Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - UAF DEFENSIVE

TIME: 301330Z SEP 25 AOR: Eastern and Southern Ukraine (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv Oblasts) PERIOD: 301300Z SEP 25 – 301330Z SEP 25 (Immediate Update)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The primary operational focus has rapidly shifted to RF deep strikes on rear areas, concurrent with localized RF ground pressure and confirmed UAF counter-fire losses.

• Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk (Critical Rear Areas): Cities are under renewed, heavy drone (Shahed/Geran-2) attack. Multiple confirmed "hits" in Kharkiv (Kyivsky district, multiple subsequent strikes confirmed by Sinehubov/Terekhov) and explosions in Dnipro (Operatyvnyi ZSU, Tsaplienko). This confirms the threat vector observed in the previous report (UAVs moving south-west).
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Orekhiv Sector): RF 58th Army (291st Regiment) claims offensive action near Orekhiv (WarGonzo footage of strikes on a defensive position). This indicates continued RF commitment to the contested zone, supporting the criticality of the Verbove intelligence gap.
• Kherson Direction: RF "Dnepr Group of Forces" claims successful airstrikes on the settlement of L'vovo (Dva Mayora), indicating continued RF air superiority/ISR effectiveness over the southern sector.
• Donetsk Axis (Counter-Battery Warfare): RF 238th Brigade claims destruction of a UAF PzH 2000 Self-Propelled Artillery system near Alexeevo-Druzhkivka (Narodnaya Militsiya DNR). This, combined with the confirmed loss of the AN/TPQ-48, signals an escalating, successful RF counter-battery campaign.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors affecting Operations

Unchanged. However, the high volume of Shahed/Geran-2 attacks confirms that operational conditions remain favorable for RF UAV usage in deep-strike roles.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF Air Defense is heavily engaged in Kharkiv and Dnipro. UAF forces are concurrently prosecuting lawfare operations (conviction of a spotter/collaborator in Kostiantynivka) and maintaining internal security (investigation into Kyiv City State Administration official corruption), highlighting a multi-domain internal posture.
• RF Posture: RF forces are actively utilizing air power (UAVs, rumored fixed-wing close air support in Kherson) to support localized ground assaults (Orekhiv) and degrade UAF rear area stability. RF is coordinating military action with internal security focus (MCHS/civil defense system upgrade in Lipetsk, TASS arrests).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RF)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) CAPABILITY: RF has demonstrated immediate ability to escalate deep strike operations against major urban centers, effectively leveraging the south-westerly UAV flight vector previously identified. RF also maintains high-precision counter-battery/loitering munition strike capability (PzH 2000 claim, AN/TPQ-48 loss).

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) INTENTION:

1. Degrade Rear Area Logistics: Utilize massed UAV attacks on Kharkiv/Dnipro to disrupt logistics, air defense coverage, and urban stability.
2. Achieve Fire Superiority: Continue aggressive counter-battery targeting (PzH 2000, AN/TPQ-48) to eliminate UAF indirect fire capabilities ahead of planned ground offensives (Lyman, Verbove, Orekhiv).
3. Moldova Information Operations: TASS reporting the sentencing of Sor Party politician Marina Tauber in Moldova reinforces the ongoing RF effort to delegitimize Moldovan pro-Western politicians ahead of the election cycle.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Concentrated Deep Strike: The near-simultaneous reports of heavy drone attacks on Kharkiv and Dnipro confirm the operationalization of the new south-westerly UAV vector, indicating an attempt to overwhelm two major metropolitan areas at once.
• Targeting Priority: Confirmed targeting of both counter-battery radar (AN/TPQ-48) and NATO-standard artillery (PzH 2000) confirms that RF has prioritized the elimination of UAF high-value indirect fire platforms.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF appears to have sufficient stocks of Geran-2/Shahed UAVs to prosecute sustained deep-strike operations against multiple cities simultaneously. This indicates robust production or stockpiling capability, despite internal corruption issues (Kuban VP arrest, MCHS bribe arrest). RF's decision to extend the full ban on gasoline exports until the end of the year (TASS, 301317Z SEP) suggests persistent, long-term concerns regarding domestic fuel security and supply for the military effort.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF C2 demonstrates effective synchronization between strategic messaging (Moldova, US political commentary) and tactical actions (coordinated UAV strikes, counter-battery operations).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) UAF Air Defense units are facing a severe, multi-city threat. UAF Readiness must be high, but the confirmed hits in Kharkiv and Dnipro suggest RF successfully penetrated air defenses in certain sectors. Law enforcement and counter-intelligence forces (SBU, General Prosecutor's Office) maintain a high operational tempo in combating internal threats (collaborators, corruption).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed conviction of a collaborator/spotter (SBU, Operatyvnyi ZSU), deterring future internal compromise.
• Continued UAF emphasis on humanitarian support and reconstruction (Vilkul reports).

