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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-09-06 06:34:26Z
5 months ago
Previous (2025-09-06 06:05:58Z)

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 060600Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

  • OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: Russian Federation (RF) forces maintain multi-axis ground offensives, with significant activity reported in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts. Key terrain objectives continue to be areas around Kupyansk, Liman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Orikhiv, and Kherson directions. RF continues deep strikes on Ukrainian energy and industrial infrastructure, with a new focus on railway infrastructure in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are actively defending, reporting significant enemy UAV activity and successful interceptions, while also conducting their own deep strikes and tactical drone operations.
    • NEW INTELLIGENCE: RF claims further advances and consolidation. Specifically, TASS reports RF assault units have "practically dislodged" UAF from Poltavka (southwest of Konstantinovka, Donetsk Oblast) (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim/IO). This signifies continued RF pressure on the Toretsk-Konstantinovka axis. ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports that evacuation has begun from settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast "to which the enemy is approaching" (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media). This indicates direct RF ground threat or indirect fire threat in Dnipropetrovsk, a potentially new axis of active engagement. UAF General Staff provides comprehensive updates on combat activities, indicating continued clashes:
      • South Slobozhansky (Kharkiv) direction: Clashes near Vovchansk (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
      • Kupyansk direction: Clashes near Kupyansk, Petropavlivka, and Kolisnykivka (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
      • Lyman direction: Clashes near Karpivka, Andriyivka, Druzhelubivka, Kolodyazi, Drobysheve and towards Olhivka and Shandryholove (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
      • Sieversk direction: Clashes near Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, Dronivka, Fedorivka, Vyyimka and towards Dibrova (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
      • Kramatorsk direction: Clashes near Stupochky (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
      • Toretsk direction: Clashes near Pleschiyivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report). This confirms UAF reporting on the Poltavka area, previously claimed by RF.
      • Pokrovsk direction: Clashes near Shakhove, Nykanorivka, Rodynske, Novoekonomichne, Mayak, Rubizhne, Sukhyy Yar, Shevchenko, Promin, Pokrovsk, Kotlyne, Udachne, Dachne and towards Filiya and Novopavlivka (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report). This indicates intense and widespread ground combat across a broad front.
      • Novopavlivka direction: Clashes near Zelenyy Hay, Filiya, Piddubne, Oleksandrohrad, Voskresenka, Temyrivka, Shevchenko, Maliyivka, Komyshuvakha (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
      • Orikhiv direction: Clashes near Stepnohirsk and Novodanylivka (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
      • Kherson direction: UAF repelled 3 RF assaults (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
      • Kursk and North Slobozhansky (Sumy) direction: UAF repelled 8 RF assaults (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
    • RF Aviation conducted airstrikes at Novoandriyivka, Chervona Krynytsya (Zaporizhzhia region), Lvove (Kherson region) (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report). This confirms continued RF close air support and deep strike capabilities.
    • РБК-Україна reports an RF attack on an ambulance in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media). This highlights continued targeting of civilian infrastructure and emergency services.
    • RF reports a powerful strike on a railway station in Sloviansk, claiming a military convoy or warehouse was hit, with ammunition detonation (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim/IO). This suggests continued RF focus on disrupting UAF logistics.
    • ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reports "Shahed" drone launches from three directions: Bryansk, Crimea, and Primorsk-Akhtarsk (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media). This indicates a multi-vector, high-volume drone attack.
    • RF has launched 91 drones, with UAF PVO having "shot down/suppressed 68 enemy UAVs" (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report). This indicates a sustained high tempo of RF drone operations and effective UAF air defense.
    • 46th Separate Airmobile Podilska Brigade of UAF Air Assault Forces shares video of an FPV drone attack, implying successful engagement of an RF military convoy (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

  • Air Operations: Conditions remain favorable for widespread Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) operations, day and night. The report of 91 RF drones launched and 68 suppressed/shot down, including Shahed launches from Bryansk, Crimea, and Primorsk-Akhtarsk, confirms continued suitable conditions for extensive multi-vector drone attacks (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF aviation conducting airstrikes in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson also indicates clear conditions for tactical air support (HIGH CONFIDENCE). UAF FPV drone operations, as depicted by the 46th Airmobile Brigade video, also confirm suitable conditions for tactical drone strikes (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Maritime Operations: Shahed launches from Crimea and Primorsk-Akhtarsk imply suitable conditions for maritime-supported drone operations, as these are coastal/naval bases (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Ground Operations: Continued intense ground operations across all axes (Kupyansk, Liman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Orikhiv, Kherson, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk directions) indicate conditions remain conducive to ground maneuvers and combat (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF's claimed dislodgement of UAF from Poltavka, and UAF evacuation in Dnipropetrovsk, further supports this (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The attack on the ambulance in Dnipropetrovsk implies continued ground-based kinetic activity or drone strikes (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

