Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - 051930Z SEP 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• OVERALL OPERATIONAL PICTURE: RF continues its multi-axis ground offensives, maintaining pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv, and claiming advances in the Donetsk sector (Markovo, Fedorovka) with a stated vector "towards Kramatorsk." DeepState reports RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. Intense ground operations persist on the Kupyansk-Sieversk axis, with RF claims of beginning an assault on Kupyansk and liberating 16% of the city (LOW CONFIDENCE). RF special forces are conducting cross-border ground operations in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts with the stated intent to create a "buffer zone," with RF claims of destroying a UAF forward deployment point (PVD) of the 119th Brigade in the Sumy direction (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF deep strikes continue against Ukrainian energy and defense industries, with a large industrial fire in Dnipro (cause unknown, but now confirmed power outages due to enemy attacks) and recent ballistic missile strike in Chernihiv Oblast. UAF President Zelenskyy has confirmed a previous Russian missile strike on the Flextronics plant in Mukachevo on 21 AUG, causing damage and casualties, underscoring ongoing RF targeting of industrial infrastructure. Air defense systems are challenged by high-volume, multi-vector drone attacks. UAF is actively defending across all axes, launching deep strikes on RF territory (Ryazan oil refinery, Anapa radar, Luhansk oil depot, artillery depots in Luhansk), and conducting successful special operations in the Black Sea and Dnipro Delta. UAF claims destruction of a Russian Buk-M2 SAM system and a Buk-M1 SAM system. UAF Special Operations forces ("Non-Stop" Group, 2nd Special Purpose Detachment of "Omega" CSB) report destroying a Russian kamikaze drone. Diplomatic activity is high; Ukraine seeks accelerated security guarantees, while RF attempts to fracture Western unity through information operations. NATO ISR activity near Kaliningrad/Belarus border indicates heightened vigilance. DPSU warns of potential provocations during "Zapad-2025." Ukraine reports 2577 service members in Russian captivity. UAF Air Force is actively engaged. Ukraine is pursuing forensic and war crimes documentation. RF motorized rifle units of the Vostok Group of Forces are observed honing skills in assaulting mock enemy strongholds in the rear of the SMO zone, indicating preparation for offensive operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF reports cutting UAF supply along the Slovyansk-Izium highway (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF claims destruction of UAF BBM and personnel in the Kharkiv direction (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF reports drone activity over several regions including Rostov, Voronezh, Volgograd, Saratov, Tambov, and occupied Crimea (HIGH CONFIDENCE). UAF Air Force reports an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv Oblast (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Croatia has excluded sending troops to Ukraine (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The industrial fire in Dnipro, initially of unknown origin, is now identified by RF sources as a former combine plant and is still burning (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

• NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1903Z - 1933Z SEP 25):

