Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 302100Z SEP 25 AOR: Zaporizhzhia (CRITICAL), Central/Eastern LBS (Dnipropetrovsk/Kharkiv), Strategic Rear Areas PERIOD: 302000Z SEP 25 – 302100Z SEP 25 (Immediate Update)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains split between strategic risk mitigation (ZNPP) and dynamic tactical engagements along the LBS.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Tactical Success): UAF forces (RONIN'S unit) have confirmed successful FPV drone strikes against RF vehicles (truck/armored transport) in the Zaporizhzhia region (1901Z). This demonstrates sustained UAF capability to target RF logistics and movement near the critical front.
• Dnipropetrovsk Axis (Contested Ground): RF sources claim success in destroying UAF infantry while advancing on the "Dnipropetrovsk front" (1919Z). While unverified, this aligns with the previous report's concern about pressure following the AN/TPQ-48 loss, suggesting RF is attempting to exploit localized fire superiority to gain ground in wooded areas.
• Central Axis (Kharkiv): Confirmed RF UAV (Geran/Shahed) strike on an urban or industrial area in Kharkiv (1907Z). This validates the previous report’s assessment of a persistent air threat to Central Ukraine, leveraging observed flight paths.
• Deep Rear Areas (Druzhkivka): RF sources claim the destruction of a Doruk 3D Radar system on 28 SEP near Druzhkivka (1911Z), reinforcing the RF's aggressive counter-ISR campaign. Note: This claim is dated but reinforces the ongoing threat to UAF high-value assets.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors affecting Operations

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) No new environmental factors beyond the existing, critical emergency state at ZNPP. Ground movement remains unaffected by weather but RF forces are leveraging the cover afforded by wooded terrain (1919Z).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF forces are maintaining high operational tempo, coupling long-range kinetic strikes (UAVs on Kharkiv) with immediate tactical pressure (Dnipropetrovsk axis advances). UAF counter-battery and air defense assets remain high-priority targets for RF precision strikes. UAF forces are successfully leveraging FPV drone technology to maintain tactical superiority in close-quarters engagements and disrupt RF logistics.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) CAPABILITY (Counter-ISR/Counter-Battery): RF forces continue to demonstrate high capability in identifying and neutralizing UAF high-value ISR/AD assets (claimed Doruk 3D destruction, 1911Z, following AN/TPQ-48 loss). This directly supports localized ground offensives. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) INTENTION (Sustain Ground Pressure): RF is actively seeking to turn tactical gains into localized operational breakthroughs, particularly in the sectors facing the "Dnipropetrovsk front," using heavy fire support to destroy UAF infantry positions (1919Z). (HIGH CONFIDENCE) INTENTION (Information Warfare/IO): RF state media and milbloggers are aggressively using the "Day of Reunification" to amplify domestic morale through organized events (Donetsk concert, 1902Z) and to distract from the conflict by focusing on international developments (US readiness against Iran/Yemen, 1901Z; Trump rhetoric, 1911Z; Houthi attacks, 1920Z).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF is adapting its targeting strategy to prioritize neutralization of UAF air defense and counter-battery radars (Doruk 3D, AN/TPQ-48) to establish localized air/fire superiority necessary for ground advances. The use of FPV drones for this purpose remains highly effective.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The sustained high-volume of RF air strikes (Geran/Shahed) indicates consistent production and delivery of these long-range asymmetric weapons. However, the successful UAF FPV strikes in Zaporizhzhia (1901Z) suggest localized logistics disruption remains possible.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF C2 demonstrates continued synchronization of kinetic operations (UAV strikes, ground pressure) with aggressive IO, focused on maximizing the psychological impact of their military successes and minimizing the impact of UAF actions.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) UAF units demonstrate high proficiency in FPV drone strike technology (RONIN'S unit, 1901Z), confirming effective decentralized tactical warfare capability to disrupt RF logistics and close-quarters maneuver. Air defense remains tasked heavily, confirmed by the strike on Kharkiv (1907Z).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• FPV Anti-Armor/Logistics Strikes (Fact): Successful FPV engagement and destruction of RF vehicle/armored transport in Zaporizhzhia region (1901Z).
• Morale/IO: Emotional content depicting soldier-family reunification (1900Z) serves as a vital counter-narrative to RF demoralization efforts.