  • RF:
    • Ground Forces: Continuing multi-axis offensive with persistent pressure across Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts. RF assault units claim to have "practically dislodged" UAF from Poltavka (southwest of Konstantinovka, Donetsk Oblast) (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim/IO). This signifies localized advances. RF ground forces are advancing "towards Kramatorsk" (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - as previous intelligence). Heavy clashes reported by UAF General Staff across all major axes (Kupyansk, Liman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Orikhiv, Kherson, Sumy, Kharkiv) (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF forces are actively repelled in Kherson (3 assaults) and Kursk/North Slobozhansky (Sumy) (8 assaults) (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report).
    • Air Assets: High volume drone operations continue, with 91 RF drones launched and 68 suppressed/shot down by UAF PVO (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report). Shahed drones launched from Bryansk, Crimea, and Primorsk-Akhtarsk (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media) demonstrate multi-vector attack capabilities. RF aviation conducted airstrikes at Novoandriyivka, Chervona Krynytsya (Zaporizhzhia region), Lvove (Kherson region) (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report), indicating active tactical air support.
    • Naval Assets: Shahed launches from Crimea and Primorsk-Akhtarsk indicate continued use of naval/coastal bases for drone operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Air Defense: RF claims to be actively countering UAF deep strikes, but the extensive UAF counter-UAS (68 drones shot down/suppressed) indicates continued high-volume RF drone deployment and a challenged air defense environment for Ukraine.
    • Information Operations (IO): TASS reports on Gazprom's gas supplies to China (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF IO) and Peskov's statements on Western business (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF IO) aim to project economic stability and self-sufficiency despite sanctions. TASS is promoting Vasily Prozorov's claims of Poroshenko signing a secret document for terror attacks in Donbas and Russia in April 2015 (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF IO), a highly inflammatory disinformation campaign to criminalize Ukrainian leadership and justify RF actions. ASTRA reports Trump considering inviting Putin to the G20 summit in Miami (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as ASTRA/media report). RF will heavily leverage this for IO to undermine Western unity and legitimacy.
  • UAF:
    • Defensive Posture: UAF PVO successfully suppressed/shot down 68 out of 91 RF drones launched (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report), demonstrating strong air defense capabilities. UAF General Staff reports active clashes and successful repelling of RF assaults across multiple directions, including 3 assaults in Kherson and 8 in Kursk/North Slobozhansky (Sumy) (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report). Evacuation has begun in parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast due to approaching enemy forces (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media), indicating a dynamic defensive situation.
    • Special Operations/Deep Strike Capabilities: UAF Air Assault Forces (46th Separate Airmobile Podilska Brigade) video shows a successful FPV drone strike on an RF military convoy (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media), demonstrating effective tactical drone operations. UAF is actively monitoring and reporting multi-vector Shahed launches (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Strategic Resolve & Diplomacy: UAF officials continue to report on the operational situation and impacts on civilians, maintaining transparency and emphasizing the human cost of the war. РБК-Україна reports PrivatBank has restored electronic services (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media), showcasing resilience in critical infrastructure.
    • Resource Management: STERNENKO reports businesses are losing employees after allowing men aged 18-22 to travel abroad (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media). This indicates a potential labor shortage impacting the economy and potentially future mobilization.
    • Civilian Resilience & Governance: Evacuation efforts in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast demonstrate proactive civilian protection (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The attack on an ambulance in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast highlights the continued impact of the conflict on civilian life and emergency services (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • International:
    • Diplomatic Momentum: Trump considering inviting Putin to G20 summit (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as ASTRA/media report) is a significant development that could impact Western unity and RF's international standing.
    • Economic Relations: TASS reports Gazprom's plans for increased gas supplies to China (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF IO) and Peskov's comments on Western businesses not returning (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF IO) highlight RF's pivot to non-Western economic partners and its economic resilience efforts.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

  • Capabilities:

    • Persistent Ground Offensive & Consolidation: RF maintains capability for sustained, multi-axis ground offensives (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Chernihiv, and now potentially Dnipropetrovsk). RF claims to have "practically dislodged" UAF from Poltavka (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim/IO), demonstrating localized tactical success. Continued clashes are reported by UAF General Staff across multiple directions (Kupyansk, Liman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Orikhiv, Kherson, Sumy, Kharkiv) (HIGH CONFIDENCE), indicating sustained ground combat and offensive capabilities.
    • Long-Range Strike & Air Presence: RF retains significant capability for deep strikes against critical infrastructure (Dnipro industrial fire, railway station in Sloviansk) and sustains high-volume tactical aviation/drone activity. The launch of 91 drones, including Shaheds from three distinct vectors, confirms multi-faceted and extensive drone attack capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF aviation conducted airstrikes in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF report), demonstrating continued close air support and strike capabilities. The attack on an ambulance in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast suggests RF's capability to target civilian and emergency assets (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Advanced Information & Psychological Warfare: RF continues to demonstrate a high capability for aggressive and inflammatory IO, notably with Vasily Prozorov's claims against Poroshenko, aimed at criminalizing Ukrainian leadership (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF IO). RF effectively leverages international political developments, such as Trump's potential G20 invitation to Putin, to promote narratives of international legitimacy and Western disunity (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF IO also focuses on projecting economic stability and self-sufficiency (Gazprom, Peskov comments) (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Intentions:

    • Achieve Territorial Objectives: RF intends to continue offensive operations to secure and consolidate control over claimed and newly occupied territories, especially in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv Oblasts. The claimed advances in Poltavka (Donetsk Oblast) (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim/IO) and reports of enemy approach leading to evacuations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as UAF media) signal an immediate intent to gain ground in these sectors. The multitude of clashes reported by UAF General Staff across various axes (HIGH CONFIDENCE) reflects RF's persistent intent to achieve territorial gains.
    • Degrade UAF Combat Effectiveness & Morale: RF aims to deplete UAF resources through attrition (e.g., continued drone attacks, ground assaults, railway station strike in Sloviansk), disrupt logistics, and undermine public morale through strikes (civilian infrastructure like the ambulance in Dnipropetrovsk) and aggressive propaganda (Prozorov's claims). The high volume of drone attacks (91 launched) indicates an intent to overwhelm UAF air defenses and cause widespread damage.
    • Deter Western Intervention & Support & Fracture Alliances: RF will continue to use IO campaigns (e.g., leveraging Trump's G20 invitation considerations) to undermine Western unity and legitimacy. Economic IO (Gazprom to China, Peskov on Western business) aims to demonstrate RF's resilience to sanctions and reduce the perceived effectiveness of Western pressure.
    • Maintain Domestic Control & Legitimacy: RF will continue to control its internal information space and project an image of self-sufficiency and moral justification for its actions. Leveraging figures like Prozorov and emphasizing economic stability serve this purpose.
  • Courses of Action (COAs):

    • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):

      1. Sustained, Attritional Ground Offensives with Localized Tactical Advances, Coupled with High-Volume Drone Attacks and Deep Strikes on Logistics/Civilian Infrastructure, Supported by Aggressive IO: RF will continue methodical, attritional ground assaults across multiple axes (Kupyansk, Liman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Orikhiv, Kherson, Sumy, Kharkiv, and now Dnipropetrovsk), focusing on localized advances (e.g., Poltavka). RF will maintain high-volume drone attacks (Shaheds from multiple vectors), targeting both military and civilian infrastructure, including emergency services (ambulance strike). Deep strikes will continue against critical logistics (railway station in Sloviansk) and industrial targets. RF IO will aggressively criminalize Ukrainian leadership (Prozorov claims) and leverage international political developments (Trump/G20) to undermine Western unity and portray RF legitimacy. Confidence: HIGH
      2. Intensified Cross-Border Operations with Emphasis on Buffer Zone Consolidation and Reconnaissance-in-Force: RF will intensify special forces and ground unit activity in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts, aiming to solidify "buffer zones" through attritional attacks, reconnaissance-in-force, and fixing UAF border forces. This will be integrated with sustained long-range fire and air support. Confidence: HIGH
    • Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

      1. Massed Air/Missile Strike on Major Urban Center with Civilian/Industrial Infrastructure as Primary Target (INCLUDING Dnipropetrovsk/Kyiv): RF conducts a coordinated, large-scale air and missile strike utilizing multiple vectors (including Shaheds from Bryansk, Crimea, Primorsk-Akhtarsk) against a major Ukrainian urban center (e.g., Kyiv or Dnipropetrovsk), specifically targeting residential areas, hospitals, or critical industrial/energy facilities to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic, possibly after a sustained campaign to degrade local air defenses. The reported drone launches and evacuations in Dnipropetrovsk suggest an elevated risk in this area. Confidence: MEDIUM
      2. Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: Given the continued, albeit less prominent, nuclear rhetoric, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration remains a low-probability but extremely high-impact MDCOA. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
  • Timeline estimates and decision points:

    • Immediate (0-24 hours):
      • RF Decision Point: Assess UAF air defense effectiveness against current drone strikes (91 launched, 68 suppressed). Continue localized ground offensives, particularly around Poltavka (Donetsk) and to maintain pressure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Amplify IO regarding Poroshenko's alleged terror plans and Trump's G20 invitation. Continue deep strikes on railway infrastructure and civilian targets. Confidence: HIGH
      • UAF Decision Point: Maintain high alert for multi-vector drone attacks, prioritizing air defense assets for critical infrastructure and population centers, especially in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Continue to report RF ground assaults and repelling actions. Conduct BDA on railway station strike in Sloviansk. Launch immediate counter-IO against Prozorov's claims. Assess the labor impact from the new travel rules for men aged 18-22. Confidence: HIGH
      • International Decision Point: Monitor RF IO leveraging Trump's G20 statements closely. Condemn RF deep strikes on civilian infrastructure and the ambulance attack. Confidence: HIGH
    • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
      • RF Decision Point: Evaluate tactical gains and losses from current offensives. Adjust drone/air strike patterns based on UAF air defense responses. Continue to reinforce economic narratives. Confidence: HIGH
      • UAF Decision Point: Reinforce defensive lines in areas where RF is approaching and consider pre-emptive evacuations. Maintain counter-battery fire. Continue to highlight RF war crimes. Confidence: HIGH
      • International Decision Point: Respond to potential escalation of RF IO. Consider further sanctions or aid based on RF actions. Confidence: HIGH
    • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
      • RF Decision Point: Consolidate any territorial gains in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. Assess success of buffer zone operations. Continue long-term DIB development and non-Western alignment. Confidence: HIGH
      • UAF Decision Point: Continue to press for international support for air defense and DIB. Work to mitigate labor shortages. Confidence: HIGH
      • International Decision Point: Evaluate the broader impact of Trump's potential G20 invitation on global alliances. Maintain pressure on RF through economic measures. Confidence: HIGH

INTELLIGENCE GAPS:

  • CRITICAL (PERSISTING): What is the definitive cause and BDA of the major industrial fire in Dnipro? Is this the start of a new RF campaign targeting industrial infrastructure, specifically industrial production and storage?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific impact of RF interdiction efforts on the Slovyansk-Izium highway on UAF logistics? Is RF achieving sustained disruption or merely localized harassment?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the definitive NATO/Polish assessment of RF intent behind the 04 SEP drone violation of Polish airspace? What specific response actions have been taken?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can the RF claims of intensified strikes and advances on the Zaporizhzhia front be independently verified with BDA? What is the specific scope and location of these alleged advances?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What are the precise details and long-term implications of the reported $100B US deal with Ukraine, particularly concerning the transfer of military development rights?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the verified status and impact of the protest on Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv against the military bill? What is the government's official response, and how will it affect soldier morale and public trust?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can the RF claims from "Sever-V" brigade videos of successfully defending against Ukrainian drones flying towards Russia be independently verified with BDA? What types of drones were involved and what was the extent of the interceptions?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the verified tactical impact of RF drone strikes shown in the Colonelcassad video (00:03:01) against "enemy shelters," "enemy personnel," "Baba Yaga" drones, "enemy trucks," and "enemy artillery"?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can the RF claims of advances on the left bank of the Volchya River near Volchansk, Kharkiv Oblast, be independently verified with BDA? What is the scope and significance of these claimed advances?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Is the RF claim of liquidation of a Patriot SAM system engineer following a Russian strike verifiable? If so, what is the specific impact on UAF air defense capabilities in the affected region?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the confirmed status of the burnt bus on the Izium-Slovyansk highway, and what additional intelligence can be gathered from the imagery (e.g., vehicle type, likely cargo, specific munition impact characteristics)?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the precise content and full context of the Eurocommission's "positive reaction" to Putin's statement on Ukraine's potential EU future, beyond the TASS reporting? What is the official EU stance on this specific statement?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What are the specific objectives and expected outcomes of Trump's consideration to strike drug cartels in Venezuela, and how will this impact RF's foreign relations and IO regarding Venezuela?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can RF claims from Marochko (TASS) regarding the formation of a "fire pocket" in Konstantinovka, DPR, be independently verified? What is the current tactical situation in Konstantinovka, and what UAF units are potentially affected?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific "key issue" identified by Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Svyrydenko for the next round of negotiations with Slovakia? What are the potential outcomes or points of contention?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What are the verified capabilities and deployment status of the "Planshet-M-IR" artillery fire control vehicles supplied by Rostec to the RF army? What impact will this have on RF artillery effectiveness?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific BDA and impact of the second "Smerch" MLRS strike near Novopetrovka, Snihurivka (Mykolaiv Oblast)? Does this indicate a new pattern of intensified indirect fire in this area?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the methodology behind GUR's estimate of Russian military personnel in Ukraine, and what are the specific implications of these numbers for both RF and UAF strategic planning?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the verified BDA and tactical impact of the reported destruction of a UAF PVD in Volchansk, as claimed by Colonelcassad?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the independent verification of RF claims regarding 1390 UAF casualties in the last 24 hours? What is the breakdown of these alleged losses by region/unit type?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the verified impact of the raid at a Hyundai factory in the USA (RBK-Ukraine)? What are the specific allegations, and what is the broader context of this event? How might RF IO attempt to leverage this?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific content and nuance of Nikita Mikhalkov's comments on artistic depictions of the "special operation" (TASS)? What specific artistic portrayals or themes is he implicitly criticizing?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What are the immediate and long-term implications of the reported increase in bribery-related crimes in Russia (TASS) for internal stability, economic performance, and potential RF IO narratives?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What are the specific agreements, if any, and the strategic implications of the 353 agreements signed at the Eastern Economic Forum (TASS)? Which countries and sectors were most involved, and what does this signify for RF's international economic relations?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can the RF MOD (TASS) claim of drone destruction of a UAF tank on the Krasnoarmeysky direction be independently verified with BDA? What type of tank was allegedly destroyed, and what is the tactical significance of this claim?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific flight path, altitude, and type of RF reconnaissance UAV operating from the Black Sea towards Odesa, and what counter-measures were employed by UAF to intercept it?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific target, munition type, and potential BDA of the reported aviation munitions threat in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Synelnykivskyi district)?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific content and full context of President Zelenskyy's proposal for a new meeting city with Putin? What are the specific conditions and parameters proposed for such a meeting?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the verified accuracy and source of Anton Kobyakov's (TASS) claim regarding the US transferring state debt to cryptocurrency to devalue it? What is the economic evidence supporting or refuting this claim?