  • UAF Logistics (ERAM Missiles): OPERATYVNYY ZSU reports the first batch of 840 ERAM missiles from the US is expected by end of October 2026. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as reporting on future delivery, not immediate impact)
  • UAF Humanitarian: РБК-Україна reports a large group of Ukrainian children returned from occupied territories. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF DIB (Aircraft Components): TASS reports Denis Manturov's statement that Russia is the only country producing all aircraft components. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim/propaganda)
  • RF PMCs: Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition mentions "PMC Pegov" and "hotter hotspots." (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - as reference to likely Wagner-style groups, but lacks detail)
  • International Support (Italy): Colonelcassad reports Italy will not send troops to Ukraine, citing PM Giorgia Meloni. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF DIB (Engine Development): TASS reports Putin is holding a meeting on engine development and that Russia is among the top five in aviation and missile engines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • RF Drone Operations: MoD Russia publishes a video claiming drone operators are thwarting enemy plans, showing various drone footage including aerial reconnaissance and strikes on infantry in trenches, an armored personnel carrier (APC), and a structure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF claim/footage, unverified BDA)
  • UAF Logistics (FPV Drone Interdiction): DeepState reports RF FPV drones inflicting fire damage on the Slovyansk-Izium highway. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • International Economy: РБК-Україна reports Norway, following the EU, lowered the price cap on Russian oil. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • UAF Operational Summary: Генеральний штаб ЗСУ (General Staff of the AFU) provides operational information as of 22:00 05.09.2025 regarding the Russian invasion (no text provided, image only, assessed as routine update). (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as routine update, content details pending image analysis).
  • RF IO (Western Disunity): Операция Z (Военкоры Русской Весны) reposts ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS report on Belgium not transferring frozen RF assets to Ukraine, framing it as "🖕🇺🇦." (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF IO)
  • RF Leadership Rhetoric: Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition reports "The Supreme" (Putin) responded to EU attempts to send troops to Ukraine, stating they "will be killed" regardless of where they stand. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as RF rhetoric)
  • RF IO (Vostok Economic Forum): Colonelcassad posts about VEF 2025 and Far East development. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - as IO content)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Air Operations: UAF destruction of a Buk-M1 and Buk-M2 SAM system by UAV, and UAF "Omega" CSB destroying a Russian kamikaze drone, indicate continued reliance on and effectiveness of UAS in current conditions. RF tactical aviation activity in the northeast persists. UAF/Philippines agreement on maritime drones points to continued favorable conditions for UAS development and deployment across domains. New UAF air threat warnings for UAVs in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts indicate continued clear-enough weather for drone operations. New UAF drone strike footage (near "sea") and RF drone-filmed artillery strikes (Konstantinovka), building strikes (Kharkiv direction claims), and "Pokrovsk Battle" footage (including thermal imaging) further confirm favorable conditions for UAS operations. RF's new "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range suggests development for varied weather conditions. DeepState reporting RF FPV drone strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway indicates conditions remain suitable for such operations. RF claims of intercepting "Lyutyi" drones by mobile fire groups "Sever V" during nighttime further confirms sustained UAS activity even in low-light conditions. RF claiming serial production of drone engines indicates a sustained capability for drone operations across varied conditions. STERNENKO's report of RF drone activity across multiple regions (Rostov, Voronezh, etc.) and UAF Air Force reporting an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv indicate continued widespread and favorable conditions for drone operations. RF footage of "Vostok Group" training includes a drone, reinforcing continued use of UAS in training/operations. MoD Russia's video showcasing drone operators thwarting enemy plans (likely RF drones operating against UAF) further confirms widespread and effective drone operations, implying continued suitable weather for aerial ISR and strike (HIGH CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report of RF FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway further corroborates favorable conditions for tactical drone employment (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Maritime Operations: RF commissioning of the "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic operations highlights their ongoing naval development. UAF's agreement to jointly produce maritime drones suggests an increasing focus on this domain, indicating conditions are suitable for continued maritime drone operations in the Black Sea and beyond. The UAF drone strike footage "near the sea" further confirms operational conditions for maritime drone activity.
• Ground Operations: RF claims of advances in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Donetsk, and cross-border operations in Sumy/Chernihiv, suggest conditions are conducive to sustained ground maneuvers. UAF's capture of 26 RF personnel demonstrates effective ground operations. The mine incident in Kherson highlights ongoing hazards in previously occupied/contested areas. UAF footage of a drone strike on an RF soldier in varied terrain (dry grass/snow-dusted) indicates general operability for UAS in these conditions. RF footage of mortar strikes by Sever Group in a wooded environment indicates conditions for traditional ground combat, likely in forested or vegetated areas. RF logistics footage for winter clothing suggests anticipation of cold weather conditions. RF FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway confirm ground conditions allow for targeted FPV operations. Zelenskyy's visit to the damaged Flextronics plant in Mukachevo and the ongoing fire in Dnipro indicate continued vulnerability of static targets to RF long-range strikes, regardless of local ground conditions. RF footage of fighting near Pokrovsk with drones indicates conditions are suitable for ground combat and aerial ISR/strike. RF video of "Vostok Group" training in a dusty, arid environment with tactical movements and simulated combat confirms conditions are favorable for ground operations, including mobility. RF claims of cutting supply on the Slovyansk-Izium highway with imagery of a burned bus indicates tactical engagements are occurring on ground lines of communication. RF claims of destruction of UAF BBM and personnel in the Kharkiv direction indicate continued ground combat and favorable conditions for aerial ISR and strike. Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition mentioning "hotter hotspots" for PMCs further suggests ongoing intense ground combat in various locations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone footage shows ground combat scenarios, including strikes on infantry and an APC, implying continued ground engagements (HIGH CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report of FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway confirms ongoing ground interdiction and tactical engagements (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF:
  • Ground Forces: Continuing multi-axis offensive with reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts (DeepState) and Donetsk (Markovo, Fedorovka, towards Kramatorsk). Maintaining pressure on Velikomikhailovka and Orikhiv. Sustained cross-border operations for "buffer zone" creation, with claims of destroying a UAF PVD in Sumy direction (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). Claims of an assault on Kupyansk beginning with 16% liberated (LOW CONFIDENCE). New claims of destroying a UAF dugout/bunker with secondary detonation (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). New drone-filmed artillery strike near Konstantinovka (Donetsk axis) and mortar strikes by Sever Group (unspecified location but "special operation zone") confirm ongoing ground fire support. Claims of destroying a PVD of 119th TDF in Zelenaya Dibrova (Sumy) are further evidence of cross-border operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF internal logistics for "4th motorcade" (clothing) indicates sustained resupply efforts for ground forces. Claims of striking a building and wooded areas (Kharkiv direction) point to continued offensive efforts (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). DeepState reporting RF FPV drone strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway indicates persistent tactical drone use on key ground lines of communication. New claims of intense fighting and destruction of UAF assets near Pokrovsk ("Otvazhnye" forces) indicate continued offensive pressure in the Donetsk region. The daily summary from Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 confirms active operations across the front. New video shows motorized rifle units of the Vostok Group of Forces training in the rear, indicating preparation for future offensive operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF claims to be cutting UAF supply along the Slovyansk-Izium highway, indicating active interdiction operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF claims destruction of a UAF BBM and personnel in the Kharkiv direction, reinforcing offensive pressure in that sector (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone footage showing strikes on infantry in trenches and an APC, along with references to "thwarting enemy plans," indicates active ground engagement and counter-UAF operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report on FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway further confirms active ground interdiction efforts (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's mention of "hotter hotspots" implies the presence and activity of RF PMCs in intense ground combat areas (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
  • Air Assets: Sustained tactical aviation activity in the northeast. Actively fielding precision artillery (Krasnopol) on Dnipropetrovsk axis. Air threat warnings for UAVs in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts indicate active RF drone presence. New "Veter-X" FPV drone with 30km+ range indicates continued investment in advanced drone capabilities for ISR and strike. Animated map of drone strikes 04-05 SEP 25 confirms widespread RF drone activity. RF claims of intercepting UAF "Lyutyi" drones by "Sever V" mobile groups indicate an active counter-UAS posture. Rostec's announcement of serial production of drone engines confirms a robust and sustained drone program. STERNENKO's report of RF drone safety (implying active RF drone presence) over multiple RF regions and occupied Crimea, and UAF Air Force reporting an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv Oblast, indicate widespread and active RF drone operations for ISR and potentially strike. MoD Russia's video showcasing drone operations, including aerial reconnaissance and strikes, highlights continued and effective use of UAS by RF forces (HIGH CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report of FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway further confirms active and tactical drone employment (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Naval Assets: Commissioning of new Arctic vessel "Ivan Papanin" indicates continued naval modernization. Developing training for unmanned surface vessels (BECs). Maintaining presence in Black Sea.
  • Information Operations (IO): Intensified, aggressive IO, including overt dehumanization ("kill Khokhols"), explicit nuclear threats, "liberation" narratives, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), efforts to discredit Ukrainian cultural figures/media (Kateryna Kotrikadze), and attempts to fracture Western unity through information operations (Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements, RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland). Medvedev's rhetoric on Finland/NATO and his dismissal of Ukrainian security guarantees are escalating border security narratives and perceived threats. IO also includes narratives on domestic issues (migration tax, internal corruption, domestic repression regarding LGBT, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch official corruption exposé), and soldier support (Putin's niece's foundation), and militarization of education by integrating "SMO participants" as teachers (Volodin's statement), and historical revisionism/hero worship (Korelyakov monologue). Peskov discussing Telegram scammers indicates internal narrative management. Kirienko's visits to "liberated territories" are key legitimization efforts. New IO includes DPRK's stated support for RF, claims of failed US Navy SEALs operation in DPRK (likely disinformation), a Kotsnews poll indicating Europeans "fear" RF, and FM Szijjarto's statement on Hungary opposing Ukraine's EU accession, which RF frames as not being against Russia's wishes. RF also actively portrays CSTO exercises as professional while NATO is "just observing." Additional IO includes: MoD Russia showcasing Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary, leveraging Trump "defeat" narrative (LOW CONFIDENCE), highlighting "Meduza" financial issues, and promoting Putin doubles conspiracy theories (LOW CONFIDENCE). The "Nash Vykhod" movement, while potentially humanitarian, is also a vector for RF to manage POW narrative and potentially gather intelligence from Ukrainian relatives. New IO includes showcasing Venezuela's military resources (Два майора), implying NATO is exploiting Finland financially for airfield upgrades, and further highlighting "Meduza" financial difficulties after USAID grant withdrawal. New IO from «Триколор» 🇷🇺 СпН «Ахмат» attempts to portray internal dissent within the US military regarding foreign policy, aiming to highlight Western divisions (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF propagandist Alexander Sladkov's complaints about the Russian film industry's reluctance to engage with the war are being highlighted by UAF sources, providing a counter-narrative of internal RF discontent (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Fighterbomber's "Отбой!" post could be part of an IO effort to manage public perception of an incident or operation (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Alex Parker Returns is using IO to mock critics of Putin, portraying the RF leadership as shrewd negotiators despite military actions (HIGH CONFIDENCE). TASS's statement from Denis Manturov on Russia being the only country producing all aircraft components is a clear IO effort to project self-sufficiency and industrial strength (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's post on "PMC Pegov" and "hotter hotspots" is IO to glamorize mercenary involvement (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). Colonelcassad's report on Italy not sending troops is used to highlight Western disunity (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Putin's meeting on engine development and TASS's reporting on RF's top 5 position in aviation/missile engines are IO efforts to project DIB strength (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Операция Z's reposting of the Belgian frozen assets decision with an emoji ("🖕🇺🇦") is aggressive IO to highlight Western disunity and disdain for Ukraine (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's report on "The Supreme" (Putin) threatening to kill any EU troops in Ukraine is escalatory rhetoric and IO to deter intervention (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Colonelcassad's post on VEF 2025 is IO to promote economic development and stability (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Domestic Repression: Increased judicial repression against dissent (Yamal janitor) and criminalization of journalists (Kateryna Kotrikadze) and LGBT individuals indicate tightening control on internal narrative. RF security services are actively disrupting perceived Ukrainian sabotage efforts (Krasnodar). Former Deputy Head of Rosprirodnadzor Mitvol's failed appeal indicates continued judicial pressure on prominent figures. Mironov's statement on car payments is an internal political development. RF reports 3 casualties in Belgorod shelling. Oleg Mitvol's request for a pardon, and Kasatkin's refusal for US extradition are domestic legal updates that RF frames for internal consumption. Putin's travel to Samara for an engine manufacturing meeting underscores a focus on domestic industrial capacity. A new report from ASTRA indicates a Kursk scientist-inventor was sentenced to three years for "justifying the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into Kursk Oblast," demonstrating continued severe domestic repression against dissent (HIGH CONFIDENCE). ASTRA's report on "Max" collecting personal data further highlights RF's pervasive surveillance and potential for domestic repression (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Military-Industrial Base: Developing training platforms for BECs. Commissioning new Arctic vessel. New "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range (30km+) at EEF indicates continued development of advanced UAS capabilities. Rostec's announcement of serial production of drone engines is a significant DIB development. Rostec plans to develop a Russian wide-body aircraft after the completion of the PD-35 engine, indicating long-term strategic aerospace DIB development (HIGH CONFIDENCE). TASS's reporting on Manturov's statement about Russia producing all aircraft components and Putin's meeting on engine development, stating RF is top 5 in aviation/missile engines, are key DIB statements (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Foreign Military Relations: Actively engaging with other nations to deepen military ties (Libya, DPRK, Myanmar). DPRK's public statement of full support for RF strengthens this relationship. Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary reception further solidifies this alliance. RF IO highlighting Venezuela and implying NATO exploiting Finland are subtle cues of RF's global alliances and anti-NATO stance.
• UAF:
  • Defensive Posture: Continuing active defense across all axes, responding to RF air activity, and maintaining a strong defense on the ground, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts following reported RF advances. Air Force maintains operational readiness. Actively conducting counter-offensive actions (Prymorske). New UAF air threat warnings indicate active monitoring of RF drone activity. Dnipro has implemented scheduled power outages due to enemy attacks, directly linking to RF deep strikes on energy infrastructure. UAF President Zelenskyy has publicly confirmed a previous Russian missile strike on the Flextronics plant in Mukachevo on 21 AUG, causing damage and casualties. UAF President Zelenskyy has confirmed a previous Russian missile strike on the Flextronics plant in Mukachevo on 21 AUG, causing damage and casualties, underscoring ongoing RF targeting of industrial infrastructure. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration is hosting UNICEF and KCMU representatives, focusing on child welfare, indicating continued civil administration resilience. Protests in Kyiv against stricter military sentences indicate an internal challenge to soldier welfare and morale. UAF Special Operations forces destroying a Russian kamikaze drone demonstrates active counter-UAS posture. UAF Air Force reports an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv Oblast, indicating active air defense engagement (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The ongoing industrial fire in Dnipro requires UAF to maintain a high state of readiness for potential further strikes and to manage civil defense (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Генеральний штаб ЗСУ's operational information update indicates a routine and active defensive posture (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Special Operations/Deep Strike Capabilities: Demonstrated effective long-range strike capabilities with the destruction of artillery depots in Luhansk. Continuing special reconnaissance and strike operations (GUR in Black Sea, "Buzky Gard" in Dnipro Delta), and effective drone strikes on underground positions ("Shadow" unit). Demonstrated effective counter-air capability with the destruction of a Buk-M2 SAM system by UAV and a Buk-M1 SAM system. Demonstrated successful capture of 26 RF personnel. New footage of a UAF drone striking an RF soldier highlights persistent successful tactical drone operations. New UAF drone strike footage neutralizing an RF occupier near the "sea" further reinforces successful tactical drone operations. UAF President Zelenskyy has reaffirmed Ukraine's commitment to respond to Russian energy strikes. STERNENKO footage of drone-based destruction of RF assets and personnel ("Rusoriz") confirms ongoing and effective tactical drone operations. UAF's capture of 26 RF occupiers ("Skelya" regiment) further demonstrates effective ground operations and intelligence gathering opportunities. The interview with a Belarusian POW provides valuable insights into RF recruitment and morale issues. UAF IO about RF propagandist Sladkov's complaints about the film industry suggests UAF is actively exploiting internal RF discontent (HIGH CONFIDENCE). UAF's counter-narrative on the "buffer zone" (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) demonstrates active engagement in the information environment to preempt RF narratives (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The reported return of Ukrainian children from occupied territories is a humanitarian success that implies successful intelligence gathering and/or special operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Precision Strike Capabilities: Effective use of drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes against RF assets (Kinburn Spit, Prymorske, Donetsk Grad, Buk M1 SAM system, Novopavlivka personnel, underground bunker, Buk-M2 SAM system, RF soldier in combat). New UAF drone strike on an RF occupier further demonstrates precision strike capabilities.
  • Strategic Resolve & Diplomacy: Leadership maintains unwavering resolve (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation, Zelenskyy on China parade, Zelenskyy on non-Russian energy supply to Slovakia) and actively engages in high-level diplomatic efforts to secure and sustain international aid. Slovakia's continued rejection of an energy blockade (despite other reservations) is a positive development. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting in Slovakia suggests ongoing diplomatic engagement. Zelenskyy's opening of the Uzhhorod-Chop railway highlights strategic infrastructure development and EU integration. President Zelenskyy's statement to Slovak PM Fico about responding to energy strikes demonstrates firm resolve. The Uzhhorod-Chop railway is a significant strategic infrastructure development, enhancing connectivity with EU. Hungary's stance against Ukraine's EU accession is a diplomatic setback. Zelenskyy's video highlighting the missile strike on the Flextronics plant in Mukachevo serves to galvanize international support by showcasing RF attacks on civilian infrastructure. Zaporizhzhia RMO and Kharkiv OMA participation in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities underscores continued governance and a united front. The UAF counter-narrative on the "buffer zone" (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) demonstrates proactive engagement in strategic communications to counter RF justifications for aggression (HIGH CONFIDENCE). OPERATYVNYY ZSU's report on future ERAM missile deliveries indicates continued strategic engagement and planning for long-term defense (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Resource Management: Significant procurement of drones and transport for military units in Zaporizhzhia demonstrates active efforts to enhance capabilities. Ukraine developing joint maritime drone production with the Philippines. The government launched a support program for 238 frontline communities for the heating season, indicating proactive resource allocation for humanitarian needs. АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА's request for donations for military support suggests ongoing, civilian-backed efforts to support UAF resource needs (HIGH CONFIDENCE). OPERATYVNYY ZSU's report on future ERAM missile deliveries from the US highlights a significant long-term resource acquisition (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Civilian Resilience & Governance: Active construction of underground schools/kindergartens in Zaporizhzhia and regular local defense council briefings (Kryvyi Rih) highlight proactive measures for civilian protection and continuity of governance. Dnipropetrovsk OMA participating in congress on frontline needs. Kharkiv OMA participating in Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Successful repatriation of funds stolen by corrupt officials demonstrates effective governance. Tragic mine incident in Kherson highlights persistent dangers for civilians. Dnipro implementing scheduled power outages due to enemy attacks is a direct response to infrastructure damage, demonstrating civil resilience under pressure. The protest in Kyiv against stricter military sentences highlights internal discourse on military justice. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration's engagement with UNICEF on child welfare underscores ongoing efforts to support civilians. KMVA's statement on regional leadership conveying information to the government underscores functional governance and communication channels. Zaporizhzhia RMO and Kharkiv OMA attendance at the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities demonstrates continued functional governance during wartime. The ongoing, unextinguished fire at the former combine plant in Dnipro will continue to stress civilian services and resilience (HIGH CONFIDENCE). РБК-Україна's report on the return of Ukrainian children from occupied territories demonstrates ongoing efforts for humanitarian support and citizen welfare (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• International:
  • Diplomatic Momentum: EU and bilateral partners continue to engage with Ukraine. Slovakia's stance against an energy blockade is a positive, though PM Fico's general anti-Ukrainian policy and rhetoric of swift conflict resolution remain a concern. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting. President Zelenskyy's direct statement to PM Fico on energy retaliation. Hungary's FM Szijjarto stating opposition to Ukraine's EU accession is a new diplomatic challenge. RF IO attempts to leverage Hungary's stance against Ukraine's EU accession as a sign of Western disunity. Croatia has excluded sending troops to Ukraine, adding to the list of EU/NATO countries publicly stating this position, which RF will likely leverage in IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE). РБК-Україна reports on Google fine by EU and Trump threats, which could be leveraged by RF as a sign of internal Western dissent (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Poland's FM Sikorski's statement on Ukraine remaining within defensible borders and integrating with the West is a nuanced, but generally supportive, diplomatic position (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Italy has also excluded sending troops to Ukraine (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Norway, following the EU, lowered the price cap on Russian oil, indicating continued economic pressure on RF (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Belgium confirmed it will not transfer frozen RF assets to Ukraine, a setback for Ukraine but a victory for RF IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Focus on Russian Aggression: International bodies and nations continue to condemn RF actions and nuclear rhetoric. EU delegation to the US for sanctions work indicates sustained pressure on RF.
  • Regional Tensions (INCREASED): Medvedev's visit to Svetogorsk on the Finnish border and warnings underscore heightened tensions on NATO's Eastern Flank. Medvedev's dismissal of security guarantees for Ukraine is a continued attempt to undermine international support. Medvedev's explicit statements regarding Finland's NATO membership and dismissing "security guarantees" for Ukraine are direct escalations in rhetoric. CSTO exercises being monitored by NATO (as claimed by RF IO) highlights continued vigilance on Eastern Flank. RF IO on Finland's airfield modernization funding aims to create friction within NATO.
  • UK Cabinet Reshuffle: Change in UK Foreign Secretary. (HIGH CONFIDENCE - non-military, but geopolitical)
  • RF Deepening Ties (NEW): RF meetings with DPRK and Myanmar defence officials indicate efforts to strengthen military-technical cooperation with non-Western partners. DPRK's public statement of full support for RF strengthens this relationship. Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary reception further solidifies this alliance. RF IO showcasing Venezuela's military capabilities could be part of a broader effort to highlight global anti-Western alliances. RF IO highlighting alleged internal dissent within the US military over foreign policy is a new attempt to sow discord and weaken the image of Western unity (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Colonelcassad's posts on VEF 2025 link economic development in Russia to its broader geopolitical stance (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • International Aid/Sanctions (MIXED): Belgium's decision not to transfer frozen RF assets to Ukraine is a setback for international aid mechanisms. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Norway's lowering of the price cap on Russian oil indicates continued economic pressure on RF (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Capabilities:

  • Persistent Ground Offensive & Consolidation: RF maintains capability for sustained, multi-axis ground offensives (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk axes, including Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction, Pokrovsk area), localized breakthroughs, cross-border operations (Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv), and effective political-administrative integration of occupied territories. Precision artillery (Krasnopol) enhances offensive reach. Claims of initiating an assault on Kupyansk (LOW CONFIDENCE) indicate continued offensive ambition. Demonstrated ability to destroy UAF defensive positions (dugout/bunker claims, PVD in Zelenaya Dibrova claims). Sever Group's mortar strikes indicate effective close-range fire support for ground operations. Claims of destroying a building (Kharkiv direction) show continued destructive capability. RF FPV drone strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway demonstrate tactical precision strike capability for ground targets. RF footage of intense fighting and destruction of UAF assets near Pokrovsk ("Otvazhnye" forces) indicate substantial ground and aerial combat capabilities. The daily summary from Дневник Десантника🇷🇺 confirms active, widespread ground operations. New video of Vostok Group training assaulting mock strongholds confirms continued ground offensive training and capability (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF claims of cutting supply along Slovyansk-Izium highway and destruction of UAF BBM/personnel in Kharkiv direction demonstrates active ground interdiction and tactical offensive capabilities (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone footage explicitly shows strikes on infantry in trenches and an APC, confirming active and effective tactical ground strike capability from the air (HIGH CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report on RF FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway further corroborates RF's capability to conduct tactical interdiction of ground lines of communication (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's reference to PMCs in "hotter hotspots" suggests continued reliance on and deployment of such groups for intense ground combat (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
  • Long-Range Strike & Air Presence: RF retains significant capability for deep strikes against critical infrastructure (Dnipro industrial fire, FABs in Sumy, Mukachevo Flextronics plant) and sustains tactical aviation activity. RF also maintains capability for loitering munition strikes against maritime targets (Lancet against BEC). Active drone threats in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts indicate persistent drone strike capabilities. The new "Veter-X" FPV drone with 30km+ range significantly extends RF's tactical ISR and precision strike capabilities, potentially allowing for deeper penetration and faster targeting. Animated map of RF drone/missile strikes for 04-05 SEP 25 confirms extensive deep strike capability. RF claims of intercepting UAF drones indicates active counter-UAS capabilities. The ongoing fire in Dnipro and confirmed strike on Mukachevo underscore this capability. Rostec's announcement of serial production of drone engines ensures sustained long-range strike and ISR drone capabilities. STERNENKO's report of RF drone activity over multiple RF regions and occupied Crimea, and UAF Air Force reporting an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv, indicates widespread RF ISR and strike drone capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The prolonged nature of the Dnipro fire (Военкор Котенок) highlights the significant destructive capability of RF strikes against industrial targets (HIGH CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone video further demonstrates advanced capabilities in aerial reconnaissance and precision strikes (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Advanced Information & Psychological Warfare: RF continues to demonstrate a high capability for aggressive and inflammatory information operations, including explicit nuclear threats, militarization of youth ("kill Khokhols", Volodin on "SMO teachers"), "liberation" narratives, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), efforts to control domestic information space (Kotrikadze wanted, LGBT repression, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch official corruption exposé), and attempts to sow disunity among Western allies (Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, Hungarian FM's statements on Ukraine's EU accession, Belgium's frozen assets decision, NATO exploiting Finland IO, Croatia's exclusion of sending troops, and alleged US military dissent). Medvedev's rhetoric on Finland/NATO and "security guarantees" is escalating border security narratives and perceived threats. IO also includes narratives on domestic issues (migration tax, internal corruption), and soldier support (Putin's niece's foundation). Historical revisionism/hero worship (Korelyakov monologue) is a new IO vector. Peskov discussing Telegram scammers indicates subtle internal narrative management. Kirienko's visits to "liberated territories" are key legitimization efforts. New IO includes public support from DPRK, claims of failed US Navy SEALs operations in DPRK (likely disinformation), a Kotsnews poll asserting European fear of RF, FM Szijjarto's statement on Hungary opposing Ukraine's EU accession being framed as not opposing Russia, and portraying CSTO exercises as professional while NATO is merely observing. Additional IO includes: MoD Russia showcasing Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary, leveraging Trump "defeat" narrative (LOW CONFIDENCE), highlighting "Meduza" financial issues, and promoting Putin doubles conspiracy theories (LOW CONFIDENCE). The "Nash Vykhod" movement can be leveraged for psychological and intelligence gains. New IO includes highlighting Venezuela's military strength (implying potential partnership) and criticizing NATO's alleged financial exploitation of Finland. New IO from «Триколор» 🇷🇺 СпН «Ахмат» attempts to portray internal dissent within the US military, demonstrating RF's capability to exploit perceived Western vulnerabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Fighterbomber's "Отбой!" post highlights RF's ability to issue deconfliction or "all clear" messages, potentially for internal consumption or to shape narratives around specific events (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Alex Parker Returns is actively engaged in IO, dismissing criticism of Putin and portraying RF actions as strategic rather than irrational (HIGH CONFIDENCE). TASS statements on DIB strength are part of this IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Colonelcassad and Операция Z are leveraging statements from European leaders (Italy, Belgium) to promote narratives of Western disunity and reluctance to support Ukraine (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's explicit threat against EU troops is a high-level psychological operation (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Internal Control & Repression: RF is highly capable of controlling its domestic information environment, suppressing dissent (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze), and isolating itself from undesirable international organizations. Medvedev's statements highlight a focus on reinforcing state border protection against perceived NATO threats. The Krasnodar incident underscores their capability to frame events as Ukrainian terrorism for domestic consumption. New reports of LGBT repression reinforce tightening social control. Mitvol's failed appeal indicates continued prosecution of former officials. Mironov's statement on car payments is a domestic political development. Belgorod casualties will likely be leveraged for domestic anti-Ukrainian sentiment. Oleg Mitvol's pardon request, and Kasatkin's refusal for US extradition are domestic legal updates that RF frames for internal consumption. Putin's trip to Samara for an engine manufacturing meeting reinforces the focus on domestic industrial capacity. The sentencing of a Kursk scientist for "justifying the invasion of the AFU into Kursk Oblast" demonstrates a severe and active capability for internal repression against any perceived dissent, even intellectual (HIGH CONFIDENCE). ASTRA's report on "Max" collecting extensive personal data demonstrates RF's advanced capability for digital surveillance and potential control over its citizens (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Manpower & Social Support: While recruitment challenges persist, the attention to soldier appeals (Putin's niece's foundation) indicates an effort to manage morale and provide social support, likely to sustain the long-term war effort. Integration of "SMO participants" into schools serves a dual purpose of legitimizing the war and potentially providing social re-integration for veterans. RF internal logistics for clothing ("4th motorcade") indicates continued support for front-line personnel. The "Nash Vykhod" movement, even if civilian-led, provides a channel for RF to address internal soldier welfare concerns and manage public expectations regarding POWs. The interview with the Belarusian POW highlights that RF recruitment methods involve coercion and that morale among coerced fighters is low, but RF still manages to deploy personnel. АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА's request for donations for military support indicates that while the state provides support, there is also reliance on public fundraising, which can be a tool for civilian engagement in the war effort (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Naval Operations: RF maintains capability for naval operations in the Black Sea and is actively developing its unmanned surface vessel capabilities (training BEC). Commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic demonstrates continued naval investment.
  • Foreign Military Relations: Actively engaging with other nations to deepen military ties (Libya, DPRK, Myanmar). DPRK's public statement of full support is a significant diplomatic and potential military-technical alignment. Belousov's visit to DPRK further solidifies military-diplomatic ties. RF IO showcasing Venezuela's military indicates an active diplomatic and military outreach to anti-Western states.

• Intentions:

  • Achieve Territorial Objectives: RF intends to continue offensive operations to secure and consolidate control over claimed and newly occupied territories, especially in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv Oblasts. The confirmed advances in Dnipropetropavsk and Kharkiv (DeepState) suggest an intention to expand control beyond existing lines. Establishing "buffer zones" along border regions remains a priority, as evidenced by special forces operations and claims of destroying UAF positions in Sumy, including the 119th TDF PVD in Zelenaya Dibrova. The claimed assault on Kupyansk aligns with this intent, though its veracity is highly questionable. RF drone footage of strikes on buildings and wooded areas (Kharkiv direction) indicates continued efforts to push into these areas. RF FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway indicate intent to disrupt UAF logistics and movement in eastern sectors. New claims of intense fighting and destruction of UAF assets near Pokrovsk ("Otvazhnye" forces) reinforce the intent to push westward in the Donetsk region. The daily summary confirms an intent for continued, widespread ground operations. The training of Vostok Group units in assaulting mock strongholds reinforces RF's intent for continued offensive ground operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF claims of cutting supply along the Slovyansk-Izium highway and destruction of UAF BBM/personnel in the Kharkiv direction further reinforces the intent to push in this sector (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone video demonstrating strikes against UAF ground forces clearly indicates an intent to achieve tactical gains and degrade UAF combat power (HIGH CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report of FPV drone strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway reinforces the intent to disrupt UAF logistics (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Degrade UAF Combat Effectiveness & Morale: RF aims to deplete UAF resources through attrition, disrupt logistics (UAF ammunition depots in Kharkiv), and undermine public morale through strikes and propaganda, including the dehumanization of Ukrainians and the criminalization of their defenders. The targeting of industrial infrastructure (Dnipro fire, now confirmed power outages due to enemy attacks, Mukachevo Flextronics plant) and continued artillery/drone attacks (Dnipropetrovsk, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka, Pokrovsk) align with this. RF IO on conditional humanitarian aid ("insulin" narrative) aims to sow distrust and demoralize. Demonstrated tactical drone strikes against UAF personnel contribute to this attrition. President Zelenskyy's statement about responding to energy strikes indicates RF's intention to target energy infrastructure is being fulfilled. The ongoing large fire at the former combine plant in Dnipro serves to degrade Ukraine's industrial capacity and sow fear, aligning with this intent (HIGH CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's video highlighting successful drone strikes against UAF ground targets directly aligns with the intent to degrade UAF combat effectiveness (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Deter Western Intervention & Support & Fracture Alliances: RF will continue to use escalatory rhetoric (e.g., nuclear threats, "legitimate targets" for NATO troops), IO campaigns (Trump/NYT disinformation, Medvedev's dismissal of security guarantees), and border provocations (Medvedev on Finland) to deter Western military aid and direct involvement, and to exploit perceived divisions within the international community. Medvedev's statements signal a clear intention to escalate political pressure on NATO's Eastern Flank. RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland also serve this purpose. Deepening military ties with DPRK and Myanmar signals a counter-balancing to Western alliances. Medvedev's explicit statements on Finland/NATO and dismissal of security guarantees confirm this intent. RF IO framing Hungary's position on EU accession as not being against Russia, and portraying CSTO exercises as effective while NATO observes, directly targets Western unity and resolve. Belgium's decision on frozen assets provides further material for RF IO to highlight Western disunity. Belousov's visit to DPRK further solidifies the anti-Western bloc narrative. New IO on Venezuela's military capabilities and NATO exploiting Finland aims to further divide Western alliances and promote RF's multi-polar world view. Croatia's exclusion of sending troops to Ukraine provides RF with new material to emphasize Western disunity and reluctance for direct intervention (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The RF IO regarding alleged US military dissent aims to further fracture Western image and unity (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Alex Parker Returns' IO, TASS's DIB claims, Colonelcassad's Italy report, Операция Z's Belgium report, and Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's threats against EU troops are all direct manifestations of this intent to deter and fracture (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Maintain Domestic Control & Legitimacy: RF will continue to tightly control its internal information space, suppress dissent, and project an image of self-sufficiency and moral justification for its actions. The Krasnodar "terrorist" narrative serves to justify internal security measures and demonize Ukraine. Medvedev's visit to the Finnish border and statements aim to rally nationalist support and justify military posture. Kirienko's visits to occupied territories and the integration of "SMO teachers" into schools are key legitimization efforts. Increased domestic repression (Kotrikadze, LGBT) reinforces internal control. Exposing Kerch corruption may be an attempt to manage public dissent by showing internal action. Domestic reports of Belgorod casualties will be leveraged to justify further aggression. Mironov's statement on car payments is an internal political maneuver to manage public sentiment. The Kotsnews poll portraying European fear reinforces a strong domestic image. Oleg Mitvol's pardon request and Kasatkin's extradition refusal are domestic legal cases that RF uses to demonstrate rule of law (as they define it). The "Nash Vykhod" movement aids in managing domestic sentiment regarding soldiers. Putin's trip to Samara and Rostec's announcement about drone engines reinforce the narrative of a strong, self-sufficient, and technologically advanced Russia, boosting domestic legitimacy. RF IO on "Meduza" financial issues serves to discredit independent media. The sentencing of the Kursk scientist for "justifying the invasion of the AFU" clearly indicates an intention to maintain strict domestic control and suppress any narrative that deviates from the state-sanctioned one (HIGH CONFIDENCE). TASS's DIB reporting and Putin's meeting on engine development serve to project national strength and self-sufficiency to a domestic audience (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Colonelcassad's post on VEF 2025 also serves this purpose (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Counter UAF Special Operations & Deep Strikes: RF intends to actively counter Ukrainian special operations and maritime drone activities, particularly in the Black Sea and coastal areas, and prevent cross-border incursions. They also intend to prevent and attribute deep strikes on their territory (e.g., Luhansk artillery depot, "AZS" claims). Claims of striking a UAF PVD in Zelenaya Dibrova are a direct attempt to counter UAF forward deployments and logistics. RF claims of intercepting UAF "Lyutyi" drones demonstrate active counter-UAS intent and capability. The UAF Air Force report of an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv Oblast indicates RF's persistent intent to conduct ISR on UAF positions and potentially inform future strikes (HIGH CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's video explicitly mentions drone operators "thwarting enemy plans," clearly indicating an intent to counter UAF operations, likely drone-based (HIGH CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report of FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway also aligns with the intent to counter UAF movement and logistics (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Reinforce Borders Against NATO: Medvedev's statements indicate a clear intention to enhance border security and adjust military posture along its borders with Finland and the Baltic states due to perceived NATO threat. Commissioning Arctic vessel indicates long-term strategic naval ambitions. Medvedev's statements from the Finnish border confirm this intention. RF IO on CSTO exercises being watched by NATO indicates a desire to portray a strong, active defense posture. RF IO on Finland's airfield modernization funding aims to subtly undermine NATO cohesion.
  • Long-term DIB Development: Rostec's plans to develop a Russian wide-body aircraft after completing the PD-35 engine indicates a long-term strategic intention to expand its aerospace industrial capabilities, potentially for both civilian and military applications (HIGH CONFIDENCE). TASS's statements from Manturov and Putin regarding RF's DIB capabilities in aircraft and engines further reinforce this long-term strategic intent (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

• Courses of Action (COAs):

  • MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action):