Setbacks:

• Loss of AD/ISR Assets (Fact/Claim): Previous confirmed loss of AN/TPQ-48, now coupled with the RF claim of Doruk 3D destruction (1911Z). This poses a cumulative strategic threat to UAF sensor coverage.
• Localized Ground Pressure (Judgment): RF claims of success in advancing on the Dnipropetrovsk front (1919Z) indicate that UAF infantry units in those sectors are currently under intense pressure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

(CRITICAL) Immediate requirement to assess and replace lost high-value AD/ISR assets (Doruk 3D/AN/TPQ-48) to prevent RF fire superiority. Continued resupply of FPV components and training remains essential given the proven tactical effectiveness (1901Z).

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF is prioritizing the "Day of Reunification" narrative, using organized public events and concerts (Donetsk, 1902Z) to project strength and legitimacy for the occupation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF milbloggers continue to amplify tactical successes (Dnipropetrovsk advance, 1919Z) and UAF losses (Doruk 3D, 1911Z) to bolster domestic support and undermine UAF resolve. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF channels are consistently linking the Ukraine conflict to broader global instability (Middle East, US politics) to diffuse international focus on Kyiv.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Public morale in Ukraine is supported by human interest stories of soldier sacrifice and reunion (1900Z). However, morale in Kharkiv and Central Oblasts remains stressed by continued urban targeting (1907Z).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

(LOW CONFIDENCE) No immediate diplomatic developments regarding ZNPP. The RF focus on global conflicts (1901Z, 1920Z) indicates an intent to dilute international attention on Ukraine.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1: Exploitation of Degraded UAF Sensor Coverage (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will leverage the confirmed and claimed destruction of UAF counter-battery and surveillance radars (AN/TPQ-48, Doruk 3D) by increasing indirect fire missions and launching concentrated ground attacks (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk front/Verbove) over the next 48 hours, operating under reduced risk of counter-battery fire.

MLCOA 2: Sustained Air Pressure on Urban Centers (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will continue to launch UAV attacks against Central and Eastern cities, including Kharkiv (1907Z), maintaining pressure on civilian infrastructure and forcing UAF AD expenditure, aligning with the new south-westerly vector.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1: Critical ZNPP Failure via Denial and Exploitation (HIGH IMPACT, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) As outlined in the previous report, RF denies critical repair access while the remaining ZNPP diesel generator fails, leading to a catastrophic loss of cooling, potentially synchronized with the SVR "provocation" narrative to justify a wider military action.

MDCOA 2: Coordinated Armor Push on Weakened Sector (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF executes a coordinated attack, likely along the contested LBS (Verbove/Dnipropetrovsk axis), preceded by intense suppression fires facilitated by the degraded UAF counter-battery network, aiming for a rapid operational encirclement or breakthrough into the UAF rear.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Mitigate Counter-Battery Gap: Immediately task Electronic Warfare (EW) and Counter-UAS (C-UAS) assets to the sectors where the AN/TPQ-48 and potentially the Doruk 3D were lost. Focus on disrupting RF FPV/loitering munition C2 channels until replacement Counter-Battery Radar systems are deployed (Ref. Previous Recommendation 1).
2. Reinforce Dnipropetrovsk Sector: Allocate dedicated long-range FPV strike units (like the observed RONIN'S unit) to the Dnipropetrovsk front to provide precision anti-vehicle support for UAF infantry engaged in contested wooded areas, neutralizing RF attempts to exploit localized breakthroughs (1919Z).
3. Harden Urban AD: Increase the number of SHORAD/Mobile AD teams protecting industrial and critical infrastructure in Kharkiv and other Central Oblasts (1907Z) to counter the MLCOA of continued UAV targeting.
4. Sustain FPV Initiative: Increase resource allocation and operational autonomy for UAF FPV units, given their proven capacity to deliver localized, high-impact strikes against RF logistics (1901Z) despite RF counter-ISR efforts.

//END REPORT//