Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL EXPLOITATION WARNING: VERBOVE AXIS

TIME: 020600Z OCT 25 (Latest Data Cut-off: 020229Z OCT 25) AOR: Eastern Operational Zone (EOZ - Verbove/Novohryhorivka), Southern Operational Zone (SOZ - Odesa), Russian Rear (Airports/UAV Attacks) PERIOD: Immediate operational window (020600Z OCT 25 – 030600Z OCT 25)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

(FACT - RF Advance Claim): RF mil-blogger reports (TASS/Marochko) claim that Russian Armed Forces (RF) have "liberated" Verbove (Zaporizhzhia Oblast) and have initiated engagements for the seizure of the neighboring settlement of Novohryhorivka (Zaporizhzhia Oblast). (JUDGMENT - Strategic Relevance): If confirmed, the RF operational push beyond Verbove and into Novohryhorivka represents an immediate strategic threat to UAF defensive lines, signaling a decisive RF effort to exploit the recent tactical breakthrough in the Orikhiv sector. Novohryhorivka is critical terrain for UAF secondary defense of Orikhiv. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) (FACT - RF Rear Disruptions): Civil aviation restrictions were imposed at Astrakhan and Saratov airports, followed by a confirmed UAF UAV attack reflection in four districts of Rostov Oblast. This indicates sustained UAF deep strike capability targeting RF military infrastructure and logistics, forcing RF to commit AD assets to the rear.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No new actionable meteorological data is available. The operational environment remains conducive to aggressive ground maneuver and continued UAV operations by both sides.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

(UAF): UAF forces are critically engaged in stabilizing the Verbove salient. The primary control measure must be the immediate deployment of anti-armor reserves to the Novohryhorivka approach routes to prevent a catastrophic RF breakthrough. (RF): RF is executing a coordinated exploitation phase, leveraging claimed success in the EOZ with simultaneous Information Operations (IO) and continued AD/EW operations in its deep rear (Astrakhan/Saratov/Rostov).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(CAPABILITY - Combined Arms Exploitation): RF has confirmed the capability to achieve localized tactical breakthroughs (Verbove) and is now demonstrating the intent to immediately exploit this success using follow-on ground forces, likely including the previously identified BMPT-72 assets. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) (INTENTION - Operational Objective): RF intention is to force the collapse of UAF defenses southeast of Orikhiv. The stated objective of taking Novohryhorivka confirms a directed, deliberate operational thrust to expand the salient into UAF-held territory. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) (INTENTION - Escalation/Deterrence): RF IO is focusing on strategic deterrence, attempting to link US-supplied Tomahawk missiles to nuclear threat scenarios, aiming to limit future US arms packages and increase Western political anxiety. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

(Adaptation - Momentum Focus): RF is demonstrating a commitment to maintaining operational momentum. The immediate push from the reported capture of Verbove to an engagement at Novohryhorivka suggests RF forces are accepting higher risk to prevent UAF from consolidating a secondary line. (Adaptation - Anti-Air Focus): The confirmed UAF drone strikes in Rostov Oblast and airport closures indicate RF is adapting its AD posture to defend high-value logistics and airfields deep in the rear, diverting AD assets away from the FLOT.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF ground logistics are supporting an immediate offensive exploitation in the Verbove sector. The earlier confirmed rail transport of specialized armor suggests a logistical push to enable this exploitation.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, rapidly integrating battlefield success claims (Verbove) into follow-on operational directives (Novohryhorivka push) and synchronizing this with strategic IO themes (Tomahawk/Nuclear messaging). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive but requires rapid offensive action to prevent RF exploitation. Readiness remains high, but reserves must be committed immediately to the Novohryhorivka axis.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