    1. Sustained, Attritional Ground Offensives with Emphasis on New Axes, Consolidation, and Buffer Zone Creation, Coupled with Expanded Industrial/Energy Strikes: RF will maintain and intensify methodical ground offensives across current axes (Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Siversk, Novopavlovka - including Krasnoarmeysk direction, Kupyansk, Pokrovsk area), with a likely increased focus on the reported advances in Dnipropetropavsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. Active cross-border special forces operations in Chernihiv, Sumy (including continued FAB launches and efforts to destroy UAF PVDs, as claimed in Zelenaya Dibrova), and Kharkiv will intensify to create "buffer zones" and destroy UAF logistics. The observed training of Vostok Group units in assaulting mock strongholds confirms preparation for these offensive operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Claims of an assault on Kupyansk (LOW CONFIDENCE) indicate possible, though unconfirmed, new large-scale offensive operations. This will be supported by continued deep strikes against critical infrastructure, with a likely expanded focus on industrial targets (e.g., the Dnipro industrial fire, now confirmed power outages due to enemy attacks, Mukachevo Flextronics plant, and the continued fire at the former combine plant in Dnipro) and energy facilities (Zelenskyy's statement), using various means including FABs, precision artillery (Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction, Sever Group mortar strikes), and drone attacks. RF will prioritize precision strikes against UAF defensive positions (claims of striking building/wooded areas in Kharkiv direction, Pokrovsk claims, and destruction of BBM/personnel in Kharkiv direction). RF FPV drone operations will continue to target UAF positions and logistics on key axes like Slovyansk-Izium highway, utilizing new capabilities like the "Veter-X" FPV drone, and will continue interdicting UAF supply on the Slovyansk-Izium highway as claimed (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone video and DeepState's report on FPV strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway are recent indicators of this ongoing COA (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Confidence: HIGH
    2. Intensified Hybrid Warfare with Deepening Nuclear Coercion, Aggressive Dehumanization, and Legal/Information Warfare to Fracture Western Unity and Project Strength, and Strengthen Non-Western Alliances: RF will amplify highly escalatory rhetoric (including nuclear threats, "legitimate targets" for NATO troops), coupled with increased cyberattacks and border provocations against Ukraine and NATO's Eastern Flank during "Zapad-2025" and along the Finnish/Baltic borders, as indicated by Medvedev's statements and visit. Propaganda will intensify to dehumanize Ukrainians ("SMO teachers," "kill Khokhols" videos, Azov criminalization, discrediting cultural figures/journalists like Kotrikadze), militarize RF youth, criminalize captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians through show trials (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), and utilize historical revisionism (Korelyakov monologue), while simultaneously promoting narratives of Western disunity (e.g., Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements on security guarantees/conflict resolution, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, Hungarian FM's statements on Ukraine's EU accession, Belgium's frozen assets decision, NATO exploiting Finland IO, Croatia's exclusion of sending troops, and alleged US military dissent), and leveraging recruitment of medically unfit personnel. RF will continue to restrict internal information flow and use domestic arrests/events as IO tools (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze, LGBT repression, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch corruption exposé, Peskov on Telegram scammers, Belgorod casualties, Mitvol's pardon request, Kasatkin extradition refusal, "Nash Vykhod" movement, "Meduza" financial issues, and the sentencing of the Kursk scientist). RF will also continue efforts to project its military capabilities and UAF weakness (Rybar) and legitimize control over occupied territories (Kirienko visits). Concurrently, RF will deepen military-technical cooperation with non-Western partners (DPRK, Myanmar, as evidenced by DPRK's public support and Belousov's visit, and possibly Venezuela as suggested by IO), and use disinformation (e.g., US Navy SEALs in DPRK, Trump "defeat" narrative) to undermine Western credibility. Recent RF IO from Alex Parker Returns, TASS, Colonelcassad, Операция Z, and Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition, including explicit threats, confirms this COA (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Confidence: HIGH
    3. Increased Tactical Aviation Activity and Enhanced Counter-Special Operations/ISR, with Reinforced Border Defenses and Expanded Naval/Aerospace DIB Capabilities: RF will maintain high tactical aviation ISR and strike operations, particularly in the eastern and northeastern sectors (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk air threat, FABs in Sumy), as indicated by the animated strike map. RF will also focus on detecting and neutralizing UAF special operations (e.g., in Dnipro Delta, GUR Black Sea operations) and maritime drone activities (e.g., Lancet strikes against BECs) in the Black Sea and coastal areas, as well as enhance counter-infiltration measures along border regions, especially in the Sumy direction following claims of UAF PVD destruction, and in Chernihiv and Kharkiv Oblasts. The deployment of the "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range will significantly enhance ISR capabilities for these objectives, supported by widespread drone activity observed over RF regions and Crimea, and reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv. In response to perceived NATO threats, RF will implement Medvedev's stated intention to reinforce its borders with Finland and the Baltic states, potentially involving new troop deployments or upgraded surveillance systems, as part of "Zapad-2025" preparations. Development and deployment of training BECs indicate an increased focus on countering/employing maritime drones. Commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic reflects a broader naval strategy. CSTO exercises will continue to be a platform to showcase military capabilities and project strength while accusing NATO of observing. RF will actively seek to intercept UAF drones, as claimed by "Sever V" mobile groups, and continue serial production of drone engines. Rostec's plans for a wide-body aircraft after PD-35 engine completion indicate a long-term strategic aerospace DIB expansion that will support both military and civilian applications (HIGH CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone video directly supports this COA, demonstrating active counter-UAS and ISR/strike capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Confidence: HIGH

  • MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action):

    1. Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: Given recent explicit rhetoric, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration (either a test or a strike in an unpopulated area of Ukraine) remains a low-probability, but extremely high-impact, MDCOA to fundamentally alter the conflict. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
    2. Coordinated Hybrid Attack against NATO Critical Infrastructure: Leveraging the "Zapad-2025" timeframe and Medvedev's rhetoric regarding perceived NATO threat, RF orchestrates a significant, multi-domain hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyber-physical attack, sabotage against energy or communications infrastructure) against a NATO member state on the Eastern Flank, designed to test Article 5 and create severe disruption without direct kinetic military engagement. Confidence: MEDIUM
    3. Massed Air/Missile Strike on Major Urban Center with Civilian/Industrial Infrastructure as Primary Target: RF conducts a coordinated, large-scale air and missile strike utilizing multiple vectors (UAVs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) against a major Ukrainian urban center, specifically targeting residential areas, hospitals, or critical industrial/energy facilities (e.g., Dnipro industrial fire potentially signaling this shift, Zelenskyy's statements on energy retaliation, confirmed Dnipro power outages, Mukachevo Flextronics plant, and the continued fire at the former combine plant in Dnipro) to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic. Confidence: MEDIUM

