Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - URGENT ACTION WINDOW

TIME: 012200Z OCT 25 AOR: Donetsk Operational Zone (Kleban-Byk, Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk Axis), Northern Axis (Kyiv, Chernihiv). PERIOD: 012100Z OCT 25 – 012200Z OCT 25 (Immediate Operational Window)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

(FACT - Reported RF Encirclement near Kleban-Byk): RF mil-blogger sources (Colonelcassad) claim RF forces have cleared the northern sector of Kleban-Byk settlement (west of Pokrovsk area) near the Kleban-Byk reservoir, stating remaining UAF forces are now "physically cut off" from the south by the reservoir. This, if confirmed, represents a significant tactical success in fixing and eliminating UAF pocket resistance west of the Myrnohrad line.

(JUDGEMENT - Operational Focus Shift): The continued RF claims regarding Myrnohrad (previous report) and now the tactical focus on Kleban-Byk confirm RF is prioritizing the westward advance in the Donetsk Operational Zone, seeking to leverage gains around Pokrovsk.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Weather remains conducive for nocturnal UAV/ISR operations. The persistent threat to rail logistics in the North continues to be the dominant environmental constraint on UAF operational freedom.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are focused on counter-battery fire (GMLRS confirmed) and active air defense engagement (Kyiv axis). UAF units near Kleban-Byk (if present) are facing intense pressure and potential local encirclement. Brigadier General Drapatii's remarks suggest UAF readiness is high but constrained by the perceived lack of required "best armament" and equipment for current tasks, pointing to a strategic resource gap.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(CAPABILITY - Localized Encirclement): RF demonstrates the capability to execute localized tactical encirclements utilizing geographical features (Kleban-Byk reservoir) to isolate UAF pockets, leading to high attrition or surrender (HIGH CONFIDENCE - based on consistent claims and geographical constraints).

(INTENTION - Achieve Operational Depth): RF intention is to create operational depth west of its recent advances, forcing UAF to divert resources to counter localized threats like Kleban-Byk, thereby preventing the concentration of UAF reserves needed to stabilize the Verbove/Pokrovsk axis.

(COA - Exploitation of Fixed Assets): RF is utilizing legal and economic warfare (Moscow court seizing assets of "Yashkino" and "Kirieshki" owners for funding UAF) to increase pressure on RF citizens who may be funding Ukraine, demonstrating a multi-domain approach to resource attrition.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate operational focus on Kleban-Byk suggests an attempt to clear flanks and secure LOCs supporting the main push toward Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk. This indicates a disciplined effort to reduce local UAF resistance before committing specialized armor like the newly observed BMPT-72.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are supporting deep strikes (UAVs) and sustained ground pressure (Donetsk Axis). The successful UAF GMLRS strike (previous report) provides localized friction but has not disrupted overall RF sustainment.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, integrating deep strike, ground maneuver (Kleban-Byk/Verbove), and strategic IO/Legal Warfare (asset seizure, US aid narrative).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive but marked by active counter-targeting (GMLRS). The establishment of the 14th Separate Regiment of Drone Systems (previous report) is a key strategic adaptation to hybrid threats. Readiness remains high but constrained by resource requirements, as implied by BG Drapatii’s assessment of equipment shortfalls.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

(POTENTIAL SETBACK): The claimed encirclement of UAF forces at Kleban-Byk, if verified, is a significant tactical loss requiring immediate counter-action or extraction.

(STRATEGIC ADAPTATION): The public recognition and institutionalization of dedicated UAS units (14th Regiment) provide a morale boost and formalize a critical asymmetric warfare capability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraints are the mobile AD assets for LOC protection in the North and the potential equipment gaps mentioned by BG Drapatii, which require urgent assessment and immediate diplomatic sourcing.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(RF Narrative Amplification): RF mil-bloggers are heavily focused on amplifying local tactical victories (Kleban-Byk "clearing") to project irresistible momentum. This aligns with the previous effort to exploit the Verbove claim.

(RF Hybrid Warfare - Domestic Economic): The seizure of Russian business assets (Yashkino/Kirieshki owners) on the grounds of "funding the UAF" serves as a powerful deterrent against any future pro-Ukrainian financial activity within Russia, reinforcing the RF narrative of a total war effort.

(External Distraction): RF sources are promoting external, non-Ukraine-related events (Serbian protests in Belgrade/Novi Sad; Gaza flotilla interception; US government shutdown claims) to dilute international focus on the Eastern European conflict (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is maintained by the institutional recognition of drone forces and the successful use of GMLRS. However, persistent air raid alerts and claims of losses/encirclement (Kleban-Byk) place continuous pressure on civilian and frontline morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF is demonstrating diplomatic manipulation (proposing UN SG selection) and legal warfare tactics (domestic asset seizure). EU support for Ukraine accession (previous report) remains a key strategic morale pillar.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1: BMPT-72 Commitment on Pokrovsk Axis (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will commit the newly observed BMPT-72 units within the next 48 hours to the stabilized axes (likely Verbove or Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad approach) to counter UAF armored/infantry counterattacks and clear remaining strongpoints, leveraging their specialized anti-infantry/anti-drone capability to consolidate forward positions.

MLCOA 2: Intensified Pressure on Kleban-Byk Pocket (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will prioritize the immediate elimination or forcing of surrender of the claimed UAF pocket at Kleban-Byk over the next 12-24 hours to secure the flank for further westward maneuvers.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1: Breakthrough to Operational Center (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF successfully leverages tactical gains (Verbove/Kleban-Byk) to commit operational reserves, achieving a decisive penetration of UAF secondary defense lines toward a major LOC or C2 node (e.g., Myrnohrad), forcing a rapid UAF withdrawal and significant loss of territory.

MDCOA 2: Rail Network Paralysis (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF successfully executes simultaneous, highly effective deep strikes against 2-3 critical rail chokepoints in the Northern and Central Oblasts (Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava) within a 72-hour period, causing an operational-level logistics failure that cripples UAF resupply to the Eastern Front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Immediate Kleban-Byk Response: Command must immediately task UAF fire support assets to suppress RF elements claiming control of Kleban-Byk, providing covering fire for any potential UAF break-out or extraction attempt. Do not allow the pocket to collapse without intense resistance.
2. Target BMPT-72 Preemption: Issue a specific intelligence brief and targeting deck on BMPT-72 vulnerabilities to all ATGM, UAS, and 225 OShP (GMLRS) units. High-value fire missions must be reserved for neutralizing the BMPT-72s prior to or immediately upon their deployment to the FLOT.
3. Northern LOC Hardening: Due to the proven threat, establish permanent, dedicated electronic warfare (EW) overwatch for all military rail movement in Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts. Integrate EW with rotational mobile SHORAD teams to defeat incoming UAV threats targeting rail chokepoints.
4. Strategic Resource Advocacy: Utilize BG Drapatii’s public statements as leverage in diplomatic channels. Request an emergency meeting with NATO/EU partners to expedite the delivery of specific "best armament" (e.g., advanced AD systems, heavy anti-armor capabilities) identified in the resource gap assessment.