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the methodology and evidence behind Anton Kobyakov's (TASS) claim that "all countries want to cooperate with Russia, only part of the West isolates itself"? What is the international community's response to this assertion?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific evidence and context for Andrey Marochko's (TASS) claim that UAF strikes on Luhansk are due to "losses everywhere" on the contact line? What is the verified tactical situation in Luhansk at the time of the strikes?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific evidence and full context behind former SBU employee Vasily Prozorov's (TASS) claim that "children in Ukraine have become a commodity sold to the West, and the fate of 10,000 of them is unknown"? What independent investigations or reports contradict or support these claims?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can Marochko's (TASS) claim that the "liberation" of Markovo allows RF forces to begin fighting for Дружковка (Druzhkovka) be independently verified? What is the current UAF disposition in and around Druzhkovka?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What are the specific reasons and strategic implications of the German Ambassador to Ukraine being appointed to head German intelligence (RBK-Ukraine)? How will this impact intelligence sharing and diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Germany?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the independent verification of TASS claims of over 138,000 cases of desertion from UAF since the beginning of the year? What is the methodology used by the Ukrainian GBR (as cited by TASS) to compile these figures?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What are the specific charges against writer Dmitry Bykov, and what evidence is presented by the RF Investigative Committee to support the claim that he would pressure witnesses (TASS)? What is the broader context of this legal action against a prominent critic?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can the RF claims of destroying nine UAF drones over Smolensk Oblast (TASS) be independently verified with BDA? What types of drones were involved, and what were their intended targets?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the independent verification for TASS claims of six Ukrainian drones shot down over Voronezh Oblast? What were the intended targets and types of drones?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the precise nature of the "classical daily FAB-ization" reported by Colonelcassad? What specific targets are being struck and what is the BDA of these operations?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can RF claims of UAF losing over 50% of its attack aircraft in counterattacks on the Sumy direction (TASS) be independently verified? What specific units, aircraft types, and timeframes are implied? What is the actual UAF Air Force readiness in this sector?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the full context and expected outcome of the US and EU meeting to discuss new sanctions against Russia (RBK-Ukraine)? What specific sanctions are being considered?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What specific cultural outputs or initiatives will Mikhalkov and Medinsky coordinate for the Eurasian Academy of Cinematic Arts and the "Diamond Butterfly" Eurasian Film Award? What is the strategic intent behind this cultural push?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the confirmed BDA and impact of the 476 RF strikes on 15 settlements in Zaporizhzhia Oblast? What specific types of munitions were used and what was the extent of damage to civilian and military infrastructure?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can the RF MOD claim of 34 Ukrainian UAVs shot down overnight over RF regions and the Black Sea be independently verified? What types of UAVs were involved and what were their intended targets?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can the Bryansk Oblast Governor's claim of 5 enemy UAVs shot down over Bryansk Oblast be independently verified? What types of UAVs were involved and what were their intended targets?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the confirmed BDA and impact of the 7 RF drones shot down over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by UAF Air Command "East"? What types of drones were involved?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific content and implications of Russian blogger Yevgeny Bazhenov (BadComedian) being added to the "Mirotvorets" list for both Ukrainian and Russian information environments?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the independent verification for former SBU employee Vasily Prozorov's (TASS) claims that Ukrainians Poklad and Chervinsky are behind 80% of sabotage and murders in Donbas? What evidence does Prozorov present, and what is the official Ukrainian response?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the specific context and verified accuracy of the Russian Milblog "Zvиздец Мангусту" stating the "situation ceases to be languid" in the Dobropillya direction? Does this indicate a new RF offensive, increased UAF pressure, or a different type of activity?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the precise BDA of the RF missile strike on railway infrastructure in Donetsk Oblast? What is the extent of damage, the specific type of missile used, and the immediate impact on UAF logistics?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the current tactical situation in Stepnohirsk (Zaporizhzhia Oblast) and what UAF units are involved, beyond the general expression of resilience?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can the RF BARS-32 unit's claim of destroying over 600 UAVs since the beginning of the year be independently verified? What types of UAVs were allegedly destroyed, and what is the operational significance of this claim?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can the RF 38th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade's (35th Army, Vostok Group) claim of a successful attack on UAF personnel and equipment in Zaporizhzhia Oblast be independently verified? What specific UAF assets or positions were targeted, and what is the BDA?
  • HIGH (PERSISTING): Can RF squad leader "Prizrak"'s claim of successfully destroying a UAF Kamaz truck with towed artillery and personnel be independently verified? What is the specific location, and what is the BDA?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the specific BDA of the RF strike in Sloviansk, including the type of munition, the target, and the extent of damage? What UAF units or critical infrastructure were potentially affected?
  • HIGH (NEW): What specific settlements were targeted in Kharkiv Oblast according to the Kharkiv Regional Military Administration, and what was the type and extent of damage in each?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the full context and strategic implications of Trump's statement regarding potentially inviting Russia to the G20 summit? What specific conditions or prerequisites did he mention, if any?