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

• Ukrainian force posture and readiness:
  • Resilient Defense & Adaptable Air Defense: UAF continues to demonstrate resilience in defending against RF drone and artillery attacks (Nikopol district) and responding to tactical aviation activity. The destruction of an RF Buk M1 SAM system and a Buk-M2 SAM system by UAF UAV highlights effective UAF counter-air capabilities and adaptability. SBU's "Spiderweb" operation indicates proactive efforts to disrupt RF strike capabilities. UAF Air Force maintains operational readiness. New air threat warnings indicate constant vigilance against RF drone activity. The implementation of scheduled power outages in Dnipro due to enemy attacks demonstrates the operational impact of RF strikes but also UAF's ability to manage and mitigate. President Zelenskyy's statement about responding to energy strikes shows proactive strategic intent. The protest in Kyiv against proposed stricter military sentences indicates an internal challenge to soldier welfare and morale that needs careful management and transparent resolution. UAF Special Operations forces destroying a Russian kamikaze drone demonstrates immediate and effective counter-UAS capabilities, indicating a high state of readiness against aerial threats. UAF Air Force reports an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv Oblast, indicating active air defense engagement (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The prolonged industrial fire in Dnipro, a consequence of RF deep strikes, highlights the need for continued robust air defense and civil defense readiness (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Генеральний штаб ЗСУ's operational update indicates continued active defense and readiness (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Effective Special Operations & Precision Strike: The successful evacuation of soldiers from occupied territory, "Buzky Gard" operations in the Dnipro Delta, GUR naval special operations in the Black Sea (destroying boat/radar), "Shadow" unit's drone strike on an underground bunker, the strike on Luhansk artillery depots, and drone strike on an RF soldier highlight high readiness and capability in special reconnaissance, rescue, amphibious, and precision strike missions, demonstrating an ability to operate effectively behind enemy lines and against hardened targets. Night-time precision strikes (Novopavlivka) show advanced capabilities. Interrogation of POWs provides valuable intelligence. Capture of 26 RF personnel by 425th regiment demonstrates strong ground operational capabilities. New UAF drone strike footage neutralizing an RF occupier near the "sea" further reinforces successful tactical drone operations. STERNENKO footage of drone-based destruction of RF assets and personnel ("Rusoriz") confirms ongoing and effective tactical drone operations. The capture of 26 RF occupiers by the "Skelya" regiment is a significant tactical success providing intelligence and increasing exchange funds. The Belarusian POW interview provides valuable tactical and strategic intelligence on RF recruitment and morale. STERNENKO's report on RF drone activity over RF regions is likely a UAF ISR product aimed at informing deep strike planning or publicizing RF vulnerabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE). UAF IO regarding RF propagandist Sladkov highlights an active effort to exploit RF internal dissent and reinforce UAF's own narrative (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The return of a large group of Ukrainian children from occupied territories, as reported by РБК-Україна, implies successful, likely special, humanitarian operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Unwavering Political Will & Diplomatic Proactivity: Leadership maintains a strong stance against aggression (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation, Zelenskyy on China parade, Zelenskyy on non-Russian energy supply for Slovakia) and actively engages international partners to sustain vital support and discuss long-term security. Active discussions on a US drone agreement underway. Slovakia's support for EU accession is a significant diplomatic success, though their non-participation in security guarantees is a setback. Zelenskyy's reiterated commitment to respond to energy strikes and long-term vision on RF oil/gas indicates strong resolve. Fico's rejection of Putin's request for an energy blockade is a positive diplomatic development. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting in Slovakia indicates ongoing high-level engagement. Zelenskyy's opening of the Uzhhorod-Chop railway highlights strategic infrastructure development and EU integration. President Zelenskyy's direct statement to Slovak PM Fico on energy retaliation reinforces political will. The Uzhhorod-Chop railway is a significant strategic infrastructure development, enhancing connectivity with EU. Hungary's stance against Ukraine's EU accession is a diplomatic setback. Zelenskyy's video highlighting the missile strike on the Flextronics plant in Mukachevo serves to galvanize international support by showcasing RF attacks on civilian infrastructure. Zaporizhzhia RMO and Kharkiv OMA participation in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities underscores continued functional governance and a united front. The UAF counter-narrative on the "buffer zone" (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) demonstrates proactive engagement in strategic communications to counter RF justifications for aggression (HIGH CONFIDENCE). OPERATYVNYY ZSU's report on future ERAM missile deliveries highlights ongoing diplomatic success in securing long-term military aid (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Poland's FM Sikorski's statement, while nuanced, confirms sustained political will from a key ally (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Resource Management & DIB: Significant procurement of drones and transport for military units in Zaporizhzhia (over 208 million hryvnias) demonstrates effective resource allocation and ongoing efforts to enhance DIB capabilities. The visit of the Minister of Defense to the front lines further reinforces this. Agreement for joint maritime drone production with the Philippines indicates strategic planning for long-term DIB enhancement. The government launched a support program for 238 frontline communities for the heating season, indicating proactive resource allocation for humanitarian needs. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration's meeting with UNICEF on child welfare demonstrates continued proactive resource management for humanitarian support. АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА's request for donations for military support, while an RF source, indicates continued civilian support for military efforts on both sides (HIGH CONFIDENCE). OPERATYVNYY ZSU's report on future delivery of 840 ERAM missiles from the US by Oct 2026 is a significant, long-term resource acquisition (HIGH CONFIDENCE). ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS reposting this also signifies its importance (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Training & Readiness: Ongoing training of units like the 22nd Mechanized Brigade highlights efforts to maintain combat readiness and integrate new personnel. Focus on soldier mental health (Presidential Brigade) is a positive development for long-term readiness. Individual soldier resilience (Воин DV footage) is high. The protest in Kyiv against stricter military sentences could exacerbate morale issues if not addressed carefully.
  • Commitment to Rule of Law & Governance: The Office of the Prosecutor General's partnership with the Netherlands for war crimes documentation and the successful repatriation of stolen funds demonstrate Ukraine's dedication to accountability, legal processes, and anti-corruption. Regional governance meetings and proactive measures for civilian protection (underground schools in Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih defense council briefings, Dnipropetrovsk OMA participation in congress on frontline needs, Kharkiv OMA participation in Congress) reinforce efforts for internal stability and public trust. Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration's engagement with UNICEF is a good example of transparent governance. The protest in Kyiv regarding military sentences signals ongoing internal debate on military justice, requiring transparent legislative review. KMVA's statement underscores functional governance and communication between regional and national authorities. The return of Ukrainian children from occupied territories reinforces the government's commitment to its citizens (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Recent tactical successes or setbacks:
  • Successes:
    • Special Operations Evacuation: Successful evacuation of four soldiers from occupied territory by Naval Special Reconnaissance Forces. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Kinburn Spit Strikes: Successful drone strikes against enemy military assets on the Kinburn Spit. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Prymorske Infantry Destruction: Successful destruction of RF infantry in Prymorske by 33rd Separate Assault Regiment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Donetsk MLRS Strike: Successful drone strike on RF BM-21 Grad MLRS in Donetsk Oblast. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Dnipro Delta Special Operations: Successful special reconnaissance and fire engagements by "Buzky Gard" in the Dnipro Delta, including drone-guided targeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Buk M1 SAM System Destruction: "Lazar" OSP battalion, 27th Pechenizka Brigade NGU, destroyed an RF Buk M1 (SA-11/17) SAM system on the Donetsk axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • SBU "Spiderweb" Operation: Disruption of RF strike capabilities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • GUR Black Sea Operation: Destruction of enemy boat, radar station, and personnel. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • "Shadow" Unit Bunker Strike: Successful drone strike on an RF underground position/bunker. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Novopavlivka Night Strike: Elimination of 3 RF personnel by "Gr. Pilot" drone. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Luhansk Artillery Depot Strike: Successful UAF strike on artillery depots in Luhansk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Buk-M2 SAM System Destruction: UAF UAV successfully targeted and destroyed a Russian Buk-M2 SAM system. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Personnel Capture: 425th "Skelya" regiment captured 26 RF occupiers. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Soldier Targeted by Drone: Successful drone strike on an RF soldier, as shown in video footage. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • New Drone Strike (Southern Axis): Drone operator from 414th UAV Brigade "Birds of Madyar" neutralized an RF occupier near the "sea." (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Drone-based Destruction of RF Assets/Personnel: STERNENKO footage (re-post) clearly shows drone-based destruction of RF assets and personnel. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • UAF Counter-UAS: Special forces from "Non-Stop" group, "Omega" CSB, destroyed a Russian kamikaze drone. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Diplomatic Engagements: Productive meetings with European leaders (António Costa, Swedish Foreign Minister, Slovak PM Fico) to discuss defense projects and continued support. Discussion of drone agreement with US. Slovakia's support for EU accession. Fico rejecting Putin's energy blockade request. Agreement for another Zelenskyy-Fico meeting. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) President Zelenskyy's statement to Fico on energy retaliation reinforces firm stance. Poland's FM Sikorski's statement offers continued support (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Norway lowering oil price cap continues economic pressure on RF (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Anti-Corruption Win: Successful repatriation of funds stolen by corrupt officials. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • War Crimes Documentation: Partnership with the Netherlands for forensic science and war crimes documentation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Resilience & Adaptation: Construction of underground schools and kindergartens in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk OMA participation in congress on frontline needs, Kharkiv OMA participation in Congress, government support for frontline communities demonstrate proactive adaptation to ensure civilian services and support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Zaporizhzhia RMO meeting with UNICEF on child welfare. KMVA statements on regional synchronization.
    • Command Presence: Minister of Defense visit to Zaporizhzhia frontlines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Drone Procurement: Significant drone procurement for Zaporizhzhia military units. Joint maritime drone production agreement with Philippines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Future delivery of 840 ERAM missiles from US (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Infrastructure Development: Opening of the Uzhhorod – Chop European-gauge railway, linking to EU cities. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Intelligence from POW: Interview with captured Belarusian POW provides valuable intelligence on RF recruitment and conditions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Humanitarian Return: Return of a large group of Ukrainian children from occupied territories. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Setbacks:
    • Civilian Mine Casualty: A boy was killed by a Russian mine in Kherson. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Persistent RF Ground Pressure & Advances: RF continues localized ground offensives (Krasnoarmeysk, Novopavlivka, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction, Pokrovsk area) and cross-border regions, forcing UAF to commit significant resources to defense. DeepState reports RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. RF artillery/drone strikes reported in Dnipropetrovsk region (Nikopol district). RF claims of destroying UAF PVD in Sumy direction (119th TDF in Zelenaya Dibrova, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF claims of beginning assault on Kupyansk (LOW CONFIDENCE) indicate continued pressure on key fronts. RF drone-filmed strikes on buildings and wooded areas (Kharkiv direction) point to ongoing ground pressure (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). DeepState reports RF FPV drone strikes on Slovyansk-Izium highway indicate continued disruption to UAF movement. RF claims of significant destruction of UAF assets near Pokrovsk indicate sustained, heavy fighting on this axis. RF claims to be cutting UAF supply along the Slovyansk-Izium highway, indicating successful interdiction of a key logistical route (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). RF claims destruction of a UAF BBM and personnel in the Kharkiv direction, demonstrating continued offensive capability and inflicting losses (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report on RF FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway further confirms RF's ability to disrupt UAF logistics (HIGH CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone video showcasing strikes on UAF ground assets also indicates battlefield losses (HIGH CONFIDENCE). (HIGH CONFIDENCE for general pressure, MEDIUM for specific RF claims)
    • Deep Strike Vulnerability & Energy/Industrial Sector Impact: The major industrial fire in Dnipro, possibly due to an RF strike, and ongoing FAB launches in Sumy highlight continued vulnerability of critical infrastructure, including industrial sites and border regions, to RF deep strikes. RF claims of destroying an ammunition depot in Kharkiv indicate continued vulnerability of logistics. New air threat warnings for Chernihiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts indicate ongoing air defense challenges. Confirmed scheduled power outages in Dnipro due to enemy attacks are a direct, measurable setback for civilian infrastructure and morale. Zelenskyy's video on the Mukachevo Flextronics plant damage due to an August 21st missile strike serves as a reminder of persistent vulnerabilities and casualties. The ongoing fire in Dnipro highlights current vulnerabilities to RF deep strikes. The confirmation from RF sources that the fire at the former combine plant in Dnipro remains unextinguished after dark underscores the significant impact of the strike and the challenge to extinguish large industrial fires (HIGH CONFIDENCE). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • RF Information Operations Effectiveness: RF propaganda aimed at dehumanizing Ukrainians ("kill Khokhols" videos, "SMO teachers"), militarizing its youth, criminalization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (as seen in Azov criminalization, Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), discrediting cultural figures/journalists (Kateryna Kotrikadze wanted), and historical revisionism (Korelyakov monologue) continues to be a potent threat in the cognitive domain. RF efforts to sow disunity in the West (Trump meme, NYT citation, Fico's statements, anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, Hungarian FM's statement) are also a concern. DPRK's public support for RF, and RF claims of US Navy SEALs failure (disinformation) further bolster RF's narrative. New IO includes: MoD Russia showcasing Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary, leveraging Trump "defeat" narrative (LOW CONFIDENCE), highlighting "Meduza" financial issues, and promoting Putin doubles conspiracy theories (LOW CONFIDENCE). The "Nash Vykhod" movement can also serve RF IO. New IO on Venezuela's military resources and NATO exploiting Finland are further attempts to sow disunity and boost RF's image. Croatia's exclusion from sending troops to Ukraine provides RF with fresh material for its narrative of Western disunity (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF IO on alleged US military dissent is a new attempt to sow discord (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Alex Parker Returns' IO, TASS DIB claims, Colonelcassad's Italy report, Операция Z's Belgium report, and Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's threats are all examples of continued effective RF IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Slovak Withdrawal from Security Guarantees: Slovak PM Fico's statement against participation in security guarantees and his belief in swift conflict resolution are diplomatic setbacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Hungarian Opposition to EU Accession: Hungarian FM Szijjarto explicitly stated Hungary will not support Ukraine's EU accession, a significant diplomatic setback. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Domestic Military Justice Concerns: The protest in Kyiv against Bill 13452, proposing stricter, non-alternative prison sentences for military personnel, indicates a potential internal morale issue and public concern regarding military justice. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • DIB Funding Gap: Confirmed financial shortfall for long-range weapon development. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • POW Numbers: 2577 Ukrainian service members reportedly in Russian captivity, representing a significant challenge for humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Belgium Frozen Assets: Belgium's decision not to transfer frozen RF assets to Ukraine represents a setback in securing financial aid. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
    • Italian Troop Exclusion: Italy's Prime Minister stated Italy will not send troops to Ukraine, adding to the list of EU nations that will not (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Resource requirements and constraints:
  • Air Defense Systems & Ammunition (CRITICAL): Continued RF tactical aviation activity (FABs in Sumy) and potential deep strikes (Dnipro industrial fire, Dnipropetrovsk air threat, confirmed power outages in Dnipro, Mukachevo Flextronics plant, continued fire at Dnipro combine plant) necessitate a constant supply of interceptor missiles and advanced short-range air defense systems to protect both frontline areas and critical infrastructure. The destruction of RF Buk-M1 and Buk-M2 is positive, but air defense for UAF remains paramount, especially with new air threat warnings. The extended range of RF's new "Veter-X" FPV drone increases the demand for effective counter-UAS systems. RF claims of intercepting UAF drones by "Sever V" mobile groups highlights the need for continued UAF air defense upgrades. The successful destruction of a kamikaze drone by UAF highlights the ongoing need for diverse and capable counter-UAS systems. The confirmed presence of an RF reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv highlights the constant threat of aerial ISR and the need for robust air defense across all regions (HIGH CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's video showcasing RF drone operations reinforces the high volume and capability of RF aerial assets, underscoring the critical need for UAF air defense and counter-UAS (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Counter-Artillery Capabilities (CRITICAL): With RF maintaining ground pressure and using precision artillery (Krasnopol, Nikopol district, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction, Sever Group mortar strikes, Pokrovsk area), sustained and effective counter-battery fire is essential. This requires consistent artillery ammunition supply and advanced targeting systems, especially in areas like Donetsk and Dnipropetropavsk. The successful strike on Luhansk artillery depots highlights the effectiveness of UAF counter-battery/deep strike capabilities.
  • Indigenous DIB Funding (CRITICAL): The $6B deficit for rockets remains paramount. Dedicated international funding and technological transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base are crucial to achieve self-reliance and produce long-range missiles, which are essential for strategic depth. Expedited drone agreement with US is a positive step. Significant drone procurement in Zaporizhzhia, while positive, underscores ongoing demand. Joint maritime drone production with Philippines is a long-term positive, but immediate needs for long-range missiles persist. RF's announcement of serial production of drone engines underscores the necessity for Ukraine to bolster its own DIB for competitive advantage. Rostec's plans for a wide-body aircraft (PD-35 engine) indicate RF's long-term DIB ambitions, further emphasizing the need for Ukraine to secure its own DIB capabilities to remain competitive (HIGH CONFIDENCE). OPERATYVNYY ZSU's report on future ERAM missile deliveries is a positive, but long-term, step towards addressing this need (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Counter-UAS & EW Capabilities (HIGH): The proliferation of RF drones, tactical aviation activity, and loitering munitions (Lancets) requires enhanced Counter-UAS systems and Electronic Warfare capabilities to protect ground forces, maritime assets, and critical infrastructure, especially in the context of RF border operations and new air threat warnings. The development of RF's new "Veter-X" FPV drone with 30km+ range further highlights this critical requirement. RF FPV drone activity on Slovyansk-Izium highway and claims of UAF drone interceptions emphasize this need. The destruction of a kamikaze drone by UAF forces underscores the constant demand for effective counter-UAS measures. The widespread reporting of RF drone activity (STERNENKO, UAF Air Force) reinforces the critical need for robust and widespread counter-UAS capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone video indicates the proficiency of RF drone operators, emphasizing the need for UAF counter-UAS measures (HIGH CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report of FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway further highlights the tactical threat posed by RF drones (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Maritime ISR & Strike (HIGH): Given continued RF naval operations and loitering munition threats against BECs, and Russia's development of a training BEC, enhanced maritime ISR and precision strike capabilities are needed to protect coastal/riverine areas and support UAF GUR operations. The joint maritime drone production initiative is a good long-term solution, but immediate needs remain. New UAF drone strike "near the sea" highlights the ongoing need for maritime drone capabilities.
  • Border Security Resources (MEDIUM): RF cross-border operations and reported advances in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions necessitate increased resources for border security, ISR, and rapid response units to prevent buffer zone creation and interdict sabotage groups. FAB launches in Sumy and claims of destroying UAF PVDs (119th TDF in Zelenaya Dibrova) reinforce this need. RF claims of strikes in the "Kharkiv direction" further emphasize this. RF's claims of cutting supply on the Slovyansk-Izium highway and destroying UAF BBM in the Kharkiv direction highlight the persistent pressure on and resource demands for border and eastern frontline security (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). DeepState's report on FPV drone strikes on the Slovyansk-Izium highway underscores the persistent threat to ground LOCs (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Mental Health Support (MEDIUM): Acknowledged combat stress and individual soldier accounts (Воин DV) indicate a need for continued and expanded mental health services for UAF personnel. The protest against stricter military sentences could exacerbate morale issues if not addressed carefully.
  • POW Advocacy & Support (MEDIUM): The high number of Ukrainian POWs (2577) requires sustained international advocacy for their humane treatment and mechanisms for exchange, while also supporting their families. RF's "Nash Vykhod" movement highlights a potential counter-intelligence vulnerability for UAF regarding POW information. The interview with the Belarusian POW provides an opportunity to highlight RF's coercive recruitment tactics and the poor conditions faced by their personnel, which can be leveraged in IO and for future POW exchanges. The return of Ukrainian children from occupied territories by РБК-Україна is a positive development that highlights ongoing humanitarian efforts, but the overall number of POWs remains a constraint (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Demining Efforts (HIGH): The tragic mine incident in Kherson highlights the critical and ongoing need for extensive demining resources and public safety campaigns in liberated and contested areas.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

