOF/sabotage groups, complementing IADS coverage.

2. Focus Counter-Battery Fire on Siversk (TACTICAL URGENCY):

   • Recommendation: Execute DP 293. Given the confirmed use of KABs in Donetsk Oblast and the focus on VDV at Siversk, concentrate all available counter-battery resources (e.g., HIMARS, Caesar, M777) on suppressing RF fire support in the Siversk salient to minimize casualty rates and degrade assault momentum.
   • Action: Increase the targeting cycles against known RF C2 and TDA sites in the Kupyansk/Siversk operational zones (e.g., the 48th Artillery Brigade target location), utilizing intelligence gained from CR 2 (if confirmed).

3. Address Internal Security Vulnerabilities (STRATEGIC URGENCY):

   • Recommendation: Execute DP 294. Utilize the recent anti-corruption and abuse reports to immediately audit the C2 and medical screening processes in high-risk military districts (e.g., Bila Tserkva) to prevent RF IO exploitation and maintain troop trust.
   • Action: Conduct a rapid review of all medical disability classifications issued to mobilization-age men in the Kyiv Oblast and surrounding areas over the last 90 days.

//END REPORT//