  • HIGH (NEW): What are the confirmed capabilities, deployment status, and observed effectiveness of the newly showcased RF ground robots (grenadiers, sappers, medics) by ЮВО forces? What are their intended mission profiles?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the verified accuracy of Операция Z's claim of a broad RF offensive towards Krasny Liman? What are the specific RF units involved, and what is the UAF disposition in the area?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the precise impact and extent of the reported difficulties with the Privat24 application (РБК-Україна)? Is this a cyberattack, technical malfunction, or another cause, and what are the implications for Ukrainian financial systems?
  • HIGH (NEW): Can Басурин о главном's claims of UAF shelling Horlivka and wounding civilians be independently verified? What evidence supports or refutes these claims, and what is the specific BDA in Horlivka?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the precise BDA and impact of RF Southern Group of Forces destroying a UAF UAV control point and antennas near Konstantinovka (ТАСС)? What specific UAF capabilities were degraded?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the confirmed BDA and tactical impact of the UAF kamikaze drone strike on an RF vehicle with ten occupants in Donetsk Oblast (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС)? What type of vehicle and RF unit were affected?
  • HIGH (NEW): What specific types of UAVs were among the 68 enemy UAVs reportedly shot down/suppressed by UAF (Оперативний ЗСУ/Повітряні Сили)? What were their flight paths and intended targets?
  • HIGH (NEW): Can Colonelcassad's claim of RF UAVs destroying a Swedish FH77 BW L52 «Archer» SPG in the Krasnoarmeysky direction be independently verified with BDA? What are the specific implications of such a loss for UAF artillery capabilities?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the precise location and BDA of the RF claimed dislodgement of UAF from Poltavka (southwest of Konstantinovka)? What UAF units were present and what is their current status?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the specific nature and intensity of the enemy approach in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast that is prompting evacuations? What RF units are involved, and what is their direction of advance?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the confirmed BDA and tactical impact of RF aviation airstrikes at Novoandriyivka, Chervona Krynytsya (Zaporizhzhia region), and Lvove (Kherson region)? What specific targets were struck?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the current status of the affected ambulance in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and what civilian casualties or injuries resulted from the attack? What specific munition was used?
  • HIGH (NEW): What is the specific impact of men aged 18-22 being allowed to travel abroad on Ukraine's labor market and potential future mobilization efforts?
  • MEDIUM: What are the detailed capabilities of the RF "Vostok Group" as demonstrated in recent training, and what does this indicate for their future deployment and mission profiles?
  • MEDIUM: Can the RF claims of destroying UAF BBM and personnel in the Kharkiv direction be independently verified? What is the specific location and significance of this claimed strike?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): Can the effects of SBU "Operation Spiderweb" be independently verified? What is the quantifiable impact on RF strike sortie rates or effectiveness?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What are the verified range and payload capacity of RF's new 3D-printed drone munitions as showcased by "Two Majors"? How widespread is their deployment?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What is the specific impact of Trump's statements on the "Department of War," Lukashenko, Venezuela, G20 attendance, India's oil purchases, US-Belarus prisoner releases, and his executive order on sanctions, on international diplomatic efforts and Western unity, beyond initial RF IO amplification?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What is the verified context and full content of Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski's statement on Ukraine's borders, and what is its official interpretation by Warsaw?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What is the specific intent and timeline behind Brazil's stated consideration of using nuclear technology for military purposes? What are the immediate and long-term implications for regional and global security?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What are the specific objectives and expected outcomes of the SCO Secretary General's visit to Moscow in November, particularly regarding economic cooperation?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What specific cultural narratives and themes will RF leverage following Zakharova's statements on "preserving culture and traditions in opposition to Western approaches"? What are the key target audiences for this cultural warfare?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What is the broader impact of Yakutia's "Air Crossing" drone delivery pilot project on RF's national drone strategy and potential dual-use military applications?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What are the specific outcomes and agreements from the meeting between RF Defense Minister Belousov and Libyan Chief of General Staff Haftar, and what are the implications for regional stability and military cooperation?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What are the specific operational details and timeline for the establishment of an SCO Development Bank, as discussed by Suhail Khan (TASS)? What impact will this have on international financial systems and RF's strategic goals?
  • MEDIUM (PERSISTING): What are the verified capabilities and deployment status of Rostec's new "Pantsir-N" air defense complex? What is its intended role and how will it impact the battlefield?
  • LOW: What are the specific locations and activities of "PMC Pegov" mentioned by Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition?
  • LOW (PERSISTING): What is the detailed composition and effective range of the new RF FPV drone systems, reportedly with increased range, operating on the Izium-Slovyansk highway?
  • LOW (PERSISTING): What is the verified status and impact of the reported TCC car theft incident in Odesa? Is it an isolated event or indicative of broader issues?
  • LOW (PERSISTING): What is the specific public and military morale impact of Ukraine losing 0-2 to France in football?
  • LOW (PERSISTING): What is the content and tactical significance of the "Обертон" - "Север" video shared by "Два майора", beyond Arctic landscapes? Is there any subtle military messaging?
  • PERSISTING: What is the definitive ground truth of RF control in Novoselivka (Dnipropetrovsk) and Novoselovka (Zaporizhzhia)?