• Propaganda and disinformation campaigns:
  • RF Objectives:
    • Dehumanization & Youth Militarization: The explicit propaganda showcasing RF youth training to "kill Khokhols," the criminalization of Ukrainian "saboteurs" through show trials (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), criminalization of Azov members, the discrediting of Ukrainian cultural figures/journalists (Kateryna Kotrikadze), Volodin's proposal for "SMO teachers" in schools, and the historical revisionism/hero worship (Korelyakov monologue) directly aim to instill hatred, legitimize aggression, and delegitimize Ukrainian forces among the next generation and wider RF populace. WarGonzo's "insulin" narrative attempts to create a false sense of RF benevolence while subtly dehumanizing Ukrainian soldiers. The Kotsnews poll on European fear of RF also serves to boost domestic morale and project strength. Claims of a failed US Navy SEALs operation in DPRK are likely disinformation aimed at discrediting Western special operations and aligning with DPRK's anti-Western stance. DPRK's public statement of full support for RF is a significant propaganda victory. MoD Russia showcasing Belousov's participation in DPRK's anniversary and emphasizing historical ties serves to normalize and strengthen this alliance. New IO includes showcasing Venezuela's military resources (Два майора), implying NATO is exploiting Finland financially for airfield upgrades, and further highlighting "Meduza" financial difficulties after USAID grant withdrawal. The video of Vostok Group training emphasizes a militaristic ethos (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's mention of "PMC Pegov" and "hotter hotspots" serves to glorify military action and likely dehumanize the enemy (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's direct threat from "The Supreme" (Putin) against EU troops is a highly aggressive and dehumanizing form of propaganda (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Psychological Deterrence (Nuclear & NATO): General Gurulyov's explicit nuclear threat, the President's warning about NATO troops being "legitimate targets," and Medvedev's statements on NATO borders (Finland) continue to be high-impact psychological operations aimed at terrifying the Ukrainian population and deterring Western support. Medvedev's dismissal of Stubb's concerns as "phantom pains" and his outright rejection of security guarantees for Ukraine as "nonsense" attempts to belittle European efforts and sow division. Medvedev's explicit statements on Finland's NATO membership and dismissal of security guarantees from the Finnish border are direct escalations. RF IO on CSTO exercises being watched by NATO aims to project military strength and deter. Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition's post on Putin's threat against EU troops directly amplifies this psychological deterrence (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Demoralization & Division (Mobilization/Conflict Resolution): The "Mogilizatsiya" narrative persists. Fico's statement on swift conflict resolution could be exploited by RF to suggest that international support for a prolonged conflict is waning. Claims about UAF weapon supplies (Rybar) and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland aim to project UAF weakness and demoralize. Reports of recruiting medically unfit individuals could also be used to normalize poor conditions or a "total war" mentality domestically. The fabricated Trump/NYT story aims to sow discord within NATO/Western leadership. The "AZS" claim by Butusov Plus (RF source) indicates RF attempting to use UAF strikes to frame their own lack of response, or to test public opinion. Hungarian FM Szijjarto's statement against Ukraine's EU accession is a significant gain for RF's narrative of Western disunity. Belgium's decision on frozen assets provides further material for RF IO to highlight Western disunity. The "Nash Vykhod" movement, while appearing humanitarian, can serve to manipulate sentiment around POWs and potentially extract information. Croatia's exclusion from sending troops to Ukraine provides RF with additional material to promote narratives of Western disunity and reluctance to engage directly (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The RF IO on alleged US military dissent aims to further demoralize and divide (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Colonelcassad's report on Italy not sending troops and Операция Z's repost of Belgium not transferring frozen assets are clear examples of RF leveraging Western disunity for IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Legitimizing Occupation & Domestic Control: Kirienko's visits to "liberated territories" (Hornyak) and the internal "whitelist" saga for internet services, signal RF's determined efforts to legitimize its control and tightly manage its domestic information space. Declaration of "undesirable" international organizations and the "foreign agents" list reinforce this isolationist policy. The Krasnodar "terrorist" arrest and journalist detention (Kateryna Kotrikadze declared wanted) are framed to justify internal security measures. Domestic repression against LGBT individuals reinforces social conservatism and control. Domestic news (Moscow forum, Nevada murder, musical premiere, inefficient encyclopedia, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch official, failed encyclopedia, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch official corruption exposé, Mitvol's failed appeal) serves to normalize the information space and distract from the war. The migration tax proposal may be part of a broader socio-political strategy to address perceived internal issues. Peskov discussing Telegram scammers indicates subtle internal narrative management. Domestic reports of Belgorod casualties will be used to justify the "SMO" and further aggression. Mironov's statement on car payments is an internal political maneuver to appease domestic audiences. Oleg Mitvol's pardon request and Kasatkin's extradition refusal are domestic legal cases that RF uses to demonstrate rule of law (as they define it). The "Nash Vykhod" movement aids in managing domestic sentiment regarding POWs. Putin's travel to Samara for an engine manufacturing meeting and Rostec's announcement about drone engines are designed to project strength, self-sufficiency, and effective governance. The sentencing of the Kursk scientist for "justifying the invasion" contributes to a climate of fear and self-censorship, reinforcing domestic control (HIGH CONFIDENCE). ASTRA's report on "Max" data collection reinforces concerns about RF surveillance and control (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Projecting Strength/Self-Sufficiency & Anti-Westernism: Promotion of the "import-substituted" SJ-100 aircraft and deployment of Chechen "volunteers" aims to demonstrate RF industrial resilience and sustained manpower despite sanctions. Primakov's historical revisionism on Japan's surrender reinforces anti-Western narratives. Continued engagement with Belarus (Bryansk-Gomel forum), Libya, DPRK, and Myanmar projects regional stability and expands influence. RF actively attempts to portray Western disunity and justify its aggressive posture along NATO borders. The development of a training BEC and commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic aims to project naval capabilities. Claims of "liberating" Kupyansk also project strength, though veracity is questionable. The new "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range presented at EEF projects technological advancement and self-sufficiency. DPRK's public statement of full support is a significant diplomatic and propaganda victory. RF claims of intercepting UAF "Lyutyi" drones by "Sever V" groups projects a strong counter-UAS capability. Rostec's announcement of serial production of drone engines is a key message of self-sufficiency. RF claims of success in "Pokrovsk Battle" also reinforce strength. Rostec's plans for a wide-body aircraft (PD-35 engine) further project long-term technological self-sufficiency (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF claims of cutting UAF supply along the Slovyansk-Izium highway and destruction of UAF BBM/personnel in Kharkiv aim to project operational success and strength (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). TASS statements from Manturov and Putin on Russia's DIB capabilities are central to this objective (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Colonelcassad's post on VEF 2025 promotes economic strength (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • UAF Counter-Narratives:
    • Resolve & Resilience: Statements from President Zelenskyy (on energy retaliation, on China parade, on non-Russian energy supply for Slovakia) and SBU Head Maliuk, alongside continued diplomatic engagement, actively counter RF's demoralization efforts by demonstrating unwavering determination and commitment to victory. Footage of resilient UAF soldiers (Воин DV, Air Force readiness), and successful operations (GUR Black Sea, Shadow unit, Novopavlivka, Luhansk artillery strike, Buk-M2 destruction, Buk-M1 destruction, drone strike on RF soldier, 26 RF personnel captured, new drone strike neutralizing RF occupier, STERNENKO "Rusoriz" footage, kamikaze drone destruction by "Omega" CSB) reinforces this. Zelenskyy's video on the Mukachevo Flextronics plant damage highlights RF's aggression and Ukrainian resilience. The Belarusian POW interview provides direct evidence of RF's coercive recruitment and poor soldier welfare, which can be leveraged to counter RF narratives of a voluntary, well-supported force. UAF IO highlighting propagandist Sladkov's discontent serves to showcase internal RF weakness and hypocrisy (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The return of Ukrainian children from occupied territories (РБК-Україна) serves as a powerful symbol of Ukrainian resilience and commitment to its citizens (HIGH CONFIDENCE). OPERATYVNYY ZSU's report on future ERAM missile deliveries signals long-term resolve (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Генеральний штаб ЗСУ's operational update maintains a narrative of active defense (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Highlighting Operational Successes: Reports of successful special operations evacuations, precision strikes (Kinburn Spit, Prymorske, Donetsk Grad, Dnipro Delta, Buk M1 destruction, Buk-M2 destruction, RF soldier targeted, new drone strike neutralizing RF occupier), effective SBU counter-intelligence (Spiderweb), and capture of RF personnel reinforce UAF's effectiveness and resilience. STERNENKO footage showcases successful drone operations. KMVA's statements reinforce effective governance. The capture of 26 RF occupiers by "Skelya" regiment is a significant, tangible success to highlight. The destruction of an RF kamikaze drone by "Omega" CSB reinforces effective counter-UAS capabilities. STERNENKO's reporting on RF drone activity over RF regions, implicitly by UAF, can be leveraged to highlight UAF's long-range ISR and strike capabilities (HIGH CONFIDENCE). UAF Air Force reporting on an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv, followed by engagement, highlights active defense (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The return of children from occupied territories (РБК-Україна) implies successful humanitarian-intelligence operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Highlighting International Support: Zelenskyy's meetings with international leaders (Costa, Swedish FM) directly counter RF's attempts to fracture unity and demonstrate continued solidarity. Slovakia's support for EU accession is a key success, despite Fico's other statements, and his rejection of Putin's energy blockade request is a positive signal. EU delegation to the US for sanctions work further supports this. Discussions for a US drone agreement are a positive signal. Agreement for joint maritime drone production with Philippines also highlights international collaboration. President Zelenskyy's direct statement to PM Fico on energy retaliation emphasizes international engagement. Zaporizhzhia RMO and Kharkiv OMA participation in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities with national leadership demonstrates continued functional governance, a positive message to international partners. OPERATYVNYY ZSU's report on ERAM missile deliveries highlights concrete international military support (HIGH CONFIDENCE). РБК-Україна's reporting on Norway lowering the oil price cap shows continued economic pressure from international partners (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Transparency, Governance & Accountability: Efforts by regional administrations (Zaporizhzhia OMA, Dnipropetrovsk OMA, Dnipropetrovsk OMA participating in congress on frontline needs, Kharkiv OMA participating in Congress) to address civilian needs (underground schools, regional congresses, reporting on Nikopol district shelling), ensure continuity of services, and combat corruption (repatriation of funds) contribute to public trust and stability. UAF's open training footage and focus on soldier mental health also projects readiness and care. UAF foreign policy on peacekeeping clarifies its sovereign stance. The OPG's partnership with the Netherlands for war crimes documentation reinforces commitment to justice. Local briefings (Kryvyi Rih) further reinforce this. Government support for frontline communities for heating season enhances trust. Opening of Uzhhorod-Chop railway demonstrates progress and EU integration. Zaporizhzhia RMO meeting with UNICEF on child welfare demonstrates transparent and humanitarian governance. The protest in Kyiv regarding military sentences signals ongoing internal debate on military justice, requiring transparent legislative review. The return of Ukrainian children (РБК-Україна) demonstrates a commitment to citizen welfare and transparent governance (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
    • Humanitarian Concerns: Reporting on the number of Ukrainian POWs highlights humanitarian concerns and RF's violations of international law. The mine incident in Kherson highlights the danger RF actions pose to civilians. Confirmed power outages in Dnipro due to enemy attacks emphasize the humanitarian impact of RF strikes. Zelenskyy's video on the Mukachevo plant damage highlights civilian casualties. The ongoing fire in Dnipro further underscores humanitarian impact of potential RF strikes. The Belarusian POW interview, highlighting poor conditions and coercion, can be leveraged to raise international humanitarian concerns about RF treatment of its own personnel. The return of Ukrainian children from occupied territories (РБК-Україна) highlights the humanitarian impact of the conflict and the efforts to mitigate it (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Public sentiment and morale factors:
  • Ukrainian Public (RESILIENT, but STRESSED & VIGILANT): UAF's operational successes (GUR Black Sea, Shadow unit, Novopavlivka, Luhansk strike, Buk-M2 destruction, Buk-M1 destruction, drone strike on RF soldier, 26 RF personnel captured, new drone strike neutralizing RF occupier, STERNENKO "Rusoriz" footage, kamikaze drone destruction by "Omega" CSB), and leadership's firm stance (Zelenskyy on energy retaliation, China parade, non-Russian energy for Slovakia) bolster morale. However, the explicit nuclear threats, persistent RF ground pressure, deep strikes (Dnipro fire, FABs in Sumy, Nikopol district shelling, confirmed power outages in Dnipro, Mukachevo Flextronics plant, and the continued fire at Dnipro combine plant), reported RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk/Kharkiv, the criminalization/dehumanization of Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), and the high number of POWs create significant stress and uncertainty. The dehumanizing rhetoric against "Khokhols" and Azov will undoubtedly fuel outrage and resolve, but also adds to the psychological burden. RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, if believed, would likely cause further frustration. The tragic mine incident in Kherson will undoubtedly cause public anger and grief. Continued proactive measures for civilian protection (underground schools, Dnipropetrovsk congress on frontline needs, Kharkiv Congress, government heating support, Zaporizhzhia RMO meeting with UNICEF), soldier welfare (combat stress awareness), and strong governance (anti-corruption, regional congresses) help mitigate fear and reinforce trust. Opening of the railway to EU is a significant morale boost for integration. The protest in Kyiv against stricter military sentences indicates an internal dynamic that could impact military morale and public trust if not handled carefully. The ongoing fire in Dnipro will likely contribute to public anxiety about RF deep strikes. The news of 26 RF captures and a POW interview offers a morale boost by demonstrating UAF effectiveness and exposing RF weaknesses. Croatia's decision not to send troops may be a minor demoralizing factor, but UAF IO highlighting RF internal dissent (Sladkov) offers a counter-balancing morale boost (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The report of an enemy reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv indicates continued vigilance and engagement, contributing to a sense of active defense (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The return of a large group of Ukrainian children (РБК-Україна) will be a significant morale boost (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The news of future ERAM missile deliveries will also provide long-term confidence (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Russian Public (MANAGED & INDOCTRINATED): RF's tight control over the internet and information flow, coupled with aggressive propaganda (including youth militarization, glorification of Krasnoarmeysk "liberators," "volunteer" deployments, anti-Western historical narratives, "terrorist" arrests, and suppression of dissent), likely maintains a managed level of support. The narrative of "liberated territories" (Kirienko visits), DIB self-sufficiency (SJ-100, "Veter-X" FPV drone, serial production of drone engines, wide-body aircraft plans), and successful operations (claims of Kupyansk assault, claims of UAF PVD destruction in Sumy, claims of UAF bunker destruction, drone-filmed strikes in Kharkiv direction, "Pokrovsk Battle" claims, Vostok Group training, cutting supply on Slovyansk-Izium highway, destruction of BBM in Kharkiv direction) aims to reinforce a sense of achievement and justification for the war. Domestic news about local issues (migration tax, Kerch official, failed encyclopedia, pension fund fraud warnings, LGBT repression, Mitvol's failed appeal, Mironov on car payments) helps to fill the information space with non-military content. Medvedev's rhetoric on NATO borders aims to rally nationalist support. The significant number of appeals to Putin's niece's foundation suggests a degree of internal strain and need for support, which RF is attempting to address. Integration of "SMO teachers" aims to further normalize the war and create nationalistic fervor. Peskov discussing Telegram scammers is a subtle message that state actors are in control of information even on independent platforms. Reports of Belgorod casualties will be used to reinforce the narrative of Ukrainian aggression and justify the conflict. The Kotsnews poll on European fear of RF also reinforces a strong domestic image of national power. Oleg Mitvol's pardon request and Kasatkin's extradition refusal are domestic legal cases that RF uses for internal consumption. The "Nash Vykhod" movement helps manage domestic sentiment regarding POWs. Putin's travel to Samara highlights the importance of domestic industrial efforts for the war. The sentencing of the Kursk scientist for "justifying the invasion" contributes to a climate of fear and self-censorship, reinforcing domestic control (HIGH CONFIDENCE). АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА's call for donations indicates public engagement in supporting the war, reinforcing collective morale (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Alex Parker Returns' IO on Putin's shrewdness, TASS's DIB claims, and Colonelcassad's VEF 2025 post all aim to boost public confidence and morale in the RF leadership and war effort (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Дневник Десантника🇷🇺's video of soldiers with the caption "victory will be ours" is explicit morale-boosting content (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• International support and diplomatic developments:
  • Sustained Diplomatic Engagement: High-level meetings and continued discussions on security guarantees and military aid (EU delegation to US for sanctions, US drone agreement discussions, Zelenskyy-Fico meetings) underscore persistent international political will to support Ukraine. Slovakia's continued rejection of an energy blockade request from Putin is a positive, but their other positions (against security guarantees, swift conflict resolution) introduce nuance. Zelenskyy's firm stance on non-Russian energy to Slovakia is a key diplomatic signal. Opening of the Uzhhorod-Chop railway demonstrates tangible steps toward EU integration. OPERATYVNYY ZSU's report on future ERAM missile deliveries highlights concrete diplomatic and military support (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Poland's FM Sikorski's statement indicates continued, though cautious, diplomatic backing (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Norway lowering oil price cap continues coordinated international economic pressure (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Challenges of Unity/Conditionality (INCREASED): While new EU sanctions are positive, the nuances of international military support (e.g., Slovenia's conditional troop deployment) suggest potential for RF exploitation of divisions. Hungary's stance on EU accession talks for Ukraine and its claims of "secret oil purchases" remain a point of contention and potential RF leverage. Fico's statements align with RF narratives and highlight existing divisions within the EU/NATO. RF IO is actively trying to amplify these divisions through narratives like the fabricated Trump/NYT story and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland. Hungarian FM Szijjarto's explicit statement against Ukraine's EU accession is a significant challenge to EU unity and Ukraine's aspirations. Belgium's decision not to transfer frozen RF assets to Ukraine further highlights internal divisions and challenges in aid. RF IO on Finland's airfield modernization funding and Venezuela's military resources aim to further exacerbate perceived Western divisions and highlight alternative global alliances. Croatia's exclusion from sending troops to Ukraine contributes to the narrative of conditional and fragmented international support, a diplomatic setback (HIGH CONFIDENCE). RF IO on alleged US military dissent aims to further exploit perceived Western weaknesses and divisions (HIGH CONFIDENCE). РБК-Україна's report on Google fine/Trump threats indicates potential for internal Western friction (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Italy's exclusion of sending troops further underscores these challenges (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Belgium's confirmed decision not to transfer frozen assets (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS, Операция Z) is a direct challenge to international financial support for Ukraine (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
  • Increased Vigilance on Eastern Flank (PERSISTING): "Zapad-2025" and past drone violations keep NATO's Eastern Flank on high alert for RF provocations. Medvedev's visit to the Finnish border and warnings indicate RF perceives increased NATO activity and is reacting aggressively, raising regional tensions. Medvedev's dismissal of security guarantees for Ukraine is a direct challenge to Western resolve. Medvedev's explicit statements on Finland's NATO membership and dismissal of security guarantees directly escalate tensions. RF IO highlighting NATO observing CSTO exercises suggests a continued focus on deterrence on the Eastern Flank.
  • Renewed Focus on Hybrid Threats & Accountability: The EU's work on sanctions and discussions around border security indicate an international focus on countering RF's multi-domain hybrid aggression. The dehumanizing rhetoric (youth training) and criminalization of POWs/civilians will likely further solidify international condemnation. Ukraine's clear stance on peacekeeping contingents provides clarity for international partners. The OPG-Netherlands partnership signifies international commitment to legal accountability for war crimes. UK cabinet reshuffle is a notable, albeit external, geopolitical development. RF deepening ties with DPRK and Myanmar indicates a broader geopolitical shift and challenge to the international order. DPRK's public statement of full support for RF is a notable development in shaping the international geopolitical landscape, confirming a growing anti-Western bloc. Belousov's visit to DPRK further solidifies military-diplomatic ties with non-Western partners. Zelenskyy's visit to the Mukachevo plant, highlighting the 21 AUG missile strike, will serve to rally international condemnation of RF targeting of civilian/industrial infrastructure.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

