Archived operational intelligence briefing
RF forces maintain multi-axis pressure, with particular focus on the Kupiansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, Siversk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia axes. Significant NATO exercises continue in Lithuania, and air defenses remain activated due to RF drone activity. Reports of RF UAVs entering Romanian airspace have been confirmed, while Polish authorities have concluded there was no confirmed airspace violation on 13 September. UAF deep strikes against industrial and logistical targets within RF territory are confirmed (Perm Krai, Ufa, Kirishi, Oryol-Kursk railway). Ukraine's Prime Minister Shmyhal estimates the cost of Ukraine's survival in 2026. RF has successfully conducted a space docking mission and continues military exercises (Zapad 2025).
KEY DEVELOPMENTS (LAST HOUR):
Capabilities:
Intention:
Courses of Action (COA):
RF Logistics:
UAF Sustainment:
Massive Air/Missile Strike Tonight: RF will launch another large-scale combined missile and drone attack within the next 6-12 hours (prior to 150600Z SEP 25), targeting critical energy infrastructure (especially thermal power plants like Tripilska and other substations) and possibly DIB facilities in central, eastern, and western Ukraine. The attack will likely feature a high volume of Shahed-type UAVs launched from multiple vectors, supplemented by ballistic missiles (Iskander/KN-23) from the north-east (Bryansk region) and potentially the south (Crimea) against key urban centers and military targets (e.g., Dnipro, Sumy, Kyiv). The intent is to further degrade Ukraine's energy grid ahead of winter and retaliate for UAF deep strikes.
Ground Consolidation and Pressure (Konstantinovka, Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk Border, Pokrovsk): RF will intensify efforts to exploit and consolidate any gains in Konstantinovka, the Myrnohrad/Kazatskoe sector, and at the junction of Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts within the next 24-48 hours. This will involve continuous localized ground assaults supported by artillery, guided aerial bombs (FABs), and FPV drones. Secondary efforts will maintain pressure on the Pokrovsk and Lyman axes to fix UAF forces and prevent redeployments. RF reconnaissance (e.g., 4th military base near Orikhiv) will continue to support these advances.
Escalated Information Warfare: RF will significantly intensify its information warfare campaign over the next 24-72 hours, focusing on:
Tactical Nuclear/Strategic Attack Signal: In conjunction with "Zapad-2025," RF could conduct a highly publicized, unambiguous, and provocative test of a tactical nuclear weapon or a strategic missile launch with a declared (but non-nuclear) warhead into an uninhabited area (e.g., Arctic). This would be intended as a direct nuclear deterrent signal to NATO, explicitly linking "Zapad-2025" to strategic escalation and demonstrating a willingness to use such capabilities if NATO intervention or aid to Ukraine escalates beyond RF's perceived red lines. This is a significantly higher-risk option than current signaling.
Limited Cross-Border Ground Incursion (Northern Front Diversion): RF could conduct a limited, deniable ground incursion into the Sumy/Chernihiv region, utilizing hybrid forces (e.g., Border Guard Service, mobilized units, or proxy forces) or Special Operations elements. This would be designed to fix UAF forces, force redeployments from the Donbas, create panic, and open a new, active front. This would be coupled with an intense IO campaign claiming "counter-terrorist operations" or "protection of border regions." The incursion would likely target border settlements and potentially logistical nodes or small military installations.
Cyber-Attack on Critical Infrastructure (NATO Member State): RF could launch a highly disruptive cyber-attack against a critical infrastructure sector (e.g., energy, finance, transportation) of a NATO member state directly bordering Ukraine (e.g., Poland, Romania). This would be a hybrid escalation, intended to demonstrate RF's capability to inflict costs on NATO without direct kinetic military action, potentially in response to increased NATO force posture or military aid, or to test NATO's Article 5 response threshold.
//END REPORT//
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