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

  1. Immediate & Robust Counter-Propaganda Against Dehumanization, Criminalization, Alliance Fracture, and Non-Western Alignment; Counter RF Cultural Warfare; Expose Domestic IO; Validate UAF Successes: Launch a comprehensive, international public diplomacy campaign to expose and condemn RF's militarization of youth, dehumanization of Ukrainians, criminalization of captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians, their efforts to sow discord within the Western alliance (e.g., Fico's statements, Anton Kobyakov's statements, Trump's G20 statements, US-Belarus talks, Lukashenko, India oil, US defense strategy, Venezuela, and considering strikes in Venezuela, Trump considering G20 invitation for Russia), and their deepening military ties with rogue states (DPRK, Myanmar, Libya, Brazil, SCO, Russian-Chinese Committee). This campaign must highlight war crimes, violations of international law, and psychological warfare implications. Immediately counter RF's graphic battlefield IO designed to demoralize UAF forces. Develop specific counter-narratives to the "Department of War" rebranding and Trump's positive statements on Lukashenko and Venezuela. Utilize Sybiha's diplomatic overture to Szijjarto as evidence of Ukraine's commitment to dialogue. Counter RF IO claims regarding Patriot SAM engineer liquidation, new advances near Volchansk, and exaggerated UAF casualty figures, including the claimed tank destruction on Krasnoarmeysky direction, Marochko's "losses everywhere" narrative, particularly the highly inflammatory claims of over 138,000 UAF desertions, and new claims of 50% UAF attack aircraft losses in Sumy direction. Actively counter RF's domestic IO, such as Kremlin award ceremonies and the subtle narratives in the social fraud report, and the positive spin on subsidized airfare programs and online voting. Develop and immediately deploy messaging to counter RF's escalating cultural warfare, as articulated by Zakharova and promoted through initiatives like the Eurasian Film Award, Mikhalkov's statements (HIGH CONFIDENCE), and Mikhalkov's coordination of Eurasian cinematic awards (HIGH CONFIDENCE), highlighting democratic values, freedom, and international cooperation against RF's authoritarian narratives. Develop messaging to counter the narrative of legitimacy and stability projected by Putin's upcoming "direct line" and press conference, and the economic success narrative of the EEF (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Leverage GUR's estimate of Russian troop numbers and UAF General Staff daily RF loss reports to underscore the scale of the invasion and RF's aggressive intentions and to boost friendly morale. Proactively counter any RF IO attempts to leverage the Hyundai factory raid (HIGH CONFIDENCE), the bribery reports, Kobyakov's claims about US economic instability and Western isolation, Kobyakov's claims about the "Max" messenger, his proposal for a "Day of Military Glory", and especially Prozorov's highly inflammatory claims about Ukrainian children (HIGH CONFIDENCE), including his specific claims against Poroshenko, Poklad, and Chervinsky. Actively counter RF IO leveraging Bazhenov's Mirotvorets listing. Counter RF IO regarding Omsk dog attacks, decreasing fish/caviar prices, new investment scams by presenting alternative facts of economic reality and social issues in RF. Counter RF IO touting counter-UAS successes (BARS-32, Sever-V) and specific tactical victories (38th Motorized Brigade, "Prizrak", new Sever V drone strikes) by highlighting UAF successes and RF losses (e.g., 46th Airmobile Brigade FPV strike). Counter RF IO regarding "Mir" cards in Thailand and the St. Petersburg programming olympiad win by highlighting RF's continued international isolation and economic challenges. Counter RF framing of Zelenskyy's diplomatic stance as "justification" for not meeting, by re-emphasizing Ukraine's sovereign terms for peace. Specifically counter Старше Эдды's anti-Semitic rhetoric to undermine the $100B US-Ukraine deal. Counter RF claims of UAF shelling Horlivka, emphasizing RF responsibility for civilian casualties in occupied territories. Publicly highlight UAF Air Assault Forces training as a demonstration of readiness and professionalism. Utilize UAF kamikaze drone strike successes to demonstrate tactical superiority and RF vulnerabilities. (CRITICAL)
  2. Enhanced Air Defense & ISR for Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Eastern/Northeastern/Southern Axes, Odesa Coastal Area, and Key Frontline Areas; Exploit RF Air Defense Gaps; Prioritize Counter-Artillery & Demining; Safeguard Rail Infrastructure; Counter Ground Advances: Immediately prioritize additional mobile air defense systems and advanced ISR assets to protect Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (given evacuations, ambulance strike, and aviation munitions threat), Kyiv and other critical industrial/energy infrastructure given recent fires/outages and drone threats (Kyiv, Vasilkiv, Odesa, widespread, new strike UAV threat for Chernihiv and Kyiv Oblast (Vyhshorodsky district)). Bolster air defense and Counter-UAS capabilities on eastern and northeastern axes (Kupyansk, Liman, Sieversk, Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Orikhiv, Kherson, Sumy, Kharkiv) in response to increased RF tactical aviation activity (confirmed by UAF Air Force report) and cross-border operations, especially in light of reported RF advances (e.g., Poltavka) and targeted FAB strikes in Kharkiv. Immediately prioritize air defense for Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts against strike UAV threats, and for Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Synelnykivskyi district) against aviation munitions threats. Special attention must be given to countering RF's new long-range FPV drone ("Veter-X") and existing FPV activity on the Slovyansk-Izium highway (confirmed burnt bus), and RF tactical drone operations (e.g., Krasnoarmeysky direction, new FAB-ization targets, new Sever V drone strikes). Investigate the veracity of RF claims regarding the liquidation of a Patriot SAM system engineer and, if confirmed, conduct an immediate BDA. Immediately assess and reinforce UAF positions in Konstantinovka, DPR, to counter the reported "fire pocket" formation and prevent encirclement, and specifically address the RF claimed "dislodgement" of UAF from Poltavka. Immediately assess and reinforce UAF positions in Druzhkovka, DPR, following RF claims of initiating fighting in the area (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim/IO). Prioritize counter-battery fire in Mykolaiv Oblast, specifically targeting "Smerch" MLRS positions following repeated strikes near Novopetrovka. Immediately allocate extensive resources for demining and UXO clearance in liberated areas. Enhance air defense in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to counter continued RF drone activity (7 drones shot down). Prioritize ISR and defensive measures in Zaporizhzhia Oblast given the 476 RF strikes on 15 settlements and claims of successful RF attacks. Immediately assess and implement enhanced protection measures for railway infrastructure in Donetsk Oblast following the missile strike on Sloviansk, including mobile air defense and rapid repair capabilities. Prioritize BDA and defensive measures for the 5 settlements affected in Kharkiv Oblast. Intensify ISR on the Krasny Liman axis to track the reported broad RF offensive. Increase efforts to counter RF UAV control points and antennas, especially in areas like Konstantinovka. Reinforce counter-battery and counter-drone capabilities in the Krasnoarmeysky direction against RF UAVs targeting UAF artillery. (CRITICAL)