• Most likely enemy courses of action (MLCOA):

  1. Sustained, Attritional Ground Offensives with Emphasis on New Axes, Consolidation, and Buffer Zone Creation, Coupled with Expanded Industrial/Energy Strikes: RF will continue methodical, attritional ground assaults in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (including Nikopol district), alongside persistent pressure on Siversk, Novopavlovka (Krasnoarmeysk direction), Kupyansk, and the Pokrovsk area. Reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts suggest an expansion of offensive axes. Active cross-border special forces operations in Chernihiv, Sumy (including continued FAB launches and efforts to destroy UAF PVDs, as claimed in Zelenaya Dibrova), and Kharkiv will intensify to create "buffer zones" and destroy UAF logistics. The observed training of Vostok Group units in assaulting mock strongholds confirms preparation for these offensive operations (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The objective remains to wear down UAF defenses, consolidate control, and integrate newly seized territories. Deep strikes against critical infrastructure, including an expanded focus on industrial targets (as potentially indicated by the Dnipro fire, now confirmed power outages due to enemy attacks, Mukachevo Flextronics plant, and the continued fire at the former combine plant in Dnipro) and energy facilities (Zelenskyy's statement), will continue, using various means including FABs, precision artillery (Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka direction, Sever Group mortar strikes), and drone attacks. RF will prioritize precision strikes against UAF defensive positions (claims of striking building/wooded areas in Kharkiv direction, Pokrovsk claims, and destruction of BBM/personnel in Kharkiv direction). RF FPV drone operations will continue to target UAF positions and logistics on key axes like Slovyansk-Izium highway, utilizing new capabilities like the "Veter-X" FPV drone, and will continue interdicting UAF supply on the Slovyansk-Izium highway as claimed (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE). Recent MoD Russia drone video and DeepState FPV reports reinforce the immediate likelihood of these actions (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Confidence: HIGH
  2. Intensified Hybrid Warfare with Deepening Nuclear Coercion, Aggressive Dehumanization, and Legal/Information Warfare to Fracture Western Unity and Project Strength, and Strengthen Non-Western Alliances: RF will amplify highly escalatory rhetoric (including nuclear threats, "legitimate targets" for NATO troops), coupled with increased cyberattacks and border provocations against Ukraine and NATO's Eastern Flank during "Zapad-2025" and along the Finnish/Baltic borders, as indicated by Medvedev's statements and visit. Propaganda will intensify to dehumanize Ukrainians ("SMO teachers," "kill Khokhols" videos, Azov criminalization, discrediting cultural figures/journalists like Kotrikadze), militarize RF youth, criminalize captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians through show trials (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), and utilize historical revisionism (Korelyakov monologue), while simultaneously promoting narratives of Western disunity (e.g., Trump/NYT disinformation, Fico's statements on security guarantees/conflict resolution, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, Hungarian FM's statements on Ukraine's EU accession, Belgium's frozen assets decision, NATO exploiting Finland IO, Croatia's exclusion of sending troops, and alleged US military dissent), and leveraging recruitment of medically unfit personnel. RF will continue to restrict internal information flow and use domestic arrests/events as IO tools (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze, LGBT repression, pension fund fraud warnings, Kerch corruption exposé, Peskov on Telegram scammers, Belgorod casualties, Mitvol's pardon request, Kasatkin extradition refusal, "Nash Vykhod" movement, "Meduza" financial issues, and the sentencing of the Kursk scientist). RF will also continue efforts to project its military capabilities and UAF weakness (Rybar) and legitimize control over occupied territories (Kirienko visits). Concurrently, RF will deepen military-technical cooperation with non-Western partners (DPRK, Myanmar, as evidenced by DPRK's public support and Belousov's visit, and possibly Venezuela as suggested by IO), and use disinformation (e.g., US Navy SEALs in DPRK, Trump "defeat" narrative) to undermine Western credibility. Recent statements from Alex Parker Returns, TASS, Colonelcassad, Операция Z, and Poddubny |Z|О|V| edition, including direct threats against EU troops, indicate this COA is actively being pursued (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Confidence: HIGH 3. Increased Tactical Aviation Activity and Enhanced Counter-Special Operations/ISR, with Reinforced Border Defenses and Expanded Naval/Aerospace DIB Capabilities: RF will maintain high tactical aviation ISR and strike operations, particularly in the eastern and northeastern sectors (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk air threat, FABs in Sumy), as indicated by the animated strike map. RF will also focus on detecting and neutralizing UAF special operations (e.g., in Dnipro Delta, GUR Black Sea operations) and maritime drone activities (e.g., Lancet strikes against BECs) in the Black Sea and coastal areas, as well as enhance counter-infiltration measures along border regions, especially in the Sumy direction following claims of UAF PVD destruction, and in Chernihiv and Kharkiv Oblasts. The deployment of the "Veter-X" FPV drone with extended range will significantly enhance ISR capabilities for these objectives, supported by widespread drone activity observed over RF regions and Crimea, and reconnaissance UAV in Mykolaiv. In response to perceived NATO threats, RF will implement Medvedev's stated intention to reinforce its borders with Finland and the Baltic states, potentially involving new troop deployments or upgraded surveillance systems, as part of "Zapad-2025" preparations. Development and deployment of training BECs indicate an increased focus on countering/employing maritime drones. Commissioning of "Ivan Papanin" for Arctic reflects a broader naval strategy. CSTO exercises will continue to be a platform to showcase military capabilities and project strength while accusing NATO of observing. RF will actively seek to intercept UAF drones, as claimed by "Sever V" mobile groups, and continue serial production of drone engines. Rostec's plans for a wide-body aircraft after PD-35 engine completion indicate a long-term strategic aerospace DIB expansion that will support both military and civilian applications (HIGH CONFIDENCE). MoD Russia's drone video further confirms the ongoing nature of this COA (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Confidence: HIGH

• Most dangerous enemy courses of action (MDCOA):

  1. Tactical Nuclear Demonstration: Given recent explicit rhetoric, a low-yield tactical nuclear demonstration (either a test or a strike in an unpopulated area of Ukraine) remains a low-probability, but extremely high-impact, MDCOA to fundamentally alter the conflict. Confidence: LOW (but extreme impact)
  2. Coordinated Hybrid Attack against NATO Critical Infrastructure: Leveraging the "Zapad-2025" timeframe and Medvedev's rhetoric regarding perceived NATO threat, RF orchestrates a significant, multi-domain hybrid attack (e.g., large-scale cyber-physical attack, sabotage against energy or communications infrastructure) against a NATO member state on the Eastern Flank, designed to test Article 5 and create severe disruption without direct kinetic military engagement. Confidence: MEDIUM
  3. Massed Air/Missile Strike on Major Urban Center with Civilian/Industrial Infrastructure as Primary Target: RF conducts a coordinated, large-scale air and missile strike utilizing multiple vectors (UAVs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) against a major Ukrainian urban center, specifically targeting residential areas, hospitals, or critical industrial/energy facilities (e.g., Dnipro industrial fire potentially signaling this shift, Zelenskyy's statements on energy retaliation, confirmed Dnipro power outages, Mukachevo Flextronics plant, and the continued fire at the former combine plant in Dnipro) to maximize civilian casualties and induce panic. Confidence: MEDIUM

• Timeline estimates and decision points:

  • Immediate (0-24 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Assess the impact of dehumanizing propaganda, tactical aviation activity (FABs in Sumy, new air threat warnings, animated strike map, Mykolaiv reconnaissance UAV), and precision artillery/drone strikes (Nikopol district, drone strike on RF soldier, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka, Sever Group mortar strikes, strikes in Kharkiv direction, Slovyansk-Izium FPV strikes, Pokrovsk claims, Kharkiv BBM/personnel destruction, MoD Russia drone video). Evaluate UAF responses to ground offensives on new axes, especially reported advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, and cross-border incursions in Sumy/Chernihiv/Kharkiv. Continue to utilize domestic arrests and "foreign agent" designations for IO purposes, including the Kursk scientist sentencing. Monitor Western reactions to "legitimate targets" rhetoric for NATO troops and Fico's statements on security guarantees, Croatia's troop exclusion, and alleged US military dissent, Italy's troop exclusion, Belgium's frozen assets decision. Execute Lancet strikes against UAF maritime drones. Continue developing training BECs. Respond to UAF Luhansk strike and Buk-M1/Buk-M2 destruction with counter-IO. Amplify claims of Kupyansk assault and UAF PVD/bunker destruction, and claims of cutting supply on Slovyansk-Izium highway. Continue diplomatic engagements with non-Western partners (DPRK, Myanmar, Venezuela) and leverage their public support (DPRK, Belousov's visit). Continue promoting new DIB developments (Veter-X drone, serial drone engine production, wide-body aircraft plans, Manturov/Putin statements on DIB strength) and claims of UAF drone interceptions. Putin's trip to Samara indicates a focus on domestic industrial capability assessments. Manage messaging around Dnipro industrial fire, claiming UAF incompetence or justifying the strike. Continue with aggressive rhetoric regarding EU troop deployments.
    • UAF Decision Point: Publicly condemn RF youth militarization propaganda, criminalization of POWs/civilians, and Medvedev's escalatory rhetoric, particularly regarding Finland and "security guarantees," and Putin's threats against EU troops. Expedite BDA for Dnipro industrial fire and allocate air defense assets accordingly, especially in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Mykolaiv given new warnings and reconnaissance UAV, and in Dnipro due to confirmed power outages and the ongoing fire at the former combine plant. Reinforce defenses on new RF offensive axes (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Krasnoarmeysk, Novopavlivka, Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka, Pokrovsk, Slovyansk-Izium highway) and against cross-border incursions, particularly in Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv. Maintain high alert for tactical aviation in the east/northeast. Continue special operations in Dnipro Delta and Black Sea, and deep strikes (e.g., Luhansk). Exploit success of Buk M1 and Buk-M2 destruction by further targeting RF air defense gaps. Publicly address Fico's statements and emphasize Ukraine's long-term energy strategy (non-Russian, as stated by Zelenskyy). Leverage successful capture of 26 RF personnel and drone strike on RF soldier in IO. Accelerate demining efforts and public safety warnings in Kherson and other liberated areas. Promote the Uzhhorod-Chop railway as a symbol of integration and resilience. Address the protest in Kyiv regarding military sentences carefully and transparently. Use Zelenskyy's video on the Mukachevo plant to highlight RF targeting of civilian infrastructure. Continue STERNENKO's "Rusoriz" operations and leverage his drone activity reports for counter-IO. Leverage the Belarusian POW interview to expose RF's coercive recruitment and poor soldier welfare. Highlight UAF's destruction of an RF kamikaze drone. Counter RF "buffer zone" narrative with ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS assessment. Exploit RF propagandist Sladkov's complaints for IO. Monitor and prepare responses to RF claims of tactical successes (Slovyansk-Izium, Kharkiv). Leverage the return of Ukrainian children for IO and humanitarian purposes. Emphasize the long-term commitment of allies through ERAM missile deliveries. Maintain transparency via Генеральний штаб ЗСУ operational updates.
    • International Decision Point: NATO and EU states to issue strong, unified condemnations of RF's dehumanizing rhetoric, nuclear threats, "legitimate target" warnings for NATO troops, Medvedev's aggressive border rhetoric and dismissal of security guarantees, and RF's deepening military ties with DPRK and Myanmar (including DPRK's public support, Belousov's visit, and any potential ties to Venezuela), and Putin's threats against EU troops. Address Fico's statements regarding security guarantees, Hungarian FM's statement on EU accession, Belgium's decision on frozen assets, Croatia's exclusion of sending troops, and Italy's exclusion of sending troops. Advance discussions on US drone agreement and UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration. Acknowledge and condemn the Krasnodar "terrorist" framing, the Kursk scientist sentencing, and the Kherson mine casualty. Condemn RF's digital surveillance capabilities (Max). Continue to implement and assess impact of oil price caps (Norway).
  • Short-Term (24-72 hours):
    • RF Decision Point: Evaluate Western response to dehumanization, nuclear threats, and "legitimate target" rhetoric; tailor further IO accordingly. Continue "Zapad-2025" preparations with potential for increased border incidents with Belarus, Finland, and Baltic states (following Medvedev's visit). Reinforce air defense networks after Buk M1 and Buk-M2 loss. Assess the effectiveness of recruitment of medically unfit personnel. Continue to deepen foreign military relations (Libya, DPRK, Myanmar, potentially Venezuela). Refine BEC development and training. Continue Kirienko's visits to occupied territories. Monitor the effectiveness of newly announced serial production of drone engines. Continue Vostok Group training and push ground offensives, especially around Kharkiv and Donetsk. Intensify efforts to disrupt UAF logistics. Further promote DIB achievements. Continue to use PMCs in "hotter hotspots".
    • UAF Decision Point: Actively counter RF dehumanization narratives with transparent communication on war crimes and international law, as well as the Geneva Conventions regarding POWs (especially given the 2577 reported POWs, and leverage the Belarusian POW interview). Intensify diplomatic efforts for DIB funding and air defense. Continue to highlight operational successes and soldier resilience. Publicize war crimes documentation efforts with international partners. Develop specific counter-IO strategies to address Fico's statements and RF claims of UAF weapon weakness, and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, and Hungarian FM's statement on EU accession, and Belgium's decision on frozen assets, and Croatia's stance, and Italy's stance. Continue drone procurement and integration in front-line operations (Zaporizhzhia), and advance joint maritime drone production with Philippines. Dnipropetrovsk OMA and Kharkiv OMA to implement measures from congress on frontline needs. Publicize government support for heating season preparations. Engage with the protesters in Kyiv and conduct a transparent review of Bill 13452, considering its impact on military morale and recruitment. Continue humanitarian efforts for children's return. Prepare for future ERAM missile integration.
    • International Decision Point: EU to make progress on the new sanctions package, addressing any divisions (e.g., Hungary's claims) and countering RF IO regarding Western disunity and Fico's statements. Member states to coordinate responses to potential Zapad-2025 provocations, especially along the Eastern Flank, particularly in light of Medvedev's border visit. International bodies to condemn RF's recruitment practices (medically unfit, as exemplified by Belarusian POW), domestic repression (Yamal janitor, Kateryna Kotrikadze, LGBT repression, Mitvol's failed appeal, Kursk scientist sentencing, Max data collection), militarization of education ("SMO teachers"), and deepening military cooperation with rogue states (DPRK, Myanmar, including DPRK's public support, Belousov's visit, and any potential ties to Venezuela). Reinforce message on the illegitimacy of RF DIB claims.
  • Mid-Term (1-2 weeks):
    • RF Decision Point: Execute "Zapad-2025" exercises, potentially incorporating more aggressive hybrid scenarios and testing of NATO border responses along the Finnish and Baltic borders. Consolidate gains and administrative control in occupied Ukrainian territories and buffer zones, including recently advanced areas in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv, and any claimed advances in Kupyansk. Continue to develop long-term DIB capabilities, including aerospace. Sustain pressure on UAF logistics and industrial targets.
    • UAF Decision Point: Implement enhanced anti-corruption measures and public transparency to maintain public trust. Integrate new Western military aid (if secured) and indigenous production (e.g., from US drone agreement, UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration) into operational planning. Prioritize development of counter-IO strategies to address RF youth militarization, criminalization narratives, disinformation about UAF capabilities, Fico's rhetoric, claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, and Hungarian FM's statements. Continue efforts to harden civilian infrastructure like schools and expand mental health support for soldiers. Intensify international pressure for POW exchanges. Expand demining and UXO clearance operations. Finalize legislative review of Bill 13452, prioritizing long-term military morale and public trust.
    • International Decision Point: NATO to reassess its Eastern Flank posture post-Zapad-2025, specifically considering Medvedev's threats and the new RF ties to DPRK/Myanmar. Countries with conditional troop deployment stances (e.g., Slovenia, Croatia, Italy) may engage in further discussions. Western nations should publicly address RF's internal repression tactics and its dehumanizing rhetoric. Support further international collaboration on war crimes documentation. Reaffirm strong, unified stance against RF on security guarantees for Ukraine.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS:

• CRITICAL (PERSISTING): What is the definitive cause and BDA of the major industrial fire in Dnipro? Is this the start of a new RF campaign targeting industrial infrastructure, specifically industrial production and storage? (REMAINS CRITICAL - cause unconfirmed, but target type confirmed by RF sources)
• HIGH: What is the specific impact of RF interdiction efforts on the Slovyansk-Izium highway on UAF logistics? Is RF achieving sustained disruption or merely localized harassment? (NEW - but information from DeepState confirms active FPV strikes, narrowing the gap on RF capability but not full impact)
• HIGH (PERSISTING): What is the definitive NATO/Polish assessment of RF intent behind the 04 SEP drone violation of Polish airspace? What specific response actions have been taken?
• MEDIUM: What are the detailed capabilities of the RF "Vostok Group" as demonstrated in recent training, and what does this indicate for their future deployment and mission profiles? (NEW)
• MEDIUM: Can the RF claims of destroying UAF BBM and personnel in the Kharkiv direction be independently verified? What is the specific location and significance of this claimed strike? (NEW)
• MEDIUM (PERSISTING): Can the effects of SBU "Operation Spiderweb" be independently verified? What is the quantifiable impact on RF strike sortie rates or effectiveness?
• LOW: What are the specific locations and activities of "PMC Pegov" mentioned by Poddubny |Z|O|V| edition? (NEW)
• PERSISTING: What is the definitive ground truth of RF control in Novoselivka (Dnipropetrovsk) and Novoselovka (Zaporizhzhia)?

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Immediate & Robust Counter-Propaganda Against Dehumanization, Criminalization, Alliance Fracture, and Non-Western Alignment: Launch a comprehensive, international public diplomacy campaign to expose and condemn RF's militarization of youth ("SMO teachers"), dehumanization of Ukrainians ("Khokhol" rhetoric, discrediting cultural figures/journalists like Kotrikadze, Azov criminalization), the criminalization of captured Ukrainian defenders/civilians (Krasnodar "terrorist" plot), their efforts to sow discord within the Western alliance (e.g., Fico's statements, Trump/NYT disinformation, RF claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland, Hungarian FM's statement on EU accession, Belgium's decision on frozen assets, NATO exploiting Finland IO, Croatia's exclusion of sending troops, and alleged US military dissent, Italy's exclusion of sending troops), and their deepening military ties with rogue states (DPRK, Myanmar, including DPRK's public support, Belousov's visit, and potential ties to Venezuela). This campaign must highlight war crimes, violations of international law (Geneva Conventions, recruitment of medically unfit as evidenced by POW interview, targeting of journalists, LGBT repression, mine warfare against civilians, targeting of industrial facilities like Mukachevo Flextronics, and the Kursk scientist sentencing, and RF's digital surveillance capabilities as exposed by ASTRA), and the psychological warfare implications, targeting both international and, where possible, Russian domestic audiences. Leverage recent UAF diplomatic meetings to amplify this message, and use Zelenskyy's recent strong statements, the Belarusian POW's testimony, the return of Ukrainian children, and RF propagandist Sladkov's discontent as a launchpad. (CRITICAL)
2. Enhanced Air Defense & ISR for Dnipro and Eastern/Northeastern/Southern Axes; Exploit RF Air Defense Gaps; Prioritize Counter-Artillery & Demining: Immediately prioritize additional mobile air defense systems and advanced ISR assets to protect Dnipro and critical industrial/energy infrastructure, especially given the recent industrial fire, the renewed air threat in Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Mykolaiv Oblasts (new warnings and reconnaissance UAV), and confirmed power outages in Dnipro due to enemy attacks and the ongoing fire at the former combine plant. Simultaneously, bolster air defense and Counter-UAS capabilities on the eastern and northeastern axes in response to increased RF tactical aviation activity and cross-border operations, especially in light of reported RF advances in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts and RF claims of an assault on Kupyansk. Special attention must be given to countering RF's new long-range FPV drone ("Veter-X") and existing FPV activity on the Slovyansk-Izium highway. Exploit the proven destruction of the RF Buk M1 and Buk-M2 SAM systems by further targeting other RF air defense assets and re-evaluating their coverage gaps. The destruction of an RF kamikaze drone by UAF "Omega" CSB should be studied to refine counter-UAS TTPs. Continue to prioritize counter-battery fire, leveraging successes like the Luhansk artillery depot strike and targeting newly identified active positions (Konstantinovka/Druzhkovka, Sever Group mortar positions, Pokrovsk area). Critically, immediately allocate extensive resources for demining and UXO clearance in liberated areas, particularly Kherson, with concurrent public safety campaigns to prevent further civilian casualties. (CRITICAL)
3. Accelerate Counter-Special Operations, Maritime/Riverine Security, and Border/Logistical Defense on Eastern Flank: Increase ISR and rapid response capabilities along the Black Sea coast and in the Dnipro Delta to counter RF naval drone threats (e.g., Lancet strikes) and protect UAF special operations (e.g., GUR operations). Invest in faster, more resilient maritime drone platforms and coastal/riverine defense systems, in anticipation of RF developing training BECs. Concurrently, reinforce border security in Chernihiv, Sumy (following claims of UAF PVD destruction, specifically the 119th TDF in Zelenaya Dibrova), and Kharkiv Oblasts with additional personnel, ISR, and rapid response units to counter RF buffer zone efforts and interdict sabotage groups, especially in response to claims of ammunition depot destruction and FAB launches, DeepState reports of RF advances, and RF claims of destroying BBM/personnel in Kharkiv direction. Prioritize ISR and interdiction efforts against RF attempts to disrupt logistics along key routes like the Slovyansk-Izium highway, as confirmed by DeepState FPV reports. Leverage successful UAF drone strikes on underground positions and individual soldiers to inform targeting of similar RF assets. (HIGH)
4. Sustain Diplomatic Pressure for DIB Funding and Security Guarantees; Expedite Drone Agreement & Maritime Drone Collaboration; Leverage Infrastructure Development: Leverage recent high-level diplomatic engagements (including the EU delegation to the US for sanctions and the US drone agreement discussions, Zelenskyy-Fico meetings, and the UAF-Philippines maritime drone collaboration agreement) to secure concrete commitments for long-term funding and technology transfer for Ukraine's defense industrial base, particularly for rocket and missile production, to address the stated funding gap. RF's announcement of serial production of drone engines and its long-term aerospace plans underscores the urgency for Ukraine to strengthen its own DIB. Push for expedited security guarantees, working to mitigate the impact of Fico's statements while highlighting his positive stance against an energy blockade, and reaffirming unified international support despite public statements from countries like Croatia and Italy. The US drone agreement is a critical step and should be finalized swiftly, building on the significant drone procurement already observed in Zaporizhzhia, and the future ERAM missile deliveries. Publicly promote the opening of the Uzhhorod-Chop railway as a tangible success of European integration and a strategic logistical asset, demonstrating progress despite conflict. (HIGH)
5. Strengthen Public Trust Through Transparency, Governance, and POW Advocacy; Address Internal Military Justice Concerns: Continue to address internal governance challenges and pursue anti-corruption efforts transparently, especially building on the successful repatriation of stolen funds. This will be crucial to maintain public confidence and national unity amidst RF's aggressive information operations. Advocate vigorously through international legal channels for the proper treatment and exchange of all Ukrainian prisoners of war, directly countering RF's efforts to criminalize them and highlighting the reported 2577 POWs and 26 newly captured RF personnel. The Belarusian POW's testimony should be disseminated to support advocacy efforts. Emphasize UAF commitment to soldier mental health and publicly acknowledge soldier resilience under fire, as well as the continued operational readiness of UAF Air Force. Counter RF claims about UAF weapon supplies (Rybar) and claims of anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland with verifiable data and operational successes. Expand collaboration with international partners on forensic science and war crimes documentation. Publicly support and showcase local initiatives like underground schools and community defense efforts, including Dnipropetrovsk OMA and Kharkiv OMA efforts for frontline needs, and government support for heating season preparations. Crucially, engage in transparent public dialogue and legislative review regarding Bill 13452 (stricter military sentences) to address soldier and public concerns, ensuring that justice is balanced with morale and retention needs. Counter RF's leveraging of the "Nash Vykhod" movement with transparent information on POWs and a focus on humanitarian treatment. (MEDIUM)

//END REPORT//