(Success - Deep Strike): Confirmed successful UAF drone strikes and the resulting disruption (airport closures in Astrakhan/Saratov) demonstrate UAF operational reach and the ability to impose cost on RF deep rear. (Setback - Ground Defense): The claimed RF advance beyond Verbove and the initiation of combat for Novohryhorivka signal a critical failure in holding the initial defensive lines in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate allocation of specialized ATGM teams and fire support to key defensive positions around Novohryhorivka. CONSTRAINT: The requirement to defend against ground exploitation at Verbove severely limits the ability to allocate resources (AD, ground forces) to mitigate the strategic threat in Odesa and the logistics interdiction risk in the North.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(Primary RF Narrative - Ground Victory): RF IO is heavily amplifying the success at Verbove and the subsequent push into Novohryhorivka, aiming to cement the perception of a major operational breakthrough. The use of terms like "liberated" is designed for domestic consumption and to demoralize UAF forces. (Secondary RF Narrative - Strategic Deterrence): RF is leveraging expert commentary (Wilkerson quote) to push the narrative that Western aid (Tomahawk) poses an existential, potentially nuclear, threat, increasing pressure on Western governments to halt aid escalation. (Hybrid/EU Disunity): RF is also amplifying reports (Fox News via TASS) of high-level disagreement between NATO leaders (Rutte/Estonian PM) over how to respond to Russian military actions (MiG-31 flights), seeking to project Alliance disunity.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The combined effect of the Odesa strike (previous report) and the confirmed deterioration of the FLOT at Verbove is expected to severely impact morale. UAF must rapidly confirm stabilization of the Novohryhorivka front or execute successful counter-strikes to mitigate the RF victory narrative.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF is actively using IO to undermine the political will for escalation within NATO/EU by highlighting internal disagreements (Rutte/Estonia) and attempting to attach nuclear risk to weapons transfers (Tomahawk). UAF STRATCOM must prepare counter-narratives emphasizing Allied unity and the defensive nature of Western-supplied weapons.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The enemy is executing the MLCOA identified in the previous report (BMPT-72 spearhead at Verbove). The current focus is the seizure of Novohryhorivka.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1: Seizure of Novohryhorivka (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ground forces, supported by superior fire and specialized armor (BMPT-72), will attempt to seize Novohryhorivka within the next 12 hours, using it as a forward base to secure the flank for a deeper push toward Orikhiv.

MLCOA 2: Increased Use of Suppression Assets (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will increase the use of heavy thermobaric systems (TOS-1A) and concentrated artillery/glide bombs against UAF secondary defensive positions southwest of Orikhiv to preemptively neutralize UAF reserves positioned for counterattack.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1: Deep Operational Penetration Towards Orikhiv (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) If UAF defenses at Novohryhorivka collapse quickly, RF commits VDV elements or fresh reserves to bypass remaining UAF strongpoints, threatening the C2 and logistics hubs in Orikhiv or utilizing a deeper salient to cut LOCs running east-west.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Immediate ATGM Defense Reinforcement (Novohryhorivka): Immediately dispatch dedicated UAF ATGM and combat engineering teams to establish hardened anti-armor strongpoints dominating all likely RF approach routes into Novohryhorivka. This is the last critical defensive point before a deeper penetration toward Orikhiv.
2. Target BMPT-72 Logistics: Since the BMPT-72s are assessed to be moving to the FLOT, allocate high-precision counter-battery fire (e.g., 155mm Cluster Munitions, HIMARS) on their identified Forward Assembly Areas (FAAs) or refueling points before they can enter close combat and exploit their anti-infantry advantages.
3. Counter-IO on Nuclear Risk: Direct STRATCOM to aggressively counter the RF Tomahawk/Nuclear narrative by highlighting the defensive and conventional nature of all Western-supplied weapons and emphasizing NATO's commitment to avoiding escalation.
4. Sustain Deep Strike Tempo: Maintain and, if possible, increase the tempo of UAF deep strike operations into the RF rear (Rostov/Astrakhan/Saratov) to continue drawing RF AD assets away from the FLOT and the Odesa/Logistics rear, leveraging the successful disruptions noted in the SITREP.

//END REPORT//