  3. Accelerate Counter-Special Operations, Maritime/Riverine Security, and Border/Logistical Defense on Eastern Flank; Address RF Ground Robotics; Mitigate Labor Shortages: Increase ISR and rapid response capabilities along the Black Sea coast and in the Dnipro Delta to counter RF naval drone threats and protect UAF special operations. Specifically enhance defenses and ISR against the reported enemy reconnaissance UAV from the Black Sea towards Odesa and multi-vector Shahed launches from Crimea/Primorsk-Akhtarsk. Reinforce border security in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts (including the Volchansk area, and the new area southeast of Kupyansk) with additional personnel, ISR, and rapid response units to counter RF buffer zone efforts and interdict sabotage groups, especially given new strike UAV threats in these regions, and new strike UAV threat for Chernihiv and Kyiv Oblast (Vyhshorodsky district). Prioritize ISR and interdiction efforts against RF attempts to disrupt logistics along key routes like the Slovyansk-Izium highway. Intensify counter-offensive operations on the Zaporizhzhia front to counter reported RF advances. Enhance maritime security and air defense in the Black Sea and coastal areas, given RF MOD claims of 34 UAVs shot down overnight, indicating continued UAF deep strike attempts into this domain. Reinforce border defenses and counter-infiltration measures in Bryansk Oblast area, given the 5 UAVs reportedly shot down, which implies continued UAF cross-border activity. Develop countermeasures and TTPs against newly introduced RF ground robots (grenadiers, sappers, medics), prioritizing ISR to understand their capabilities and deployment. Develop and implement strategies to mitigate the reported loss of skilled labor due to new travel rules for men aged 18-22. (HIGH)
  4. Sustain Diplomatic Pressure for DIB Funding and Security Guarantees; Expedite Drone Agreement & Maritime Drone Collaboration; Leverage Infrastructure Development; Prepare for ERAM Integration: Leverage recent high-level diplomatic engagements (US drone agreement, Zelenskyy-Fico, UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration, new UK FM call, Svyrydenko's announced negotiations with Slovakia, new RF-Libya meeting, SCO Development Bank discussions, German Ambassador to Ukraine heading intelligence, US/EU sanctions discussions, new EU sanctions talks in Washington) to secure concrete commitments for long-term funding and technology transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base. Push for expedited security guarantees, working to mitigate the impact of Fico's statements while highlighting his positive stance against an energy blockade. The US drone agreement is a critical step and should be finalized swiftly. Publicly promote the opening of the Uzhhorod-Chop railway. Carefully manage discussions surrounding the reported $100B US deal. Continue active diplomatic engagement with Hungary. Utilize Trump's announcement of the G20 summit in Miami as a platform for Ukraine to engage globally. Closely monitor and coordinate diplomatic responses to Brazil's statements on potential military nuclear technology use. Actively engage with the Eurocommission to clarify any statements regarding Ukraine's EU future. Leverage the potential US ERAM missile supply as a tangible sign of sustained international support. Proactively engage with allies to counter Trump's consideration of inviting Russia to the G20 summit. Immediately initiate planning and training for the integration and operational deployment of ERAM air-launched missiles, expected in October. Utilize President Zelenskyy's proposal for a new meeting city with Putin as a significant diplomatic initiative, emphasizing Ukraine's commitment to peace on its own terms and highlighting RF's continued aggression, including Zelenskyy's firm stance that Putin should come to Kyiv for talks. Monitor and respond to Trump's potential G20 invitation to Russia, actively engaging allies to present a unified front. Highlight RF's efforts to expand alternative financial systems (e.g., Mir cards in Thailand) as part of broader efforts to circumvent sanctions and undermine international financial stability. (HIGH)
  5. Strengthen Public Trust Through Transparency, Governance, and POW Advocacy; Address Internal Military Justice Concerns; Highlight Training and Resilience; Ensure Cyber Resilience: Continue to address internal governance challenges and pursue anti-corruption efforts transparently. Advocate vigorously through international legal channels for the proper treatment and exchange of all Ukrainian prisoners of war. Publicly support and showcase local initiatives like underground schools and community defense efforts. Engage in transparent public dialogue and legislative review regarding Bill 13452 (stricter military sentences) to address soldier and public concerns. Publicly address and manage the TCC car theft incident transparently. Engage directly with the organizers and participants of the Maidan Nezalezhnosti protest to maintain unity and address potential RF IO exploitation. Proactively counter RF IO regarding alleged UAF desertions and claims of significant UAF attack aircraft losses with transparent reporting on unit strength and morale, alongside explanations for legitimate combat attrition and personnel rotation. Publicize successes of UAF air defense (e.g., 7 drones shot down over Dnipropetrovsk, 68 UAVs shot down/suppressed) to bolster public confidence and morale. Continue to highlight UAF tactical engagements and resilience through media (e.g., Stepnohirsk video, Mezheva humanitarian aid distribution, UAF Air Assault Forces training, UAF kamikaze drone strike on RF convoy). Showcase continued and effective military training (e.g., BARS-32 unit) to maintain public confidence and demonstrate combat readiness. Immediately investigate and address the reported difficulties with the Privat24 application, implementing robust cyber security measures to prevent financial disruption and maintain public confidence in digital services. (MEDIUM)

//END REPORT//

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