Setbacks:

• Confirmed multiple drone strikes in Kharkiv and Dnipro, resulting in potential damage to critical infrastructure or civilian areas.
• Loss of a PzH 2000 Self-Propelled Howitzer (UNCONFIRMED BDA, HIGH PROBABILITY) near Alexeevo-Druzhkivka, compounding the earlier loss of the AN/TPQ-48 radar. This represents a significant degradation of UAF strike and counter-fire capability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The immediate requirement is the urgent resupply and repositioning of mobile, point-defense air defense systems (e.g., Gepard, Avenger, short-range MANPADS teams) to protect critical infrastructure in Kharkiv and Dnipro, and to counter the observed UAV flight paths. The losses of counter-battery radar and high-value artillery necessitate immediate prioritization of replacement assets and increased use of deception/camouflage measures for remaining indirect fire assets.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF continues to weaponize international news:

• US Political Exploitation: RF media (TASS, Dva Mayora) continues to amplify the meeting of US leadership with generals and quotes from US politicians regarding military readiness (Trump/Hegseth). This aims to portray the US as unstable or aggressively escalatory, thereby legitimizing RF actions and encouraging Western aid fatigue.
• Moldova Interference: The Moldovan court sentencing of Marina Tauber is immediately amplified by TASS, supporting the narrative that pro-Western elements are corrupt or persecuting legitimate political opposition.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF Morale: UAF public channels are focusing on successes (collaborator arrests) and resilience (reconstruction efforts in Kryvyi Rih), counteracting the immediate fear generated by the air attacks on Kharkiv and Dnipro.
• RF Morale: RF milbloggers are using hyper-local human-interest stories (soldier rescuing a kitten) to boost front-line morale, indicating the ongoing need to personalize and normalize the conflict for domestic audiences.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The closure of Czech visa centers in Russia (TASS) and the Swiss removal of sanctions on minor RF/LNR figures are minor diplomatic data points but reinforce the overall trend of European decoupling and localized sanctions adjustments. Neither significantly impacts military aid or strategic support for Ukraine.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-72 HOURS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA 1: Sustain Combined Air/Ground Pressure (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will sustain the high-tempo deep strike campaign against Dnipro and Kharkiv for at least the next 24-48 hours to overload UAF air defenses and disrupt logistics. Simultaneously, RF ground forces will attempt localized assaults on the Orekhiv and Lyman axes, seeking to exploit the temporary fire-superiority gap created by the destruction of UAF counter-battery assets.

MLCOA 2: Intensified Counter-Battery Focus (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ISR/strike teams will intensify hunt-and-kill missions targeting any remaining high-value UAF artillery systems (e.g., HIMARS, CAESAR, Krab) and associated radar, using confirmed successful tactics (FPV/loitering munitions). This is critical preparation for a larger ground offensive.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA 1: Tactical Breakthrough at Verbove/Orekhiv (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF utilizes the degraded UAF counter-fire capability to launch a concentrated, heavy armored assault against the still-unverified line at Verbove or the contested Orekhiv sector. If successful, this could achieve a localized operational breakthrough, requiring a major UAF strategic reserve commitment.

MDCOA 2: Escalation of False Flag/Hybrid Activity (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF executes a high-impact hybrid action (sabotage, assassination, or military incident) in a neighboring state (e.g., Moldova or a NATO border region) and immediately attributes the act to the "provocation" narrative established by the SVR, aiming to destabilize NATO/EU resolve.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Immediate Air Defense Re-tasking: Immediately divert mobile, short-range Air Defense systems (SPAAG, MANPADS teams) to the likely approach corridors of the observed south-westerly UAV vector to establish more robust point defense for critical infrastructure in Dnipro and Kharkiv (MLCOA 1).
2. Force Protection for Artillery Assets: Implement immediate, mandatory Force Protection measures for all remaining high-value artillery assets (PzH 2000, Krab, HIMARS). This includes relocating assets, instituting strict EMCON, and deploying extensive deception/decoy operations to counter RF counter-battery success (MLCOA 2, PRIORITY 2 GAP).
3. Verbove Reserve Commitment Pre-authorization: Place the designated operational reserve for the Zaporizhzhia axis on heightened readiness (90-minute deploy time). Pre-authorize the movement of initial blocking forces should the PRIORITY 1 intelligence gap confirm an RF penetration exceeding 2km depth (MDCOA 1).
4. Counter-Hybrid Tasking: Task SBU and military police with heightened vigilance against internal collaborators following the latest conviction. STRATCOM must continue to proactively counter RF's SVR "provocation" narrative.
5. Re-assess Logistics: Due to the sustained RF deep strikes and RF gasoline export ban, Logistics Command should review and diversify fuel and ammunition depot locations in Central Ukraine to mitigate risk from MLCOA 1.

//END REPORT//